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ANDRÉ LIEBICH

BETWEEN IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA

The Politics and Philosophy of August Cieszkowski

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ANDRÉ LIEBICH

July 1978

INTRODUCTION

I

Nineteenth-century European intellectual history has given rise to such varied and abundant research that one is surprised to find certain important problems long identified and yet still relatively unexplored. Such is the case for certain aspects of the crucial transition from Hegel to Marx, for minority tendencies among French socialists and for the Messianic phenomenon, national and religious, so central to the period, particularly in Eastern Europe, and so rarely studied in detail. Certainly, these lacunae are exemplified by the absence of any comprehensive work on August Cieszkowski whose overall contribution to the history of the period may be marginal but whose specific role in each of the areas mentioned is both significant in itself and illustrative of certain wider problems.

Cieszkowski first achieved recognition as the author of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* in 1838. This short tract never became popular among the Berlin Hegelians for whom it was intended but it affected a number of radical intellectuals outside their circle. His next work, *Gott und Palingenesie*, was a defense of personal immortality against Hegelian revisionism. The following year, however, he founded the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* as a bulwark of the Hegelian school against external critics and internal dissolution.

Throughout the 1840's France provided the framework for much of Cieszkowski's interests and writings. His two principal works of the period, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* and *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, were both projects of economic and political reform. His other writings dealt with what was then called "the social question" and today would probably be termed welfare or development. There is evidence of innumerable contacts with French intellectual figures of all ideological persuasions though it is his co-operation with the Fourierists which is best documented.

Cieszkowski's later years were devoted to the realization of his life project, the *Our Father*. Originally conceived in the 1830's, sixty years

later this work had expanded to four volumes for the most part unpublished, unfinished and secret. The *Our Father* is a philosophy of history on a grand scale, inspired equally by Hegel and Christianity. It encompasses a systematization of Cieszkowski's earlier views and its principal significance lies in adding to those views an utopian vision of the future as the age of the Holy Spirit. It is this vision which gives sense and unity to the entirety of Cieszkowski's writings and work.

In addition to this substantial and wide-ranging corpus of writings in German, French and Polish, Cieszkowski attained prominence as a national leader in his native Poland and an active participant in the intellectual life of the continent. 1848, with all its implications for European intellectual and political life, marked Cieszkowski's entry into politics. As a deputy to the Prussian diet he became a leading spokesman of the Polish cause and, simultaneously, created the first mass political organization in Posen. As the wave of 1848 receded Cieszkowski tried to re-orient the struggle for national survival into a programme of enlightenment and modernisation which came to be adopted by the following generation. At the same time he remained a cosmopolitan figure, respected abroad and ever abreast of general European currents, sharing the hopes and concerns of his contemporaries. Indeed, even those aspects of his system which may today seem fantastic or merely quaint – his profound eschatological certitude above all – identify him closely with his age.

II

My purpose in undertaking the following study is threefold. First, I hope to present a reasonably thorough intellectual biography of August Cieszkowski. By this I understand an analysis of his writings, a description of his social and intellectual milieu, and an examination of the former in relation to the latter. In doing so I hope to counter the neglect into which Cieszkowski has fallen and hopefully provide the reader with the elements necessary to form his own judgement on Cieszkowski's relative importance.

My second purpose is to contribute to the understanding of the thought structures existing, perhaps prevalent, at a given period in the past. It is a premise of my study that thought can be understood as a collective enterprise, a movement which creates certain objective

structures which are significant units of study in the history of thought; indeed, that the study of such models is the beginning of political theory[1].

A corollary of this premise is that the history of political theory is not the exclusive domain of those magnificent figures whose greatness compels us to listen. The study of the truly great has a value of its own but it is problematical to the extent that these figures dominate their exegetes, transcend models and proclaim history to be the exclusive playground of their heroic feats. In fact, the analysis of a minor figure may shed as much light on the problems confronting an age and offer certain methodological advantages in allowing a set of perspectives appropriate to the object.

My third purpose is to illustrate through the example of August Cieszkowski the weakness inherent in the dominant model of relations between ideological allegiance and theoretical position. In simplest terms this is a model which assigns groups or individuals a spot on a spectrum from left to right by virtue of their answers to certain questions concerning authority, equality, human nature. When couched in historical terms and in reference to the period to be considered here, these are questions regarding Reason, Religion, the French Revolution. A particularly sophisticated model of this sort is Karl Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* and it is his construct which I propose to use as a point of departure for the study of Cieszkowski[2].

III

In Mannheim's *Ideology and Utopia* the term ideology has both a particular and a total meaning. In the former it refers to ideas which "are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation". In the latter it means "the total structure of the mind of this epoch or this group"[3]. Mannheim's argument is that the two meanings have a tendency to merge. The result is a structure of mind termed ideological which re-enforces an existing order. Ideologies may transcend reality but they remain ideologies unless "they shatter, either wholly or partially, the order of things prevailing at the time"[4].

In Mannheim's model ideologies occupy a residual position. They are uniform expanses of static rationalizations whose destiny is to be punctured by utopias, "that type of orientation which transcends

reality and which at the same time breaks the bonds of the existing order"[5]. Utopias are of four types: the chiliastic, the liberal-humanitarian, the conservative and the socialist-communist. The suggestion is that modes of thought can be either ideological or utopian and that intellectual history consists of an interaction between these two categories.

The model lies open to a variety of criticisms. Such bifurcation of thought tends to create dichotomies and impose contradictions where differentiation along a continuum or even ultimate compatibility are more appropriate relationships. Moreover, the distinction between thought structures which break the bonds of the existing order and those which merely transcend them without breaking them is an extraneous one. It rests either on a subjective evaluation or on the success of a given ideology or utopia in imposing itself on its age.

The differentiations within the major categories are themselves problematical. The sub-divisions of utopia follow each other in temporal sequence; chiliastic utopianism, for instance, is the *first* modern form of the utopian mentality, thus skirting the problem of the co-existence of several forms of utopian mentality contemporaneously, even simultaneously within the same individual. Furthermore, the various types of utopian mentality are not equally transcendent nor even similar in origin and aim. Eschatological structures negate reality and radicalize alternatives on the basis of a concept of human nature and divine salvation which sets them apart from most utopian thinking with its usual premise of an essentially good and autonomous man[6]. The conservative utopia is different from other utopian forms in its very impulse as well as in its function.

The image of ideologies as monolithic structures does not bear examination. Certainly, opposition to radical change does not denote agreement on any substantive question. Nor, in Mannheim's understanding, are ideologies any more congruent with reality than utopias. Finally, the distinction between the two is profoundly ahistorical. It rests on formal criteria wich ignore the concrete circumstances under which a given ideology and utopia arise.

If Mannheim's categories are applied to Cieszkowski he appears to be a maze of contradictions. In the most general terms the contradiction is one between utopian theory and ideological practice. How else can one explain the discrepancy between the uses to which Cieszkowski's formulation of *praxis* was subsequently put and

Cieszkowski's own application of this concept? How else can one see the relation between the final goal which he sought and the inadequacy of the means which he advocated in its pursuit? How can one reconcile Cieszkowski's essentially secular aims with his intense and orthodox religiosity?

If the answers to these questions do not lie in either personal eccentricities or in false consciousness they may well be sought in two assumptions which this study proposes to test: first, that there can be an essential similarity between right and left wing social critiques; that is to say, that the ideological and utopian camps may overlap significantly. Second, that the religious or secular tendency in a given worldview need not bear a direct relation to that worldview's character as ideology or utopia; in fact, within the period relevant here the relation between a religious consciousness and ideology is the opposite of what is generally supposed.

Elsewhere, Mannheim himself recognizes a similarity between the critiques of the left and of the right:

> It is generally believed that the socialists were the first to criticize capitalism as a social system; in actual fact, however, there are many indications that this criticism was initiated by the right-wing opposition and was then gradually taken over by the left opposition; we must, of course try to find out what shifts of emphasis made this reception of "right-wing" motifs by the "left-wing" opposition possible[7].

Earlier, Marx had made the same point[8]. Nevertheless, it is the polar opposites "right" and "left" and their more highly developed counterparts "ideology" and "utopia" which have dominated inquiry. I am suggesting that the insight quoted above is a more useful point of departure for the study of Cieszkowski than the conventional alternatives.

The second assumption may be thus stated: in the early part of the nineteenth century the mingling of religious and secular consciousness reached a point where the two became confused to the point of indistinguishability. The problem must be seen as closely connected with romanticism, with the replacement of old authority patterns as a consequence of the French Revolution, and as a struggle towards "a new sense of the universe". Under such circumstances it is useless to judge the worldview of a thinker like Cieszkowski on the basis of his religious perspectives.

I have tried to define the starting-point of my study by pointing to some of the theoretical problems which stand in the way of an

understanding of August Cieszkowski. Before proceeding further I propose to review the literature available about this figure.

IV

At Cieszkowski's jubilee in 1893 and at his death a year later the eulogies expected of an elderly public figure and generous benefactor flowed in somewhat perfunctory fashion[9]. This eulogistic spirit was perpetuated by August Cieszkowski Junior in his efforts to secure recognition for his father's achievements. These efforts were directed principally to the editing and publishing of the *Ojcze Nasz* and the translation and republishing of Cieszkowski's other works[10]. Accompanying this laudable undertaking was a conscious effort to project a legend of Cieszkowski as a social retrograde, unimpeachably orthodox Catholic and mystically inspired seer[11].

Some clerical critics were prepared to accept the image. A bishop declared that Cieszkowski had died in grace and there was some indulgent talk of Cieszkowski's *Ojcze Nasz* as a *peccatum splendidum*, excusable perhaps by the blameless moral life of its author[12]. Others, however, voiced their criticism loudly. They distinguished to some extent between volume I which had appeared in Cieszkowski's lifetime and the posthumous volumes; in the latter, elements of pantheism, rationalism and Protestantism ran rampant[13]. Cieszkowski's views were compared to those of obscure and distant heretics[14]. Naturally enough, his strong criticisms of the Jesuits were particularly resented by his primarily Jesuit reviewers, such as Koppens and Gabryl.

If Cieszkowski's stature as a Catholic was somewhat shaken by these attacks he recovered ground as a national thinker. Eventually, Polish Messianism, discredited after the ill-fated insurrection of 1863, was rehabilitated – first culturally and then politically[15]. With scant regard for the character of Cieszkowski's Messianism or the transnational nature of his Utopia, he underwent incorporation into the romantic and patriotic tradition[16]. In fact, the first English-language article on Cieszkowski compared his kingdom of the spirit to the resurrected Poland[17].

Fortunately, such comments shared the field with more sober analyses. A German doctoral thesis, though a rather insubstantial one, had

been devoted to Cieszkowski in 1904 and a French thesis followed shortly[18]. The interwar period too saw several monographs appear in Poland, for the most part concerned with Cieszkowski's religious thought[19]. The most valuable contribution was the painstaking work of Walter Kühne which included publication of a large part of Cieszkowski's *Nachlass* with an extremely detailed commentary[20].

Also significant was Cieszkowski's rediscovery abroad. Not surprisingly, in Western Europe Neo-Hegelians and historians of the Hegelian School remembered him primarily for his *Prolegomena* and commented on its originality[21]. Among Russian thinkers, on the other hand, Cieszkowski aroused interest by virtue of his Messianism. Thus, Berdiaev praised the author of the *Our Father* lavishly calling him the greatest, and hitherto insufficiently appreciated, philosopher of Polish Messianism[22]. In certain respects, Berdiaev wrote, he was prepared to place Cieszkowski's thought higher than Soloviev's although the personality of the latter was more complex and richer – an affirmation which, in my view, betrays insufficient biographical knowledge of Cieszkowski[23]. Apparently, Leo Tolstoy too was familiar enough with Cieszkowski's work to question a Polish vistor to Yasnaya Polyana in detail about him[24]. This Russian interest, and perhaps affinity, may also explain the relatively prominent position which historians of Russian and Slavonic Hegelianism in general have attributed to Cieszkowski[25]. Indeed, the foremost work on this subject goes so far as to say that only two Slavs, Cieszkowski and Bakunin, made a fundamental contribution to Hegelianism[26].

It was inevitable that research on the young Marx and his Hegelian origins should alight on Cieszkowski[27]. Lukács' article on Hess preceded this research and might have warned enthusiasts that Cieszkowski's role in the pre-history of Marxism was problematical[28]. Nevertheless, Cieszkowski's name sometimes came to be linked to Marx in unconvincing attempts to prove the latter's dependence on a Slavonic or Christian thinker[29]. Only in postwar Germany did scholarly attempts to understand the Young Hegelians on their own terms rather than by reference to their Marxian consequences begin to evaluate Cieszkowski's contribution accurately and sympathetically[30]. These and other attempts have succeeded in putting the Marx–Cieszkowski relationship in proper perspective and have brought out both the originality and innovative character of Cieszkowski's contribution to Young Hegelian self-interrogation[31].

In postwar Poland, Cieszkowski could not escape the contamination of approval by the *ancien régime*. The earlier thesis whereby the ideological struggle in mid-nineteenth century Poland had been one between Hegelians and Catholics was rejected. The essential struggle, it was now argued, had pitted Catholics and Messianists against progressives and Cieszkowski clearly belonged to the former[32]. Mercifully, however, this interpretation was soon modified as scholars came to suggest that post-1831 ideological currents in Poland had, in fact, been more complex and more differentiated. Coming in the wake of this re-evaluation of the utility of the very notion of progressiveness in Polish intellectual history and of the applicability of categories drawn from West European experience, this re-interpretation showed that in addition to the camps of extreme reaction and revolutionary democrats there had existed an important camp of liberal estate-owners dedicated to non-revolutionary social reform[33]. Alongside this philosophical reassessment, the historical analysis of Cieszkowski as political figure also evolved. Already the first studies of his activity in the Prussian Diet had never really shown convincingly that Cieszkowski was unconditionally allied with the reaction and now the ideological fluidity of his position began to be recorded faithfully[34]. The history of the province of Posen also presented him in a different light as the "organic work" which Cieszkowski had advocated was subjected to scrupulous examination as a struggle on two fronts, against socialism certainly – but also against traditionalism[35].

At the same time, Cieszkowski has been shunned by Soviet scholars, perhaps precisely because of the difficulty of classifying him along traditional lines. To be sure, Cieszkowski is mentioned in various specialized works on Hegelianism[36]. Moreover, parts of the *Prolegomena* have been translated and included in philosophical anthologies[37]. However, standard Soviet reference works are disappointingly perfunctory in their treatment of Cieszkowski; although he is acknowledged as an "ideologue of liberal-gentry circles"[38] in Poland and attention is drawn to his attempt at synthesizing German idealism and French socialism as well as to his role in the development of Young Hegelianism, Cieszkowski seems to be most appreciated for his influence on such Russian thinkers as Herzen and Stankevitch[39]. Even in this regard, however, the definitive statement concerning Cieszkowski's impact on Russian thought has been made not by a Soviet but by a Polish scholar[40].

Recently, Polish scholars have been continuing to work on different aspects of Cieszkowski's thought[41]. Most notable has been the work of Andrzej Walicki who has not only shed new light on Cieszkowski through a general re-interpretation of Polish Messianism but who has also sought to identify the many French-inspired themes in Cieszkowski's writings[42]. Thanks to these and other efforts a Cieszkowski bibliography today would count far more than the one hundred ninety-three items listed in 1961[43]. Nevertheless, there has still not been any comprehensive treatment of Cieszkowski. Hopefully, this study will, to some extent, make up for this lack.

PART I

GERMANY AND PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER I

ROMANTICS AND HEGELIANS 1830–1840

I

August Dołęga Cieszkowski was born in September 1814 at Sucha near Warsaw[1].

The family originated from the village of Cieszkowo in the Łęczycki district of Central Poland. It was well established as Mazovian landowning gentry having long served in various military and administrative posts; many members had been castellans in the eighteenth century[2]. It was thus fairly representative of the higher *szlachta*, the class which ruled the pre-partition "republic of nobles" and one whose anarchy and patriotism so puzzled Rousseau.

August's father, Wicenty Paweł, was considerably wealthier and more cultivated than most members of his class. He not only owned numerous estates, bred horses and wrote on horse-breeding but also patronized culture and imported Italian artists to Poland[3]. As a widower, shortly after 1814 he moved to Italy for several years with his only son and returned with the Papal title of count[4]. Thereafter, Paweł Cieszkowski appears to have been active in local diets of nobles, adapting himself pliantly to Russian rule[5]. He was to unfailingly finance his son's projects and provide moral support and encouragement, only occasionally wondering at his son's radical leanings[6]. He lived quietly until 1862, a rather timid and moderate member of his class and generation — cultivated but not progressive, attached to the national tradition and the constitution of 1815, but above all eschewing conspiracy and revolution.

August Cieszkowski was first educated by native and foreign tutors[7]. He mastered French, German and Latin thoroughly. His English and Greek were probably weaker and, though he was a tsarist subject, there is no evidence that he knew any Russian[8]. About 1829 he entered a gymnasium in Warsaw. Among his teachers was Bronislaw Trentowski, later of National-Hegelian reputation, with whom Cieszkowski's intellectual and personal relations were to be complicated[9].

Politically, the period was marked by the anomaly of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, the Holy Alliance's reluctant concession to the principles of constitutionalism and nationality. Intellectually, the conflict between romantics and classicists, soon to be resolved in favour of the former, was being waged on the philosophical level with debates over questions such as "Is our language philosophical?". Proclaiming that Polish was indeed philosophical, the romantics proceeded to translate German terms into inebriating Polish neologisms. Obviously, the importance of the national language was common to romanticism throughout Europe. But in Poland where national aspirations were frustrated on so many levels language became the very form of national self-assertion, growing into a fetish for some and into an extraordinary source of inspiration for others[10].

Cieszkowski participated in this romantic current enthusiastically. It is difficult to ascertain to what extent he shared in the cult of Rousseau typical of his schoolmates or in the Napoleonic cult summarized eloquently in a Cracow schoolwall graffito: "Nil desperandum. Napoleon lives. Long live the Poles!"[11] Certainly, he fervently admired romanticism's literary manifestations. Apparently, at age fifteen, upon hearing that Mickiewicz was nearby he immediately ran to the great poet's room and flung himself at Mickiewicz feverishly reciting the epic *Conrad Wallenrod*[12].

Cieszkowski's first known piece is a poem entitled "A song on the note of a song about May". Written in 1830–1831, it mixes lyricism and patriotism in an ode to the national insurrection which reads like a poor Marseillaise:

> A glorious day has dawned
> Hail, O children of Poland's earth
> Yesterday you groaned in chains
> Today blessed freedom shines
> this is the time, this is the time
> which sees us free![13]

The whole poem is juvenile, superficial and imitative and it has been described as "both formally and thematically typical of the lyrics of the November Insurrection"[14]. Interesting here, however, is its warning against tyranny, its appeal to national unity, its confidence in a brilliant future and its invocation to action. Above all, it firmly establishes Cieszowski's commitment at a very early age to the national cause.

Legend has it that Cieszkowski participated actively in the insurrection[15]. In view of his extremely frail health it is doubtful that he indeed dug fortifications for the siege of Warsaw. Nor is there any evidence to support the claim that he acted as scribe to the Diet[16]. That such a legend has arisen can be explained by the importance of the insurrection to the national psyche. Society was divided into those who had supported the insurrection and those who had not; with the former assuming the intellectual and moral leadership of the country from their Parisian exile. Such claims are thus attempts to validate Cieszkowski's status as a patriot[17].

Whether of his own will, or at his father's orders, Cieszkowski left Warsaw in September 1831 just before the end of the insurrection. He matriculated in the free city of Cracow in February 1832 and five days later enrolled in the philosophical faculty of the Jagiellonian university there. According to university records his name was withdrawn in April. This appears to have been done to satisfy Russian orders forbidding its subjects to study in Cracow[18]. In fact, Cieszkowski continued the *Gesamtkursus* in theoretical and practical philosophy – logic, metaphysics, anthropology, ethics, pedagogy – for two semesters. He also studied universal history, letters – philology, literary history and Italian literature[19]. The dominant philosophical direction appears to have been Kantian. There is no evidence that Hegel was known[20].

At some point Cieszkowski developed an eye disease, probably trachoma, which forced him to interrupt his studies and move to Berlin for treatment. He resumed his studies in philosophy at the Friedrich Wilhelm University there probably in the autumn of 1833 and remained five semesters[21].

II

When Cieszkowski came to Berlin Hegel was dead but Hegelianism reigned triumphant.

Hegel's chair remained conspicuously vacant. Only in 1835 was it occupied by Hegel's most faithful pupil, Gabler, a third-rate mind who had never taught at a university and whose main publication was a description of part one of Hegel's *Phenomenology*. In spite of these unimpressive credentials Gabler's close ties with the master assured him the respect of the entire philosophical faculty and – at least initially – a curious and enthusiastic audience[22].

If Hegel could be replaced only by nonentities his system was both irreplaceable and unmodifiable. Its very nature, as a closed circle, precluded improvements. The brilliant exposition of the universal principle, Spirit, and of Spirit's many varying manifestations had dazzled Hegel's listeners as it can still dazzle his readers. The bare logic of the argument sufficed, however, to substantiate Hegel's claim that knowledge had reached its absolute standpoint. He suggested as much in his closing lecture on the history of philosophy:

> I have tried to develop and bring before your thought this series of successive spiritual forms pertaining to philosophy in its progress and to indicate the connection between them. This series is the true kingdom of the spirit, the only kingdom that there is ... A new epoch has arisen in the world. It would appear as if the world spirit had at last succeeded in stripping off from itself all alien objective existence and apprehending itself at last as absolute spirit ... (it) has attained to the reality which it lacked. This is the whole history of the world in general up to the present time and the history of philosophy in particular (23).

Hegel's students shared a heavy burden. They were the gravediggers and the monument-builders of philosophy. They saw their task in the pious preservation, transmission and propagation of Hegel's thoughts. As Alexander's satraps they divided the empire of thought among themselves[24]. Gans, Michelet, Henning, Boumann and others founded a *Verein von Freunden des Verewigten* and each edited part of Hegel's works.

In seeming paradox, the very reasons which had created this epigonal consciousness also underlined the significance of the age. Hegel had announced a new era. Indeed, he had assumed it and pointed to the monumental events of the day and, even more, to the position which thought had attained in his system as confirmation[25]. The certitude that Hegel had not only replaced opinion with truth but that in doing so he had closed one era and announced another inspired the Hegelians of the 1830's. This "epochal consciousness" tempered the anguish of epigonism by adding to their philosophical mission a historical role[26].

Within the kingdom of Prussia the historical and political position of the Hegelians was a happy one. Since Stein's reforms Prussia could lay some claims to rationalism and liberalism. Under Friedrich Wilhelm III the independence of the burger estate was firmly established, an examination system for bureaucratic recruitment deprived the nobility of much of its privilege, a wide-spread school system functioned and a

constitution, though not actually decreed, seemed imminent[27]. Thus, it appeared that Prussia was indeed advancing towards Reason.

Moreover, the Hegelians not only dominated the university but enjoyed the benevolent and admiring patronage of the powerful minister of culture, Altenstein. This happy coincidence of clement circumstances has been wistfully evoked by Rudolf Haym:

> (It was) the time ... when all knowledge feasted at the richly laden table of Hegelian wisdom, where all the faculties queued in the anti-chamber of philosophy in order to acquire at least something of its lofty view of the Absolute or of the treasures of the famous dialectic. One was either a Hegelian or a barbarian, idiot, laggard and hateful empiricist ... (It was a time) when in the eyes of the Prussian ministry of culture and learning it was considered nearly a crime not to be a Hegelian[28].

This smug superiority and the comfortable relationship with authority made it all the easier to believe in the reconciliation of the real and the ideal which Hegel had proclaimed[29].

The tension between this sense of strength and the "bitter seriousness of the question concerning the further content of world history now that Hegel's philosophy had brought the world spirit to its aim"[30] injected into the Hegelians a certain energy and an impatience with obstacles to their as yet undefined goals. It was perhaps inevitable that the conflict between an epigonal and an epochal mood should breed frustration and conflict. When the crisis exploded in 1835 it centered around David Friedrich Strauss' newly published *Das Leben Jesu.*

Strauss' book was one of many efforts to raise various fields of inquiry – in this case, Bible criticism – to the speculative viewpoint. Strauss summarized the scholarship of the preceding fifty years and offered a solution to the historicity of miracles[31]. Rejecting the Enlightenment's naturalistic explanations he applied the concept of myth to the miracles, historicized them and concluded that they were an expression of the Jewish consciousness of the early Christian era; useful legends in their time but no longer necessary because philosophy had now grasped the speculative core of Christianity.

The storm broke on all sides. Semi-rationalist theologians allied with supernaturalists in denunciation[32]. Within five years, forty to fifty polemical essays had been written[33]. Strauss bowed to criticism in the third edition of 1838–39 with numerous concessions, retracting these same concessions in the following edition[34]. He at no time questioned the actual existence of Jesus, nor did he deny the uniqueness and the indestructibility of the fact that Jesus had realized God's manhood in

his person. Nevertheless, Protestant theology reeled under the shock and its vibrations echoed through the universities[35].

The significance of Strauss' *Leben Jesu* extended far beyond its actual subject and, ultimately, far beyond theology. To the Hegelians it suggested an inadequacy of Christian dogma. If Christ was not divine, then the Incarnation could be conceived as proof that man, perhaps any man, can become God. In fact, perhaps the human species itself in its march towards absolute knowledge was the proper incarnation of the Divine Logos[36]. If so, then the principle of personal immortality would require re-examination and perhaps replacement by a collective immortality of the species. In any case, the speculative method had shown its superiority over theology in explaining the central dogmas of Christianity.

The immediate impetus to these thoughts was the Strauss debate, but their origin lay in Hegel himself. In exploiting what Barth has called a Lutheran tendency to invert heaven and earth and thus to forget eschatological limits, and in insisting on the identity of religion and philosophy, Hegel had deliberately marred the boundaries between the two[37]. His students considered the relations between Christian dogma and speculative philosophy with circumspection, obviously uneasy about the possible results of such an inquiry[38]. In 1833 the question was put to them pointblank in Friedrich Richter's *Lehre der letzten Dingen*, a critique of the Hegelian ambivalence regarding the other-worldly[39]. Two years later, Strauss' association with Hegelianism confirmed the suspicions which Richter had raised.

By 1838 the Hegelians stood divided into three camps: those who saw the unity of divine and human nature fully and perfectly realized in the person of Christ; those who saw this unity as only partially realized in Christ; those who denied that it had been realized and expected its realization in man. A corresponding divergence arose regarding personal immorality which was affirmed by the first camp, diluted by the second and denied by the third. These three groups soon accepted the designations of Right, Center and Left[40].

It is important to remember the theological basis of this division. It was, above all, an internal quarrel. All factions accepted the Hegelian system as a whole and defended it against pietists, romanticists and empiricists. Not until later did some Hegelians realize that "Hegel had not gone far enough to permit a critique of Christianity which would not also be a critique of original Hegelianism"[41].

Moreover, the quarrel had no immediate political implications. The Hegelians were genuinely convinced of the importance of the Christological question and the problem of individual immortality[42]. They were not masking political concerns in involved theological language[43]. When the political test came, such left Hegelians as Strauss and Feuerbach were to prove themselves loyal subjects and staunch constitutional monarchists[44]. On the other hand, political radicals – Ruge, Bauer, Hess – showed themselves to be so permeated with a religious consciousness that they could not shake off the pervasive Christian symbol structure[45].

In the period up to 1838, therefore, the terms "right" and "left" Hegelians imply very little about a critique of society. In fact, Bruno Bauer and Arnold Ruge maintained an active alliance with the Prussian state and held comfortable university posts[46]. Similarly, the labels "old" and "young" Hegelians carried no ideological nor even substantive connotations. The distinction was between those Hegelians who had studied under the master himself, and those who had come to Berlin only after his death. Thus, one could find Old Hegelians who belonged theologically to the Left and politically to liberalism or radicalism — Gans and Michelet, for example; or one could find Young Hegelians, such as Kirkegaard, who identified with the Right in most respects[47].

Certainly in the following years the division between Right and Left was to take on total, i.e., philosophical, religious and political meaning. In broad terms, the right Hegelians became those for whom the experience of epigonism was dominant; the left Hegelians were those who saw their epoch as apocalyptic[48]. The transition from a specific to the total meaning of the Right/Left division may be seen as having begun with the appearance of the *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst* in 1838[49]. The editor, Arnold Ruge, later described their purpose as that of "criticizing the romantics, working for freedom in thought and preparing the way for the Young Hegelian apocalypse"[50]. Significantly, however, the *Jahrbücher* formulated their critique of Prussia in terms of its "Catholicizing tendencies" and its infidelity to Protestantism[51].

At the time when August Cieszkowski was studying in Berlin, and thus most directly under the influence of the Hegelians, the structure of Hegelianism was already tottering. It was not yet clear whether it would fall and if it did, what might emerge from the ruins. Indeed,

even in retrospect, it is still difficult to determine the steps which led to its collapse. Even ten years later, the writings of the period, including Strauss' *Das Leben Jesu*, seem oddly irrelevant to the later preoccupations of the school. Certainly, the appearance of August Cieszkowski's first book, *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* in 1838 was a landmark as it indicated the beginning of new concerns among Hegelians and turned its back on the theological debate. Four years later, however, Cieszkowski published *Gott und Palingenesie*, subtitled "an open letter to Professor Michelet on the occasion of his lectures concerning the personality of God and immortality of the soul". In 1842 the very subject was to ring odd, like the echo of a debate which had already ended.

III

Less than a generation separates the philosophers who wept at Hegel's funeral from the revolutionaries of 1848. Yet in this short period the Hegelians moved from contemplation to activity, from *theoria* to the deed, and from theology to social and political concerns. August Cieszkowski constitutes a single but not negligeable moment in this transformation. Before examining his contribution, however, it may be useful to trace in further detail the metamorphosis of the Hegelian movement.

The change occurred in two phases. The first was a reorientation from the primacy of theoretical knowledge towards a concept of action, originally close to Aristotelian practical knowledge but developing into a heavily charged catch-word suggesting pure energy, affirmation, revolution. The second was a redirection from a critique of philosophy to an examination of society, inspired by philosophy but seeking to free itself of its inspiration. Both these changes are too fundamental to be explained uniquely as an internal process of Hegelianism, or even a native process in the Germany of the *Vormärz*. The impetus to change was, in large measure, imported. It came from France or, at the very least, from the German experience of France.

Hegel had unambiguously asserted a sequence where practice followed and depended on theoretical development:

> Every day I am evermore convinced that theoretical work brings more into the world than practical work. If the kingdom of the imagination is revolutionized first, then reality cannot hold out[52].

It was this sequence which his disciples challenged. Feuerbach expressed his frustration confusedly as early as 1828 when he wrote to Hegel of the need to realize the Idea, to make it worldly (*verweltlichen*), to incarnate the pure logos[53]. His uneasiness appears to have been widespread; an obscure figure wrote:

> Yes, the time will come when philosophy, the tutelary goddess of the Germans will cease to be a bare school-mistress enthroned upon university chairs. The time will come when she will act and execute (*handelt und vollbringt*), when she becomes dead and takes possession of the world[54].

Hegel's image of philosophy as the "owl of Minerva"[55] was consciously reformulated and directed against him. Hinrich declared that philosophy was an "eagle at mid-day"[56] and Michelet called it "the cock-crow of a newly breaking day"[57]. These affirmations were only wishes, defiant and yet dependant on Hegel's very imagery. In short, they were the mixture of submission, frustration and revolt which characterized the Hegelians' relation to their master.

It is arguable whether this reaction made the Hegelians receptive to ideas from across the Rhine, or whether their reaction is explicable in terms of an antecedent receptivity to French influence[58]. In my view, the former possibility appears more plausible. Hegel had lent philosophical support to the notion of the French as a practical nation in direct contrast to the philosophical Germans. The events of 1830 re-enforced the impression that in France one did what in Germany was only thought[59]. Thus, the Hegelians looked to Paris curiously, even hopefully, expecting that a solution to their predicament would come from France.

Yet when confronted with French social thought, primarily in the form of Saint-Simonianism, the Hegelians' first reaction was to reject it. Hegel had commented rather favourably on the Saint-Simonian doctrine[60], but his pupils proved more Hegelian than Hegel himself. The unspeculative language of the French socialists shocked these new scholastics and Saint-Simonian Catholic sympathies were denounced by virtually all Hegelian factions[61]. Later, as the radical Hegelians drifted away from theism they found the religious preoccupations of French socialists mystifying and annoying. Engels wrote a few years later:

> One thing is odd; whereas the English socialists are in general hostile to Christianity and thus must suffer from all the prejudices of a truly Christian people, French communists, even though part of a nation famous for its disbelief, are themselves Christians. Their favourite principle is: '*Christianity is Communism*'[62].

The key to Hegelian suspicions of Saint-Simonianism lay in the latter's close ties with romanticism. Certainly in Berlin the romantic school was denigrated as irrational and reactionary. Indeed, rejection of romanticism distinguished Berlin from other German intellectual centres, particularly Munich. After 1830, however, romanticism itself underwent a revolution. In France, it forsook individualism for a social orientation. It combined "the yearning for harmony with a prophetic vision"[63]. In short, romanticism reversed its ideological connotations and it did so largely through the intermediary of the Saint-Simonian school.[64]

Some German intellectuals who realized the possibilities of making literature a vehicle of the action for which they longed, created "Young Germany". Butler has defined it as German Saint-Simonianism, and described its achievement concisely: "Romantic theory was asleep; Young Germany awoke it and killed it"[65].

The importance of this phenomenon here lies in the influence which Young Germany, and through it Saint-Simonianism, exerted on the Young Hegelians. The nominal similarity between "Young Germany" and "Young Hegelians" was not accidental. The two movements overlapped from the very beginning[66]. Moreover, a strong tie existed between them in the person of Heinrich Heine. Though he shared many Hegelian prejudices concerning the philosophical incompetence of the French, Heine publicized Saint-Simonianism enthusiastically[67]. Though he stood outside the Hegelian circle properly speaking, his prestige assured him a respectful hearing in Berlin. Finally, the Saint-Simonians themselves were great admirers of Germany and particularly Prussia, a fact which flattered the Hegelians and acted as a guarantee of Saint-Simonianism's seriousness[68]. The result of these various currents throughout the 1830's was an intense sympathy for France among the Hegelians[69].

Saint-Simonianism's contribution to the transformation of the Hegelians' consciousness lies in its extricating social concerns from the hands of the conservatives. Hegel had paid passing attention to the transformation of the *Pöbel*[70]. It was, however, J. M. von Radowitz, a military bureaucrat, who first applied the name "proletariat" to that human mass created by the disintegration of feudal ties[71]. The proletariat's claims to legal rights and redress of the existing unequal social relations, rather than to private or public charity, were first expounded by Franz von Baader – a mining engineer and glass factory

owner, a Catholic and staunch conservative[72]. Baader corresponded with Hegel and was a known figure in Varnhagen von Ense's circle. Nevertheless, Baader's personal and philosophical position made his insights unacceptable to the Hegelians – even as they were eagerly grasping similar insights from abroad[73].

It was thus those Hegelians who were most interested in and closest to France who first dealt with the social question. Certainly some exceptions occurred. The first German book about Saint-Simonianism was written by F. W. Carové, a Catholic Hegelian of mildly liberal views and no particular social commitment. His interest in the doctrine appears to have been motivated by his Catholicism and an intimacy with France stemming from the days of the Napoleonic occupation[74]. Interestingly, Carové later wrote on Messianism and on Mickiewicz's *Book of the Polish Pilgrims*[75].

A much more prominent importer of French thought, and one more closely connected to Cieszkowski, was Eduard Gans. His long and intimate association with Hegel – marred only by a political quarrel in Hegel's last months – and his brilliant attack on Savigny's historical school of law, won him wide respect[76]. He expressed his liberalism widely and openly, making himself enormously popular with students and exasperating even the indulgent government of Altenstein and Friedrich Wilhelm III[77].

Gans early showed much interest in the social question in France and prophesized that this would become the central problem of the future. His assessment of the Saint-Simonians was somewhat mixed. Although he sympathized with their aspirations and credited them with having seen that slavery was only formally abolished, ultimately Gans rejected Saint-Simonianism[78]. His merit lies in having realized the importance of the processes occurring in France and of having drawn the attention of the Hegelians to them. One can speculate on the possible evolution of Gans' thought had he not died prematurely in 1839.

Like most liberals of the time, Gans was sympathetic to the Polish cause[79]. This undoubtedly created a link with Cieszkowski, but the actual tie was much closer. Cieszkowski asked of Gans frequently in his correspondence with obvious familiarity[80]. He studied philosophy of law and philosophy of history under Gans[81]. Finally, it was Gans' edition of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history which provided the impetus to Cieszkowski's publication of his *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.*

Cieszkowski was even closer to Karl Ludwig Michelet. A Huguenot and active member of Berlin's French community, Michelet had turned from Schleiermacher to Hegel in the 1820's. Subsequently, he spent an exciting year in Paris and established long-lasting ties with prominent, though not radical, French intellectuals – Victor Cousin, Guizot, Edgar Quinet, Lerminier. Michelet's later years were bitter. He claimed that Strauss had plagiarized his unpublished notes on Hegel's philosophy of religion. He was denied a full professorship, less because of his political than his religious views. Nevertheless, he remained convinced of the eternal value of Hegelian philosophy. When he died in 1893 he was, in all senses, the last of the Old Hegelians[82].

In the great debate of the 1830's, Michelet stood in an intermediate position. He recognized the consequences of Strauss' critique and yet refused to acknowledge that Hegel's treatment of the gospel problem was itself unclear, perhaps even purposely ambivalent[83]. In this way, Michelet straddled the boundary between the Hegelian left and right. It was he, however, who was the most vocal spokesman for the introduction of philosophy into life; in this lies both his greatest merit and his strongest influence on Cieszkowski.

The task of philosophy was now to penetrate all the sciences and all spheres of life. Michelet saw his own mission as the proclamation of a Hegelian philosophy which would be universal and popular. The result would be a radical transformation of man's future:

> The aim of the future is no longer hidden. It is the realization of rational freedom and the development of all substantial relations of the spirit in a way corresponding to the idea. The goal of world history is thus the development of mankind to the image of God in reality... From the point of view of thought this reconciliation has already been brought about. What remains now is that reality everywhere rise to reason... Philosophy teaches us that truth for us is in our activity and that through it we can attain freedom[84].

All of Hegel's claims for philosophy are present here but there is a good deal more. According to Michelet, philosophy must cease to be the property of philosophers. It must permeate all branches of knowledge and all classes of society, only then will it become truly universal. Moreover, it cannot remain passive for human deeds themselves must become expressions of philosophy. Although Hegel had laid the preconditions for the realization of philosophy and the divinization of man actual progress depends on man's activity[85].

A few years later such ideas were commonplace but in 1837 they

were radically new, tolerated only because their implications were not understood. Michelet himself refused to draw the consequences from these innovations. In his unwillingness to historicize Hegel, to treat him as a moment in the history of philosophy which must be transcended, Michelet believed himself to be faithful to his master. It was left to younger Hegelians, like Cieszkowski, to play with the paradox that perhaps fidelity to Hegel lay in overcoming him[86].

Under the influence of Gans, Michelet and their colleagues – Henning, Marheineke, Hotho, Erdmann – Cieszkowski abandoned his youthful romanticism for Hegelianism. The conversion, however, was not as thorough as that which had characterized his teachers. Cieszkowski never excluded the possibility of wholesale transformation of the system. Hence, his receptivity to foreign influences, particularly French and Polish, was unfettered. Consequently, it is perhaps with Cieszkowski that one can see the beginning of the transformation of Hegelianism from a system to a certain style of thought.

IV

After having left Berlin, Cieszkowski visited Germany, Holland and England, for some reason by-passing France[87]. Upon returning to Poland he settled on a 1,500 hectar domain presented to him by his father[88].

In his first letter to Michelet Cieszkowski described something of the joys of country life:

> As for me, I am feeling rather well. The country air does me good and I must confess that I have a lot more time here than in Berlin. One of the causes of this is my improving health; moreover, I do not have the fixed hours which cramped me in Berlin. In the company of my father, with French, German and Polish books at my disposition and with the ever improving state of my eyes, I am reaching for my pen . . .[89].

He divided his time between intellectual and agricultural pursuits. The former predominated, however, and even the latter were of primarily intellectual intent:

> The administration of these properties will not cause me too much trouble. On the contrary, I am trying to develop them. This year I intend to set up a sugar refinery, and then to introduce silk worm culture . . . These, and other manufacturing establishments which already exist will give me the opportunity of doing a practical course in agronomy in spite of the lack of technology and I shall be very happy to take on for an hour or two each day the title of *industriel*[90].

The obvious allusion to Saint-Simon is matched by persistent references to peculiarly French doctrines throughout the correspondence. Thus, various bantering remarks about marriage can be understood only in the context of Young Hegelian fascination with whatever issued from Paris. Typically, when Michelet invited Cieszkowski to re-read Hegel's remarks on the family, Cieszkowski recommended that he read Balzac, George Sand and Fourier[91]. Nor is it perhaps entirely coincidental that Cieszkowski should have turned his attention to sugar beets at a time when the sugar industry in France was a subject of intense debate[92].

In addition to these particular pre-occupations the correspondence between Michelet and Cieszkowski reveals the eclectic, indeed, the catholic nature of the latter's interests. I am fortunate, however, in having another rich source of information about Cieszkowski's thoughts and plans between 1836 and 1838 in his diaries[93]. Taken together, the correspondence and the diaries reveal a complex and informed mind and go far in explaining the entire *corpus* of his writings.

The diaries are in no way systematic. They begin in 1832 and peter out in 1839. Throughout they are a collection of scattered thoughts, personal comments and reading lists. The extent of Cieszkowski's indebtedness to these youthful notes will become apparent in the course of this work. Here I propose to look primarily at those entries which reveal something of his personality, at his readings and at his critique of Hegel.

Most apparent is Cieszkowski's intense moral seriousness. All his activities are seen as moments in the realization of an ultimate plan. At times this approaches the comic:

> In almost every event this year some important social purpose is to be seen. We even find it where we least expect it. For example, the discovery this year (1837–AL) of three types of fabrication of artificial manure is an extremely important omen. We are approaching a radical reform of the world, in which Nature will also know a rebirth and by its results original sin will be not only morally but physically evened out. The earth will be freed of this mighty curse and from now on it will give birth to more than merely shrubs and thorns. For this to happen it will need substantial nourishment of which this manure will be the means[94].

Even the humble sugar beet is to be an instrument of regeneration as important as the railway:

> ... the same can be said of railroads and sugar beet refineries. The first will condense and unite the life of humanity, extending thus the life of individuals by saving them vainly wasted time; the second will literally sweeten their life[95].

Cieszkowski's overwhelming sense of self as moral agent leads him to reflect:

If I should ever become a *roué* it will be by reason and not by character. Moreover, such a state could not but be ephemeral and transitory[96].

It is hardly surprising that such a personality should have shunned social activities[97]. Cieszkowski faithfully notes "interesting" conversations with prominent figures; most frequently with Szaniawski, a Polish ex-jacobin who became chief censor in Russian Poland and was denounced by Mickiewicz as a traitor[98]. This, as well as his appearances at official occasions, suggest a certain political quietism quite remote from his youthful insurrectionist enthusiasm[99].

Above all, Cieszkowski read voraciously. His diaries contain staggering numbers of readings carefully divided into categories of thoroughly, partially, superficially read. The variety of fields seems equally vast and, perhaps in justification of his eclecticism, Cieszkowski mused:

It is said that in order to succeed in the world one must often change one's opinions. Basically, this remark is true but badly expressed. One must not change one's views but possess them all. That is, one must have a synthetic conception of the world[100].

He sought this synthetic conception impatiently. For instance, in the last quarter of 1837 he studied the following authors: in philosophy, Göschel, Fischer, the younger Fichte, several works by Rosenkranz, Erdmann, Richter's *Lehre der letzten Dingen*, Hegel's philosophy of religion and logic; also, Trentowski St. Martin and Saint Teresa[101]. In literature, several works by Balzac, Sand, Hugo and Montalembert, Madame de Staël on passions, and Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre*; among other topics, Villeneuve-Bargemont's *Economie Politique chrétienne*, Berzeliner on chemistry, Poppe's *Technologie*, Lacroix on algebra.

In his quarterly summary Cieszkowski lists four works as particularly important and thoroughly read: Wroński, *Prodrome du messianisme*: Fourier, *Nouveau monde industriel*; Buchez, *Introduction à la science de l'histoire*; Barchou de Penhoën *Histoire de la philosophie allemande.* He notes that his principal occupation was philosophy and theology, lately finance, mathematics and agronomy; natural sciences and history rather neglected. He concludes: "I have read much but I have not read much thoroughly"[102].

Nevertheless, among other activities of the same period he lists: explanatory notes and new deductions for the commentary (presumably his *Our Father*); contributions to historiosophy; plan of a work on

the determination of the future; sketch of a work on the Holy Alliance (presumably never realized); introduction to a chronosophy about chance and necessity; plan for a new philosophy of religion; financial notes; introduction to a new theory of finance. Obviously, as this covers only a quarter of a year he was not idle!

The entirety of Cieszkowski's diaries can best be grasped as an exercise around Hegel. They are an extended attempt to universalize Hegel by applying him against a variety of intellectual problems and situations. The result is the critique of Hegel which issued in the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.*

V

Cieszkowski's critique of Hegel began in desultory fashion. He had long been concerned with finding a suitable formulation of personal immortality. Having first expressed this as a passage of the human soul from a state of activity to passivity at the moment of death, Cieszkowski examined Hegel's explanations. In May 1835 he wrote:

> Hegel erred in beginning philosophy of spirit with anthropology . . . the soul belongs to nature properly speaking. It is mortal; only the spirit is immortal and its first characteristic is consciousness, which the soul does not have . . .[103]

This criticism is not really tenable. Hegel goes to some pains to emphasize that soul is not yet of spirit:

> The soul is no separate immaterial entity. Wherever there is nature, the soul is its universal immaterialism, its simple "ideal" life . . . it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality of it all. But as it is still conceived thus abstractly the soul is only the sleep of the mind . . .[104]

The critique is significant, however, inasmuch as it is couched in terms of a disagreement about formal categories. Cieszkowski does not accuse Hegel of being incorrect but of misplacing the soul in the table of categories.

A similar sort of criticism was directed against Hegel's understanding of objective spirit. In 1834 Cieszkowski wrote:

> The philosophy of objective spirit, it seems to me, is badly conceived and induced in Hegel. As I see it, objective spirit includes 1) art, corresponding to . . . the subjective position of anthropology, 2) science as realization of the true, corresponding to the

phenomenology of spirit, 3) the whole sphere which Hegel calls philosophy of law and corresponding to the idea of the good and Hegel's proper psychology[105].

Once again Cieszkowski appears to be merely rearranging the same elements somewhat arbitrarily, adding little and demonstrating his absolute dependence on Hegel. It was such formal criticism, however, which led Cieszkowski to consider Hegel's position in the development of philosophy:

> Hegel considered the progress of the history of philosophy as philosophy itself . . . philosophy having thus given birth to itself must now find itself at a point of its history corresponding to a criticism of that self-knowledge which is the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hence, Hegel's position in the history of philosophy is the position of the phenomenology in the *Encyclopedia*. The *Phenomenology* is the main work of Hegel's progress, one which he called his *Entrechnungsreise*. All of Hegel's works found in the *Encyclopedia* after the Phenomenology (i.e., objective mind and absolute mind – *AL*), with the exception of the philosophy of law have not yet arrived at their absolute determinations[106].

At this point Cieszkowski's critique moves from formal to substantive terms. In effect, he is denying Hegel's claims to philosophical completion and relativizing Hegel as an intermediate moment in the progress of philosophy. Significantly, he is questioning Hegel's contribution in the most important spheres of existence – morality, social ethics, art, revealed religion and philosophy.

Spurred by these doubts Cieszkowski turned his attention to the philosophy of spirit and toyed with the idea of a vast work which would raise this aspect of Hegel's system to the perfection of the logic. He sought to apply the Hegelian dialectic universally as in June 1836 he wrote to Michelet:

> . . . while recognizing the immense value of the discoveries and works of Hegel in this field (i.e., philosophy of spirit – AL) it seems to me that his genius has not managed to raise this branch to the level of his other productions and principally his logic. His logic is also doubtlessly susceptible to modifications in the development of its categories, as you have affirmed yourself. Nevertheless, the immutable law of the dialectic has been found . . . the entire edifice is complete but for a few minor touches! I would not dare say as much for the philosophy of nature and *a fortiori* for that of spirit. Here I see lacunae in the fundamental deductions. It is the architectonics themselves which are vulnerable and, above all, the grand dialectical progress so vigorously deduced in the logic seems to be lacking here or to weaken[107].

Immediately Cieszkowski apologized for so audacious a project. Soon he hoped to be able to pass to a more positive polemic. Dismissing his comments as *bavardage* he casually mentioned one subject among

others which particularly interested him. This would be a "Dialectic of History . . . a sort of philosophy of history". It would also be a critique of Hegel but 'its germ and base would belong to (Hegel's) system"[108]. There was no hurry about this, however; he would perhaps wait for Mr. Gans to finish his edition of Hegel's lectures on the subject. Nevertheless, Cieszkowski continued, "I have a sort of predilection for this subject"[109].

He returned to the project in the following letter with an explanation of his use of the word "dialectic" admitting that perhaps a better title could be found[110]. By dialectic Cieszkowski meant neither the purely negative dialectic which was the second degree of the logical process, nor the subjective dialectic of the Eleatics, but the true objective dialectic: "the intrinsic process which develops the unity of contrasts, the normal march of the object in its organic genesis, the development of the idea in its totality"[111].

Michelet was immediately interested in the projected work. He warned his student of the danger of falling into utopianism, referred him to Fichte's *Characteristics of the Present Age*, and suggested that Cieszkowski avoid abstraction by talking in terms of a concrete people – present day Christianity, for instance[112].

Cieszkowski answered some of these remarks and brushed others aside. Michelet had objected that "precision and mathematical formulae were inapplicable to the vital questions of the spirit which was ruled by liberty and not by fatality". Cieszkowski answered that liberty should not be seen as the antithesis of necessity but as itself a synthetic conception. No, he would not choose to focus on a concrete people for reasons which would become obvious upon reading the work[113]. It was in the same letter that Cieszkowski expressed the intentions and ambitions of his proposed work most clearly:

> Has philosophy become an exact science or not? If it has, then with the principles given we may draw the consequences . . . everything invites us to make our calculations, to seek the extrapolation of this progression and to discover the *x* of the problem.
>
> This *x*, I confess, is the future. The future which has so often escaped intuition and reflection – I want to conquer it on behalf of positive speculation and in spite of this confession (I would even say because of it) I maintain that neither vague prognostics, nor dreams nor utopias are to be feared[114].

Michelet still had reservations about the work even though, in general terms, he approved Cieszkowski's project:

Within the limits of Christianity I would lend my approbation to all possible improvements; should you wish to found a new Christianity which, emanating from the principles of modern speculation, would be the vulgar and generally comprehensible realization of ideas which as yet are the esoteric property of a few elect[115].

As Michelet had understood it, Cieszkowski, inspired by Saint-Simon or other Messianist currents, was attempting – or at least, should be attempting – to show how existing historical phenomena would approach their idea – in short, an appendix to the philosophy of history. Cieszkowski's aim, though modest, was more extensive: he sought a reformulation of the principles of the philosophy of history rather than a further application of Hegel's principles. Perhaps Michelet had realized before Cieszkowski that an enterprise of this sort could not remain faithful to its original inspiration.

If the third part of the projected work, the "extraduction" as Cieszkowski called it, was somewhat controversial, the correspondents established agreement on the first and second parts. The first chapter could not be compared to Fichte's *Characteristics.* Cieszkowski intended to begin with "the bases of knowledge, its development and its essence without defining details"[116]. It would be "a sort of catalogue of the categories of history"[117]. Part two would treat of teleology and in contrast to the first which would be rather speculative, the second would be primarily intuitive. Evidently, it would be only the third part which would explain the "concrete organism of history"[118], and hence, bear the full weight of Cieszkowski's argument. Elsewhere, he titled the three sections: "Introductio – deductio – extraductio"[119].

The final work took a form somewhat different from the earlier sketches. They are important, however, in showing that the *Prolegomena,* although actually written quickly, was the result of a long and carefully considered plan[120]. A draft was read to Michelet and Werder[121] in Berlin in July 1838. After some corrections and notes had been added it was published by Veit and Co. later that same summer[122].

CHAPTER II

DIE PROLEGOMENA ZUR HISTORIOSOPHIE

I

In the unpublished preface to the *Prolegomena*, Cieszkowski explained his reasons for undertaking a critical revision of Hegel's system:

> From the moment when I became familiar with the Hegelian philosophy of history I perceived both the important treasures and the insufficiencies it contains, not simply within the Hegelian system itself but outside it. That is, I found his philosophy of history not completely adequate to his philosophical standpoint in general either in form, method or content. Moreover, I found his philosophy itself inadequate to the absolute standpoint of world history[1].

The work he offers is, in the fullest sense, a "prolegomenon" and, elsewhere, Cieszkowski refers to it as a "brochure" or an "opuscule"[2]. The original edition ran to 157 pages but in an age of multi-volumed tracts this was a slender book indeed. Precisely because it is but an introduction it has a dogmatic and undeveloped character. Exposition, demonstration and empirical detail are presumably left for the main corpus of a future "Historiosophie".

The *Prolegomena* opens with a resounding declaration of faith:

> At last humanity has reached that stage of consciousness where from now on it recognizes the laws of its normal development and progress not as the self-deceiving concoctions of zealous investigators of the spirit but as the true determinations of the absolute thought of God, as the manifestations of objective reason in universal history (*PzH*, p. 1)[3].

At once, Cieszkowski qualifies himself. We are only beginning to find our way in the labyrinth of history. We have understood only the formal side and the possibility of progress, and we have not applied the laws of progress to the entirety of history. It is almost as if Hegel had purposely neglected to show how history reflects the laws of logic which he had first revealed to us.

In purely formal terms Hegel is inconsistent. He distinguishes four eras in history. Such a tetrachotomous division is appropriate to nature where the second moment bifurcates. It is inappropriate to the highest process of spirit which is distinct from the externality of nature. Plato

had already shown that anything stationary has two centres, but this cannot be the case for spirit which is eternal motion. Hence, history must be seen not as natural tetrachomy but as spiritual triad. Moreover, Cieszkowski examines and dismisses rationalizations of Hegel's inconsistency: either the laws of dialectics are inviolable and universal, or they are not laws at all; until it has been shown that the dialectic operates in history too the dialectic cannot be said to have any firm foundation in other spheres as well.

A far more substantial weakness, Cieszkowski declares, is that Hegel has left himself open to the accusation of having declared an end to history. Cieszkowski disassociates himself from a view which he associates with Herbart, that past history is only some sort of beginning. The present time is, in historical terms, an intermediary one with an open perspective. In fact, Cieszkowski maintains, Hegel never excluded the possibility of future progress. He simply ceded to a prejudice which frowns upon discussion of the future and Cieszkowski states his own conviction unambiguously:

> As for us, we must state as a premise our conviction that without *knowability of the future*, i.e., without considering the future as an integral part of history, which would include the realization of the destinies of humanity, there can be no question of knowing the organic and ideal entirety or the apodictic process of history. (*PzH*, p. 9)

He compares Hegel's inability to include the future in his system with Kant's surrender to the inaccessibility of the absolute. As Hegel went beyond Kant, so we are called to forge beyond Hegel:

> If our postulate seems too daring and paradoxical, it is surely not more daring than that which scored such a great victory over critical philosophy. Since knowledge of God's essence, of freedom and immortality, lies within the realm of rational possibility why should the *essence* of the future be excluded from this realm? (*PzH*, p. 10).

Cieszkowski hastens to assure us that it is only the necessary essence of the future and not its multiple contingent manifestations which he is claiming for the realm of cognition. Foretelling the latter is the function of prophecy, future-guessing; it is *praesagium* not *praescientia.* Cieszkowski's intention is overwhelmingly teleological. He is not concerned with forecasting particular heroes or deeds. His aim and, as he sees it, the proper aim of philosophy is:

> ... to examine the proper nature of humanity, to determine the laws of its progress, to recognize the appearances of this progress in history, to evaluate the road already covered in relation to the road yet to come, finally, to define the periods of this

continuous formation along with the proper characteristics of its content; these make up the realization of elements established *virtualiter* in humanity (*PzH*, p. 12).

What proof does Cieszkowski offer for his assertions regarding cognition of the future? He cites Cuvier who required only one tooth of a fossil to reconstruct an entire animal. Natural science, usually so scornful of *a priori* speculation, acknowledges his claim. How much more convincing is the claim of history where we have abundant data!

Cieszkowski again takes pains to distinguish the sphere of nature and spirit. It might seem that natural necessity is inapplicable to history, which is the proper realm of freedom. However, freedom itself is the speculative synthesis of necessity and contingency. Hence, the natural antagonism of these two apparently contradictory terms is transcended and resolved in spirit. Moreover, the analogy from nature is relevant because the historical process too constitutes an organism, defined as a "totality where every member must correspond to every other, all members are mutually dependent and each conditions the other" (*PzH*, p. 13). Having thus affirmed the organic nature of history, Cieszkowski later alludes to it frequently as if proven. In fact, his whole historiosophy must be seen as confirmation of what is introduced here as a naked postulate.

The knowability of the future and the organism of history are closely inter-related. Having asserted the latter, Cieszkowski establishes the "determinations" of the future, i.e., the ways in which the future is intuited, intellected, or willed, as feeling, thought, will. The first is blind, natural, immediate; the second is reflective, conscious, theoretical; the third is perfected, applied, and free. Clearly, the categories are reminiscent of Hegel's description of the phenomenology of spirit.

The difference lies entirely in the third determination. Will belongs to the future as feeling and thought belonged to the past and present respectively. Beauty and Truth were their goals and characteristics as the idea of the Good constitutes the aim and standard of the future era of the will. In this post-theoretical and practical era passive facts will give way to conscious and active deeds. In fact, this will be the era of the deed – "the *substantial* synthesis of thought and being" (*PzH*, pp. 18–19).

Cieszkowski has now postulated a historiosophic triad of elements constituting the organism of history. The entire conception is inspired and presumably validated by Hegel's logical and phenomenological

categories. However, Cieszkowski seeks further confirmation of his schema in an appeal to the Hegelian philosophy of nature. Just as the sensuous un-mediated past was the era of mechanical relationships, the future must be the age of organic co-activity and symbiosis. Justification for such application of physical categories to history is provided by the principle of analogy. Cieszkowski interprets Spinoza's, "the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" meaning that "all is reflected in all because one essential thought rests at the bottom of the universe" (*PzH*, p. 46). Hence, "the history of the world as the zenith and aim not only of spirit itself but of the whole universe" must epitomize the universal connection of things. The method of proof here and elsewhere in the *Prolegomena* is closely reminiscent of Hegel's circularity: the elements deduced from a posited totality serve to confirm the truth of the positing.

At this point in the *Prolegomena* Cieszkowski has outlined the premises both of his critique of Hegel and his own system and he now attempts to interpret the actual course of history in the light of this system of principles. The interpretation is intended to be both a demonstration of the truth of these principles and an explanation of them.

Generally speaking, the characterization of the past follows Hegel quite closely. The exteriority of the pre-Christian world is contrasted with the interiority of the Christian era. Most striking is the absolutely central position assigned to Christ as the only one "to have caused a radical reform of mankind and turned over the great leaf of history" (*PzH*, p. 25). Hence, the entire past divides easily into two periods, leaving the future open as a separate age.

Similarly, the manifestations of absolute spirit have been hitherto limited to two realms: Art in the ancient world and Philosophy in the modern world. Religion is not excluded but set above both as their synthesis. Although Cieszkowski scrupulously cites Hegel's authority for this view it is clear that his intention differs from Hegel's[4]. Cieszkowski reserves religion as the realm of the absolute spirit for the future.

In another, logical sense time divides simply into past and future:

> Thus, wherever we find only a *definite one-sided* element in the past we should shift its precisely *opposite moment* into the future; *wherever we find already developed conflicts and contradictions in the past – as we generally do – we shall let their synthesis fall to the future*. . . . In this way, the negative aspects of the past will be the positive sides of the future

and only thus will we come to the realization that past and future constitute an absolutely mutual dependence within the organism of history. (*PzH*, pp. 22–23)

Having thus bifurcated historical time, the past and future become discrete entities and the present emerges as a pivotal point. Hegel's genius has elevated philosophy to sophia itself and made possible the transition from a philosophy of history to historiosophy thus endowing the present moment with overwhelming importance:

(The present stands) between the fore-feeling and the execution of history at that turning point where facts become deeds, a point which itself becomes absolute knowledge of history (*PzH*, p. 44).

Consequently, the present moment is of an importance equal or perhaps exceeding that of the appearance of Christ. Without attributing any credit to himself, Cieszkowski maintains that the organistic conception of history has made possible the breakthrough beyond the limits of retrospective cognition and into the essence of the future. This breakthrough itself marks the beginning of an absolutely synthetic future.

The second chapter is a further development of the logical, physical and spiritual categories of history.

The logical categories are primarily Hegel's. Cieszkowski defends the aprioristic method against the charge of pedantic formalism. His active apriorism would "systematically *seek out* the logical in universal history where Hegel simply speculatively *found* it" (*PzH*, p. 51). He pleads for a true identity of the universality of thought and the specificity of being rather than the Hegelian preponderance of the former. Finally, he suggests the possibility of understanding history through mathematical categories.

Whereas logical categories have been badly applied to history, physical categories have not been applied at all. Cieszkowski cites Novalis, Herder and Buchez as having approached an understanding of the succession of natural forms which correspond to historical transformations. Hegel himself had spoken of Persia as the land of light[5] but he had failed to see mechanism as the principle underlying the Chinese spirit; electricity as proper to Greece, with Athens as dynamic and Sparta as static variations. Thus, Cieszkowski explains that Church and state in the middle ages can be understood as differentiated chemical elements. Modern states are not yet organic but simply neutralized chemical combinations consisting of indifferent substrata. The chaos of

the present is a bio-genic fermentation announcing the elementary process of organic life.

Cieszkowski qualifies these categories as simply symbolic. Thus, their actual influence on history is not clear, though he does maintain that the physical sciences themselves are dependent on the general development of the spirit. Hence our failure to date in unravelling the secrets of biology, the organic science *par excellence.* Physical categories determine history in a real sense also. As Montesquieu and Herder have shown, climatic and geographic conditions are of extreme importance. This part of Cieszkowski's exposition is uncontroversial and unoriginal.

Spiritual categories, on the other hand, are neither abstract nor symbolic like the preceding ones. When the categories of subjective, objective and absolute spirit are applied to history as a whole, i.e., to the entirety of humanity, to specific peoples and to particular individuals, the result is that differentiation according to criteria of Beauty, Truth and the Good already outlined in the first chapter. The underlying conception, that history is a spiritual process requires no justification. Indeed, history appears as both spiritual microcosm of the universe and spiritual macrocosm of the individual.

Only God *qua* absolute spirit stands above history. As history is the ultimate tribunal of the world, so God is the judge of history. This is the principle on which the founders of the philosophical conception of history, Augustine and Bossuet, constructed their science. According to Cieszkowski, however, even divine rule in the world is historically conditioned. God first revealed Himself and ruled through faith; then through knowledge; finally, he will allow mankind to institute the highest cult – "the active elevation of men to God, unquestionably surpassing their elevation in feeling or thought" (*PzH,* p. 70).

In the third chapter, "The teleology of history", Cieszkowski explains that the teleology of history must also go through a process of development.

> Having now answered two questions concerning the organism of history – *How*? and *What*? – we pass on to the question *Why*? This must also be grasped as a genetic process (*PzH,* p. 77).

Cieszkowski considers Schiller's concept of aesthetic education and Herder's notion of culture and characterizes both as appropriate to the first historical era, that of Art and Beauty. In fact, he notes, citing the

sixth letter of the *Aesthetic Education of Mankind*, even Schiller himself had recognized that the artistic standpoint belonged to the past. Thus, Schiller's affirmation that "through Beauty one reaches freedom" contains both a truth and a falsehood. Beauty is only the lowest step in the highest teleological process. Hegel realized this and declared that Beauty must pass into conscious thought if mankind is to realize not only its sensuous but its ideal nature. Accordingly, the aesthetics of history become the philosophy of history, Beauty becomes Truth, and the artistic life of man is absorbed in the philosophical idea.

Philosophy is simply the antithesis of beauty. It is abstract and conscious where the latter is concrete and unconscious; it shows necessity against the latter's contingency. The ultimate aim of mankind cannot lie in either of these for man's *telos* must reside in a unity beyond all contradictions. Cieszkowski states the requirements and the solution explicitly:

> Absolute Thought must return to absolute Being without alienating itself from itself. That Being, brought to the fore a second time, will not be passive, given like the first but will be then consciously generated, created Being which constitutes the absolute *Deed* (*PzH*, p. 111).

The Deed will find its proper sphere of activity in social life where debased art and petrified philosophy will be revitalized. Whereas in Hegel, "all spiritual activity has no other aim than acquiring *consciousness* of the unity of subject and object", (*PzH*, p. 121) this unity itself will now be realized in the Deed.

The particular faculty of the Deed is the Will. In Hegel, the Will is a mode of thought. Now it is to be a creative determination of the spirit. As the spirit had formerly dwelt *an sich* and then *für sich*, it is to become *ausser sich* – the creative transformation of conscious thought back into being. Hence, *thought is to be a mode of the Will.* The corresponding philosophy will be the development of truth in concrete activity; a philosophy of practice which will permeate all spheres of life, becoming popular and exoteric.

Cieszkowski makes his intention somewhat clearer by pointing to the utopias which characterize the present period:

> It is easy to understand the passion, indeed the monomania with which our times construct social systems *a priori*. This is but a dim feeling for a need of the age which has not yet become conscious. Should it be considered abnormal? In terms of content, certainly; in terms of form, not at all. Formally, consciousness already feels entitled to

guide practical deeds, to refuse to recognize reality as given but to see it as *conscious* and *willed.* Hitherto, however, out times have *only felt* this; in other words, they have only stood at the level of feeling and imagination. That is why they have not attained a *true content*... (*PzH*, p. 132).

Cieszkowski draws the attention of his readers to Fourier's system:

(It) is a considerable step on the road to development of an organic truth in the realm of reality. Certainly this organism has not yet transcended the level of mechanism but it is already an organism... As the immediate reconciliation of the Platonic and the Rousseauian principle this utopia is undoubtedly of great importance for the future. (*PzH*, pp. 146–147).

Precisely because it is only an immediate unity Fourier's system is an utopia. In fact, it may be the greatest and the last of the utopias. Fourier shares the fundamental fault of all his predecessors: "instead of letting his utopia develop along with reality, he would have it intrude into reality" (*ibid.*), and he thus condemns his system to remaining utopian by surrendering too easily to reality. By accepting the reality of the present aprioristically, he fails to grasp the ideality of the historical organism and its ultimate teleological meaning.

II

It seems relatively easy to summarize the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.* The book's polemical directness makes it repeat a few basic arguments in several different ways without developing any at length. Cieszkowski can be summarized as stating that history is best understood as an organism; that the future is knowable in its essence; that the main characteristic of the future is the realization of the idea of the Good through the Deed, creative activity of the conscious Will.

In another sense, however, the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* is an extremely difficult book to evaluate. Today, its language rings archaic; its references are obscure and its premises are unfamiliar. Hence, the *Prolegomena* can only be understood through an analysis of the authors who inspired it and upon whose authority it rests.

The most obvious point of reference is Hegel himself. Cieszkowski emphatically asserts his debt to "the Hero of modern philosophy" (*PzH*, p. 2) and the very core of the *Prolegomena's* criticism is the charge that Hegel has failed to draw the obvious implications of his

own system. At the same time, Cieszkowski realizes that in this failure Hegel is merely being faithful to his system:

> We must come out against Hegel as much for his inconsistency as for his consistency. As we have already stated, we cannot doubt that if Hegel had been able to re-work his lectures on the philosophy of history and analyze this lofty manifestation of the spirit even more deeply than he already did, he would have himself advanced the postulates expressed here. We would have received from him a far more organic work with a most tightly and faithfully developed dialectic on the one hand and most concrete development of elementary determinations on the other (*PzH*, pp. 72–73).

The *Prolegomena* thus divides into a properly Hegelian and a non-Hegelian part. Cieszkowski attempts to expand the former to the maximum by, wherever possible, emphasizing his concordance with Hegel. Accordingly, he affirms that Hegel never excluded the possibility of future progress; his errors were privative, not negative, and his silence regarding cognition of the future is not to be taken as denial of that possibility (*PzH*, p. 8).

It is clear that such claims are somewhat far-fetched. There is fragmentary evidence to suggest that Hegel did not consider the historical process as such to have terminated in his own time. However, he is quite explicit in denying that philosophy has any predictive value[6]. Similarly, he rejects the use of history to guide the present or, *a fortiori*, the future[7]. Perhaps Hegel might have subscribed to a more differentiated notion of prediction where the truth of a proposition is made to depend on the actual existence of the event in question. Here predictions could be declared as neither true nor false but dependent on a third logical category[8]. Cieszkowski's claims go much further: the future not only can be predicted but is necessarily predictable.

The *Prolegomena* also seeks to enlist Hegel's support for its juxtaposition of the pre-Christian and the Christian world. Although he appeals to an obscure and, as it turns out, specious text[9] Cieszkowski could have invoked Hegel's other texts where Christianity marks a watershed in the development of the spirit[10].

Certainly the suggestion that a similarity of formulation between Hegel and Cieszkowski in this respect implies any sort of confirmation of Cieszkowski's overall historiosophic division is simply false.

In justifying his analogies between history and nature by referring to Hegel, Cieszkowski is standing on firmer ground. The Hegelian philosophy of nature is customarily passed over in silence, perhaps because it is considered an embarrassment by latter-day Hegelians[11].

Indeed, Cieszkowski himself has been ridiculed by Croce for, in effect, taking Hegel's philosophy of nature seriously[12]. Yet Hegel insists that nature is – at least implicitly – the Idea[13]. Even Cieszkowski's rather odd comparison with Cuvier's fossils merely echoes the letter and spirit of Hegel's philosophy of history[14]. In short, where Cieszkowski's exposition rings queerest, it is actually most faithful to its inspiration.

At times, Cieszkowski does not seem to distinguish properly between his borrowings and his additions to Hegel. Above all, the concept of a self-conscious will is not original[15]. Indeed, the philosophy of right is an extended demonstration of the way in which the universal and infinite will acts in the spheres of abstract right, morality and ethics; in the *Prolegomena*'s terms, of the way in which post-theoretical will acts on social life. If anything, what Cieszkowski calls post-theoretical will is a regression to a purely indeterminate form of the will[16]. The difference between the two concepts may lie in the fact that although both see the will as the identity of thought and being, Hegel sees the will as its own object, whereas Cieszkowski assigns it an object called the "deed". This deed, however, is a vague, loosely applied term, neither analyzed nor described, and one which exploits certain emotive and cultural connotations[17]. Perhaps this imprecision explains the success which the "deed" was to have as a catchword for a whole generation.

Elsewhere, Cieszkowski seems to depart only slightly from Hegel. For instance, in his discussion of world-historical individuals Cieszkowski emphasizes their time-transcendent nature. Their appearance is preceded by intense yearning and followed by decisive historical change. Hegel, on the other hand, stresses their intense presentness as "men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time"[18]. This difference leads to a wider autonomy for the world-historical individual in Cieszkowski's system. There is not the least suggestion that the individual is a prisoner of his time – on the contrary, he is to consciously create his age[19]. Paradoxically, however, the role of passion and volition turns out to be much more prominent in Hegel's account of history than in Cieszkowski's[20].

III

That part of the *Prolegomena* which is not an explicit confrontation with Hegel – primarily the third chapter – lies enmeshed in a network

of intellectual currents and influences. On the one hand, these encompass the German Enlightenment and the entire German idealist tradition both before and after Hegel. On the other hand, they extend well beyond Germany to a variety of contemporary authors.

Generally speaking, I do not propose to discuss at this point the authors whom Hegel had opportunity to consider. Obviously, Herder's conception of society as an organism, his insistence on the role of organisms of nature in history, his ideal of *Humanität*, are all acutely relevant to Cieszkowski's intentions in the *Prolegomena*. Indeed, Cieszkowski refers to Herder frequently and respectfully[21]. In a sense, however, Cieszkowski's view of Herder is mediated by Hegel's prior absorption of Herder's thought into his own system. In the discussion of the *Our Father* I shall have occasion to distinguish Herder's influence as a separate thread in Cieszkowski's thought, but the *Prolegomena* looks at Herder only through the prism of Hegel. This is also true of the *Prolegomena*'s treatment of Kant and Montesquieu.

In one respect, however, Cieszkowski may be seen as attempting to rehabilitate an aspect of German idealism which Hegel had transcended. The *Prolegomena*'s Fichteanism has been noted by Georg Lukács who describes the entire Young Hegelian movement as a Fichteanization of Hegel and points to Cieszkowski as the initiator of this process, thus obliging us to look closely at Cieszkowski's position vis-à-vis Fichte[22].

It is apparent from Cieszkowski's diaries and correspondence that he was familiar with at least Fichte's more popular writings[23]. At the time when Cieszkowski was studying in Berlin, Immanuel Herman Fichte was editing his father's later writings and securing them a wide audience[24]. Although in a letter to Michelet, Cieszkowski expressly disassociated his *Prolegomena* from Fichte's *Characteristics of the Present Age*, he did suggest that the chapter dealing with the teleology of history would be in some way similar to Fichte's *Vocation of Man*[25]. In spite of this acknowledgement the *Prolegomena* contained only one slightly ambiguous reference to Fichte:

> We now have to raise absolute will to such heights of speculation as reason has been raised already. We find pointers in this direction in the older Fichte which are of no small weight. Without deprecating their importance, they remain only pointers analogous to those truly speculative pointers whose appearance we notice in Kant but whose essential discovery we owe only to Hegel (*PzH*, p. 114).

Turning to Fichte himself one finds many formal similarities to the premises of the *Prolegomena*. The fundamental idea of the *Characteristics* is that of a world plan unfolding itself where each period is determined by the preceding one. Man is now at the very middle of universal time, coming out of a period of universal constraint and not yet having entered the period of universal freedom. The whole process of history covers five distinct periods, carefully characterized, and the end of history brings humanity back to where it began, to a state where reason once again rules but as art rather than instinct[26]. At the same time, it should be noted that the *Prolegomena* does not allude to the dialectic of instinct and reason which dominates Fichte's philosophy of history. The tirade against mysticism is quite absent from Cieszkowski's work and foreign to his intention. Indeed, the *Characteristics* is a polemic against romanticism whereas the *Prolegomena* is profoundly romantic in spirit[27].

There are certain general parallels: both Fichte and Cieszkowski see man's destiny as an essentially religious one[28]. In spite of his regard for the theoretical achievements of the age, Cieszkowski basically agrees with Fichte's diagnosis of the present as a time of anguish[29]. The circular or spiral nature of history – the return of thought to being in a higher form – is a view common to both. Nevertheless since such notions were so prevalent among German idealists as to constitute the very consciousness of the period they are insufficient to establish any special affinity between Fichte's thought and Cieszkowski's. The affinity, if any, must lie in their concepts of the will, action and the deed.

According to Fichte man's destiny is to participate in the infinite will, which determines him not only as an ethical being but as a knowing subject. Reality cannot be seized through knowledge. Only through an intuition of duty, a practical determination of the will which Fichte calls faith can man attain understanding:

> It is not (the external object – AL) but the necessary faith in our freedom and power, in our own real activity and in the definite laws of human action which lies at the root of all our consciousness of a reality external to ourselves[30].

Knowledge is both preceded and followed by activity: "we do not act because we know but we know because we are called upon to act"[31]. Fichte states this in the form of a moral law: "Not merely to know but according to thy knowledge to *do* is thy vocation"[32]. Thus, the will as

understood by Fichte, is an active and creative faculty. Indeed, it is a good deal more than that:

> The will is that point at which intelligence and intuition of reality penetrate each other internally. It is a real principle for it is absolute and irresistably allots energy while sustaining and producing itself. It is an intelligible principle, penetrating through itself and contemplating the ought. In it potential is fully exhausted and the schema of divine life is raised to reality[33].

The claims which Cieszkowski makes on behalf of the will in the *Prolegomena* are reminiscent of Fichte's. In both, the will is the absolute repository of spirit. Its sphere of activity, the Good, is the ultimate destiny of man. In spite of their overriding concern with the ethical sphere and the concomitant absorption with practical reason, both Fichte and Cieszkowski ultimately mythicize the will, attributing to it the characteristics of a divine force which urges virtue out of being. In both the *Vocation of Man* and the *Prolegomena* the will dominates its auxiliary concepts, practice or activity and the deed, so thoroughly that the auxiliaries are left effectively undefined.

In light of this fundamental convergence between Fichte and Cieszkowski a whole series of lesser similarities and inspirations becomes evident. Thus, Cieszkowski's arguments of behalf of the organic nature of history can be seen to be based not simply on contemporary organic theories in general but very specifically on Fichte[34]. Cieszkowski's distinction between facts and acts is drawn not, as one might have supposed, from Schelling but from Fichte[35]. Finally, the notion of freedom which the *Prolegomena* develops in rudimentary form, where the Hegelian preponderance of necessity is to be overcome, turns out to be properly Fichtean[36].

Lukács, who originally asserted the similarity between Fichte and Cieszkowski, carefully distinguishes Fichte from the Fichteanized Young Hegelians with Cieszkowski at their head. Cieszkowski is in no sense "making the objective again subjective as Bruno Bauer was to do"[37]. According to Lukács, even though Cieszkowski maintained against Hegel that the individual was a valid subject in the historical sphere he in no way raised the ego as such to the position it had played in Fichte's system. In regard to the future and its cognition, Lukács admits that Fichte's position is little more than a more concrete expression of Kant's unending progress whereas Cieszkowski, and Hess following him, seek to make the future as concrete an epoch as

the past and present[38]. Lukács does not seem to see that in attributing a specific determination to the future, Cieszkowski is extending Hegel's absolutization of the present moment onto the future. Instead of enriching Hegel's, and *a fortiori* Fichte's, philosophy of history, Cieszkowski is restricting the range of the possible by defining the potential of development. Ultimately, the achievement of the *Prolegomena* is to close the Hegelian system even more tightly by closing off the escape-hatch marked "the future".

Some of Lukács' criticisms, such as those concerning Cieszkowski's "apriorism", are irrelevant inasmuch as they ignore the very essence of idealism. His comments about Cieszkowski's "purely mental dialectic" are both unfair and untrue. It should be clear from the summary of the *Prolegomena* that Cieszkowski's intention was precisely to break out of a purely mental dialectic and make the dialectic a real category in history. Lukács' assertion that Cieszkowski tried to found a concrete natural right permeated by history to replace the revolutionary natural right of the eighteenth century is provocative but obscure. At the same time, Lukács concedes that Cieszkowski actually went well beyond Fichte's position in the *Grundzüge*:

> The contact is no direct influence, all the less so since Cieszkowski, and following him Hess, see a question and a problem here while Fichte still naively, dogmatically comes straight out with an answer. Already this critical, dialectical, less formal way of putting the question shows that Cieszkowski and Hess, in spite of all approximation are not a simple return to Fichte's viewpoint. The future as object of dialectical thought, the attempt to grasp it by way of the dialectic, to make the future the measure of judgement of the past and present go far beyond Fichte's philosophy of history[39].

To the extent that the term is applicable, therefore, Cieszkowski's Fichteanism would seem to refer primarily to his – perhaps unsuccessful – attempt to overcome Hegel's contemplativeness. Certainly, this attempt can be viewed as a first expression of the Young Hegelians' inchoate urge to break out of the contemplative life and their re-direction from theoretical to practical reason. Nevertheless, the originality of Cieszkowski's admittedly vague and metaphysical formulation of *praxis* has been obscured by the subsequent fortune of the term[40]. In fact, the Young Hegelian understanding of *praxis* was, well into the 1840's, even more narrowly dependent on Hegel than Cieszkowski's formulation.

Perhaps this originality can be best illustrated by comparing Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* with Karl Friedrich

Biedermann's *Fundamental Philosophie*, a work published in Leipzig in the same year as the *Prolegomena*, and one to which Hillmann attributes the role of "founding the practical movement of post-Hegelian thought"[41].

Biedermann does speak a great deal about the practical role of philosophy. His call to direct spirit towards action is based on a critique of philosophy and a description of the perspectives opened to men when philosophy becomes practical which are very close to Cieszkowski's exposition. If his call is heeded, Biedermann declares:

> ... life itself would become philosophical and so philosophy would no longer need to escape life but would enter into the very heart of life and work from there outwards ... philosophy has tried too long to work from the outside ...[42].

At the same time, Biedermann attacks those contemporary philosophers who would first perfect the theoretical system before it could pass on to the deed[43]. Although this criticism is directed at Michelet, it could almost equally well apply to Cieszkowski's redefinition of Hegelian categories in preparation for the era of the will. Nevertheless, upon closer examination it becomes apparent that Biedermann does not go beyond Michelet. For both, the catalyst to practice is itself intensely theoretical: the spirit of mankind which Biedermann invokes is the self-consciousness[44]. Thus, the intensification and universalization of human self-consciousness is seen as the sufficient agent of change.

Cieszkowski's contribution to the development of a theory of *praxis* is precisely his awareness that practice must be sought outside the domain of cognition. Though his "deed" remains undefined and is to follow a perfected theory it is very much an ethical and not an epistemological act. It is irrelevant that Biedermann pays more attention to the social question than does Cieszkowski in his *Prolegomena*. As I have tried to show by citing the examples of Baader and Radowitz, an absorption in social-economic problems was as much an indication of never having risen to Hegel's position as of having overcome him. Actually, Biedermann's and Cieszkowski's subsequent careers show a basic similarity[45]. In 1838, however, by developing his demands around the notion of self-consciousness Biedermann had shown himself to be a prisoner of the Hegelian system in a much more fundamental sense.

IV

To the extent that Cieszkowski broke out of the Hegelian system he did so neither by returning to Fichte nor by drawing on his German contemporaries, but by allowing himself to be influenced by foreign, primarily French authors. Indeed, the fundamental inspiration of the *Prolegomena* belongs not to Hegel alone but perhaps almost equally to a rather minor philosopher of history, Philippe Joseph Buchez.

Buchez's *Introduction à la science de l'histoire* first appeared in 1833. It defined history as "the science whose goal is to foresee the social future of the human race in its free activity"[46]. In fact, according to Buchez, all science is a form of cognition of the future since any useful form of knowledge has an active value as a guide to the future. The *prévoyance* which characterizes science is "the determination of the whole series of secondary terms existing between the first term, the point of departure, and the final term, the goal"[47]. Buchez articulates this final term which man has formerly only sensed:

> The holy problem of humanity consists of instituting in a habitual manner the ordinarily temporary and accidental preponderance of sociability[48].

History, the science of general human goals, is both a divine and social process. Laws governing societies, particularly the most general society – humanity, are analogous to physical laws. Every element is integrated with every other; every effect is a cause. In short, for Buchez as for other Saint-Simonians society develops as an organism where "the future is the last link of a series whose first link is the past"[49]. The difference between physical and social laws lies in the fact that "man is a creature who can move not only *a posteriori* but *a priori*; he is someone who can will"[50]. Humanity advances towards its goal through three great eras and two secondary stages: desire, reasoning and realization which must pass through the stages of theory and practice"[51].

Even though Buchez's work is intended to be only an introduction to the science of history it is, in fact, a substantial two volume *opus* – more comparable in scope to Cieszkowski's *Our Father* than to his *Prolegomena*. Its arguments are expounded systematically and its historical material and periodizations are richly developed where the *Prolegomena* is sketchy and schematic. It is not surprising that

Cieszkowski had read Buchez's *Introduction* thoroughly and was obviously much impressed[52]. In fact, the *Prolegomena* may be understood as a Hegelianized interpretation of Buchez.

Apart from the actual similarities there is an underlying agreement between Buchez and Cieszkowski. In later years, both entered the current of what was to be called Social Catholicism[53]. The critique of the present age as a period of egoism, cruel competition and negative liberty which Buchez had already elaborated in 1833 was to become Cieszkowski's[54]. In a sense, Buchez's call – "The Revolution must proclaim itself Christian" – was also Cieszkowski's[55]. Above all, their agreement found concrete expression in the account of the relation of God to history. In the *Prolegomena*, God and indeed the concept of religion if not its phenomenal variations stood outside the dialectic of history. To Buchez, the idea that man could have produced his own goals was an absurdity for it was religion which showed the aims governing men and these aims were dictated by Providence[56].

Upon examination, therefore, the organic analogy so central to both Buchez and Cieszkowski is only applicable in a qualified sense. Above the organism of history stands a Divine Being. Hence, the organic laws of history are ultimately subordinated to Providence and the future is determined because the Divine Mind has determined it from all time. Even human activity, apparently springing from ethical impulses and cognition of the future, is actually an implicit confidence in the realization of a divine plan. It is to Cieszkowski's credit that he acknowledges a possible contradiction between a future which is to be freely and organically determined and a future providentially predetermined. His solution lies in postulating a dialectical interrelationship between God and the world; in a very peculiar way, God is somehow dependent for His happiness on the world He has created[57].

It has been suggested that this solution is inspired by Fourier[58], a suggestion all the more interesting in light of the strong – though bashful – claims which the *Prolegomena* makes on behalf of Fourier's system[59]. I would maintain, however, that these claims should not be taken as an endorsement of Fourier's position. Although Cieszkowski owes much to Fourier and, in some respects, can be described as a Fourierist, his references to Fourier himself in the *Prolegomena* are incidental. Cieszkowski says nothing at all about the substance of Fourier's system[60]. Indeed, he could have substituted Saint-Simon's name for Fourier's without changing the meaning of the passage or its

significance to the *Prolegomena* as a whole for Cieszkowski's intention is not to praise one school against another[61]. He is simply attempting to offer a glimpse into the future without committing himself to a specific blueprint and to rehabilitate the concept of utopia from its Hegelian neglect.

In spite of this effort at rehabilitation the *Prolegomena* is characterized by a certain Hegelian uneasiness vis-à-vis utopia[62]. Although the term appears only as a negative description[63], the *Prolegomena* makes a strong plea on behalf of the sphere of *Sollen* thus leaving Cieszkowski open to the charge of utopianism and a dismissal of his work on that basis. At the same time Cieszkowski is anxious to avoid the implications of social radicalism which the term "utopia" was beginning to acquire[64]. Thus, in evoking Fourier's system as one "which has made a great step in developing organic truth within reality", (*PzH*, p. 148) and simultaneously criticizing it as an un-self-conscious production, Cieszkowski is conveying two ideas: first, that the construction of utopia is a valid tool in the cognition of the future; second, that utopia has been inadequately understood as a relation between the ideal and the real[65]. The implications of the paradoxes which he deduces from Fourier's position are unmistakeable[66]: if utopia as a category of analysis is developed speculatively and consciously it will result not in vain utopianism but in knowledge of the future. The true utopia can "never be ideal enough"[67] for it is teleological. In this way, the concept of utopia – like myth in Strauss' work – is taken out of the realm of illusion or deception and granted legitimacy[68].

In addition to his somewhat unsure and apologetic defence of utopia Cieszkowski quite openly suggests that Fourier's system is illustrative of the future era which his *Prolegomena* has announced. Fourier's views are not to be taken as truth but rather as an example of the sort of theory which is proper to the era of the Will, the era of the Good. As Hegel's philosophy belongs to the present, so Fourier belongs to the future. Thus, it is in the discoveries of French social thought that one can find satisfaction for the needs of the present moment and an indication of the shape of the future. It is here that one will find a way out of the *impasse* of Hegelian thought. As Cieszkowski discusses Fourier's achievement the earlier assertions regarding the social nature of the future take on definite contours. The appeal to Fourier is, in a very definite sense, the conclusion of the *Prolegomena zur*

Historiosophie: Cieszkowski's confrontation with Hegel is a self-confrontation and it terminates in Fourier. Thus, the *Prolegomena* is also a prolegomenon to Cieszkowski's paramount concerns – the description of mankind's needs and its destiny.

V

Inasmuch as the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* is a contribution to a polemic now forgotten, it is difficult to appreciate its meaning or its importance. Even when understood as self-clarification or as a specific critique of Hegel it must be considered in terms of the audience for which it was intended before it can be properly assessed.

The immediate reaction to the *Prolegomena* is readily available in the reviews it was granted. The earliest and most superficial of these reviews appeared anonymously in the *Allgemeine Preussische Staatszeitung*. In a slightly condescending tone the reviewer remarked that the *Prolegomena* was symptomatic of the times:

> Some try to set philosophy on the level of art; others range it among the sciences. No one raises it to a completely new level...[69].

It is not quite clear whether he considers Cieszkowski to have attained the "new level" which philosophy is seeking. Probably not, for although "this book promises much in the development of the independent philosophy which we all desire"[70], the reviewer's praise is rather restrained.

The key to the *Staatszeitung*'s hesitation may lie in what it called "the somewhat bold nature" of the *Prolegomena*. As the official Prussian gazette, the *Staatszeitung* may well be expected to have shown a certain wariness in regard to philosophical innovations when these attempted to establish themselves in the sphere of social theory by drawing on the discoveries of little-known French socialists[71]. On the other hand, the very insertion of the review acted as a sort of official *imprimatur* for the *Prolegomena*. One can speculate as to whether this approval was granted out of ignorance of the work's implications or as a consequence of the generally liberal attitude to Hegelian philosophizing in the Altenstein administration.

The most thorough review was written by Karl Ludwig Michelet for the *Jahrbücher für Wissenschaftliche Kritik*[72]. Michelet had introduced Cieszkowski to the history of modern philosophy[73], had followed the

development of the *Prolegomena*, read the draft and assisted its author in the technicalities of publication[74]. It is not surprising that his review should show enthusiasm and pride at a pupil's achievement. Nevertheless, Michelet's summary of the work is remarkably fair and exhaustive[75]; his critical comments are well placed. Above all, the review conveys precisely the differences between Cieszkowski's and Michelet's position vis-à-vis Hegel. In general terms, this difference is one between the Young and Old Hegelians.

Michelet's critical observations have a single theme: Cieszkowski errs in thinking that he has gone beyond Hegel; his *Prolegomena* is only the elaboration of ideas unfortunately left implicit in Hegel:

> Hegel teaches everywhere that philosophy as consciousness and as the seizure-in-thought (*In-Gedanken-Fassen*) of an age is at the same time a stepping-beyond and out of that age and, thus, is the kernel of a new shape of reality. It is inconceivable that Hegel should be untrue to his own principle and deny the capacity of creating a better future to the most perfect formulation of philosophy[76].

Michelet admits that at times Hegel does seem to be untrue to his philosophy:

> Certainly, in practice Hegel expresses himself in such a way that his own time is presented as the completed ideal of mankind above which nothing can be attained. Thus, although Hegel must recognize the July Revolution as a great deed it remains an annoying and disagreeable happening in his eyes[77].

He stoutly insists, however, that this is not a consequence of Hegel's system, as Cieszkowski would have it, but the result of a failure to follow through his own principles strictly:

> It is true enough that Hegel affirms philosophy to be the highest expression of the spirit; the most essential aim of the history of the world, however, is the representative state which always remains for him the model of all constitutions[78].

Hegel is a constitutionalist and though he says that the aim of all spiritual activity is the consciousness of the unity of the subjective and the objective in the forms of art, religion and philosophy – as Cieszkowski had quite correctly quoted him – Hegel had also said that in the philosophy of history his aim is the state.

Whatever the validity of this interpretation of Hegel it underpins Michelet's specific criticisms of the *Prolegomena*. Thus, Cieszkowski is declared to be mistaken in maintaining that Hegel remains a prisoner of the sphere of thought; the *Philosophy of History* has as its object the concrete reality of the state. Although Michelet's statement may be

formally correct it cannot be taken as sufficient to disprove Cieszkowski's more general assertions about the theoretical nature of the Hegelian system as a whole. At the same time, Michelet tries to show that Cieszkowski's deed is itself pre-eminently theoretical. Here, Michelet stands on firmer ground because of the undefined character of the deed as presented in the *Prolegomena.* Cieszkowski would have to admit that "thought itself remains capital because it is the impulse to action and action's innermost kernel"[79]. Nevertheless, Cieszkowski has indicated that the deed has a particular sphere of activity, that of social life – however ill defined – which makes it more than simply another mode of thought.

It is clear that Michelet does not think much of the concept of "social life". He dismisses it as a "Saint-Simonian sounding name" corresponding to the fifth age of mankind in Fichte's *Characteristics of the Present Age.* He quotes Cieszkowski's affirmation that "the state will abandon its abstract remoteness . . . and man will emerge out of his abstraction to become a social individual"[80]. To Michelet, this is but another way of saying that the end of history is the Hegelian state.

Evidently, Michelet can conceive of no progress beyond Hegel. In fact, his review opens with a curiously incorrect and irrelevant ode to the advance of Hegelian philosophy throughout the world:

> I remark joyfully that whereas our Western neighbours have long been acquainted with the newest German philosophy and have been active in its self-production . . . this self-production has now attained the East. Since Hegel's fame and teaching have been transplanted over France and England into the United States of America and have long counted many adherents in Poland and the Russian Empire . . . we can truly call its spirit a world traveller. Now, a voice arises out of the nation which touches us in the East and with a part of which the ties of common statehood join us. (This voice) speaks in our native tongue and gives us proof that the spirit of German philosophy has penetrated these people more deeply than in the West. Moreover, it has generated self-acting fruits, raising the nation which gave birth to them to greater heights and striving to push it out of and beyond itself[81].

In the light of such comments it is clear that Michelet's comments regarding Cieszkowski's dependence on Hegel in no way minimize the importance of the *Prolegomena.* On the contrary, inasmuch as Hegel cannot be superseded the only true progress possible lies in a submission to Hegel's genius.

Julius Frauenstadt's review of the *Prolegomena* in the *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst* shows much less deference to Hegel[82]. Cieszkowski is commended for requiring of any

forthcoming philosophy of history that it include the future and for requiring of Hegel that he observe his own trichotomic divisions and spiritual categories when considering history. Like Cieszkowski, Frauenstadt has no patience with those who would make a virtue of Hegel's failings: Hegel's method must be applied universally or not at all.

Frauenstadt's criticisms concern the actual content of the categories as they are developed in the *Prolegomena*:

> We agree fully with the formal aspect of the author's argument but in his definition of the content of history we see how formal truth can co-exist with factual untruth for the author's trichotomy is not that of history itself; it is a contrived, subjective, and hence untrue trichotomy[83].

Frauenstadt is prepared to accept Cieszkowski's "table of categories of world history" with its logical, physical and pneumatic constituents as a set of symbols or analogies. Symbols may be suggestive, but they do not provide explanations of the concept to which they refer[84]. Thus, the course and object of history is to be gleaned not from a compilation of abstract, symbolic categories but from an analysis of social life:

> History is the development of the *objective, general* spirit of mankind. Its categories are neither logical, physical, anthropological nor psychological. They are the categories of church and state as both earthly and religious communities. Mankind is a community destined to produce the kingdom of God... The whole course of history has no other meaning than the transfiguration of man into a God-Man[85].

Thus, Frauenstadt suggests an alternative trichotomy where history appears as the evolution of the human community from its original unity of church and state in antiquity, through the separation of the present, into an era now beginning – the interpenetration and reconciliation of church and state. This is the true content of the unity of the this-worldly and the other-worldly which Cieszkowski rightly characterizes as the content of the future.

Whereas Michelet had criticized Cieszkowski for having claimed to have overcome Hegel and for having failed to see that Hegel provides the answers to the *Prolegomena*'s questions, Frauenstadt seems to be making a different demand of Cieszkowski. He is imposing a specifically Left Hegelian model of history and wondering why Cieszkowski does not conform to it. In effect, however, both Frauenstadt's and Michelet's criticisms are similar: both are accusing Cieszkowski of paying insufficient attention to the development of objective spirit, the

realm of social institutions. In other words, they are saying that Cieszkowski has not applied the insights of the *Philosophy of Right.*

It is true that Cieszkowski is vague about the institutional shape of the future social era. He does affirm that nations will pass out of a natural and into a social state, creating a family of nations where international law, morality and ethics will rule. He even calls the future organic humanity "a *Church* in the highest sense" (*PzH*, p. 153). Nevertheless, the tone of these comments is muted and he does not become more specific. I would suggest that this apparent failure is intentional. First, the *Prolegomena* is intended to show only the form and not the content of his historiosophy. Secondly, and more significantly, Cieszkowski is quite consciously seeking to avoid antagonizing any of the emerging factions of the Hegelian school.

The *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* attempts to provide the groundwork of a general philosophy of history. As such, it is a work of conciliation which looks for the lowest common denominator among its potential contributors. Only if there is unity among the Hegelians can a concerted effort to apply Hegel's method to history take place. Most significantly, only if there is theoretical agreement can a post-theoretical *praxis* be defined and realized.

Perhaps the concepts which the *Prolegomena* develops – the deed, the future, the will – can be seen as attempts to escape not only out of the theoretical *impasse* bequeathed by Hegel but also out of the political and metaphysical conflicts raging through the Hegelian school. In eschewing any further entanglement in theoretical questions and urging the Hegelians to devote themselves to the positive, practical construction of an ideal future Cieszkowski is trying to create unity at a supra- or post-theoretical level.

The reviews cited above are evidence of his failure. It is striking that the Hegelian Centre in the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* and the Hegelian Left in the *Hallische Jahrbücher* – so much at odds in many other matters – should have been at one in rejecting Cieszkowski's plea for a transition to an era of practical philosophy and social *praxis* as he understood it. Ironically, therefore, the intended audience of the *Prolegomena* paid it little heed while elsewhere it found an enthusiastic reception[86].

VI

The Young Hegelian on whom the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* exerted the most significant influence was Moses Hess[87]. In his

Europäische Triarchie Hess praised both Cieszkowski's critical and positive achievements:

> . . . the so-called "Hegelian Left" is already preparing the passage out of the philosophy of the past into the philosophy of the deed so that the last stage of Hegelian, and in general German, philosophy is already a *negation* of the philosophy of the past. A *positive* passage out of German philosophy into that of the deed has been made in the above mentioned work of Cieszkowski and also earlier in my own work. (The reference is to Hess' *Heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* and Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena*)[88].

The *Prolegomena* is acknowledged as a "highly interesting work . . . which besides its positive side also has a polemical aspect where the weakness of the Hegelian system is uncovered with much skill"[89]. Thus, Hess attributes to Cieszkowski the merit of having realized that "absolute idealism has reached the summit of what philosophy in general is capable"[90]. Moreover, Hess borrows directly from the *Prolegomena* the distinction between the preconscious *fact* and the post-theoretical *act* and applies the distinction to his own concept of the deed.

In spite of this close affinity Hess is rather impatient with the limits of the *Prolegomena*. He reproaches Cieszkowski for passing all too fleetingly over the self-contradiction in which philosophy stands as long as it remains prisoner of its own prejudices against the knowability of the future. For Hess, it is evident that the future can and must be known; otherwise human activity would be bereft of all freedom. Consequently, Cieszkowski's long-winded proofs and analogies drawn from Cuvier appear to Hess to be quite irrelevant[91]. In short, one might say that Hess raises Cieszkowski's claims on behalf of the knowability of the future to a higher power, basing his confidence on the conviction that "man has a good, enlightened, divine, rational-will (*Vernunftwillen*): man is a participant in divine knowledge"[92].

Cieszkowski would be prepared to accept this notion. Indeed, the *Prolegomena* had suggested a dialectic of the human and the divine which would culminate in the eventual divinization of man. However, there is a profound difference between Cieszkowski and Hess in this respect. The former sees the end of the historical process as the attainment of a certain semblance of humanity divinized – a semblance only because God is ultimately above history and even above the categories of spirit. Hess, on the other hand, seems to see human cognition as absorbing and replacing divine knowledge; when man is God, the divine being as a separate entity disappears.

The implications of this difference for the "philosophy of the

deed" – a term Hess borrows directly from Cieszkowski – are far-reaching. As the traces of reliance on Divine Providence disappear the deed comes to operate in the realm of absolutely unqualified freedom and freedom becomes attainable only through the deed:

> What happens in the future, even if for itself it occurs with freedom, happens only out of necessity for us because it does not happen through us. Only that which is executed *through us* occurs with freedom *for us* – even though for itself it be in necessity. (It occurs in freedom) insofar as our innermost essence, our consciousness is its determining characteristic[93].

Thus, Hess destroys the somewhat fragile tie in the *Prolegomena* between epistemology and ethics – between cognition of the future and the moral imperative of acting according to these cognitive discoveries. Hess has entered the realm of the purest *Sollen* and the urgency of his call to act stands in sharp contrast to Cieszkowski's somewhat placid speculation.

It is interesting to note that Hess' position in the *Europäische Triarchie* marks the middle point in an evolution whose starting point puts him much closer to Cieszkowski. In his first book, *Heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* – described today as unreadable, strange and chaotic[94] – Hess had attempted to construct a historiosophy very much in the same way as Cieszkowski though with less success[95]. He had distinguished three periods: unity between God and man, followed by division and finally reintegration; these periods had been inaugurated by Adam, Christ and Spinoza successively[96]. In another sense, history divided into two periods: the past and the New Jerusalem of the future. Although it was not clear whether the caesura occurred at the Reformation, the time of Spinoza or the French Revolution it did seem that, for Hess, the future era had already begun.

The similarities of method and intention between the *Prolegomena* and the *Heilige Geschichte* are striking[97]. The philosophy of history of the latter underlies the *Europäische Triarchie.* However, in the *Triarchie* Hess focusses on the immediate needs of the present. His concern is with a specific political arrangement realizable now; hence, the pressing tone of the call to action and the willingness to forsake all further speculation[98]. Two years later, in an article specifically entitled 'The Philosophy of the Deed,' Hess abstracts from the programmatic content of the *Europäische Triarchie* and radicalizes its principles. The result is a concept of the deed where thought and action (*Handeln*) no

longer stand in opposition but appear as a single activity of the ego[99]. Thus, Cieszkowski's "deed" originally censured for its abstraction, then utilized in a political programme, finally reappears in another form of abstraction[100].

The numerous similarities between Cieszkowski and Hess as reflected in their first works suggest not only a co-incidence of views but a certain intellectual, and perhaps psychological, affinity. Biographically, they shared the characteristic of operating on the margin of several cultures. Hess' intimate relations with France, his participation in German political and philosophical life, his religious attitude to socialism and his later national Messianism, all remind one closely of Cieszkowski[101]. In the late 1830's, Hess and Cieszkowski were the only Hegelians already influenced by the ideas of French socialism. Indeed, it might appear that their assessment of these ideas was similar – Cieszkowski's criticism of Fourier for "having laid down his arms too easily before reality accepted *a priori*" (*PzH*, pp. 147–148) would seem to correspond to Hess's critique of Saint-Simon as "ignoring the task of the present"[102]. In fact, however, these comments point to a profound ideological and practical difference: whereas Cieszkowski's reproached the French socialists for not recognizing the possibilities and value of gradual reform, Hess accused them of overlooking the revolutionary potential of the moment.

Most discussion of the Young Hegelians, including that which concerns Cieszkowski, slips into an inquiry about Marx. This connection is certainly understandable since it is Marx who formulates the most trenchant critique of the Young Hegelian movement and it is this movement which forms the crucible for his own system. At the same time, however, such a perspective on the Young Hegelians falsifies one's perspective by focussing uniquely on an outcome external to their concerns and by neglecting the intermediate steps leading to this outcome, among them the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.*

There is certainly sufficient evidence to suggest that, in spite of a specific disclaimer, Marx was at least indirectly familiar with the *Prolegomena.* In 1882 he was to write to Engels:

> This Cieszkowski – a count, as the Swiss Bürkli remarks, and into the bargain a 'Doctor of Philosophy' . . . this Cieszkowski etc. in fact visited me once in Paris (at the time of the 'Deutsche Französische Jahrbücher') (i.e., 1844 – AL) and I was so smitten that I absolutely could not and wished not to read any of his sins. . .[103].

It would be surprising if Marx had not read someone whom he remembered so vividly forty years later. In any case, Engels' recollections appear even fresher as he replied to Marx:

> This Cieszkowski had already before 1842 written a naturphilosophisches (*sic*!) book and, if I am not mistaken, collaborated in the 'Deutsche' or even the 'Hallische Jahrbücher'...[104].

Certainly, Marx could hardly have escaped being informed of the content of the *Prolegomena* from his own mentors in the period 1838–1842. For example, Karl Werder, highly respected tutor to a number of aspiring Hegelians, corrected the printer's proofs of the *Prolegomena* and expressed his agreement with the work's contents[105]. Moses Hess, whose admiration for the *Prolegomena* has already been cited, was among Marx's closest collaborators in the *Rheinische Zeitung* and his guide to French socialism[106]. To be sure, close chronological examination does point to a certain discrepancy: Marx arrived in Berlin in 1836 just as Cieszkowski was leaving[107]. Nevertheless, Marx's encyclopedic readings of Hegelian philosophy and his tenacious efforts to keep abreast of all developments in this field are virtual guarantees that he could not have overlooked the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.*

Above all, however, it is not the question of Marx's possible contact, direct or indirect, with Cieszkowski which attracts attention but rather the similarity in certain aspects of their critique of philosophy and the relation between their notions of *praxis* or the deed. The *Prolegomena*'s rejection of Hegelian contemplativeness is to be repeated more emphatically by Marx in his global denunciation of German idealism, particularly in the *German Ideology.* Inasmuch as this rejection draws on the general consciousness of post-Hegelian philosophy and the frustrations of epigonism already described it would seem to situate Marx – at a later date – within the same broad tendency which the *Prolegomena* had helped to define. In fact, however, the relation between their notions of *praxis* goes much further. For Marx before 1845, as for Bruno Bauer and others, *praxis* refers essentially to a critical or dissenting attitude towards Hegelian orthodoxy. Thus, *praxis* is still a fundamentally theoretical activity, "practical" only to the extent that it gravitates increasingly, if often unintentionally, towards a critique of the social and political connotations of Hegelianism. At the same time, the term acquires a second and more muted epistemological significance revolving around the

affirmation that truth is not to be discovered but created and this truth-creating activity is referred to also as *praxis*[108]. It is not until 1845, and most clearly in his *Theses on Feuerbach*, that Marx adopts in full Cieszkowski's original argument: that hitherto philosophers had only interpreted the world, henceforth their task would be to change it[109].

It is reflections such as these which have led some scholars to suggest that Marx is basically indebted to Cieszkowski[110]. Generally speaking, their arguments are more convincing than those which refuse to recognize any significant role at all to the *Prolegomena* in the formation of Marx's views[111]. Nevertheless, in the absence of any further proof, one must concur with those commentaries which simply see Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena* as an essential moment in the pre-history of Marxism without hazarding any guesses as to the precise relation between Marx and Cieszkowski[112].

VII

In the late 1830's and early 1840's, as the Hegelian School in Germany was grappling with its numerous schisms and contradictions, Hegelianism was rapidly becoming something of a cult in Russia. The latest pronouncements from Berlin were awaited with awesome anticipation, read in exaltation, and passionately dissected and disputed[113]. Even granting due allowance for this extraordinary enthusiasm for all things Hegelian, however, the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* created a noteworthy stir. It was read and debated by Stankevitch, Ogarev, in all probability Bakunin, and above all Herzen[114].

Alexander Herzen had read the *Prolegomena* in 1839 at the end of his exile in Vladimir[115]. In a letter to the theosophist, A. L. Vitberg, he conveyed his excitement upon reading Cieszkowski:

> I have been particularly busy with history and philosophy. In particular, I have undertaken an essay on the following subject: "what sort of a link does our age constitute between the past and the future?" The question is important so I've worked a great deal on it. Suddenly, I see that something similar has been published in Berlin, the *Prolegomena zur Historiographie.* I order the book and imagine my joy: on all essential points I find myself in agreement with the author to an amazing degree. Consequently, my propositions are correct and I shall work them out further[116].

In spite of the unfortunate mis-title it is obvious that Herzen was much impressed with the *Prolegomena.* Inasmuch as he read Cieszkowski before he had read any Hegel, the *Prolegomena* may be

seen as Herzen's introduction to Hegelianism[117]. Although the projected essay on "the present as a link between past and future" is unknown, Herzen's other writings of the period show substantial similarities with the ideas of the *Prolegomena.*

First, Herzen and Cieszkowski agreed in their periodization of history. They distinguished three eras, the first ending with the coming of Christ – hardly an idea original to them. However, in contrast to Hegel and some Hegelians – Moses Hess, for instance – they saw the present time as the end of the second era. Thus, for Cieszkowski and Herzen the Reformation and the French Revolution assumed only secondary significance[118]. The future, on the other hand, became a single and primary historical unit. Moreover, the claims made by both on behalf of the future divided history *de facto* into two periods: the past, its antitheses and contradictions, as against a future of harmony and universal reconciliation, with the present as a critical boundary[119].

Second, it appears that Herzen was much impressed with Cieszkowski's analogies between the processes of nature and history[120]. He accepted without hesitation the *Prolegomena*'s comparison of the knowability of the future to Cuvier's ability to deduce an entire fossil from a single tooth[121]. Moreover, he endorsed the theory of the organic nature of history which underlay the comparison. At the same time, Herzen was at one with Cieszkowski in never allowing his recognition of the importance of physical categories in history to limit his appreciation of the profoundly different and higher nature of spiritual categories properly speaking[122]. In this respect, both were careful to maintain a certain distance from their romantic and Schellingian contemporaries[123].

Third, Herzen's critique of Hegel corresponds closely to that expressed in the *Prolegomena*[124]. The connection is only indirect in that part of Herzen's early writings where he is chiefly concerned with overcoming the passive understanding of "reconciliation" so characteristic of his Hegelian compatriots[125]. Later, however, particularly in his "Buddhism in Science", Herzen attacks the theoretical nature of Hegelianism. In its place he attempts to develop a concept of activity:

> In knowledge, thought and being are reconciled; but though the conditions of the world are constituted by thought, the full world lies in activity... Thought is the activity of the truncated reason destroying the personality... The activity of the truncated heart is a particular action, incapable of developing into a universal... In rational, freely ethical

and passionately energetic activity man attains the reality of his personality and eternalizes himself in the world of events. In such activity man is eternal in time, infinite in necessity, the representative of his race and himself, a living and conscious organ of his epoch[126].

Herzen appears to be repeating Cieszkowski's notion of a post-theoretical *praxis*. Here he is not reasoning historiosophically but personally and purely polemically; nevertheless, the implications are those of the *Prolegomena*: German philosophy has succeeded in its own sphere; now the will must impose its knowledge on the external world.

Thus, at the very least, there is a striking coincidence between the views of the young Herzen and those expressed in the *Prolegomena*[127]. This coincidence rests on a number of broad and lasting similarities already manifested in Cieszkowski's and Herzen's common concerns of the early 1840's. Both read many of the same contemporary authors and understood the implications of French socialist theories well before others of their generation[128]. Above all, both shared a concern for the ethicization of all spheres of life; a concern which included the demand for an application and transformation of philosophy.

On the basis of such similarities and Herzen's own comments, one is led to go beyond an affirmation of coincidence and to conclude that Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena* influenced the formation of the young Herzen's views in general, and his attitude to Hegel in particular[129]. At the same time, however, one is surprised to find that there is no evidence showing that Herzen and Cieszkowski met in later years in spite of Herzen's *engagement* on behalf of the Polish cause and the fact that they were to frequent very much the same circles in France and share a number of common friends[130]. One suspects that they would have found a great deal in common not only by virtue of their similar class origins and cosmopolitanism but, above all, in their growing scepticism towards the revolutionary tide to which they had contributed – more consciously in the case of Herzen than Cieszkowski – and which was to leave them both far behind.

A last word on the Cieszkowski–Herzen relationship is to be found in Herzen's only recently published essay on Granovskij. Whereas in the writings of his Hegelian period Herzen had sometimes seemed implicitly to minimize Cieszkowski's achievement[131] even as he was drawing on the latter's insights and even though Herzen later assumed a

self-mocking attitude towards his own, and his contemporaries', youthful Hegelian infatuation, in this essay Herzen gives Cieszkowski his due:

> the honour of the first attempt to scientifically depart from the Hegelian construction of history (belongs to Cieszkowski – AL). He was the first to remark the unilateralness about which we spoke. His main thought consists in forsaking the goal of the Germanic world which is knowledge of truth. He does not assume this goal to be the universal goal of history, reserving for the future an actualization of truth filled with love, bliss and virtue[132].

The reception of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* in France and Poland belongs to a fuller discussion in the following chapters of Cieszkowski's activity in these two countries. In France, the general ignorance of German philosophy limited the potential readership of the *Prolegomena*. Significantly, however, the French intellectual closest to Germany, Edgar Quinet, found in the work an impressive confirmation of his analysis of German philosophy as striving to escape the contemplative character imposed on it by Hegel[133]. In Poland, a relative philosophical underdevelopment, mingled with resentment of Poles writing in German, prevented a balanced assessment of the *Prolegomena*[134]. Nevertheless, two radicals – Edward Dembowski and Henryk Kamieński – criticized the work in sound and pertinent terms[135].

Dembowski dismisses the originality of Cieszkowski's periodization claiming that Cousin had done something very similar ten years earlier[136]. Moreover, he attacks Cieszkowski for blurring distinctions within the first two historical eras. In effect, this reproach of vagueness is a condemnation of the *a priori* character of the *Prolegomena*'s historiosophic deductions and as such similar to that which Lukács was to make in the article on Hess already discussed. Dembowski also questions Cieszkowski's exposition of the categories of the spirit. Feeling, thought and deed, says Dembowski, do not have Beauty, Truth and the Good as corresponding categories. Not feeling but equilibrium gives birth to Beauty; Truth itself is the highest good – "'The Truth will save you' says the Redeemer" – and Truth is already virtue because the latter cannot exist without the former[137].

Finally, Dembowski criticizes Cieszkowski's concept of the deed. According to Dembowski, the deed is only the conscious manifestation

of thought[138]. The unity of thought and feeling is creativity. Cieszkowski's mistake lies in his confusion of a range of related concepts – deed, action, creation, production. Moreover, he confuses the appearance and development of thought in itself, which is knowledge, with thought's development in time, which is history[139]. In fact, Dembowski suggests that Cieszkowski is somehow forced by his general position to make the deed man's highest goal as well as the means to men's goals[140]. He finds confirmation of Cieszkowski's difficulties with the concept of the deed in the latter's failure to go beyond attributing a label to "the philosophy of the deed"[141].

Kamieński's criticism is directed entirely at the concept of the deed. In general terms, he criticizes the "deed" as an "only partially developed and independent theory simply serving to clarify the new period of philosophy which is expected to follow"[142]. More specifically, he points out that for Cieszkowski practical philosophy consists of thought plus something else; hence, it is not unitary and thus – by implication – still characteristic of an epoch of division and dualism[143]. Kamieński then advances his concept of the unitary deed which is "the active relation of the individual with humanity and is a necessary condition of human spiritual life"[144]. In this way, the deed becomes not only the outcome of the spirit's development but its condition.

Inasmuch as both Dembowski's and Kamieński's criticisms appeared five years after the publication of the *Prolegomena* their value as original, contemporary comment must be qualified. In the intervening five years, the Hegelian school had changed considerably; Ruge, Hess, Feuerbach and others had all gone far beyond both the critical comments and the positive postulates of the *Prolegomena*. Moreover, the criticism of the two Polish radicals is unfair: both reproached Cieszkowski his infidelity to Hegel by using Hegel's arguments against him; simultaneously, both were adapting the Hegelian system to their own needs – and drawing on Cieszkowski's insights in the process. Nevertheless, because of their own concern with the transformation of philosophy into practical activity, Dembowski and Kamieński were able to identify the weaknesses of the *Prolegomena*'s appeal to action. They realized that this appeal was merely theoretical. Indeed, Cieszkowski realized this himself and his life and many of his later writings are an attempt to spell out and to demonstrate his concept of "the deed".

VIII

As he was writing the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, Cieszkowski was also preparing his doctoral dissertation: *De Philosophiae ionicae, ingenio, vi, loco.* He submitted it to Heidelberg on his way to France in the summer of 1838 and duly received his doctorate a few months later[145]. As a thesis about the beginnings of philosophy the *Ionian Philosophy*, is a symmetrical counterpart to the *Prolegomena* and it complements the critique of Hegel expressed there. Moreover, in spite of its academic nature, the *Ionian Philosophy* is worth examining as a terse and well-argued contribution to Cieszkowski's overall system.

The *Ionian Philosophy* divides naturally into three parts: an assessment of Hegel's position in the history of the history of philosophy; an alternative account – based on a redefinition of logical categories – of the development of philosophy; a substantiation of this account through an analysis of the Old Ionian school.

The work opens with a tribute to Hegel – similar in spirit to that of the *Prolegomena.* Hegel is lauded for having seen that the history of philosophy presents a cumulative and progressive pattern:

> Only Hegel gave life to this science, discovering that the history of philosophy is the successive development *in time* of absolute philosophy in itself... Only Hegel has proven that the process of thought developing *intensively* in the general system of knowledge and the process of knowledge developing *extensively* in succeeding philosophical systems are... one absolute progress. (*I.P.*, p. 288).

With Hegel, thought has found itself in the labyrinth of its past. Cieszkowski affirms – adopting the *Prolegomena*'s distinction – that in their newly found self-consciousness, former philosophical *facts* now are the *deeds* of thought. In its oneness, the present standpoint of philosophy overcomes national philosophic systems. The true philosophy is the common property of all mankind.

However, Hegel is the culmination and termination of philosophy "*only in a certain sense*" (*I.P.*, p. 297). His system marks the limits of a cardinal philosophical era, as Aristotle's system had earlier. Certainly, Hegel's achievements cannot be by-passed and even his weaknesses are the conditions of further progress. Nevertheless, Cieszkowski maintains, the philosophy of history has not attained its final form for two reasons:

> If asked whether the history of philosophy has attained the absolute satisfaction of this last condition, i.e., whether its present form is an unerring touchstone of the system of thought, we would answer: not quite... After all, those *disjecta membra philosophiae*

have not yet reached their final and absolute organization; ... after all, the true organism of the history of philosophy has not yet been revealed, either in regard to its past or its future... (*I.P.*, p. 290).

Thus, Cieszkowski evaluates Hegel's history of philosophy in terms of the organic notion of spiritual development so familiar to readers of the *Prolegomena*. Here, however, his concern is with the past; specifically, with a re-organization of the history of philosophy which affects its very beginnings. As Cieszkowski points out, Hegel identifies the birth of philosophy with the Eleatic school. In this way, he dismisses two preceding schools – the Ionians and the Italics or Pythagorians. According to Cieszkowski, the classification of the two early systems as mere *presentiment of philosophy* is not simply factually incorrect; it is a natural deduction from the incorrect ordering of logical categories in Hegel's system.

Cieszkowski first considers Pythagoras. The latter's philosophy rests on the concept of abstract quantity and numerical relations. In Hegel's logic, however, the initial category of abstract being is first defined in terms of the category of quality; quantity only follows as a subsequent and further qualification of being. Hence, Hegel is forced to deny Pythagoras' priority in the history of philosophy because of his general requirement that the latter science, like all sciences, follow the order of development of his logic and because of his specific assertions regarding the logical priority of quality over quantity[146].

Whereas Cieszkowski is entirely prepared to accept Hegel's general requirement, he questions the actual order of the categories:

This beginning of history (of philosophy – AL) is false because the above mentioned categories (being-nothing-becoming – AL) are only the particular moments of the more general category of *quality*, but Hegel incorrectly considers the category of quantity as a progress vis-à-vis quality (*I.P.*, p. 299).

In effect, Hegel is attributing too much to quantity. He fails to see that quantity is actually the most abstract, the most indeterminate, the poorest of categories. Hence, according to Cieszkowski, any qualitative definition, however general, already marks a step beyond quantitative definition. Hence, qualitative categories are subsequent logically; therefore, they appear later temporally in the history of philosophy.

Hegel's error – blindly repeated by his school – has two sources which Cieszkowski states and refutes:

First, (Hegel) considers quantity as the abolition and indifferentiation of quality. In truth, it indicates the failure of the former to rise to the level of the latter.

This first error rests partly on the second:

Second, the pure concept of quantity is erroneously considered in the sense of *multiplicity*. Hence, quality is seen as a not-yet-separated oneness; the category of quantity originating from it is treated as an already developed multiplicity or many-ness (*I.P.*, p. 299).

Cieszkowski now presents his own understanding of the category of quantity:

Quantity in itself is not at all multiplicity, but includes oneness as well as many-ness within itself and is their pure generality. Multiplicity is true progress vis-à-vis unity; it is its falling-apart (hence, its second dialectical moment). Both these categories still remain within the womb of pure and general quantity, which in relation to being and its abstract, but already content-filled determinations, is still more abstract and purely formal, deprived of all internal determinations (*I.P.*, p. 300).

These assertions have far-reaching consequences: mathematics, long recognized as purely formal, now becomes truly fundamental in the logical sphere; the system of knowledge does not begin with being and nothingness which are already content-filled determinations but from zero and number; thus, ontological determinations are replaced as the first categories of thought by numbers and formal relations.

Having shown to his own satisfaction the priority of quantity over quality, Cieszkowski returns to the history of philosophy. On the basis of his logical arguments, he affirms as proven his thesis that Pythagoras' mathematical system constitutes the real beginning of philosophy.

If Pythagoras opens philosophy, the preceding school, the Ionians, would still appear to be excluded. The exclusion, however, is only apparent. In fact, Cieszkowski reserves much greater claims for the Ionians. They are an overture to philosophy containing within themselves all the themes of philosophy's further development:

In every systematic whole, what is not contained in it but properly belongs to it in form as well as in content, constitutes an introduction to that system. It is the *germ* of the organism... It ties together that which the entire system is to develop and which will be unravelled only at the (the system's) final stage... The Ionian philosophy ... does not remain outside the doors of philosophy but constitutes the portico of the philosophical edifice. (*I.P.*, p. 302).

Cieszkowski's actual exposition of the three moments of the Ionian school as represented by Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes follows Hegel very closely both in its sources and its factual content[147].

Thales opens the door of philosophy only in realizing the need of pure *principium*. In choosing water as his principle, Thales falls back into the immediate substantiality of being. His successor, Anaximander, postulates an antithetical principle: as Thales had fastened on a substantial natural element, Anaximander postulates pure indeterminacy, potential and energy. The meaning of his ἀπειρον is irrelevant; its significance is as an abstract general negation of Thales' particularity. Finally, Anaximenes synthesizes with a principle as determined as Thales' – air; at the same time, as general and undefined as Anaximander's – infinite air[148].

In spite of its factual similarities, Cieszkowski's account of the Ionian school differs profoundly from Hegel's in its implications. Whereas Hegel had dismissed the whole school rather contemptuously, Cieszkowski saw in it a microcosm of philosophy itself. In its three moments, he saw the passage from the metaphysics of understanding, through a negatively rational dialectic, to absolute speculation. Similarly, Cieszkowski argued that the three Ionians corresponded to the three main divisions of "the systematic organism of philosophy"[149]: natural philosophy; logic; philosophy of spirit. Thus, Thales is the father of materialism, Anaximander the father of idealism, Anaximenes the mediator between them; his position might be termed – if the term were properly defined – absolute spiritualism. Finally, each Ionian system expresses itself in a particular and appropriate sphere of spiritual activity: Thales' mythical and poetic constructions belong to art; Anaximander's prose and sober consciousness is properly philosophical; Anaximenes is the herald of spiritual life[150].

An examination of the *Ionian Philosophy* may begin by comparing it to the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*. There are certain obvious similarities: first, the concept of historical reality as an organism is applied to philosophy. This is simply a corollary of the *Prolegomena*'s position when applied to the history of philosophy. When transferred to the system of philosophy, however, the attribution of an organic character is a radically new proposition. It suggests that the constituent elements of the philosophical structure as a whole – natural philosophy, logic, philosophy of spirit and their numerous sub-divisions – are related to each other in a particular manner, i.e., as organic members. It is not quite clear whether Cieszkowski is affirming that philosophy is an organism or whether it is simply analogous to an organism. In the former case, one would have to ask of Cieszkowski that he explain the

nature of an organism and show the actual relation of philosophy to it. Certainly, Hegel would have no assistance to offer here; for Hegel, organics are simply the third sub-division of the philosophy of nature and no more[151]. Inasmuch as Cieszkowski offers no explanation of his statement, but only compares philosophy's development to that of a plant, it is probable that the organicism of philosophy is only an awkward analogy[152].

The second fundamental similarity between the *Ionian Philosophy* and the *Prolegomena* lies in their common obsession with triadic divisions. Justifying itself by a doubtful appeal to Hegel, this division was the initial inspiration of Cieszkowski's critical comments regarding the periodization of history in Hegel[153]. Already somewhat forced in the *Prolegomena*, in the *Ionian Philosophy* the schematic and aprioristic application of the triad tends towards an almost sophistic sleight-of-hand. In a superficial manner, the insistence on the triad creates a common pattern in Cieszkowski's historiosophy and history of philosophy. Moreover, it gives the *Ionian Philosophy* a – perhaps deceptive – directness and simplicity.

The *Ionian Philosophy* also presents significant divergences from the standpoint of the *Prolegomena*. In some respects, the former returns more closely to Hegel's position. Thus, in the *Ionian Philosophy* religion stands vis-à-vis philosophy in the same relation as it does in Hegel's history of philosophy[154]. Since the latter is founded on Hegel's account of absolute spirit the *Ionian Philosophy* implicitly recognizes Hegel's general position; thus, religion is no longer the all-embracing category of spirit which it was in the *Prolegomena*, but simply one of the three categories of absolute spirit. Indeed, even Cieszkowski's apparent qualification to this downgrading of religion – the exaltation of Christianity as the unity of all elements of spirit – is identical to Hegel's position[155].

In another respect, the *Ionian Philosophy* seems to agree with Hegel but diverges both from him and from the *Prolegomena*. Hegel had seen philosophy as being of two kinds – the Greek and the Teutonic and Cieszkowski initially seems to confirm this designating Aristotle and Hegel as the culmination of two cardinal philosophical eras (*I.P.*, p. 297)[156]. However, Ionian philosophy as a prefiguration of the entire course of philosophy clearly shows three moments. Whereas the first two have been played out, the position foreshadowed by Anaximenes – absolute spiritualism – remains to be developed.

This argument is somewhat surprising in view of Cieszkowski's tribute to Hegel in the *Prolegomena.* There he had affirmed that Hegel's system marked the very height and hence the conclusion of philosophy[157]. Similarly, in his letters to Michelet, Cieszkowski had expressed his aim as that of raising the philosophy of spirit to the position of Hegel's logic[158]. In the *Ionian Philosophy* he is denying the validity of that logic's point of origin in the category of quality. Some insight into this apparent reversal of position between the *Prolegomena* and the *Ionian Philosophy* can be gleaned from Cieszkowski's unpublished notebooks[159]. However, the only sufficient explanation lies in the recognition that the *Ionian Philosophy* is an overly ambitious, and hence contradictory, attempt to draw very general conclusions from a limited subject matter. This is evident in Cieszkowski's manipulation of the facts available concerning the Ionians to fit the needs and structure of his argument; a manipulation similar to that which Hegel had exposed with specific reference to standard accounts of Ionian philosophy in the introduction to his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*[160].

To be sure, the principal shortcoming of Cieszkowski's *Ionian Philosophy* is not that he attributes far too much to the actual discoveries and the philosophical consciousness of the Ionians. His facts and sources are the same as Hegel's, and he certainly does not harbour any illusions about the Ionians seeing themselves as an introduction to something greater. Cieszkowski's fault lies rather in attempting to "mould ancient philosophers" not only into the forms of modern thought but into the forms of his own intuitive insights which are themselves of mixed value. The theory of an introduction as a microcosmic reproduction of a following whole is an imaginative but not significant notion. Whatever validity it has issues from the organic analogy discussed earlier for it rests on the idea of a seed containing within it all the elements of future growth. The proposition concerning the logical priority of the category of quantity over that of quality is provocative. Nevertheless, since Cieszkowski simply thrusts the proposition into a given logical system without much explanation, it is not really a challenge capable of affecting the intricately deduced system of Hegel's logic.

Cieszkowski's juxtaposition of the two logical categories is important, however, in understanding his own philosophical system. Early in his *Diaries,* mathematics assume a fundamental place – in both senses

of that adjective: as both underivative and significant. In the *Prolegomena*, Cieszkowski calls for a recognition of the importance of mathematics:

Whoever would deny mathematical calculations any value in the field of speculation is in great error for he is himself abstracting from the *basic abstraction*. There is no doubt that mathematics are unable to develop the whole wealth of concepts; nevertheless, mathematics remain their first foundation... Reason, which is the soul of mathematics has been held in contempt long enough. It would be easy to prove that whenever we think we have risen above reason, we have merely failed to reason about what we are actually seeking. In a word, mathematics do not express everything but what they do express is the most fundamental for they constitute the *foundation* of *everything*. As the foundation, they are not the highest but the *lowest*, and as the lowest, the most durable and the most all-embracing. (*PzH*, p. 105 note)[161].

In the same work, Cieszkowski plays with a translation of his definition of philosophy and art into purely formal, i.e., mathematical terms:

Mathematically speaking, philosophy would be the square of thought multiplied by being. Art, on the contrary, would be being squared multiplied by thought. Now, a square multiplied by a single number becomes a cube, i.e., a third power. In other words, it becomes a true and concrete dimension, whereas lineal and plane relations are still abstractions. (*PzH*, p. 104)

Thus, out of the equation $Ph = t^2 \times b$ and $A = b^2 \times t$ with their addition $A\,Ph = (b+t)^3$ Cieszkowski makes a concrete statement about the nature of the synthesis between art and philosophy[162]. Although it is algebra – as the most formal, hence the most fundamental aspect of mathematics – which absorbs him most, mathematics in general are often introduced into all aspects of Cieszkowski's thought not only illustratively but heuristically[167]. For instance, in his *Diaries*, grappling with the concept of value in political economy, he fastens on a mathematical statement of the problem:

Political Economy: The estimated value of each thing is equal to the product of its utility multiplied by its costs of production, just as the weight of a body is equal to its magnitude by its mass. Thus, if the utility of air is a and the costs of its production and its rarity is 0, then the value of air will be $a \cdot 0 = 0$. Therefore, we do not attach a single concept to value as Smith would have it, but the concept of value is itself the synthesis of its two constituent moments[164].

Even in attempting to understand the nature of God, Cieszkowski resorts to mathematical formulations: "The highest Godhood... is the

idea of sanctity multiplied by the highest degrees of the ideas of truth, utility and the good"[165]. This peculiar mode of expression recurs often in the entire *corpus* of Cieszkowski's writings but it is in the *Ionian Philosophy*, that it is first applied explicitly and creatively as a characteristic of Cieszkowski's philosophy.

CHAPTER III

GOTT UND PALINGENESIE

I

Four years after the appearance of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, Cieszkowski published his second philosophical work. In the fashion of the day, this carried a somewhat elaborate and lengthy title: *Gott und Palingenesie: erster kritischer Teil. Erstes kritisches Sendschreiben an den Herrn Professor Michelet auf Veranlassung seiner Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele.*

In many ways, *Gott und Palingenesie* is the least readable of Cieszkowski's works. As a rebuttal of one of K. L. Michelet's more abstruse writings, it involves a particularly obscure aspect of Hegelian polemics. Moreover, it is essentially an uncompleted work. As a "first, negative part" *Gott und Palingenesie* is simply another voice in the din of arguments and counter-arguments which have themselves, and whose very points of reference, have long since been forgotten. Finally, by its very nature, the *Sendschreiben*, or "open letter", is a philosophical *genre* which, though much beloved by the Hegelians, has the durability and the vitality of an internal office memorandum.

With this much said, *Gott und Palingenesie* still deserves consideration for two reasons. First, it constitutes an important point in the development of Cieszkowski's system, clarifying and extending some of the ideas of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* and forming a basis for his theological speculations in the *Our Father*. Second, it shows an acute awareness of the ideological implications of the seemingly abstract debates among the Hegelians; thus, it reveals much both about the development of the Hegelian school and of Cieszkowski's relation to it.

The divergence between Cieszkowski and Michelet on the issue of the personality of God was longstanding. Cieszkowski reminds his teacher in the opening pages of *Gott und Palingenesie* of a letter which he had written Michelet in 1840:

> You surely remember, dear friend, the letter which I wrote you from Venice two years ago at Pentecost, after my meditations in St. Mark's and on the Lido about the

personality of the Holy Spirit. Your remember also how ardently I called upon you to publish your lectures, though I voiced my expectation that you would give us an excellent work but one which would not finally solve the question ... (*GuP*, p. 6)[1].

Michelet needed little encouragement. He informed Cieszkowski that he had found a publisher for his *Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes und Unsterblichkeit der Seele oder die ewige Persönlichkeit des Geistes*[2]. The first part was to be a historical exposition of the doctrines of the personality of God and the immortality of the soul in both the pagan and the Christian worlds. The second, dogmatic part was to consist of three sections: a metaphysical one, which treated the categories of *generality* and *particularity*, *time* and *eternity*; a psychological one, which explained the nature of the finite human, and infinite divine, mind; a logical one, which contained an explanation of the concept of becoming-man (*Menschwerdung*) and the eternal personality of the spirit. The third part was to be a defense of the dogmas previously expounded[3].

Michelet was very optimistic about the book's prospects of success. His hopes were founded, as he wrote to Cieszkowski, on the topicality of the subject matter and the brevity of the manuscript[4]. It is surely a revealing comment on the period that a 400-page tract on the personality of God and the immortality of the soul could be thus described! It is a further indication of the times that the book was confiscated from Cieszkowski's luggage by tsarist police as he was returning to Poland[5]. Presumably, the absence of a censor's stamp signified potentially inflammatory material.

It does not appear that Michelet was much disturbed by the threat of a rebuttal from his student. In fact, he wrote Cieszkowski that the *Vorlesungen über die Persönlichkeit Gottes* mentioned the *Prolegomena* twice – an affirmation which is only true if the references are understood as being indirect and nameless[6] – thus implying that the *Vorlesungen* paid due tribute to Cieszkowski's point of view.

Cieszkowski, on the other hand, was much agitated by the prospect of replying to Michelet's *Vorlesungen*. He first worried that "Schaller or someone else[7]" would beat him to a rebuttal. Then, he expressed his anxiety that Michelet would misunderstand the attack. It was "the inflexible objective dialectic", Cieszkowski explained and not really personal choice which forced him into the position of "destroying point by point ... the whole magnificent structure" which Michelet had set up[8].

Finally, Cieszkowski gloomily forecast that his own rebuttal would draw the dissatisfaction of everyone "from the most naive to the most speculative minds". He continued:

> Heresy would be sought in all respects. Perhaps I would find some who would prefer absolute negative statements to my positive affirmations. I would not even be surprised if M. Henning were to deny me hospitality between the covers of his review (*Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* – AL). Some would accuse me of being too religious; others of not being religious enough.

But Cieszkowski was resigned to such reaction:

> I am making a rather severe and pre-mature judgement about myself. What is to be done? This is, in my view, the fate of this vital question. I cannot retreat; I cannot halt at the territory already occupied. Of necessity, I must move forward . . .[9]

It was thus with a heavy heart and a sense of duty that Cieszkowski worked on his *Gott und Palingenesie* at his West Prussian country estate between January and May 1842, submitting it to publication in the summer of the same year.

II

Gott und Palingenesie opens with an explanation of the essential connection between the two problems it proposes to examine: the personality of God and the immortality of the soul. The former involves the nature of the Divine; the latter, involves the nature of humanity. Thus, both constitute a single question about the meaning and the essence of spirit. In fact, however, it is the problem of the personality of God as absolute spirit which most absorbs Cieszkowski's attention; the immortality of the soul is simply a corollary theme.

Cieszkowski praises Michelet for rejecting the concept of the absolute spirit, God, as other-wordly or separate from all other being; in other words, for not making God a total abstraction. Similarly, he praises Michelet for not equating God with Spinozian substance, thus avoiding a second common abstraction. However, Michelet has fallen into a third abstraction – albeit the highest, Hegelian one. Michelet's God is simply universality, impersonal unity, ideal form. It is not a personality in itself or for itself. At most, it is a personality in its otherness, i.e., in being the negation of personality. As Cieszkowski puts it at one point: "We are convinced that the personality which you attribute to God is only an impersonal personality". (*GuP*, p. 98).

Cieszkowski attempts to refute this predominance of the moment of universality at the cost of true personality in Michelet's concept of the divine personality by an examination of the logical, natural-philosophical and spiritual premises upon which Michelet's argument rests[10].

The examination begins with a criticism of Hegel's logic. In the development of the notion Hegel had distinguished three moments: universality, particularity, individuality (*Lesser Logic*, para. 163). However, Hegel himself had used the terms particularity and individuality "promiscuously" (*GuP*, p. 24) in opposing both these moments, which should have been carefully distinguished, to the moment of universality.

This is not an accidental oversight in Hegel. It is rooted firmly in the pre-eminence of the moment of universality in his system as a whole. The result is that, in spite of the acknowledged need to bring the three moments together in a concrete unity, Hegel – and following him Michelet – sacrifices synthesis and with it the subordinate moments of the synthesis, particularity and individuality, to universality in itself.

It is therefore not surprising that Michelet's efforts to inject content into pure universality should flounder on the pre-eminence of thought. According to Michelet, the only truth, positivity and substantiality of the individual member of a species is that which it borrows from the species *qua* universal and which consequently it must return to the species. Since the only activity of the universal is thought, the individual also cannot rise above thought of the universal. This has obvious implications for Michelet's doctrine of immortality; here, however, its significance is that the universal individual which he postulates as a category suitable for an expression of the personality of God is no individual at all but merely the collective thought of the human species.

The greatest obstacle to imparting a substantial content into the form of universality, Cieszkowski continues, is the prejudice which posits spirit and nature as contradictions. The assumption that spirit is the highest affirmation because it is the negation of nature which is itself a negation, i.e., an otherness, represents an unfortunate remnant of dualism. Cieszkowski points out that idealism, such as that defended by Hegel and Michelet, argues that the absolute idea is the highest logical category because it is *By-and-With Itself* (*Bei-sich-selbst Sein*) and *self-determined* (*Lesser Logic*, para. 236). Idealism, however,

refuses to recognize that in the sphere of nature, the organism is also a *Bei-sich-selbst Sein* and a self-determination. The organism is, in a certain sense, the negation of the dispersedness of nature. Thus, it is already a concrete identity of universality and particularity. By refusing to accord nature the status of a concrete identity, Michelet is forced to deny substance or natural characteristics to the highest and most concrete identity which is expressed in the personality of God.

After having thus criticized Michelet's application of the Hegelian logic and philosophy of nature, Cieszkowski turns to Michelet's understanding of spirit. In Hegel, the weaknesses of the logical categories are transferred to subjective spirit. The first form of subjective spirit, the soul, has the form of universality; its second form, consciousness, appears as particularization; its third form, spirit as such, appears as individuality. (*Encyclopaedia*; part III, para 387, *Zusatz*). Thus, the confusion between particularity and individuality which Cieszkowski had criticized earlier simply re-appears here intact. The result is that consciousness and spirit-explicitly-for-itself are assumed to be identical, with the latter often being reduced to the former.

In addition to this error inherited from Hegel, Michelet had compounded the fallacy on his own account by identifying the subjective with the finite spirit and the objective with the infinite spirit. The subjective, finite spirit possesses only individuality or particularity, inasmuch as these are only carelessly distinguished, and inasmuch as individuality is the highest form of subjective spirit in Hegel's exposition. The infinite or objective spirit alone possesses universality. Thus, since God is the infinite, or universal spirit, God is identified with objective spirit.

Cieszkowski is in agreement with Michelet that in trying to define the personality of God, one must begin with the finite and subjective spirit and then move on to a consideration of God as objective spirit. Historically, God has indeed been conceived as the objective spirit of a household or a nation as in the city-gods of the Greeks or the Roman *penates*. What Michelet appears to ignore, according to Cieszkowski, is that the present standpoint of philosophy can no longer be satisfied with the portrayal of God as another objective spirit. The personality of God transcends the limits imposed by the manifestations of objective spirit, such as the state or the family. The personality of God belongs to a realm behind all abstractions, that of the absolute. Here, God appears not in opposition to the finite, human or subjective spirit, but as its apotheosis.

Cieszkowski criticizes Michelet's exposition of God *qua* objective spirit and his view of the relation between the finite and the infinite spirit as an insufficiently developed position:

> I see nothing wrong in your assumption that finite spirit must pass into the universal spirit. I only wish it would return from there – enriched and transformed, it goes without saying. To its misfortune, however, you relegate finite spirit permanently to the sphere of the universal and leave it there. (*GuP*, pp. 73–74).

Thus, finite spirit or subjectivity is drowned in the universality of an infinite spirit, conceived as objective, instead of contributing to a true definition of the absolute spirit which is God. A double casualty ensues thereby, because the subjective spirit is denied immortality and the infinite, divine spirit is buried in objectivity instead of rising to the absolute heights where it belongs.

III

Given this critique, it is legitimate to inquire into Cieszkowski's own conception of God, in terms of which he measures the inadequacies of Michelet's theses. The matter is complicated, however, by the fact that *Gott und Palingenesie* is only a critical fragment. Thus, even the title of the work is misleading; "palingenesis" does not appear in the text though it is implied that it will be explained in the second part of the work. Unfortunately, this second, positive part has perished.

Reportedly, the second part of *Gott und Palingenesie* was burned by Cieszkowski's friend, the poet Zygmunt Krasiński, in fear of a police raid on the latter's Warsaw home[11]. It is equally possible, however, that Cieszkowski himself declined to publish the second part, thus shrouding the positive expressions of the *Gott und Palingenesie* in the same veil of secrecy which surrounded his *Our Father*. He would have chosen this course for either or perhaps both of two reasons: first, it was clear after the publication of the first critical part that Cieszkowski's failure to subscribe fully to either of the increasingly hostile Hegelian factions deprived him of a sympathetic audience; moreover, as the Hegelians – including Cieszkowski himself – turned away from theology, the topic itself ceased to hold their interest. Second, Cieszkowski incorporated the positive exposition of the *Gott und Palingenesie* into his *Our Father*, thus dispensing with the need for a separate exposition of his views.

There are, however, strong indications of Cieszkowski's positive thought on the personality of God and the immortality of the soul in

his notebooks, in his unpublished notes to the *Gott und Palingenesie*[12], and in the published, critical part of the work itself. It is these sources which I propose to examine in this section.

In the intimacy of his diaries, Cieszkowski gives full expression to his doubts concerning certain basic Christian tenets. The fundamental question is whether Christianity was indeed the final revelation and the ultimate form of religious truth. A certain logical moment, he observes, can occupy different positions in various categorizations. Thus, although Christianity is indeed the third, synthetic moment following polytheism and monotheism, it is only a second moment in the absolute progress of the idea of religion. (*Diary I*, dated 11th March 1834.)

If Christianity is only a relative truth, then within Christian doctrine one can distinguish true and false dogmas. The Christian conception of God, Cieszkowski wrote, is indeed the highest proof of the concreteness of Christianity. In this respect, "one could wish to see in Christianity the highest degree of true revelation" (*Diary I*, p. 22). It is precisely in Christianity, however, that God remains a *concept*, a dogma and not a fact. Antiquity had had a pre-sentiment of the divine Trinity; Christianity made the Trinity into a dogma; the future era will make it into a true and practical reality through the real descent of the Holy Spirit upon all humanity in the *deed* itself.

The transition from dogma to reality or the realization of Christianity is dependent on a re-habilitation of matter, i.e., a de-etherealization of the divine personality and a restitution of dignity to the human body. In an inversion of a Scriptural passage – a technique he much favoured – Cieszkowski writes:

> It is said (in Saint John) that what was born of the flesh is flesh and what was born of the spirit is spirit – but I say unto you: what is born of the flesh becomes spirit and what is born of spirit becomes flesh. (*Diary I*, p. 93.)

It is in the same vein that Cieszkowski writes "the body is the temple of our spirit as the world is the great temple of God" (*Diary I*, p. 26.) He elaborates this idea to some extent:

> The world is the body of God; God is the body of the world. In this way, speculative transcendance and divine immanence, pantheism and personalism, are reconciled in God. The divine ego is separate from the world and yet it embraces the world as the soul embraces the body. The ego without the world would be an abstraction. It is thus a personal pantheism and a pantheistic personalism. All finite things are the organs of God but do not constitute his essence as our members do not make us up. (*Diary I*, p. 24.)

Although the point of departure for Cieszkowski's conception of God appears basically pantheistic – "God is all and something more" (*Diary I*, p. 31) – his notebooks show a concentrated effort to refine and specify the original pantheistic inspiration. Thus, he admits that his reflections on God betray a "Spinozian pantheism because all determinations are attributes or modes of a single substance", but he adamantly refuses to accept the label of pantheist adding: "Spinoza says that the love of God for men is only a love of self. In exclusive pantheism this would be true but it is not so for us". (*Diary I*, pp. 34, 36). One can speculate that it is precisely to ward off the accusation of pantheism that Cieszkowski feels compelled to criticize Michelet's concept of God as universal thought as simply a variant of pantheism.

Similarly, in considering the problem of immortality in his notebooks, Cieszkowski is intent on restoring the rights of the individual body. He goes so far as to affirm that the facticity of Christ's resurrection is irrelevant; the importance of the event consists in its being a foreshadowing of the factual resurrection of humanity (*Diary* I, p. 24). and he makes a similar argument concerning the Incarnation as simply an affirmation that "man is the highest fruit and flower of nature"[13].

Cieszkowski's concept of immortality, however, is distinct from a re-introduction of a literal resurrection dogma. It is in seeking to define immortality without letting it remain an abstraction or sink into naive dogmatism that he fastens on the notion of a progressive palingenesis:

> The beginning of this life must be the limit of another and the same individuality must begin a new higher process since it has ended an old one . . .
>
> This is the only possible reconciliation for, 1) the requirement of merit which God's justice demands, and 2) the impossibility of merit in the case of a newly born infant. (*Diary I*, p. 56.)

Cieszkowski realizes that this view is incompatible with Christian doctrine:

> The immortality of the soul in Christianity is only a result of grace. It must result from merit. Where there is no merit, there too is no immortality. There the soul falls into nothingness and nothingness is hell, eternal punishment – eternity but not immortality. Indeed, it is that which Scripture calls second death. Christ dying descended into hell, i.e., fell into nothingness but through his infinite merit won immortality for himself and, so great was his merit, that he could impart grace to others. (*Diary I*, p. 38.)[14]

There are numerous sketchy references in Cieszkowski's notebooks to palingenesis and the corollary concept of metempsychosis; he notes their appearance among the Jews, the Celts, the ancient Slavs, in Origen and in Plato.[15] He could have included, and undoubtedly thought of, Lessing, Ballanche.[16] Clearly, in the positive part of the *Gott und Palingenesie* Cieszkowski intended to develop the second term of the title as in the negative part he had developed the first.

The only extant fragment of the second part of *Gott und Palingenesie* is an essay on the "this-wordly and the other-wordly" (*Diesseits und Jenseits*)[17]. It is valuable for the way in which it shows Cieszkowski attempting to define dialectically a relation between earth and heaven which would sacrifice neither to the other.

Cieszkowski first develops the notion that the this-worldly and the other-worldly are correlatives. Taken separately, the meaning of each term is only that which it borrows from the other. Thus, the this-worldly is world for and in itself but it is also the otherness of the other-worldly; similarly, the other-worldly is the otherness of the this-worldly, but is this-worldly for itself. At first glance, this would seem to indicate an identity between the two, reducing both to one as Strauss does.

However, Cieszkowski relates the above equation to the concept of time as past, present, future. These three moments are fluid, merging with each other. Thus, the "this-worldly" which appears to correspond simply to the immanent, present moment is, in fact, more complicated. In positing itself, the this-worldly present limits itself and thus sets up something outside itself. If the this-worldly were the highest, absolute identity it would suffice unto itself and absorb the otherness of the other-worldly. In fact, however, for the this-worldly in the immanence of the present, all which is not now is, by virtue of being a past or future, an other-worldly. Indeed, there is nothing which is less immanent than the present because it lacks the quality of permanence. Thus, the correspondence between the this-worldly and the present turns out to be false.

The other moments of time are also more complicated than they would first appear. This becomes clearer if "past", "present", "future" are replaced by "yesterday", "today", "tomorrow". Though there is a certain equivalence among the three terms, there is also a specific difference. The day designated as "tomorrow" remains that same day,

i.e., "tomorrow", even when it has become "today". The difference lies in that "tomorrow" has been realized; without losing its identity it has been *fixed* (*gesetzt*). As it is the destination of tomorrow to become today, of the future to become present, so the other-worldly is destined to become the this-worldly.

However one may judge the internal consistencies of the argument, Cieszkowski's underlying idea is straightforward. He is attempting to assert the existence of a transcendent realm while rejecting the complete detachment of this realm from concrete, this-worldly existence. Seen from the Christian point of view, it is the affirmation of earth against heaven and a further rehabilitation of matter – a theme which occurs so frequently in the notebooks and in defense of which Cieszkowski undertook his polemic against Michelet's abstractly divine personality.

In spite of the loss of the positive part of the polemic, even the published, critical *Gott und Palingenesie* allows one to trace the germ of Cieszkowski's positive conclusions on the personality of God and the immortality of the soul as well as the method he would employ to reach these conclusions.[18]

Cieszkowski declares his willingness to "concede to you (i.e., Michelet – AL) the sphere of individuality, subjectivity and even consciousness as such" (*GuP*, p. 54). In other words, he is prepared to accept the limitations which Michelet imposes on these categories in his (i.e., Michelet's) effort to show that, because of these limitations, they could not possibly be attributes of the divine personality.

These apparent concessions, however, are only a prelude to an independent deduction of the divine personality. Cieszkowski's essential premise reads:

> God is the fulfillment of all reality; since the individual is real, God must also be an individual. (*GuP*, p. 79.)

If God is an individual, He must also be an ego possessing consciousness. Michelet's denial of divine individuality had forced him into the further denial of God as ego, on the grounds that this would necessitate the positing of a divine non-ego. Moreover, inasmuch as God could not be conceived as subject, i.e., ego, He could all the less be seen as a conscious subject. Thus, Michelet found himself denying consciousness to the divine personality. Cieszkowski put this position

into a pithy metaphor: "You prefer, Sir, to tear the eye of consciousness out of God's essence out of fear that He perhaps see something" (*GuP*, pp. 95–96).

To Cieszkowski, the divine personality is not only a subject, it is the absolute subject-object (*GuP*, p. 77). The divine consciousness is not an abstract knowledge of universals but the absolute determination of a divine will. Michelet had conceded activity to absolute spirit; Cieszkowski dismisses this pure activity as another abstraction: the absolute spirit is not some indeterminate activity but the highest self-acting (*das Selbstthätige*) (*GuP*, pp. 42–43). Thus, the divine personality is the human personality raised to its highest power. What is true of the latter *qua* spirit is infinitely true of the former:

> The self-acting is the concept, the determination and the goal of spirit. Reality, the natural, the material is its means and its material. It contains this material and these means in and through itself. Because of this it is the fullest and the concretest being. It reigns above nature, not struggling with nature nor conquering it, but absorbing it into itself. Hence, its freedom, since it contains within itself the necessity which reigns in the field of thought and the struggle between necessity and contingency characterizing the material world, and it determines them out of itself. (*GuP*, p. 43.)

In a similar way, Cieszkowski attacks Michelet's three levels of immortality – fame, thought, family. "The absolute eternity of the present", which – according to Cieszkowski – Michelet has borrowed from Schleiermacher, is no more than a transposition into the realm of spirit of the determinations of pure logic. True immortality is something quite different:

> The eternity of the spirit must be active, creative, determined by itself and determining itself out of itself... (*GuP*, p. 136.)

Generally speaking, the claims made on behalf of the immortality of the soul and the divine personality in *Gott und Palingenesie* are bare assertions, unsupported by any proofs of their validity. Cieszkowski himself admits that this part of his work only shows the possibility of his tenets; their truth will be demonstrated at a later point. Nevertheless, he is fairly explicit about the methodological foundations for his views, thus offering a valuable insight into his reasoning.

The "concrete-synthetic moment" which he is seeking as an adequate definition of both the divine being and the immortal soul corresponds to what Cieszkowski calls, the *principle of individuation.* The term itself, he points out, was used by Michelet; it has its roots in

Aristotle, the Scholastics and Leibniz. It is not a totally satisfactory term because it still has something atomistic about it. Nevertheless, it is the most appropriate description of the process by which abstract universals are made to give way to concrete, and yet synthetic, realities. (*GuP*, p. 26.) It may well seem that the "concrete totality and complete unity" (*GuP*, p. 26) which results from the process of individuation is simply a mystical concept. Far from denying this charge, Cieszkowski welcomes it and launches into a defense of the place of mysticism in philosophy:

> Mysticism is indispensable to philosophy as an integrating moment of all true speculation. Mysticism is precisely speculation *in nuce*... it is the seed which dogmatism de-composes and develops and which true speculation brings to its proper fruition. (*GuP*, p. 66 and 68.)

Mysticism, however, is not to be confused with mystery or mystification. If it remains undeveloped, it amounts to no more than fossilization:

> Ancient augurers took their point of departure in a very deep and true thought about the universal analogy and harmony between physical and spiritual phenomena in the universe, but they remained at that without thinking it out properly... This is the immemorial story of confused mysticism... only as raised and transcended will mysticism maintain its meaning in philosophy. (*GuP*, p. 67.)

Cieszkowski's claims on behalf of mysticism issue from his oft expressed conviction of the limitations of abstract thought:

> That so-called speculation, which scorns both mysticism and dogmatism, is condemned to speculating on a barren desert. Along with intuition it has lost reason; what can it hope to attain?

Obviously, it cannot hope to attain much. Thought by itself is not creative; it is a deducing and deduced moment which is sterile without the moment of *active intuition* where mysticism finds its source. Cieszkowski limits his definition of active intuition to a single sentence: it is a higher concept of the *intellectuelle Anschauung*. For his readers, who were well acquainted with Schelling, this definition would suffice.

IV

Upon putting down the *Gott und Palingenesie*, one is left with a sense of profound futility. The arid ratiocination, the pedantic bombast, the

interminably vicious circle of critique and counter-critique lead one to apply to it Hegel's characterization of Scholasticism:

> Though the subjects which they investigated were lofty... yet this scholasticism on the whole is a barbarous philosophy of the finite understanding without real content... although religion is its subject matter, thought here reaches such an excessive point of subtlety that, as a form of the mere empty understanding, it does nothing but wander about baseless combinations of categories. Scholastic philosophy is the utter confusion of the barren understanding in the rugged German nature...[19]

In addition to this general criticism, one must ask whether Cieszkowski's portrayal of Michelet's position is not misrepresenting the *Vorlesungen.* It would appear, from even a cursory reading of the text, that Michelet is intensely concerned with restoring the rights of the divine personality and the immortality of the soul vis-à-vis its Left Hegelian critics.

In 1840–42, these critics were most eloquently represented by Strauss, Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer. They agreed generally on the doctrines which characterized the Left Hegelians as a whole: the incompatibility of faith and philosophy, and the impossibility of literal and personal immortality[20]. As such, they were direct heirs of Richter's *Lehre der Letzten Dingen* and Strauss' *Leben Jesu.* Within the Hegelian Left, however, there were two divergent tendencies, loosely described by Erdmann as "pantheists" and "atheists". The former were exemplified in D. F. Strauss, whose *Christliche Glaubenslehre* argued that "there is no other God than the thought which is in all thinking beings and no attributes of God which are other than the laws of nature"[21]. The latter found their spokesman in Feuerbach, whose *Essence of Christianity* affirmed that the true meaning of philosophy is to show the identity of all predicates of God and man"[22].

The apparent similarity of these two doctrines conceals a very fundamental distinction. In a sense, the pantheists attempted to submerge the self-conscious, individual personality in the universal substance of thought. The atheists, on the other hand, sought to affirm the absolute status of the human personality not merely in its consciousness or spiritual nature, but in its flesh and blood totality. Thus, the similarity is actually an obverse image. The Hegelian materialism of Feuerbach can be compared with Strauss' Spinozistic idealism only because each is the absolute negation of the other.

It is in this light that the Michelet–Cieszkowski controversy must be seen. Clearly, Michelet gravitates strongly towards Strauss' position.

He writes in his *Vorlesungen*:

> That we are eternal insofar as we take part in divine nature is a truism ... that God becomes eternally finite and eternally human, there lies the absolute divine personality. But man, to the extent that he can raise himself to representing this eternal personality of God in his earthly existence and thus be a reflection and an honourable image of God, is himself lifted to eternity. The immortality of the soul is thus the permanent process of the divine becoming personal (*das stets persönlich Werden Gottes*) and with the eternal personality of God an immortal element is found in the individual[23].

The foundation of Michelet's theory appears to be the participation of the human spirit in the divine. This conforms with Strauss' position to the extent that a participation implies the similarity of substance between the human and the divine. Only if the two are essentially alike can the former reflect and represent the latter. Indeed, Michelet explicitly repeats some of Strauss' criticism of Hegel; in opposition to their master, both see spiritual progress as potentially endless – participation in the infinite can never be terminated[24].

Inasmuch as the human and the divine substances share an identity, and the human personality is – however inadequate – an image of the divine, it would seem that Cieszkowski's criticism of Michelet's "impersonal personality" is unjustified. Upon closer examination, however, it is evident that Michelet's understanding of what properly belongs to the "divine personality" is very narrowly circumscribed. Significantly, where Strauss sought an explanation of the beginnings of consciousness in the existence of spirits on other stars and searched for historical revelations in geology, Michelet dismissed such speculation as "transcendental superstition"[25], and argued that the history of the earth provides us with co-existent and not successive phenomena. Although it is probable that Michelet was right on the first count, and it really does not matter whether he was wrong on the second, both his critiques are typical in rejecting any attempt at imparting concreteness and material substance to the notion of God.

Michelet was forced into the position of a totally unqualified idealism – described by Cieszkowski and others as abstraction – by the very nature of the mediation which he had undertaken. Apparently, Michelet was quite sincerely concerned with restoring the identity between philosophy and religion which Hegel had affirmed and developed. Whereas Hegel's practical problem had been one of justifying his system in terms of Christian beliefs, Michelet's task was to defend the latter in terms of the former. It is an indication of the political

climate, the intensity of debate and the confidence in Hegel's philosophy that within a decade of his death, his system was being used as a standard to condemn the traditional tenets of Christianity.

Michelet needed to maintain a delicate balance. On the one hand, he had to prove to skeptical left-wing Hegelians that the traditional baggage of Christianity could be integrated with philosophy. On the other hand, he fought a rearguard battle against those anti-Hegelians – pietists, romantics, Schellingians – who pointed to the Left Hegelians as the true consequences of Hegel. Here too, Michelet had to prove the conformity between Hegel and Christianity, though subordinating the former to the latter and, from the preface to the *Vorlesungen*, it would appear that he was more anxious to assuage his orthodox critics than his Hegelian colleagues.

The particular defense which Michelet chose drew him to the pantheist position. If religion and philosophy were truly one they had to meet in the all-permeating universality of thought. Whatever the merits of this conciliatory stance, it ignored the fundamentally different challenge raised by the Feuerbachian atheists. These did not attack religion in the name of philosophy or vice-versa; they set out to destroy both and replace them with an anthropological materialism. Feuerbach described himself as "nothing but a natural philosopher in the realm of mind"[26], and in a final triumph over idealism exclaimed: "the idea is to me only faith in the historical future; it has only a moral and a political significance"[27].

Cieszkowski was far more sensitive to the problems raised by Feuerbach than was Michelet. Above all, because in a very fundamental way he sympathized with Feuerbach's premises. Reaching back to the etymology of religion, Cieszkowski argued that the religious consciousness was essentially a social one[28]. Moreover, the "true rehabilitation of matter", which he had called for in the *Prolegomena*, referred precisely to the sort of re-direction of philosophy which Feuerbach now offered, grounding speculation in concrete human needs. Finally, Cieszkowski could not but be sympathetic to the intensely ethical and future-oriented character of Feuerbach's enterprise. For the author of the *Prolegomena* too, the idea was "faith in the historical future" and philosophy was a worthy pursuit to the extent that it hastened the achievement of human goals[29].

There is thus significant common ground between Feuerbach and Cieszkowski. It should be noted that the *Essence of Christianity* specifically rejected the label of atheism; *Gott und Palingenesie*, on the

other hand, can in no way be treated as defense of orthodox Christianity[30]. Their affinity seems to lie in a common rebellion against the primacy of thought affirmed in Hegelian idealism and, historically, in a common susceptibility to the materialism of the Saint-Simonians. It is precisely this affinity which led Cieszkowski to understand the implications of the theological debate within the Hegelian school more clearly than Michelet or his other contemporaries. It was quite evident to Cieszkowski that Michelet's defense of Christianity was no defense at all. In reducing Christian tenets to philosophical hypotheses Michelet and the "pantheists" could only prove that religion was, in fact, dispensable and add grist to Feuerbach's mill by showing that the religious tie merely obscured man's concrete essence and his existence as a species being, i.e., as man existing for mankind. If Christianity, indeed if religion, was to be preserved, the divine being had to be granted the status of a true personality and the immortality of the soul had to be vouchsafed in a real rather than a metaphorical sense[31].

Cieszkowski thus saw himself forced to defend a position which set him at odds with the entire Hegelian school, both right and left, and one which lent itself to misinterpretation immediately. Instead of advancing a "new Christianity" he found himself apparently defending strictly traditional Christian dogma. Instead of hailing the concrete and social re-orientation which Feuerbachian anthropology had brought to speculation or the imaginative Biblical re-interpretations of Strauss, he saw himself obliged to issue a warning about the consequences of these developments.

It was the realization of these consequences which led Cieszkowski to insist so intransigently on the literal meaning of personality in God:

> In accordance with this faith (i.e., in Christ, the God-man) did the God-man not appear in specific, national conditions? Did he not attain a definite age? Did he not have definite characteristics? Did you not come to love even the features of his face eternalizing them in a particular type? If you deny this, a myth will appear... You know what myth can become: as an ostrich (pun: Strauss) still refined, elevated and supple, it flows through the fiery stream (pun: Feuerbach) of basic criticism to land in the radical camp of the too protestant peasants' (pun: Bauer) war. (*GuP*, p. 80.)

It was also his perception of the overall general threat which made Cieszkowski lump Strauss and Feuerbach, pantheists and atheists, together as a single manifestation:

> At first glance, it may be surprising that we identify the position which considers religion as a substantial relation with the position which sees in religion a product of self-knowledge. This may appear shocking because it is difficult to find a more clear-cut

opposition than the one between substantiality and subjectivity. Moreover, taken externally, Strauss and Feuerbach contradict and exclude each other. Regardless of this, we see in them children of a single spirit, occupying an essentially identical position. (*GuP*, p. 120.)

According to Cieszkowski, both positions were but obverse sides of a relation contained implicitly in Hegel. Thus, Feuerbach is quite wrong in not considering himself a Hegelian. There are different levels of initiation into Hegel, but even in his lectures, the most intimate expression of his thought, Hegel still "turns in speculative vagueness" (*GuP*, p. 121) which necessitates interpretation and specification. For Cieszkowski, Bruno Bauer's *Die Posaune des Jungsten Gerichtes über Hegel den Atheisten und Antichristen* provides proof enough that Feuerbach only represents a point in the process of explicating Hegel's meaning[32].

Bruno Bauer is the truest consequence of the newest direction of philosophy:

To deny importance to Bruno Bauer *qua* scientific phenomenon would be the same as maintaining that the Reformation was not an important historical occurrence...

It must be clearly stated that the critique begun by Strauss and probably even before Strauss, the critique which Bauer has brought to a culminating point, is a true crisis in knowledge; a crisis which we must traverse since we have not been able to overcome it positively and organically... (*GuP*, pp. 122–23.)

Translating the problem into a historical metaphor Cieszkowski writes:

... this is no longer a revolt against theology but a revolution which has gone a long way from the Girondiste Strauss to the Montagnard Bauer. For the latter, it is sufficient that someone be called a theologian for him to become suspect. He has applied the guillotine of thought even unto the highest spheres... and has not hesitated to go in the chosen direction resolutely by-passing half-measures and reaching ultimate consequences. (*GuP*, p. 123.)

The comparison with the French Revolution is actually more than metaphor. From the present standpoint, it is clear that the theological debate among the Hegelians was to have far-reaching political consequences – indeed, the destruction of theology is the pre-condition of radical social theory as it developed in the 1840's. It was already apparent to Cieszkowski at the time that the theological debate was assuming political overtones. In expressing the divisions he fastened on an extended political comparison. Addressing Michelet he wrote:

I consider your book the manifesto of the so-called philosophical Left in philosophy's parliament (or if you prefer, and perhaps more accurately, the left Centre). I would not

consider your position the alpha and the omega of this grouping and I know full well that your own party colleagues would reject some of your views and that one could add to your arguments. Nevertheless, I consider your lectures a particularly worthy and serious expression of this tendency. If I were to extend the comparison then in my opinion you represent the party of Passy–Dufaure. (*GuP*, p. 7.)

Passy and Dufaure were both ministers of the so-called liberal conservatives in the France of the July Monarchy[33]. Thus, contrary to what one might initially expect from Cieszkowski's comparison, they stood much closer to the Centre than to the Left. In fact, Cieszkowski recognized that Michelet's position put him closest to the *juste-milieu* (*GuP*, p. 114), a standpoint which he abhorred as weak indecision. The *juste-milieu* was, in fact, worse than the Left, for while thinking that it had mediated between Left and Right, it had in fact ceded to the former[34].

Confronted with the negative terror of the Left and the shallow compromise of the *juste-milieu*, Cieszkowski opted for the Right. He did so with profound uneasiness:

If the above comparison of philosophical positions with the political spectrum could further mutual understanding, then I would not deny that in appearance, particularly after this critical letter, I could be counted among the Right; this does not mean in the least that I want to remain in that position. (I am rather) like Lamartine who sits on the extreme right waiting to move to another seat, and who, though counted among the conservatives, does not accept that label at all in a static sense, much less in a reactionary sense. (*GuP*, pp. 8–9.)

Cieszkowski went to extraordinary pains to define the sort of conservatism to which he admitted:

... I am temporarily choosing a seat on the right of the philosophical parliament and I willingly accept the title of conservative in the full and progressive sense of the word. In its full and progressive sense, however, this word is completely different from the meaning which it is usually given. By conservation I understand the organic absorption and intended preservation of all elements which appear successively in the course of universal history, taking account of the position, importance and actuality of each... true conservatives render, in this sense, justice to both past and present not ceasing for a moment to be men of the future. They have not lost faith in the past... but any partisan hatred of the present is foreign to them. They approach the present with a profound *love*. Finally, instead of doubting the future they put their deepest *hope* in it – that is why, in the end, theirs will be the kingdom. (*GuP*, pp. 9–10.)

Cieszkowski was not alone at this time in insisting on a differentiation within the general category of "conservatism". Not only he but Baader, Lagarde and others sought to distinguish themselves from the

simple and unphilosophical advocates of the past and/or the unqualified *status quo*[35]. In most cases, these efforts drew their theoretical underpinnings from a rich romantic tradition which stressed organic continuity, measured change and planned, controlled progress. These were conservatives, not traditionalists and, like Cieszkowski, they seemed desperately anxious to give content to the distinction[36].

They were unsuccessful on all counts. Politically, the true or progressive conservatives represented neither the views of the Prussian government nor of the liberal and radical opposition emerging in the latter days of the *Vormärz*. Intellectually, the very terms of their arguments were unacceptable to the Left whereas the progressive interpretation of these terms made them suspect to the Right. Moreover, they were a heterogeneous body whose emphasis on the manner of change rather than its goals eventually led them to focus on controlling change rather than encouraging it.

From the very beginning, however, all the progressive conservatives shared the dominant conservative impulse of regret. In their case, however, it was not a nostalgic regret of a distant past but rather a more concrete regret of the unrealized potential of the present moment. Essentially at odds with their initial optimism and hope of mediation between restoration and revolution, this gnawing regret appeared only embryonically in the early 1840's. If regret had been little evident in Baader a few years earlier, it was to permeate Lagarde's thought two decades later.

In Cieszkowski, this regret at lost opportunities found expression in a retrospective passage of the *Gott und Palingenesie*. After having surveyed the ravages wrought by Bauer, Cieszkowski wrote with more sadness than bitterness:

> There was a time when this direction could have been opposed, or at least its results neutralized – a time when one could have taken Hegel's position as an immediate point of departure and attained a further position, not critically but organically, developing Hegel's basic principles without waiting for them to be developed from outside or allowing radical consequences to appear or take over. (*GuP*, p. 124.)

Referring to his *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, Cieszkowski reaffirms his thesis that the primacy of consciousness which characterizes Hegel's absolute idealism must be overcome. In the realm of thought, deviation from Hegel means degeneration. The proper field of activity for his successors lies not in further revolutionizing thought but in applying knowledge to the social and material world. Paradoxically,

Cieszkowski sees *praxis* as an antidote to revolutionary criticism. In 1842 he could claim with some justification that his *Prolegomena* stood far closer to social reality and the material world than Bauer's intellectual exercises or Feuerbach's juggling of the notions of God and man. Since *praxis* is a practice based on theory, however, Cieszkowski had good reason to fear the dissolution of the Hegelian consensus which had served as point of departure for his *Prolegomena*. Once that base had been transformed, the notion of *praxis* could not avoid undergoing the fundamental re-direction which we, in retrospect, can see as having found its fullest expression in Marx.

Cieszkowski sees and acknowledges this ongoing transformation. In a sense, he is so resigned to it that he treats the philosophical developments of the period as a historical phenomenon comparing them to the French Revolution – an event which was necessary but which could have occurred in a different, peaceful manner (*GuP*, p. 125). Nevertheless, he refuses to withdraw from the philosophical struggle. As he puts it:

> Even in the face of a scientific Terror, we do not have the right to emigrate from the realm of thought. We must simply take care that the transition be as mild, as careful and as circumspect as possible. (*GuP*, pp. 126–27.)

This refusal is based in part on an analysis of the problem. The intellectual Terror is caused by the *uncontrolled* nature of the spirit's progress not by its progress as such. Cieszkowski even manages to castigate those timid minds who simply fear the speed of spirit's advance and not its control or direction. Thus, his refusal to "emigrate" is an affirmation that the course of spirit is ultimately rational and that even a restricted participation in it is preferable to withdrawal.

Above all, however, his refusal is an ethical declaration. Regardless of the effectiveness of his role, Cieszkowski seems to be saying that inactivity or surrender are morally intolerable. Regardless of the forseeable consequences of the philosophical struggle, the means and the process of that struggle must remain faithful to the dicta of progressive conservatism. The counter-criticism which Cieszkowski offers insists on being organic, i.e., it must find its source and sphere of activity in philosophy itself. Hence, his rejection of political interference in the philosophical forum; an official decree could stamp out the danger of the Hegelian Left easily, but such an eradication would bring

shame not only to the political authorities but to all, Cieszkowski and the progressive conservatives included, who are most threatened by the Hegelian Left.

For this reason, as well as for others discussed earlier, *Gott und Palingenesie* leaves the reader with a peculiarly poignant feeling. Cieszkowski was acutely aware even as he was writing the book that it was a work destined for failure and misinterpretation. Today, it stands as a marking stone in the Hegelian debates of the 1840's and as a memorial to the prescience of its author.

CHAPTER IV

SCHELLING AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE HEGELIAN SCHOOL

I

Gott und Palingenesie apparently drew the rancour of the entire Hegelian school[1]. Unassuaged by Cieszkowski's assurances, Michelet responded with sharp counter-criticism:

> To lead philosophy into life... is what Cieszkowski had declared as his principal scientific endeavour. It is to be noted that to the extent that he involves himself in the theological debates of the school, he has remained behind Hegel. On the other hand, in believing that he has overcome Hegel's purely theoretical standpoint, he himself is the hated consequence of that school. Thereby, he joins the Pseudohegelians and even Schelling – not only in the way that the Right (of the Hegelians – AL) does, i.e., in content, but also through the principle of knowledge, the active intuition....[2]

In view of the relations between the Pseudo-Hegelians and the Schellingians on the one hand, and the Hegelians on the other this criticism can be easily described as invective.

The leading Pseudo-Hegelians were Christian Hermann Weisse of Leipzig and Immanuel Hermann Fichte of Tübingen, who edited the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie*, described as "the audience chamber of all anti-Hegelians"[3]. Weisse had originally declared himself a Hegelian. In a critique very similar to Cieszkowski, however, he had reproached Hegel his panlogism and as early as 1832, warned of a widening cleft between philosophy and a public concerned with maintaining a proper place for the Godhead[4]. Reproached by the orthodox Hegelians for falling into a dualism which separated formal logic from the other sciences, Weisse soon found himself excluded from the Hegelian circle. Even after having adopted an expressly anti-Hegelian position, however, Weisse's thought developed in a direction similar to Cieszkowski's. Thus, Weisse postulated a dialectic of the beautiful and the true which issued in a synthesis of the idea of the good much as the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* did. Regarding the immortality of the soul, he distinguished between the logical denial of personal immortality required by Hegel's system and its affirmation in moral and religious experience.

His own position was somewhat intermediate: only those who accept the spirit partake of immortality, reminiscent of Cieszkowski's view that immortality must be earned[5].

It was such similarities which led Cieszkowski, in obvious defiance of Michelet and his colleagues, to praise Weisse's critique of Hegel. In fact, the *Gott und Palingenesie* complained that the Pseudo-Hegelians had not gone far enough in affirming their basic principle, the active intuition:

> The weakness of these positivists is precisely that which is positive. In a word, the tension of the active intuition is insufficient. The intuition evokes and creates progress which is later developed and substantiated by speculation. The spark of this intuition may sometimes lead the spirit of the world much further than long and extensive reasoning and speculation... (*GuP*, p. 92 note).

The "active intuition" was obviously reminiscent of Schelling's "intellectual intuition". Indeed, such enthusiastically eclectic Pseudo-Hegelians as Fichte junior emphasized their dependence on the latter[6]. Strictly speaking, the closeness could have ended at a terminological similarity; Schelling's intellectual intuition referred to "an intuition of the identity of the intuiting with the intuited self"[7] in an attempt to bridge the gap between the infinite and the finite. It did not necessarily imply an anti-rationalist, much less a mystifying position.

In fact, however, in 1840 any mention of Schelling was tantamount to a critique of rationalism, particularly in its Hegelian form. That this should have been so lies partially in the nature of the Schellingian system. On questions of personal immortality and the divine personality, for instance, his formulations obviously inspired the Pseudo-Hegelians and Cieszkowski himself[8]. Above all, Schelling's well-publicized and long-standing feud with Hegel, his relative isolation in Munich, and his protracted abstinence from philosophical polemics even as rumours flew that he was finishing his entire system, all combined to give him something of the status of myth in Berlin – ridiculed or secretly feared by the Hegelians; admired and awaited by their opponents.

In 1841, the myth became flesh. The new Prussian king, Friedrich Wilhelm IV, originally reputed as a liberal, took a deep interest in his university. He was soon alarmed by what he saw as the dominance of a religiously skeptical and politically unstable Hegelian party. Instead of purging the philosophical faculty[9], he sought to counterbalance Hegelian influence by inviting Schelling from Munich. After protracted

negotiations in which Schelling managed to extract a magnificent salary, a pension, freedom from censorship of all his prospective writings, and no specific teaching commitments, he was prevailed upon to launch an anti-Hegelian campaign with an inaugural lecture at Berlin on November 15th, 1841[10].

Given this background to Schelling's position vis-à-vis the Hegelians, the gravity of Michelet's charge against Cieszkowski may be somewhat clearer. Before examining Cieszkowski's self-declared position vis-à-vis Schelling, it may be instructive to survey in general terms the course of the struggle between the latter and the Hegelians as a whole.

II

A contemporary account by Engels conveys something of the drama of Schelling's inaugural lecture:

> If you ask any man in Berlin who has any idea at all about the power of the spirit over the world where the battleplace for control over German public opinion in religion and politics, i.e., over Germany itself, lies he would answer that the struggle is taking place in University auditorium nr 6 where Schelling is giving his lectures on the philosophy of revelation[11].

For a moment all philosophical discussion ceased. Hegel's other opponents – Stahl, Hengstenberg, Neander – ceded their role to Schelling. In spite of some turmoil, even the Hegelians themselves listened intently to the prince of the romantics as he attacked their master. Among the listeners were representatives of a new and fateful generation – Engels, Bakunin, Kirkegaard, Jacob Burckhardt[12]. In short, if Hegel's ghost was to be exorcised, this seemed to be the moment.

Yet somehow Schelling failed. The essence of his critique was direct and predictable enough: Hegel had taken the philosophy of identity and developed only its negative aspect. In his one-sided concentration on formal logic, Hegel had neglected the actual existence of the absolute of which he spoke. Reason, said Schelling, can only prove the possibility of things; it enables us to see the essence of *what* is, it cannot prove *that* anything is. This is not to say that reason is misleading but simply that it is insufficient. If the absolute is to be grasped as true identity of subject and object – a formulation on which

Hegel and Schelling are in agreement – it cannot be intellected rationally but must be intuited[13]. Thus, Hegel cannot possibly do justice to the nature of God. To describe the divine personality as eternal truth is merely a smug rationalism. One idea merely leads to another idea and if the reality of the divine personality is to be apprehended one must take as a point of departure not theoretical reason but an act of the will. Not logic but faith is the beginning of knowledge about God's existence and this faith is illuminated by Christian revelation and confirmed by an examination of myth[14].

In spite of the original harmony between Schelling's and Hegel's youthful speculation, the "positive philosophy" which Schelling preached in 1841 was so radically different from the very premises of Hegel's thought that the Hegelians were at some loss in beginning to criticize it. For those Hegelians like Göschel, Rosenkrantz and Michelet who still believed that their philosophical standpoint was compatible with their religious convictions, Schelling seemed to be wantonly denying the very possibility of significant philosophical knowledge and repudiating his own earlier contributions to philosophy. For the anti-theological Left, as Engels' zestful account demonstrates, Schelling was merely the farcical nemesis of all those who clung to Christianity in spite of the lessons of Hegel.

In refusing to publish anything but his inaugural lecture and in periodically promising a complete exposition of his positive system, Schelling did not make the Hegelians' task any easier. When it became clear that Michelet's challenge to enter into open debate would not be met, the Hegelians resorted to criticism on the basis of unpublished lecture notes – a method which they themselves admitted was unsatisfactory[15]. The Hegelians' principal efforts, however, had to be defensive. In addition to their pietist and orthodox critics who condemned Hegelianism from the pulpits, they now found themselves under fire in their former stronghold, the university. Moreover, the loss of official protection with Altenstein's demise exposed the vulnerability of their situation as Prussian civil servants. Finally, the split within Hegelian ranks weakened the position of the moderate Hegelians by putting into question not only their sincerity but even their ability to draw lessons from the teachings of Hegel.

Actually, the danger from Schelling was not as grevious as it first appeared. Very soon it became evident that Schelling had nothing to say and lacked the capacity to lead any sort of philosophical campaign. Indeed, he turned out to be a cantankerous old man, obsessed with

proving that Hegel had "stolen" his ideas and ever promising to unveil the "positive philosophy" which had absorbed thirty years of his life. In spite of intense publicity and official partisanship on his behalf, Schelling failed to win a suit for plagiarism against Frauenstadt and other critics[16]. Eventually, even his listeners dwindled and he found himself forced to give up teaching rather than being faced with the ignominy of not having any students[17]. By then, Friedrich Wilhelm IV had withdrawn support from him both in suspicion of Schelling's catholicising tendencies and in realization of the blow which Schelling's failure would effect to his own prestige.

Of course, the Hegelians had no way of foreseeing this outcome. Hence the bitterness of their accusations against Cieszkowski as he argued the necessity of recognizing the cognitive function of the active intuition and of integrating the element of mysticism into philosophical speculation. They could have pointed to his earlier statements on behalf of the primacy of the will and the practical over the theoretical reason[18]. Certainly, as has been pointed out above, Cieszkowski and Schelling were in substantial agreement on the particular question of the divine personality and the immortality of the soul.

When faced with the prospect of choosing between Schelling and Hegel, however, Cieszkowski unhesitatingly chose the latter. Generally speaking, Cieszkowski had high expectations of Friedrich Wilhelm IV – as did initially many liberals[19]. He also showed more curiosity than hostility to the news of Schelling's convocation to Berlin[20]. Indeed, Cieszkowski's original reaction to the inaugural speech was one of hesitation and guarded hope. Although he was absent himself, he sought reports of the speech eagerly; in all probability those he received would have been from sources unfriendly to Schelling. Yet upon reading the text of the lecture he wrote:

> From beyond the borders of Germany (i.e., from Russian Poland – AL) we greet you Schelling and with sentiments appropriate to yours we extend our hand to you in love... You bring science with love and for that we greet you.
>
> What beautiful words these are, inspired by the gospel "I come to build not to destroy". How those must blush who imputed their own jealousy to you and said that you look with a malicious and sour eye at the green plants growing on other plains...[21]

This encouragement was coupled with a very strong warning against infringing Hegel's position in the development of philosophy:

> Do not even try to cast a shadow of suspicion over this established figure (i.e., Hegel – AL). It is agreed that you will go beyond him – we shall go with you – but do not step over him. (*Ibid.*)

Similarly, Cieszkowski called for recognition of Hegel's achievement, suspending for a moment his own criticism of Hegel but acknowledging the deep divisions which had arisen within the Hegelian school:

> Do not judge your times so lightly! What you call only half of philosophy (i.e., Hegel's system – AL) is in fact the greatest whole which ever appeared on the field of knowledge. But this whole fell apart within itself because it still felt cramped, because its living members had to develop. This organic sphere began to fall afresh into disorganization and disintegration in all directions. On the one hand, through ever further evening and smoothing out it became almost a *tabula rasa*. On the other hand, it congealed within itself and crystallized into a hard form. (*Ibid.*)

At the same time, Cieszkowski prepared a German letter to Schelling with substantially the same content and subscribed to a letter prepared by Michelet challenging Schelling to open debate and seeking assurances that Hegel's achievements would be vouchsafed. The latter letter was never sent because of the vacillation of the other signatories; it is not known whether the former ever reached its addressee[22].

In spite of these outright commitments to the Hegelian party, it is evident that Cieszkowski's originally critical orientation to German philosophy as a whole was becoming more pronounced. This found expression in a critique of the Germans on the one hand, and of his intellectual contemporaries on the other. For instance, in a short and unpublished fragment, Cieszkowski expressed his frustration at the character of German intellectual life:

> They lack *concrete* life entirely. In Germany, everything finds a strong and healthy echo of approval but no harmonious concord. Everything dissolves in details, and their general image is itself abstraction, chimera, caput mortuum. Science and life, ideality and reality are completely separate. It is a constant "on the one hand, on the other hand"[23].

He pointed to the mass translations of current literary and philosophical news into German and the total inability of the Germans to absorb these, to apply them and to develop them further: "at the very best they manage to attain an active-reflective position of reflection concerning a particular foreign position from a particular German position"[24]. In short, they lacked any sort of vital spirit or inspiration.

Such views could have been gleaned from Hegel, Hess or Marx. Indeed, they formed but a part of the common wisdom of the period. Even Cieszkowski's comparison of the philosophical fragmentation of Germany to its political situation is not peculiar to him[25]. His indication of the potential contained in a German discovery of the Slavs remained, as yet, nothing but a pious hope expressed as a conclusion to

the fragment cited: "The unknown and neglected Slavdom, neglected even in relation to China, is beginning to interest the Germans"[26].

Cieszkowski's criticism of the Germans reflected his dissatisfaction with German philosophy generally. This dissatisfaction had found expression in the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*'s extolment of the will and call for action, as well as in the *Gott und Palingenesie*'s inveighings against arid rationalism. In a summary note, Cieszkowski repeated this criticism directly and extended it to include all Hegelian wings:

> Those who practice a theological hypercritique or fight with religion as an artificial creation which requires negation as a purely external phenomenon, do not realize that they are doing nothing more than repeating the work already done by Voltaire and the encyclopedists, that they are re-conquering what has already been conquered in the spiritual life of humanity with the only difference that their predecessors had the good taste not to descend to the lowest and dirtiest levels[27].

He was equally severe with the theologians and logicians:

> Those who are still engaged in empty speculation on all fields of knowledge are not our contemporaries either. They are still practicing scholasticism, even if historical conditions make their scholasticism appear as if it had wider horizons and more freedom. . . .
> If the former are still imprisoned in the middle ages because they are still struggling against it, the latter are rooted in the middle ages because they are going in the same direction. They think in order to think, speculate in order to speculate, and have no eyes for the green pastures of life. (*Ibid.*)

The present times called for a different sort of man. His true contemporaries, wrote Cieszkowski, were those who had buried the middle ages and turned with love and joy to the tasks of the present moment. These tasks he defined as "the striving for a true and harmonious organization". They alone corresponded to the character of the present historical moment:

> Our times are a period of formation and approximation to organization. All manifestations of life aim ever more quickly and ever more forcefully at an organic state. The centuries which have passed were precisely a period of disorganization and chaotic transition. Religion, art, science, the state of humanity – all were undermined and shaken... Has this process come to an end? In regards to the crisis of the spirit, I believe, I ardently wish, I hope that it has. In regard to the deed of the spirit, this is only the beginning. (*Ibid.*)

Obviously, Cieszkowski saw himself as a man of the present era. As such, he would be expected to turn his back on the problems of internal contradictions in the religious consciousness and decline the challenge to counter the sophistry of the schoolmen with further

argumentation. Such withdrawal, however, was a wholly insufficient response to the needs of the times. Since neither withdrawal from philosophical debate nor writing further philosophical tracts would bring him closer to participation in the movement of the age, the construction of harmonious, organic structures, Cieszkowski suggested a new project: the founding of a positive review which would serve as a forum for all sides of the Hegelian school and, hopefully, reorient the Hegelians and the general public to a more positive direction. The *Philosophische Gesellschaft* which issued from this suggestion was born in a flurry of hope at the possibility of revitalizing and re-integrating Hegelianism. Its history is a reflection of the disappointment of these hopes and the final collapse of the Hegelian school.

III

Cieszkowski had apparently been arguing on behalf of a new and positive intellectual review for some time before broaching the matter forcefully to Michelet in a letter of December 1842:

> ... I must speak to you of a subject which is much more than personal. You remember that I spoke to you warmly already last year of the need of founding in Berlin an organ which would be positive and not critical like most German publications, devoted to modern philosophy and the whole of intellectual life. I feel the need of something of this sort more every day. The progressive enfranchisement of the press as it is being developed by the king even makes this a duty. For once, let us cease to criticize and organize instead. Let us found a review where the cardinal questions of knowledge and social life would be treated ... with the aim of imparting to the sparse and divergent elements of intellectual life a positive and progressive tendency[28].

Cieszkowski emphasized the urgency of the question by pointing to the sad state of the Hegelian school both internally and vis-à-vis the intelligent public:

> Admit it yourself – Hegel's school is, I would not say divided because that had to happen – but atomized, scattered, I would almost say, routed by the absolute lack of a tie which would make of it a body, whatever the progress which Hegelian ideas make outside the school. (*Ibid.*)

It is probable that Cieszkowski's invitation to Michelet at this particular time was also intended as a gesture of reconciliation after their public quarrel which had evoked the *Gott und Palingenesie.* Actually, the reasons which Cieszkowski advanced on behalf of the proposed journal were not as impelling as he supposed. Friedrich

Wilhelm IV's liberal press policies were to prove short-lasting[29]. The atomized Hegelians had been drawn together somewhat by the threat from Schelling; since it had soon become clear that the threat could be weathered easily – at least intellectually, if not politically – they had reason to reassume some of their earlier cocky self-assuredness. This did not, of course, imply that they were any more united on matters of substance but they perceived themselves as being under lesser pressure.

For whatever reasons, Michelet accepted Cieszkowski's invitation. During the Christmas period of 1842, they visited many of Hegel's friends and students recruiting members and contributors for the proposed philosophical society and its organ and were encouraged by the response. Only state councillor Johannes Schulze, Altenstein's former colleague and ally, declined to join because of his official position[30].

Thus, on January 5th, 1843 the group held its first meeting at Cieszkowski's Berlin residence, 66 Unter den Linden. The original fifteen or so members were, for the most part, academic Hegelians of fairly Right-wing Hegelian persuasion[31]. Their intention was certainly not to create a conservative club. Rather, they had been drawn to the society by virtue of their academic position and their personal relation to Hegel. Most were also linked through the *Verein von Freunden des Verewigten* which was engaged in putting out the first edition of Hegel's collected works.

Cieszkowski's position may have appeared somewhat anomalous. He belonged entirely to the Young Hegelian generation which had never known the master. Although he had offered to edit the philosophy of history, his offer had not been accepted[32]. Moreover, he was an outsider not only to the Berlin academic establishment but, by virtue of his nationality and his constant travels, to German intellectual life as such. Perhaps his principal qualification for entry into this circle was his readiness to put considerable material means at the disposition of the less affluent university Hegelians. Certainly it was this generosity, as well as his organizing energy, rather than the two unorthodox pamphlets which he had contributed to their philosophical debates, which earned him the respect of the group assembled at his home in January 1843. Inasmuch as its relation to Cieszkowski was not based on a strict intellectual and ideological compatibility, however, one could expect the divergences which would later develop between the society and its founder.

At their first meeting, the group adopted the name *Philosophische Gesellschaft* and stated their common aim:

> The here present friends and students of Hegel, without wishing to hide differences in their orientations but conscious of a common ground, bind themselves together in order to act united for a closer understanding and an all-sided development of philosophy[33].

As means to this end, they resolved to come together regularly for lectures and discussions and to put out a periodical where articles approved by the society would appear.

Originally, another goal had been advanced: "the leading of philosophy into life". This clearly corresponded to Michelet's and Cieszkowski's intentions for the society. In spite of the former's energetic defense of the principle, it was replaced upon the suggestion of Gabler by the more neutral phrase about "all sided philosophical development". The change was made because of the majority's fear that the former expression might be understood as an effort to create an opposition to the government – surely an indication both of the state of politics at the time and the philosophers' unwillingness to risk confrontation:[34]

As it happened, both the political fears and the threat of internal schism proved well founded. The first quarrel occurred concerning the publishing house which was to put out the projected journal. Cieszkowski and Michelet suggested Schröder Verlag; Hotho and some others wanted to use the firm of one of the society's members, Moritz Veit.[35] The issue was painfully resolved when Agathon Benary, Vatke and Hotho decided to set up a periodical independently of the society.

Their projected journal, *Für Leben, Kunst und Wissenschaft* ran into administrative problems immediately. The editors were received by Eichhorn, the Minister of Education, and told that their project was "bound to fail" even if it should, by some luck, obtain the permission of the Ministry of the Interior. The reason which Eichhorn gave for his prediction was the irreligious nature of Hegel's philosophy; presumably, the German reading public's piety condemned the enterprise before it had been launched. Although the quirks of Prussian law would have permitted the journal to appear as a monthly rather than a weekly without the ministry's approval, Eichhorn's scarcely veiled warnings and his promise of compensation to Benary for the losses already incurred put an end to this splinter group's plans. It seems that

they were re-integrated into the main body of the society a little while later[36].

Soon after the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* had decided to put out a journal to be entitled *Philosophische Monatshefte für die Fragen der Gegenwart*, Ludwig Noack approached Michelet with an invitation to have the society's proceedings published in his *Jahrbücher fur spekulative Philosophie und die philosophische Bearbeitung der empirischen Wissenschaften* known more popularly as *Noacks Jahrbücher.* Noack himself was a young academic whose concerns and orientation resembled Michelet's attempts to mediate theory with practice and to introduce the Hegelian method into all branches of science[37]. Thus, the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* finally found itself with the organ which it had been seeking for some years.

Even in the early years, the minutes of the society's meetings reveal frequent and usually petty friction among the members. In March 1843, for instance, Hotho brought to the society's attention that one of its members, Henning, had participated in the bestowal of a medal upon Schelling. Seconded by Agathon Benary, he demanded that Henning be censured and that the society officially take a hostile position to Schelling. Cieszkowski opposed this motion energetically. There is no trace of the actual arguments he presented, but in all probability he defended the rights of individual members of the society to unhindered philosophical and political activity. He may also have implied, though others would have been quicker to express it, that it was simply not politically prudent to go on record as unconditional opponents of Schelling[38].

Shortly afterwards, the society was racked by charges of plagiarism directed against Michelet. In the absence of a house organ and in view of the improbability of the society's agreeing quickly on the formation of one, sometime in 1844 Michelet decided to publish independently a paper which he had read to the society and the discussion which ensued. Even though this first part of his trilogy, *Die Epiphanie der ewigen Persönlichkeit des Geistes*, under the title *Über die Persönlichkeit des Absoluten* appeared with the real names of the discussants obscured by Greek pseudonyms, many of Michelet's colleagues were outraged. The matter was temporarily patched up but three of the dissatisfied members – Benary, Hotho, Vatke – left the society in the following year[39].

Cieszkowski was most disturbed by these internal bickerings. Evidently, he attempted to play a conciliatory role and there is ample

evidence in his correspondence that even when he was away from Berlin he manoeuvered diplomatically to lessen tension and assuage offended sensibilities. Although he was in agreement with Michelet over the issue of the publication of the *Persönlichkeit des Absoluten*, he urged Michelet to adopt a low profile temporarily and to give the malcontents certain honorific positions in the society[40].

This is not to say that Cieszkowski attempted to maintain a homogeneity of views within the *Philosophische Gesellschaft*. Quite to the contrary, he constantly impressed upon Michelet the need of maintaining a dialogue with divergent tendencies within the society:

> Only all-sidedness is capable of really manifesting the truth. Would you not admit yourself that you are indebted to your furthest adversaries for your most fortunate inductions... Believe me, it is the heterogeneity of the society which creates its unity... I find that the society is far too insufficiently complex; that there is a wealth of elements which is not at all or only feebly represented, that the society sins by exclusion – yet you would want it to undergo a new abstraction![41]

Initially, Cieszkowski participated actively in discussions which he saw as significant. Thus, in an animated exchange on Veit's paper concerning "ethics and the state", he presented his own notion of the development of objective spirit. Praising Veit for having replaced Hegel's sequence of family, civil society and the state with a succession leading from family through state to humanity, Cieszkowski spoke of the need to impart substance to the last notion by recognizing that the institution proper to humanity can only be termed a church. Only thus would the concrete education of mankind which Michelet had called cosmopolitanism be given an organized form corresponding to the associational needs of the times[42].

The earnest and enthusiastic spirit of these early discussions is strikingly conveyed in a poem read in March 1843 at a banquet given in honour of Cieszkowski by his philosophical friends. The founding of the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* was described as a new Pentecost in lyrical stanzas:

> The feast of Pentecost was fulfilled
> The air blew gentle and mild,
> The youths sat in their shelters
> Feeling alone and abandoned.
> For since their master had departed,
> One and all they felt deserted
> Wondering whether fulfillment would be theirs,
> whether the kingdom of God would come and stay.

And that which happened in the days of old,
We, my friends, are living through this today.
When our master went away
With sticks and pikes did the pharisees
Begin to drive the spirit out
For they could not fit it into their narrow house.
Yet it penetrated into every land
We preach it already in foreign tongues,
The Swedes, the Danes, akin to the Germans
All follow the ghost of the great thinker.
In France, the land of a free movement,
They have been seized by a spiritual impulse;
In Poland, there noble hearts beat,
Their salvation is Hegel, they bet on him.
And across the sea in the new world
Lectures on the logic are being held[43].

Alas, their euphoria was short lived! In addition to the personal squabbles already described, the society's discussions themselves took on an increasingly academic flavour, becoming ever more reminiscent of the ratiocination which the society had been founded to avoid. A list of the topics debated is a gloomy confirmation of this tendency[44]. Cieszkowski found himself hearing and repeating familiar metaphysical and theological controversies. His participation became increasingly nothing more than a defense of the positions taken in his *Prolegomena* and his *Gott und Palingenesie.*

Moreover, Cieszkowski's growing social and political preoccupations drew him away both from philosophy and the *Philosophische Gesellschaft.* This was reflected not only in increasingly frequent absences from the meetings but in a certain tension which developed between himself and other members on some contemporary issues. Thus, Cieszkowski could not have approved Michelet's article on the Cracow uprising of 1846 where the latter spoke of Poland's fate as "the strong hand of world order" and explained the partitions thus:

In order to let this people go through the normal process of European humanity, the world spirit enclosed it with three absolute monarchies which imposed the above mentioned process (i.e., liberation from aristocratic control – AL) as an externally coercive one since it did not develop from the internal spirit of the people because of the unbound sense of the freedom of the individual[45].

In later years, Cieszkowski was also prepared to rationalize the Polish partitions historiosophically. Nevertheless, he would at no time have agreed with Michelet's historical analysis of the Polish *szlachta*, nor

with the Hegelian smugness which underlay it. In 1848 this smugness was to easily transform itself into German chauvinism.

Evidently, Cieszkowski was disappointed with the direction in which the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* was heading. He wrote from Paris in December 1846:

> As for our society, I only know that it has celebrated the anniversary of Hegel's death – would it not think of celebrating something more living and itself give some sign of life? I know that Noack's journal has begun to appear but I have not yet seen it. What sad times we are living in! What moral and physical hunger![46]

Indeed, already in 1846 Cieszkowski appears to have lost interest in his own creation. Some of the reasons may become clearer as we examine below Cieszkowski's other activities of those years. However, there are also reasons intrinsic to Hegelian philosophy and to its character as a political force in the Prussia of the 1840's.

Ultimately, Hegel's system could not be translated into a body of practical precepts. Those on the Left who tried found themselves with a political programme intensely critical of Hegel. Those on the Right soon abandoned the attempt and became reverent custodians of Hegel's texts. The Prussian state obviously repudiated and persecuted the first; it found ideological support of only scanty value among the second. The latter were, for the most part, good and solid citizens; their involved reasoning, however, usually seemed irrelevant and unnecessarily obscure for the ideological needs of Prussia.

Cieszkowski found himself estranged from the second grouping, the Right, by virtue of his primarily social and moral concerns. Simultaneously, he was excluded from the politicized Left by the specific nature of his social and moral orientation. His alienation from the former may be explained by a generational gap; the experience of having studied together under Hegel himself unified the Old Hegelians, for the most part of the Right. His reluctance to join the Left can perhaps be illuminated by a class analysis; it is, however, infinitely more complex and must be studied in detail in subsequent chapters of this work.

Although Cieszkowski took part in the proceedings of the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* and its successors for a full half-century, his active role in it really ends before 1848. Nevertheless, it may be instructive to trace briefly the later history of the society inasmuch as it throws light on the disintegration of the Hegelian school.

The tumultuous year 1848 dealt the society a blow from which it took long to recover. The number of meetings dropped from seven in

1848, to six in 1849, to one in 1850. One of these meetings was directly supervised by a police officer who, incidentally, found nothing to reproach. Many members withdrew over political disagreements with their colleagues; all publications ceased.

In 1853–54, Michelet took the initiative of reviving the society with a new periodical, *Der Gedanke.* Although Cieszkowski disliked the title for its one-sidedness, he heartily encouraged Michelet's efforts:

> I am delighted to learn that the philosophical society is finally returning to its labours. Although the moment is not very well chosen for philosophizing, inasmuch as it is either too early or too late for that, this does not make me any the less happy and I shall not fail to take part in your November meeting[47].

It is indicative of the considerably humbler and more mundane spirit of the Hegelians of the 1850's that the revived society, after some debate, was transformed into an eating club under the curious name of *Philosophische Mittagsgesellschaft.* Michelet never approved of the change and in 1857, after Hotho had once again withdrawn – apparently in protest against the increasingly philosophical tone of the luncheons[48] – the society was rechristened *Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin.*

The society survived the political and philosophical vicissitudes of the Bismarckian era. It even gained prominent and politically radical new members such as Moses Hess and Ferdinand Lassalle[49]. However, in 1868 with the death of court councillor Forster, one of the founding members, the Hegelians within the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* found themselves in a minority. Consequently, a few years later the statutes were amended to suit the neo-Kantians and empirical natural scientists. The expression "science of the absolute" and the goal of studying "the One as All, *sub specie aeternitatis*" were replaced by references to the "science of final principles" and the declaration that "everything individual will be considered in relation to the whole"[50]. It was more than a change of vocabulary; it was a final rejection of Hegelianism.

Cieszkowski remained on the sidelines during these years. In addition to occasional participation in discussion, he donated generously to the society's various projects – prize essays, publication costs, and – even though he did not like the idea – a monument to Hegel on the centenary of his birth[51].

Michelet remained active in animating the society and attempting to preserve its Hegelian character well into the 1890's. His memoirs

convey something of the sadness at the turn which events had taken: "Nowadays, few of the survivors take part in the meetings... even Cieszkowski comes now only rarely to Berlin"[52]. It is clear that Michelet was not simply grieved at the passage of time and friends but, above all, puzzled that the Hegelianism in which his own generation had placed so much exuberant hope could have been defeated.

Here perhaps lies the difference between the Hegelianism of Michelet and Cieszkowski. The former never understood how philosophy in its absolute form could have suffered first political and then philosophical rejection. The latter understood but was powerless to prevent it, perhaps because he himself had contributed to its defeat.

IV

Any attempt to summarize the rise and decline of the Hegelian school between 1830–1848 and to define Cieszkowski's part in the process presents baffling problems. Although its emergence as the dominant philosophical school of the period is as rapid as its fall, one can hardly point to a specific moment of crisis which would explain the disintegration.

Perhaps one should begin the inquiry with a reconsideration of Hegel himself. Initially, there does not seem to be much cause for questioning Hegel's and his followers' claim that Hegelian philosophy represented the culmination and the systematization of the entire idealist tradition. Certainly, Hegel's philosophy had a power and a completeness which made it the most appropriate expression of German philosophy.

At the same time, one must recognize a profound ambiguity in Hegel. On one level, this may simply be termed a bibliographical problem. Hegel's actual publications were few; the most compact expression of his system, the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* underwent several editions with substantial variations in his own lifetime[53]. Above all, the bulk of his work, the several sets of lectures, never had an authorized version and were modified by Hegel from one year to another. On another level, Hegel seemed to have expressed himself purposely in what his disciples called esoteric rather than exoteric language. Thus, although his contradictions regarding his expectations of the historical future may be attributed to the vagaries of time and context, the difficulties of interpreting such fundamental

questions as the relations among the three manifestations of absolute spirit cannot be dismissed as easily.

This is not to say that one must assume with Hegel's enemies that Hegel cultivated an intentional obscurity. Nor does it mean that Hegel was a coward who hid his true convictions[54]. It is simply to state that the very richness and complexity of the Hegelian system left much unsaid or merely implied. One may still argue fruitfully today as to what these implications really are; in the context of this work it is sufficient to realize that Cieszkowski's contemporaries also saw a need of examining and developing what their master had but suggested.

The initial arena of such examination was a particularly vulnerable aspect of Hegel's system: the relation between religion and philosophy. The Hegelians could not rest satisfied with the assertion that both were different forms of the same content, presenting the truth in different ways. When applied to specific problems such as the nature and the personality of God, the immortality of the soul, the philosophical significance of the Incarnation the explanation seemed to some insufficient. In the course of examination into these questions, some Hegelians – Michelet, for example – found Hegel's formulation to be satisfactory. Of those who found it insufficient, some repudiated Hegelian philosophy and others rejected the Christian religion, indeed any religion. Even among the last, important variations remained. Contrary to Cieszkowski's accusations, both Bauer and Feuerbach did not consider religion to be simply a manifestation of ignorance, as their Enlightenment predecessors had done, but a necessary stage in cultural and spiritual development. It was not until Stirner and Marx that the position which Cieszkowski had criticized was attained.

The *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* was the first work to redirect Hegelian debate from religious to political concerns. Several years later, changed political conditions and the inability of the orthodox Hegelians either to agree on Hegel's meaning or to forge beyond Hegel towards an independent position, gave Cieszkowski's distinction and his concept of *praxis* a particular relevance. However, inasmuch as its application took place in a climate of increasing ideological polarization it soon departed from the intentions of its formulator. Instead of expressing the need of concrete social activity nourished by philosophical insight, it became the catchword of opposition to the government. Ironically, *praxis* eventually evolved into a rejection of all philosophy, whose quietism had purportedly made it an ally of the reactionary state.

Cieszkowski's second philosophical undertaking was completely different in character. Where the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* had been scientific in intention and future-oriented, the *Gott und Palingenesie* was personal and backward looking. It was an ethical declaration, a *prise de position* on some of the major theological questions troubling the Hegelian school and it looked back ruefully to the damage wrought both to philosophy and theology in the last years. Unlike the *Prolegomena* it did not suggest solutions; it simply registered Cieszkowski's beliefs and regrets. Finally, the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* was an afterthought to philosophy. It was apparently a consciously quixotic gesture to save a unity which had already been lost. Cieszkowski realized this from the beginning and his early withdrawal from the society's activities is testimony to this realization.

PART II

FRANCE AND THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT

CHAPTER V

A HEGELIAN IN FRANCE

I

For the men of Cieszkowski's generation France was not a geographical location but an intellectual construct. They were not the first to seek inspiration from across the Rhine but with characteristic intensity they developed an existing legend to staggering proportions. Having shrouded the land of the Revolution in myth, they proclaimed Paris a universal schoolroom, a workshop for their hopes and the capital of the future[1].

There was considerable irony in such an idealization of France under the Bourgeois Monarchy. Indeed, the encounter between German intellectuals and French reality was most often a bitter one. Nevertheless, beneath the rather placid surface of Louis Philippe's reign these intellectuals had correctly discerned a sub-current of vast historical implications. They observed and added to the process of social and intellectual ferment which eventually transcended both the borders of France and its historical context, destroying the Bourgeois Monarchy in its course.

Before examining Cieszkowski's place within this process between 1838 and 1848 I propose to survey the conditions which he encountered and which defined both the sphere of his activity and the development of his ideas. For him, as for so many of his contemporaries, the French experience proved to be a political and intellectual laboratory in which a new dimension of social reality was discovered.

When Cieszkowski arrived in Paris in the autumn of 1838 the July monarchy was eight years old. Its birth had marked the failure of all efforts to distribute power between the *haute bourgeoisie* and the surviving elements of the *ancien régime*. The former had repudiated the compromise Charter of 1814, chosen their own monarch, and insisted on governing alone. Apparently, the third estate had triumphed. In fact, however, the class which had come to power was narrowly circumscribed. Even after a lowering of the property qualification had doubled the number of voters, the *pays légal* numbered

only 190,000 in a country where universal male suffrage would have extended to some 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 electors[2]. The abolition of a hereditary Chamber of Peers transformed that institution from an assembly of nobles into a plutocracy where industrialists, merchants and functionaries jostled with men of intellectual merit for the chairs left vacant by bishops and aristocrats. In short, some four hundred families of the *haute bourgeoisie* ruled France.

Other groups benefited from the new regime. The law on associations limiting gatherings to fewer than twenty people was allowed to lapse. Between 1830 and 1835 the press operated under few restrictions[3]. Municipalities were granted a greater measure of autonomy and the municipal suffrage was widened[4]. Laicization was carried out strictly robbing the Church of its privileged position. Above all, economic development proceeded rapidly. This was an era when "the ruling class was able to make history while doing business"[5]. Indeed, the regime consciously tied its very legitimacy to the advance of wealth among its citizens: "Enrich yourselves through work and saving and you will become electors" was Guizot's exhortation[6]. The textile industry prospered particularly; the proportion of the country's work force engaged in agriculture declined from 85% to 75%; coal production leaped from 2,500,000 to 5,000,000 tons and still proved insufficient to meet the needs of growing French industry. Finally, machines became the ally of the bourgeois in his quest to increase production. France had fifteen steam engines in 1815, 623 in 1830 and 5200 in 1848[7]. After some hesitation, France embarked upon construction of a railway network which transformed the internal market thoroughly. For many contemporaries, including Cieszkowski, the railway symbolized the advent of a new age[8].

It was an age of misery for a substantial part of the population. Throughout the period 1830–1848 one-seventh to one-third of the population of Paris was indigent. The great Lyons revolt was set off when wages were reduced to eighteen sous for an eighteen-hour day at a time when the average wage of the worker was two francs a day and the minimal subsistence level was eight hundred francs annually. The working classes considered bread a luxury[9].

It would seem that this should have been an age of unqualified liberalism. The "rule of the private citizen in business"[10] lent itself to an extreme individualism and an absolute *laissez-faire* which both had strong foundations in the writings of Benjamin Constant and other

restoration liberals as well as in the fashion for English political economy. When it was suggested that the sugar industry should be supported for the sake of giving work to the labourers, the president of the National Assembly, Sauzet, answered that it was the task of the House to pass laws and not to create employment. A first measure of social legislation was reluctantly passed in 1841 concerning the conditions of child-labour; in effect, it simply re-introduced a law which had existed under Napoleon[11].

In economic rather than social policy, the liberalism of the July monarchy was far more qualified. Whereas the *ancien régime* had deliberately maintained a low price for bread, Louis-Philippe kept prices high out of consideration for landed interests. Here, as in many other fields, high customs and protection duties were the rule. Simultaneously, the national budget expanded through a variety of new, generally indirect, taxes and, above all, through the general enrichment of the country. In fifteen years, the state spent some 1,500,000,000 francs on public works; the annual war budget rose from 219,000,000 francs to 350,000,000 francs; expenditure on public education also increased – from 7,000,000 to 9,000,000 francs! Even the additional wealth of the country could not support such expenses: heavy borrowing raised the national debt by some twenty percent[12].

Thus, the July monarchy shrank from the full implications of liberalism. Till its very end dogmatic liberals constituted an opposition group. Indeed, in 1846 a group of French economists – Rossi, Chevalier, Bastiat, Passy, Wołowski – founded the *Journal des Economistes* and the *Société d'économie politique* in the hope of persuading the French to follow the example of the German *Zollverein* and the English repeal of the Corn Laws. The regime remained unpersuaded.

The period is best described as the reign of the *juste milieu*. The middle classes were to steer a middle course between the undesirable extremes of democracy or absolutism. The virtue which stood in the middle was stability; virtue's reward was prosperity; the virtuous were Joseph Prudhomme and the philistines immortalized in the *Comédie Humaine*. In a sense, the very ethos of the period rejected ideology. Self-interest and enrichment required no philosophical foundations. Nevertheless, even the bourgeois of the *juste milieu*, proud of his pragmatism and scornful of metaphysics, needed to have the premises of his rule defined. Characteristically, he simply selected and adapted existing systems. Having uncritically and simplistically assimilated

Maine de Biran's sensualism, he turned to Royer-Collard for political definition and to Victor Cousin for a veneer of philosophical culture.

Royer-Collard's political credo had one dogma: equilibrium. His master passion was mediation; his deity was reason[13]. Sovereignty belonged to neither people nor kings but to reason "the only true legislator of humanity"[14]. The balance of powers and the sovereignty of reason required liberty; above all, however, it required authority to which liberty would be merely a counter-weight. Moreover, reason could be served only by a class which was more enlightened than the masses and, at the same time, one which unlike the aristocracy, was close enough to the masses to represent the interests of the entire nation. This class could only be the bourgeoisie. Although Royer-Collard's principal activity belonged to the period of the Restoration, his influence and that of his disciple, Guizot, thoroughly dominated the political theory of the July monarchy[15].

Victor Cousin sought to melt together systems and philosophies as Royer-Collard tried to separate and balance powers. The results were roughly similar. Cousin's "Eclecticism" has been described as a "*juste milieu* of philosophy, a monstrous alloy of incompatible principles"[16]. In overcoming the limits of Cartesian rationalism, Cousin tried to integrate what he saw as the four principal philosophies of the past: sensualism, idealism, skepticism, idealism[17]. The system drew heavily, though mostly tacitly, on Hegel and Schelling[18]. Theologically, it culminated in an eminently moderate sort of pantheism. Politically, it issued in an uncritical justification of the *status quo*. In spite of the superficial and syncretist nature of this self-styled eclecticism, Cousin was both immensely esteemed and popular[19].

It is hardly surprising, however, that the dominant ideology of the July monarchy should have been judged deficient by important elements of public opinion. Originating as a somewhat inchoate dissatisfaction with the religious indifference and the social callousness of the era, voices of dissent eventually formulated their critique of the epoch and advanced alternatives to the ethos of the regime. Although analytically distinct, the religious and social impulses merged to constitute a movement of opposition, in varying shades of radicalism, to the principles on which the regime rested.

The spiritual malaise of the period has found eloquent chroniclers. Musset, Chateaubriand, Sainte-Beuve[20], all bear witness to what fundamentally different men like Fourier called "inquiétude universelle"

and what Saint-Simon termed a wearying state of uncertainty[21]. Lesser figures spoke with no less anguish of "being suspended between past and future, a past which was tottering and a future which has not yet come"[22]. Men faced a terrible vacuum and it apparently threatened to absorb within itself Christianity, the social order, indeed, the world as they knew it[23]. If this condition seems familiar as simply the "unhappy consciousness" of modern man, it should perhaps be recalled that in the period under discussion here it held the additional terror of relative novelty[24].

The reaction to the spiritual *malaise* described took a variety of forms. Such occult practices as magnetism flourished[25]. Numerous religious movements, most charitably described as eccentric, arose[26]. Paradoxically, the impending end of Christianity seemed to drive some men back into the Church in redemptive fervour[27]. Piety, religious frenzy and hypocrisy all joined in denouncing Voltairism as anachronistic and outmoded.

In some minds, the religious crisis evoked a more considered formulation. In the midst of the Revolution, Joseph de Maistre had declared that men stood before a single alternative: either they had to create a new religion or Christianity would be rejuvenated in some extraordinary way[28]. Maistre's choice was unambiguous: he expected a "new explosion of Christianity" and saw the present ills of France as a scourge for her sins and a prelude to her redemption[29]. In this he provided a paradigm for the national Messianism which was to loom so large throughout the nineteenth century[30]. Above all, Maistre shared in one of the dominant impulses of his adversaries. In only seeming paradox he wrote: "what we want is not the counter-revolution but the contrary of the revolution"[31]. In fact, what he sought was also a revolution. He would have agreed with the contempt expressed in Robespierre's statement that "atheism is aristocratic"[32]. Like Robespierre and many others of the succeeding generation, he sought a moral revolution which he could express only in religious terms.

A moral critique of society, formulated in a religious vocabulary, was by no means a prerogative of the theocrats. Indeed, the emphasis on moral renewal and the inability to transcend religious categories characterized social theory of all ideological variations throughout this period. Similarly, the identification of a "social problem" was a common discovery of widely divergent ideological groupings. In France, unlike Germany, it would be unfair to suggest that conservatives first pointed to the problem raised by the existence of a large class of

propertyless and up-rooted individuals[33]. French conservatives, however, were certainly more perceptive than the liberals or even latter-day Jacobins in realizing that the interests of the two classes in society were irreconcilable.

A particularly interesting integration of moral, religious and socio-economic elements into a comprehensive social theory is the somewhat diffuse tendency known as Social Catholicism[34]. Its very origin suggests internal incompatibility: issuing from both Christian democracy and legitimist theory, its impulse was the realization that the misery of the present day was not susceptible to treatment through traditional charity but constituted a totally new problem – that of the labourer in society. Although specific solutions differed, they shared a common repudiation of the notions of class struggle and a firm belief in the benefits of working-class association[35].

Among the movement's weaknesses was a failure to produce any outstanding individual spokesmen of the stature of a Saint-Simon or a Fourier. In their time, however, Social Catholics were both influential and perceptive. Thus, as early as 1830, Charles de Coux pointed to industrialism as the cause of the rupture between rich and poor. His proposed solution lay in an association of masters and workers[36]. Villeneuve-Bargemont extended de Coux's economic analysis though his remedy, the establishment of agricultural colonies, would suggest that he did not fully grasp the implications of industrialization[37]. Hippolite de la Morvonnais developed the notion of association in largely Fourierist terms, though, like other Catholic theorists, with substantial regard for the family[38].

More familiar are those figures who stood between the Social Catholics and the socialists. Philippe Buchez whose philosophy of history has been discussed already, upon leaving the Saint-Simonians, converted to Catholicism seeing it as a more "social" religion than Protestantism[39]. Although he denied the necessity of "the terrible doctrine that society is divided into two classes"[40], Buchez' social analysis assumed a parasitic entrepreneurial class and an oppressed working class. His remedies were unoriginal: association, education, various social funds, productive co-operatives, agricultural colonies and colonial expansion[41]. In spite of his commitment to "the moralization of the lower classes" and the related denial of a potential for independent initiative on the part of the proletariat, Buchez' organ, *L'Atelier*, was the only radical publication of the period actually

controlled by workers[42]. An indication of the esteem in which Buchez was held by his contemporaries is his election to the presidency of the National Assembly in the most critical days of 1848 – a task to which he proved unequal.

An even more important Catholic figure was Lamennais[41]. His *Paroles d'un Croyant* and *Livre du Peuple* thundered against existing social inequities in Biblical language and reached a massive audience, particularly among the working classes. For all his influence and importance, however, Lamennais himself showed the limits of Social Catholicism. His social writings were condemned by the Church and, after having begun as an ardent advocate of papal power, he found himself in deep opposition to Catholic institutions and even doctrines[44].

A further limitation to the scope of Catholic, or indeed any exclusively religiously inspired social critique, was the neglect of economic science. Certainly, the very term "political economy" was synonymous with liberalism. Nevertheless, as early as 1825 Simone de Sismondi had defected from Ricardianism to argue against the misery of the worker from an economic standpoint. Although his argument centred about a misconceived notion of overproduction caused by the declining buying-power, and consequently declining consumption, of the majority, it merits recognition as a frontal attack on liberal abstractions and a plea for the introduction of sentiment into economic theory[45].

The distinction of synthesizing the religious and the economic critique of society into a total and original view of the world is shared by two contemporary and rival schools: the Saint-Simonians and the Fourierists. In their own time, these were merely two, rather eccentric sects whose limited influence clashed with their overwhelming self-importance. In retrospect, their pretensions to a discovery of the laws governing man in the present and dictating his future development have proved ill-founded. Nevertheless, their vision of the world and their formulation of men's needs acted as a catalyst to further thought as well as to actual social transformation. Out of the ideological debris of the July monarchy it is they who have ultimately emerged as victors.

Significantly, the Saint-Simonians found themselves correcting popular misconceptions about their theory virtually before that theory had been formulated. Thus, in 1831 the leaders of the Saint-Simonian religion informed the National Assembly that contrary to what that august institution had previously heard the Saint-Simonians advocated

neither the abolition of property, nor the community of wives, nor the natural equality of all men, nor even the destruction of religion. They sought rather a hierarchial social order where all men would be rewarded on the basis of their capacities and where the productive process so vital to men's material well-being would be organized on rational principles[46]. Underlying the Saint-Simonian ideals was the realization that the onset of industrialism had profoundly changed the requirements of social order. Henceforth, neither conquest nor the privileges of birth but the capacity for productive and useful work could create claims on society. A corollary of this goal was a repudiation of the inheritance rights and a condemnation of the classes who thrived on inheritance; in the original form of the Saint-Simonian doctrine, this was perhaps its most radical tenet.

Benjamin Constant was thus correct in characterizing Saint-Simonianism at one point as "industrial papism"[47]. The evolution of the doctrine however, led it in a populist direction. The Saint-Simonians of 1830–31 distinguished within the class which Saint-Simon had globally called the "*industriels*" between the captains of industry and the "most numerous and poorest class". It was the amelioration of the lot of the latter which became their chief concern. Nevertheless, the Saint-Simonians still conceived their task as the synthesis of liberalism and Catholicism, philosophy and religion[48]. To this extent their emphasis on a more efficient exploitation of the earth and on a planned industrial economy stands not beyond liberalism but at its margin.

The Fourierists represent a far more clear-cut break with the prevailing ideology. Their utopian communities, the Phalansteries, were intimate agrarian-handicraft societies where the din of the industrial revolution, so central to Saint-Simonism, could not penetrate. As the Saint-Simonians based their theory on a philosophy of history, so the Fourierists founded their views on psychology. Men were conceived of as clusters of needs, passions and desires. Fourier's great discovery, the "law of attraction", was the realization that in each man certain passions prevailed and that a society could be created where the master passions of all could be satisfied in harmonious co-operation with all others. In short, this social application of Newtonian principles led to a condition where all attractions were so balanced that any friction was eliminated[49].

There are certain underlying similarities between the Fourierists and the Saint-Simonians. Both see the present organization of society as

essentially irrational, i.e., not organized according to scientific principles. Both are as concerned with simply increasing production as they are with a more just redistribution of the social product. Neither Fourierists nor Saint-Simonians had a developed metaphysics nor any systematic relation to Christianity[50]. Moreover, neither group was in sympathy with the extreme political opposition to the July Monarchy, the republicans and the Babouvist egalitarians. Indeed, the socialists were generally thought of as a rather peaceful and harmless sort; their bizarre schemes were amusing, perhaps provocative, but certainly not dangerous[51]. In spite of these far-reaching similarities, however, historical circumstances put the Fourierists and the Saint-Simonians at extreme odds with each other. Fourier and Saint-Simon were roughly contemporaries but it was the latter's disciples who first achieved public prominence and popularity. Not until the Saint-Simonian wave had broken – primarily as a result of its own follies – did Fourier attract attention, and disciples, away from Saint-Simonism[52].

The Fourierists and the Saint-Simonians were the principal constellations in the galaxy of the French counter-culture but there were innumerable more transient stars. There is no exaggeration in calling the assembly of social critics, prophets, thinkers and reformers a parallel society or sub-culture which dominated its adherents as totally as any state or church authority instilling in them a radically new way of assessing social reality. Nor is there any exaggeration in speaking of their impressive numbers. Though the members of each sect or school may have been few, the numbers of such groups proliferated. Thus, a Saint-Simonian could write:

> We see one or two general doctrines blossom every week. They are all at one and the same time a new politics, a new doctrine of social organization, a new economic system, a new morality, often even a new religion and always an infallible recipe which would assure all men without any exception their happiness on earth. It is an invasion, a deluge of systems and of philosophical doctrines. Besides Auguste Comte, Bonald, de Maistre, Saint-Simon, Fourier, Cousin, Azais, Wroński, Coessin, Ballanche, Ancar all have their system. The newspapers themselves have their doctrines – the "unitary" doctrine of the *Revue Encyclopédique*, the general synthesis of the *Européen* and so many others[53].

Fourier added a more sober analysis of this phenomenon:

> In the fluctuation of systems, civilization is like a sick individual who tries all positions in order to find some comfort, he calls in all the charlatans who know how to flatter him in pompous style with hopes of a recovery and who, in promising something new, simply engender new calamities[54].

It is hardly surprising that German intellectuals should have rushed to Paris to shop at an intellectual bazaar of unprecedented proportions. Gans exclaimed:

With what excitement and what tense expectation can one compare a call to a literary or scholarly trip to Paris ... In Paris, I found everything important and meaningful; all was known to me from hearsay: the city quarters, the streets, places of merriment, the men ... [55]

It was on one such trip that Gans discovered the Saint-Simonians and Fourierists. Although he appears to have been far more impressed with the former, he faithfully reported the doctrine of both and could hardly conceal his amazement at their vigour and originality. Arnold Ruge, writing some years later, was no less overwhelmed by this discovery of France:

For Germany, Paris is no less important than it is for the departments. Our victories and our defeats we experience in Paris. Even our philosophy, with which we are a step ahead (of the French – AL), will not come to power until it has come into the open in Paris and taken on a French spirit ... [56]

In contrast to Gans, however, Ruge was far more impressed with Fourier. Paying Fourier something of a supreme compliment he wrote:

The father of all the thoughts and systems which now penetrate the French world under the name of socialism even unto its lowest classes and often appear in literature without consciousness of their origin is Fourier ...

His role is similar in the French world to that played by Hegel in ours; he lends arms to all parties. His polemic against philosophy and revolution pleases reactionaries, his critique of civilization, commerce, the family, morality and politics pleases revolutionnaires ...

Just as with Hegel one cannot say whether he is for or against, when it is a question of a decisive conflict between parties each one can cite him in his own case ... so it is with Fourier[57].

The Fourierists, Ruge goes on, treat their doctrine like a revelation but they are much less fanatical than the communists who "wait impatiently for the moment when they can make the world happy with a single blow"[58]. Even French communists, however, are more tolerant than their German counterparts, "the hotheads who arrive here to find a dogma all readymade for them, whereas the French have participated in its development"[59].

Such impressions created the myth of European salvation through an intellectual alliance of France and Germany; the revolutionary experience and the political maturity of the former and the Hegelian

philosophy of the latter were seen as invincible allies in the transformation of the world[60]. A practical obstacle, however, was French disinterest for all things German. Indeed, Ruge complained that the French were infinitely more interested in the fate of Poland and in their Polish exiles than they were in their German visitors[61]. Thus, even though there were 85,000 Germans in Paris in 1843 the French intellectuals remained serenely unaware of their presence. Far from allowing themselves to be discouraged, the German Hegelians continued to gravitate towards France confident that they could teach and be taught.

It is tempting to linger over the excitement of this encounter and the vitality of the social and intellectual movement which confronted the Hegelians. Certainly, no account of this topic should leave unmentioned such names as Cabet, Leroux, Pecqueur, Proudhon. A sketch of the sort attempted here, however, must forsake any pretensions to historical completeness and rest content with having evoked the mood of a period.

II

Cieszkowski proceeded to Paris at a leisurely pace in the summer of 1838. In the course of his three month voyage, he carefully noted a wealth of impressions, readings, ideas and chance encounters.

Cieszkowski appears to have been particularly impressed with two aspects of the voyage: the prosperous agricultural country which he crossed, and the trains and steamships which carried him part of the way. Thus, he records the "high degree of agronomy and industry in Saxony"[62]. Similarly, he exclaims about the "state of agriculture on the Rhine", and the splendid view from the Belgian border. Splendour as he understands it consists of "A flowering of the land and agriculture, pastures, plantations, gardens, groves and a chorus of cattle (*sic*)"[63]. The idyllic bucolic vision carries with it utilitarian rather than aesthetic overtones. At the same time, Cieszkowski excitedly notes every brief railway trip. Indeed, he seems to see particular significance in the fact that he began his twenty-fifth year in a train somewhere between Antwerp and Ghent[64]. A steamship trip on the Rhine, a tunnel in Belgium, a railway station of magic appearance, all these enter his notebook. Yet his enthusiasm is somewhat qualified. "Delights and discomforts of such travel", he writes and he jots down the complaints

of a coach driver who condemns mechanized means of transportation and greedy burgers in one breath[65].

After having visited all his philosophical friends in Berlin, there is little mention of Cieszkowski seeing other people. Indeed, in a comment from Boulogne-sur-mer, Cieszkowski seems to suggest that the bathing establishment would be ideal if there were no one but himself there[66]. His leisure hours seem to have been filled with readings of a somewhat lighter nature than those which had earlier absorbed him. Primarily, Cieszkowski read books pertaining to his travels. Within this category itself, however, he showed considerable variety. Apart from Baedecker's *Belgien* and a *Belgique Pittoresque*, he read an *essai sur la statistique de la Belgique*. Systematically preparing himself for his anticipated stay in Paris, he devoured books about that city. At the same time, he appears to have turned his attention to social history with Michel Chevalier's *Des intérêts matériels en France* and Garnier de Cassagne's *Histoire des classes ouvrières et bourgeoises*. This too should perhaps be seen as preparation for his encounter with Paris[67].

In the French capital itself, Cieszkowski seems to have divided his time equally between three activities: public lectures particularly at the *Académie des sciences morales et politiques* of the *Institut de France*; conversations with various French intellectual figures; the theatre. His sheer energy and the extraordinary range of his acquaintances in this brief period are themselves quite prodigious.

At public lectures, Cieszkowski heard primarily socio-economic subjects discussed. A series on Corsica offered by Adolphe Blanqui particularly engaged his attention. The lectures seem to have been dominated by classical liberals – Passy and Rossi are names which appear frequently. The critical studies of working-class conditions being carried out by Villermé at this time, however, also figured prominently in the Academy's programme. It is an interesting coincidence that at precisely the same period, between December and March 1838-39, another young man newly arrived in Paris, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, also attended the same lectures. Even though Proudhon was to be on familiar terms with Cieszkowski at a later date, their reactions to the world of official French scholarship could not have been more disparate. In contrast to Cieszkowski's enthusiastic participation, Proudhon wrote:

> I have given up on public courses which I regard as a completely useless national luxury. I could feast you with the rubbish which flows from there[68].

Cieszkowski's circle of acquaintances embraces all possible ideological opinion, official as well as radical, though it leans somewhat in the direction of moderate reformers. Among his first friends in Paris was Louis Wołowski, a liberal economist of some stature. After having emigrated from Poland following the revolt of 1830, Wołowski became professor of commercial law and, after A. Blanqui's death, took over the latter's chair as professor of political economy in Paris. Among his other distinctions was a long-term presidency of the *Académie des sciences morales et politiques*, and editorship of the liberal *Journal des Economistes*[69]. Although only four years older than Cieszkowski, Wołowski appears to have been something of a patron for the latter. Indeed, Cieszkowski first appears in Proudhon's notebooks as "Cieszkowski, l'ami de Wołowski"[70].

Also early in his stay in Paris, Cieszkowski met Joseph-Marie Hoëné-Wroński. A Polish émigré who wrote exclusively in French, Wroński can lay claim to being the first Messianist of this age. After having begun as Kant's first French translator, Wroński eventually developed a philosophy of creation expressed in mathematical formulae. Its acceptance by the heads of great states, he claimed, would inaugurate an age of order and put an end to the revolutionary chaos poisoning the present. Wroński's Slavic Messianism rested on repeated appeals to the tsar which, of course, made him an ideological outcast among Polish émigrés[71]. Nevertheless, Wroński appears to have been a familiar figure in the Parisian demi-monde of learning. The French police described him as a "madman, but not dangerous"[72]. Balzac, apparently fascinated, incorporated Wroński and his quest for the absolute principle into his own portraits of the time[73]. Cieszkowski had studied Wroński's work earlier and had taken him quite seriously. Their meeting in Paris was undoubtedly an important occasion for the young Pole; their conversation, however, appears to have dealt not with the great questions of Wroński's law of creation but with the rather more technical details of Wroński's project for a new type of locomotive[74].

Presumably on the strength of recommendations from K. L. Michelet, Cieszkowski met Cousin and talked with him at length about Berlin, Fichte, Göschel and the *Historiosophie*. Perhaps through Wołowski's and Cousin's intervention, the *Académie des sciences morales* reviewed the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* and discussed the manuscript of what was later to become *Du Credit et de la*

Circulation[75]. Thus, in a very short time, Cieszkowski acquired a certain modest reputation as a promising young Hegelian philosopher with a commendable interest in French social and economic theories.

Cieszkowski's notebooks record dinner with Lamennais, a meeting with Ballanche and with Pierre Leroux, evenings with Jules Michelet, Victor Considerant. Cieszkowski's path seems to have often crossed that of the Marquis de Custine who was preparing to embark on his historic trip to Russia[76]. It is a pity that the frenzy of Cieszkowski's social life should have prevented him from recording in more detail both his impressions and the topics discussed in these encounters. Frequently, too, Cieszkowski took leave of the salons to see other aspects of Parisian life. He notes visits to prisons as well as to a sugar-beet factory and farm, as keenly concerned about this particular industry as he had been in Poland some years earlier. Visits to the offices of the *Phalange*, the Fourierist organ, are often mentioned. Evidently, the delightful atmosphere which Ruge was to describe several years later reigned in the winter of 1838/39 as well[77]. It was there that Cieszkowski met Louis Blanc and it was among the Fourierists that Cieszkowski tried to escape Christmas frivolities.

The theatre was Cieszkowski's all absorbing passion at this period. Hardly a day went by without mention of some play and the name of one of the leading actresses of the period, Rachel, dominated whole pages of his notebooks. Although it was certainly true that the theatre was something of a social forum where fashionable society could rendez-vous regularly, it might be fair to Cieszkowski to suggest that his infatuation with the institution was not altogether playful. Indeed, the Saint-Simonians had attached great importance to the educational potential of the theatre and had assigned it a role surpassing that of the other arts in the process of socialization[78]. Cieszkowski's early project of a historical novel which would teach the Hegelian conception of history through the use of a fictional form shows his grasp of the possibilities for social utilization of art[79].

Among the most intimate glimpses of Cieszkowski which emerge from his notebooks at this time is his minute transcription of a visit to a fortune-teller. It is difficult to tell whether this reveals any sort of superstitiousness on his part. In all probability it does not. Mademoiselle Lenormand, the oracle in question, widely reputed as the "Parisian Sibylle", was certainly one of the period's attractions and doubtlessly no motive deeper than sheer curiosity attracted many of

her clients[80]. Her predictions for Cieszkowski himself turned out to be widely inaccurate. Nevertheless, Cieszkowski appears to have been rather impressed by her promises of romance, fame and excitement linked with danger on the high seas. It may be suggested that his reaction to the prophecies betrays a thirst for recognition both as scholar and as Byronic hero. It reveals a romantic side to his character which would seem to be otherwise absent in this humorless and bookish young man[81].

The same impression emerges from Cieszkowski's account of his stay in Rome, where he spent the carnival weeks of 1840. In sharp contrast to the bulk of his writing, here he expresses a romantic regret at the ravages of industrialization. With very minimal respect for the Roman Church he compares the Vatican unfavourably to the Forum. The main attraction of the former, he confesses, is its library. Cieszkowski finds the festivities of the carnival interesting only to the extent that they provide a rich demonstration of social customs. Obviously, he finds none of the intellectual life which so absorbed him in Paris. In Rome, he writes, "organized society resembles this city of memories and monuments. It is also a museum of ruins"[82]. Indeed, it is the Rome of antiquity alone which wins his praise. The most interesting institution of contemporary Rome is the charitable foundation of St. Michael where orphans are instructed not only in various trades but in the arts[83]. Otherwise, Rome offers nothing to compare with the interest of Paris. Rome belongs to the past as clearly as Paris dominates the present.

Throughout the 1840's Cieszkowski returned frequently to France. In 1842, he bought a villa at Champétrier in the Basses-Alpes and seems to have considered taking up permanent residence there[84]. However, Paris itself was changing and its attractions ebbed. The Germans, such as Marx and Engels, arriving in the 1840's were a far more radical, post-Hegelian generation. Soon the socialists merged with the extreme ideological Left, the communists, and the extreme political Left, the republicans and the democrats. Those who did not, like Enfantin and many ex-Saint-Simonians, were co-opted into the existing system. The failure of their utopian experiments cast a deep shadow on the hopes of the Fourierists. Finally, the great events of 1848 confirmed that an era was indeed over.

Although Cieszkowski continued to write in Polish and German throughout the 1840's, virtually all he produced bore the imprint of

the French intellectual context which had inspired it. In a sense, Cieszkowski attempted to do the reverse of what had characterized his *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.* Whereas that work had managed to break out of the self-imposed limits of Hegelianism by drawing on the social and practical philosophy of French, particularly Saint-Simonian, thinkers, he now attempted to apply some of the insights of Hegel to the concerns of the French. Though the effort bore only limited historical results, it is one which is well worth examining.

CHAPTER VI

DU CRÉDIT ET DE LA CIRCULATION

I

The "dismal science" of classical economics inspired scant enthusiasm within the Hegelian school. Hegel himself may have held the more philosophical economists – Adam Smith notably – in some esteem, but he could hardly have accepted liberal economics as anything more than the operative principle of civil society[1]. Among Hegel's disciples both classical liberal solutions to economic problems and the overall question of the material conditions of production were long subordinated to metaphysical, religious and strictly political issues. Indeed, it is only in the light of this neglect that one can understand Marx's excitement upon discovering "political economy" through the intermediary of two very unorthodox Hegelians, Moses Hess and Friedrich Engels.

In this light, Cieszkowski's early and sustained interest in economics is all the more significant. His notebooks show that his readings included leading English writers – Smith, Ricardo, MacCulloch[2]. Presumably by way of a critique of these readings, Cieszkowski pondered the problem of value and presented a synthetic solution which owes as much to his English readings as to his Hegelian background:

> Value is of three kinds: the objective, grounded in the essence of the thing; the subjective, *pretium effectionis*; the subjective-objective, based on the productive capacities of the object in relation to the intentions of the subject . . . these three types of value are found in Prussian law in a foreshadowed or intuited but not yet dialectically developed form. . .[3]

Cieszkowski treated the definition of the factors of production and the branches of the system of production in equally philosophical terms:

> The original factors of production are two – natural qualities and work. Capital is the factor emanating from both and synthesizing the two, one of which is objective and the second is subjective. . .
>
> There are three branches of industry: agriculture, craftsmanship, and commerce . . . (corresponding to) . . . the categories of quantity, quality, and relativity. . .[4]

The above passage expresses a rejection, in an economic if not in a moral sense, of one of the basic tenets of classic economic doctrine, the

labour theory of value. A corollary of this rejection is Cieszkowski's replacement of the classical notion of value as stored-up labour with a more general conception of capital as the result of several factors and the elevation of agriculture to a somewhat higher dignity than the labour theory, distrustful of "natural qualities", is willing to accord it. Here too, Cieszkowski polemicizes with J. B. Say's typically classical assessment of commerce as fundamentally unproductive[5]. Indeed, Cieszkowski's notebooks reveal his opposition to any sort of economic monism which would set up a single value, such as labour, to the exclusion of the multivarious phenomena of economic life.

The critical attitude to economic liberalism, apparent in these very early notes, may perhaps be explained by the diversity of Cieszkowski's economic formation. His introduction to English liberalism coincided with his immersion in an older continental tradition, a legacy of the cameralists and physiocrats. This tradition viewed economics primarily in terms of practical advice to statesmen or what would today be called public policy. Thus, in its attitude to the state, this tendency contrasted sharply with the very essence of economic liberalism and the cry of *laissez-faire*[6]. Certainly, Cieszkowski's earliest and most direct introduction to economic science must have come in the person and writings of an heir to this anti-*laissez-faire* tradition, Count Frederyk Skarbek – Prussian-born Polish polyhistorian, Russian bureaucrat, French economic writer – who contributed to the spread of Smithian doctrines at the University of Warsaw before 1830, but is remembered as a precursor of List's *étatiste* school of national economy[7].

Skarbek's main work, *La Théorie des richesses sociales*, published in Paris in 1829, had as its point of departure J. B. Say's work of 1803, *Traité d'économie politique*, subtitled, "how riches are created, distributed and consumed". Although Skarbek's treatise condemned public consumption as "always a diminution of individual wealth"[8], it departed from the underlying assumption of a harmony of interests among economic actors by postulating an outright contradiction between the interests of capitalists and workers[9]. The true wealth of a nation, Skarbek maintained, consisted not in the mass of values created or accumulated by capitalists but in the material well-being of the majority of the nation. Such a state of beneficial production and optimal distribution would only be attained through social and state intervention[10].

Skarbek's views exerted a powerful influence in Poland. Moreover, his theoretical views found practical expression in his career. For many years, he was active within the Warsaw Society of Friends of Science[11]. After 1830, he served on the council of charitable institutions of the Kingdom of Poland. He was briefly president of the general administration of insurances and, in 1844, realized a long-standing project of creating a savingsbank for the lower classes[12]. Thus, apart from Skarbek's theoretical influence on Cieszkowski's economic education, they seem to have pursued similar sorts of interests and projects.

In addition to biographical parallels there is a further similarity in Cieszkowski's and Skarbek's common indebtedness to the economic work of Simone de Sismondi, described as both a left-wing liberal and a precursor of socialism. In his *Nouveaux principes d'économie politique* of 1819, and particularly in the revised edition of 1826, Sismondi abandoned his early dogmatic liberalism – apparently under the impression of the horrors of English industrialization[13]. Instead, he espoused a conception of political economy as essentially a theory of charity concerned with the increasing of men's happiness and relying on the state for its attainment.

Sismondi's theory combined regressive and progressive elements. He was strongly opposed to mechanization and held to a naive overproduction theory. At no time did he question the institution of property and the means suggested to ease misery were timid and paternalistic[14]. At the same time, he effectively criticized the abstraction of liberal theory and its irrelevance to the fundamental contradiction between labour and capital, a contradiction rendered unjust by the unequal strength of the two sides and evolving towards a concentration of wealth in the hands of the few[15]. Above all, Sismondi introduced sentiment into economics, refused to recognize personal interest as the only economic motive, and called for an appreciation of political economy as a philosophy of history. It was particularly this last point which found a sympathetic echo in Cieszkowski but esteem for Sismondi bound him to no particular school. Sismondi had few disciples apart from Pecqueur and Villeneuve-Bargemont, the latter of whom Cieszkowski read and seemed to admire[16]. However, it provided him with a position from which to view the struggle between liberals and their critics – a position leaning to the side of the latter.

Thus, Cieszkowski's economic views were fairly well established even before his sojourn in France in 1838/39. In fact, there is evidence

that *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was conceived while he was still preparing the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* and it was completed, at least in draft form, by May 1838. This may be taken as further testimony to Cieszkowski's familiarity with French problems and the immense scope of his interests and readings in these early years. Most significantly, however, it reflects his assessment of the intellectual climate of Paris as opposed to Berlin and his view of his own mediating role between the two cultures. The work was written in French and Cieszkowski chose to delay its publication so that he could gather French reactions at first hand. It was thus not until early 1839 that the Parisian publishing house of Treuttel and Wurtz put out *Du Crédit et de la Circulation.*

II

Du Crédit et de la Circulation is a four hundred page diagnosis of the economic ills of society as reflected in its monetary system as well as a reform project to overcome these ills. Although it is the latter aspect which concerned contemporary readers most, it is the former which sheds more light on the premises of Cieszkowski's social and economic doctrine.

The overwhelming need of the present moment is to create an economic system which transcends all existing, exclusive forms of economic organization. Cieszkowski writes:

> The days of *laissez-faire* and *laissez-passer* have just as surely passed as those of the prohibitive system. *Aid and encourage, develop, organize* (*aidez à faire, développez, organisez*) – such should be the principles of the science from now on. They are organic principles since they imply the normal and positive agreement of public and private action – of institutions and individuals – of the collective interest and of competition (*CetC*, p. 105)[17].

Cieszkowski emphasizes that his transcendent conception is not "an accommodating middle term nor . . . an ambiguous and impotent compromise" (*CetC*, p. 100). The formula he proposes stands not between extremes but above them for it is the historical outcome of all prior economic doctrines and the conclusion of the system of political economy.

The relegation of liberalism to a specific historical position allows Cieszkowski to recognize its merits without committing him to its acceptance. Thus, free trade and the unhindered activity of the market

are praised for their potential of abolishing privilege and allowing natural and spontaneous processes a wide scope for realization. Similarly, the positive mission of the state is quite different from the restrictive activity of pre- or anti-liberal governments. Indeed, a state which fulfills its function is held in the highest regard:

> Governments are the hearths of societies called upon to exert a force which is neither that of repulsion nor abrogation but one of convergent gravitation and healthy radiation. Their intervention is certainly as natural as it is beneficial every time it is a question not of depressing, forbidding or excluding but of raising to a higher power and rallying in a common goal the most divergent interests (*CetC*, p. 109).

As could be expected in any social scheme which is to succeed to and assimilate the conquests of liberalism, the sphere of private activity maintains an inviolable autonomy, if not the full dignity of the public sphere:

> (This intervention of the government – AL) should cease or abstain everywhere where particular interest does not collide directly with the public interest. In this case, *private* exploitation – whether individual or social – is not only by right common and natural, but still *economically* the most advantageous whereas government intervention would only impede or falsify development (*ibid.*).

At the same time, Cieszkowski's requirement of positive involvement allows him to establish an eminently sensible, if somewhat vague, delimitation between the public and the private spheres:

> There are functions of social life which enter essentially into the attributions of governments and whose highest direction should of all necessity belong to the state or risk taking an abnormal development. These are the functions which concern the general well being. Thus, the more a function calls into play the public interest the greater is the necessity of its centralization, which as soon as it is *organic*, ... far from paralyzing or impeding liberty and private activity in any way, on the contrary, affirms it and corroborates it (*CetC*, p. 108).

According to Cieszkowski, misunderstanding of these basic truths has resulted in the present antagonism between the public and the private sphere. Here, Cieszkowski resorts to an organic analogy to underline the absurdity of the antagonism: the government is the heart of the body politic, individuals and corporations are its members. In the present woeful state of affairs, the members act without regard to the whole or to the central organ which is the heart. The latter, however, is also inadequate to its function: it fails to pump blood into the members thus threatening them with atrophy. In fact, the organic analogy extends even further and connects Cieszkowski's general economic

views with the specific intentions of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*:

> Financial assets are the reproductive blood of the social body, its nutritive element, its distributive element, its condition of existence and development... venous blood, i.e., raw assets (is transformed) into arterial blood, i.e., circulating and reproductive assets... credit and circulation have vegetated until now because of the absence of a proper organization. Consequently, if until now the circulation of assets has been comparable but to the imperfect circulation of sap, let us now raise it to a superior level in the scale of organisms in making it analogous to the circulation of blood... (*CetC*, p. 121).

Thus, the present deficiencies of economic organization are both reflected in and – more significantly – traced back to an insufficient and defective credit and monetary order. Indeed, the reform of society hinges upon a transformation of credit institutions and even the very foundations of monetary policy, the nature of money itself, must undergo a total reform if society is to attain its full and healthy development.

Du Crédit et de la Circulation opens with an inquiry into the present state of knowledge concerning credit:

> Credit has spread too many benefits on the one hand and too many ills on the other upon modern societies for us to deny that it is time to ask of it an exact account of its existence, its intimate nature, its resources, and its abuses... (*CetC*, p. 1).

An abundant literature has produced only an erroneous definition of credit as "an anticipation of the future" (*CetC*, p. 5). This is morally unacceptable inasmuch as it transfers present debts to the account of future generations. Moreover, it denies the intrinsically creative character of credit. Finally, it ignores the historical development of credit which runs from passive, particular and personal forms to the active, general and substantial forms emerging in certain institutions of the present.

The definition which Cieszkowski proposes contains a radically different conception:

> Credit is the metamorphosis of stable and pledged capital into circulating or free capital. It is the means by which capital is made available and circulating and it thus allows capital to be carried everywhere its need is felt... (*CetC*, 2nd & 3rd ed., p. 6)[18].

The notion of "circulation" has a double meaning. Sometimes it refers to currency as such. Most often, it has a more general meaning closely linked to that of credit:

> Circulation... is but the reverse side of credit; if credit is but the putting into circulation of existing capital, circulation in its turn is but the development of the general credit of a nation... (*ibid.*).

Credit is thus the freeing or disengagement of actually existing capital and circulation is the funnelling of credit into productive uses. Given these definitions, it emerges that the maximal development of credit and its optimal application are determining factors in the growth of a nation's wealth. The extension of credit, however, is limited by the requirement that credit rest on a real and substantial capital fund. Cieszkowski repudiates the notion of credit as confidence as he had earlier rejected the notion of anticipation as a basis for credit. Confidence provides merely a moral and personal tie which is neither substantial nor real. Since the real capital supply of any nation is finite, Cieszkowski's problem is one of finding a way of tapping capital resources to a maximum by putting as much capital as possible into productive circulation. He expresses the problem as one of transforming fixed into circulating capital:

> . . . if fixed capital could *at the same time* serve as *working* capital and thus divide itself to face two functions simultaneously, such an instrument would be the greatest motor imaginable for the accumulation of wealth and would add enormous strength to the development of all industry. Such an instrument is credit in its normal and general conception (*CetC*, p. 10).

Such a transformation is neither impossible nor miraculous. Historically, the credit system has evolved in this direction from pawnshops through deposit banks to fledgling land-banks (*crédit foncier*) in the present day. In all cases, certain real values are put up as security in return for the opening of a credit account; in the last variant, the values pledged, i.e., land, represent immobile capital *par excellence* which thus becomes transformed into a basis for mobile credit susceptible of any application desired.

If the problem of mobilizing fixed capital for circulation appears soluble, the obverse side of the problem remains unresolved: how is circulating capital – currency, banknotes, bonds, promissory papers of all sorts – to acquire real and concrete gaurantees? Under the present system, banknotes and the like are expected to be covered fully by supplies of precious metal but this is unsatisfactory for three reasons: first, gold or silver has primarily a conventional and not an intrinsic value; second, the value of precious metal itself varies; finally, and most significantly, the requirement of full bullion backing restricts the issue of value-bearing or value-representing notes, thus crippling a society's capacity to create credit and diminishing the scope of the values which can be put into circulation.

Cieszkowski summarizes thus the two sides of the problem he proposes to solve:

> We have now reached the point where we can formulate the two radical vices of the present organization of credit and indicate their reform at the same time. These vices, one of which is exactly the opposite of the other, are: 1) the lack of a *real guarantee* of circulating values on the one hand; 2) the lack of *circulability* of real values on the other hand. That is to say, that while values put out into circulation are deprived of *foundations*, the foundations are deprived of mobilization ... there is, thus, both a *lack* and an *excess* of circulating values but a lack of real values and an excess of fictitious values (*CetC*, p. 33).

Given this problem, Cieszkowski's aim is evident: "to free pledged values and pledge freed values" (*CetC*, p. 34). At this point, he passes from diagnosis to prescription. Indeed, the bulk of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* consists of an original and ingenious scheme to satisfy this aim by cutting through the impasse where credit is grounded and thus assuring the proper material development of mankind.

Cieszkowski's scheme calls for the issuing of interest-bearing mortgage notes which would serve as legal tender. The value of these notes would be based on a specified fraction of the market value of state, communal and private properties. Once issued, these notes would act exactly like currency with the additional benefit of bearing interest. The project's realization is dependent upon a strong Treasury or central banking institution. All owners of immobile capital would submit the deeds of their property to this institution and receive the interest-bearing notes in return. Moreover, the state would remain the guarantor of these notes – not necessarily to the extent of redeeming them but in honouring them at par in all manner of payment.

The advantages of the scheme are innumerable. The common interest would be served by the mobilization of substantial and hitherto unexploited capital assets for the expansion of the nation's credit potential. Moreover, the interests of the state and the agricultural classes would be particularly furthered. The state could utilize the capital buried in natural assets – public land, forests, mines – for the purpose of public works and the subsidizing of deserving industries. Most significantly, this would reform the public debt by making it a mortgage charge instead of a capital borrowing. Finally, the flow of investment away from agriculture towards the stock exchange would be reversed; land would acquire investment value in its own right.

The mechanics of the scheme are rather intricate; nevertheless, the

idea itself is disarmingly simple: Cieszkowski is suggesting nothing less than the abolition of money and a re-creation of the bases and the very concept of value. He is proposing to do all this through a single instrument – an interest-bearing mortgage note – and he is confident that this single measure will transform not only the credit system but the economic life of society.

III

Any critique of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* must examine this work in its own terms as an original reform project. At the same time, without impugning its originality, it may be of value to consider the work in relation to a variety of intellectual and economic tendencies which may have affected its character. The very diversity of these tendencies explains somewhat the originality of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation.*

It should be first observed that in the years 1822–1836 Catholic doctrine regarding interest underwent certain fundamental revisions. The earlier practical disregard for the scholastic theory of interest, which condemned payment for the use of a loan as usury and authorized interest only as compensation for default or delay in the repayment of credit, was now formally legitimized. The Holy Office declared that only oppressive interest charges levied on the poor should be condemned and the proper measure of justice was the advantage of the borrower rather than the former criterion of equality among goods exchanged. Thus, both the Church and a host of Catholic commentators recognized the extraction of interest as a legitimate cost for the use of money *qua* productive commodity[19]. In view of Cieszkowski's hopes for the development of Catholic social doctrine and his familiarity with Catholic social literature, it is probable that this revised attitude gave free rein to his speculations regarding the transformative potential of credit.

In studying the history of credit schemes, Cieszkowski encountered the theories of John Law whose influence upon *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* merits attention. Law's principal concerns were the nature of money and the function of credit. Like Aquinas, Law distinguished within money between the metal and the stamp and attributed the generalized value of money to the latter. At the same time, he assumed that the prosperity of a nation depended on the amount of money in circulation. The prime economic problem thus became one of

generalizing the stamp of value and expanding its circulation to a maximum. This amounted to an extension of the credit system and, inasmuch as credit required some sort of backing and metal possessed no intrinsic value, this backing had to be sought in the actual wealth or assets of the nation. Given an agricultural economy, this meant that notes of credit would be backed primarily by land[20].

Law's plan required a strong central bank for its administration. Through judicious use of the credit notes, this bank could subsidize great national projects and put credit at the disposition of even small entrepreneurs. Since the state was the greatest land proprietor, it would transform the state from a borrower to a lender of funds. Moreover, it would stimulate commercial activity by increasing the amount of value-representing notes without incurring the inflation caused by the debasement of metal money[21].

Of course, Law's scheme collapsed in a colossal crash. Various explanations have been suggested: the basic error may have been in the government's refusal to accept the plan in its entirety which forced Law to weaken his scheme by making it an addition to the existing monetary structure rather than a substitute for it. More probably, Laws' acceptance of stock shares as currency left him vulnerable to the inevitable market bubble which brought about his ruin. Whatever the causes, Law's fiasco discredited banking in France for a century. Even in the 1840's, critics of Cieszkowski's *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* who condemned him for "Lawism" were evoking a particularly potent *cauchemar.* Nevertheless, the idea of basing money on immobile property did not die out[22]. It was actually applied in the colony of Massachusetts, where in the absence of metal the imaginative colonists had recourse to various value standards: rice, tobacco, fish. Ben Franklin defended the principle of land-based banknotes but the measure was applied only as a temporary expedient[23]. Other experiments with land money were also treated as undesirable and provisional emergency measures[24]. Perhaps the most serious effort to redirect the standard of value from metal to land took place during the French Revolution. Notes called *assignats* presumably representing the value of the crown and church lands confiscated by the revolutionary government were distributed as currency. They failed, not least because of the instability of the government which issued them and the tremendous distrust of paper money which had existed since Law's disaster.

It is important to realize, however, that Cieszkowski's scheme was fundamentally different from earlier attempts to connect or mobilize land on behalf of a nation's system of credit and currency. Whereas Franklin's conception rested on the assumption of an inherent, value-producing quality somehow hidden in the soil, Cieszkowski's understanding was far more sophisticated. He saw "land" as a juridical abstraction, a sort of shorthand for the existing but under-utilized wealth of the nation. In this, Cieszkowski had understood Law's original scheme better than both the latter's adherents and detractors. Moreover, in dissolving the immediate connection between a specific note and a specific plot of land Cieszkowski overcame the awkwardness which had plagued earlier similar projects.

Although the concept of land money remained confined to the heretical fringes of economic theory, the related notion of land banks found greater acceptance. The creation of credit through the mortgaging of immobile property was no new invention. In the eighteenth century, it was systemized through land banks in Silesia and later in Prussia. By 1838 Cieszkowski could point to the smooth functioning of these institutions, particularly in the Prussian province of Posen and in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw as examples of the benefits which might be obtained by the mobilization of land on behalf of a nation's credit needs[26].

France was, in one way, ideally suited to the development of a similar system of land credit. It was an overwhelmingly agricultural nation with a large class of small proprietors and a pressing need for an extension of credit facilities. At the same time, however, its banking system was in an extremely rudimentary stage. In 1840 the liberal economist, Rossi, complained to the Chamber of Peers that the majority of the country's departments did not even know of the existence of banknotes and, if confronted with banknotes, would be disposed to discard them as nothing but another issue of *assignats*[27]. Although the situation was bemoaned by liberals and socialists alike their combined pressure brought very few changes. In 1840, the National Assembly discussed the possibility of opening branches of the Banque de France outside Paris but decided against it. In any case, the Banque de France operated exclusively through private banks which were small and weak. Isolated efforts to orient banks towards the needs of industry and commerce – Laffite's Caisse générale du commerce et de l'industrie, founded in 1837 – could achieve little in the face of popular and

official distrust[28]. Clearly, application of Cieszkowski's scheme would have had vast implications for French banking. It would have eliminated the private intermediary bankers, centralized the entire banking system, multiplied the credit resources of France many times over and made credit accessible to a whole class of small proprietors. Although Cieszkowski's intentions were shared by many others in the 1830's and 1840's, nevertheless, among the many reform projects of the period, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* stands out alone as a fully thought out and coherent alternative to the existing organization of banking[29].

In addition to Cieszkowski's debt to John Law, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was also strongly marked by the so-called circulation theory of capital. According to this concept, the very condition of economic prosperity was a speedy and smooth movement of money and wares. Credit's task, and indeed that of money itself, was one of hastening and intensifying the circular, and hence perpetual, flow of wealth within a nation. Inasmuch as it was the flow and not what flows which is important, one could ask – as Berkeley did – whether money itself was not simply another form of credit[30]. Apparently, the circulation theory enjoyed some popularity among eighteenth-century thinkers of utopian tendencies since underlying it was a fundamental distrust of money and a concentration on the exchange process as the most essential of all economic relationships[31]. It culminated in the conviction that money was not only unnecessary to exchange but actually operated as an obstacle to the circularity of goods and services. In a striking example of the continuity of the utopian tradition during the Industrial Revolution many social critics saw the origins of the evils afflicting the worker not in the new mode of production but in the existing mode of exchange. Somehow, it seemed that in translating labour into monetary terms and exchanging it against goods, the worker was cheated of his rightful earnings; the solution lay in eliminating the intermediary term, money.

Certainly, this was the reasoning which underlay Owen's labour exchange and found echoes in most socialist writers[32]. Neither Saint-Simon nor Fourier, however, advocated the abolition of money. Indeed, Saint-Simon attributed a particularly important role to banks as a social institution of the future[33]. Fourier's *phalange* could also be compared to a joint-stock company where the proper distribution of dividends would be greatly facilitated by the existence of monetary values[34]. Nevertheless, both Fourier and Saint-Simon were reacting

against the relations engendered by the market mechanism. In Saint-Simon's case, the reaction was authoritarian; in Fourier's, it was co-operative. In both cases, the revolt against the exchange process as exemplified in the market found its origins in the earlier revulsion against money as a factor obstructing the natural circulation of the economy.

Cieszkowski's position vis-à-vis the socialist rejection of the market is quite peculiar. Instead of calling for its destruction or advocating substitutes, he seeks to enclose the market in a framework of governmental regulation. Instead of abolishing money, he would reintroduce it on a different basis. In many ways, the economic problem of the present for Cieszkowski is not one of outright exploitation or of misguided economic principles. He diagnoses the basic economic malaise as underdevelopment – an underdevelopment of government, of social policy, of banking, and of credit. This explains the tone of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*; it is not one of protest or outrage but of urgency. Cieszkowski sees a tremendous task in front of himself and his generation and there are no class villains standing in the way of realizing this task. Cieszkowski is not waging social struggle; he is assisting in the education and enlightenment of a nation growing towards economic maturity.

Given the "geneology" of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* as I have attempted to sketch it, one can safely say that this book appeared much less bizarre to Cieszkowski's contemporaries than it seems to today's readers. Above all, credit reform was very much a fashionable topic. Originally something of a monopoly for radical critics, by 1848 credit reform had become an acceptable topic for even the most timid academic discussion[35]. Cieszkowski's contribution lies not in raising the question of credit but in reworking certain neglected conceptions of credit in a reasoned and original manner. In fact, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* may be seen as a vindication of Lawism and utopian economics vis-à-vis the anarchy of banking in an age advancing towards liberalism.

IV

To Cieszkowski's chagrin, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*'s idea failed to evoke any serious efforts at practical application. The subordinate

notions of *crédit foncier* and *crédit immobilier* eventually found acceptance as did the concept of credit as a liberation of fixed values. The principal idea of the work, however, that of interest-bearing currency notes based on immobile property was not applied. It is for this reason that reviews of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* have an overwhelmingly academic flavour. Generally, the book was discussed as an interesting manifestation of some contemporary trend or praised for its philosophical character rather than its economic doctrine. Only certain Polish critics considered the feasibility of Cieszkowski's proposals – and ended up with rather negative conclusions. As with the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* and even *Gott und Palingenesie*, Cieszkowski's reluctance to identify himself with any ideological camp or school in his economic thinking made him suspect to all potential allies.

One of the earliest reviews of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was written by Michel Chevalier for the *Journal des Débats*. In 1840, Chevalier had already broken his ties to the Saint-Simonians and was building a reputation as an economic liberal[37]. Nevertheless, he retained a respect for German philosophy which led him to hail the author of this work in most flattering terms:

> We are intentionally joining the title of doctor to M. Cieszkowski's name... nothing could give us a better idea of the spirit of this excellent work or of the special merit which distinguishes it. The philosophical capacity of M. Cieszkowski deserves a title in our eyes...[38].

For Chevalier, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* is an outstanding example of the light which philosophy can shed on the most diverse problems:

> There is no branch of human activity which could not gain from being subjected to a philosophical examination for every act requires its theory... M. Cieszkowski's book shows what results one can hope to attain regarding public and private credit, banks, loans, the monetary system, all with the help of a good philosophical method, a tight logic, and a sharp metaphysic, and using a small number of judiciously chosen and skillfully grouped observations (*Ibid.*).

Thus, Chevalier's conviction that philosophy is an eminently practical enterprise finds confirmation in Cieszkowski's work:

> It proves that philosophy does not force those who cultivate it to isolate themselves in a distant cloud. One can remain philosopher and yet, when necessary, descend from the sublime to touch, measure and weigh the interests of the earth (*Ibid.*).

In spite of such praise, Chevalier can find little common ground with Cieszkowski's theses. He is extremely skeptical about the possibilities

of replacing metal-based money with anything else. Moreover, he is fearful about the role which Cieszkowski assigns to the state: "in this age when the people no longer can be ordered about but must themselves legislate, we cannot impose Cieszkowski's solution," writes Chevalier. Thus, portraying himself as a firmer democrat than Cieszkowski, Chevalier calls upon time to realize the project of the *Du Crédit et de la Circulation.* Evidently, Chevalier sees no urgency in the matter.

If *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* strayed too far from liberal tenets to be accepted by the economists of the *Collège de France,* it was not accepted as a socialist tract either. The Fourierist journal *La Phalange,* preceded its review with a lengthy polemic against political economy as the science of fragmentation, grounded in antagonisms and lacking a common purpose, a science which could never aspire beyond the simple given facts and remained prisoner of the empirical. Fortunately, remarked the anonymous reviewer of *La Phalange,* there was an ever-growing realization that political economy provided no solutions. With specific reference to Cieszkowski's *Du Crédit et de la Circulation,* he wrote:

> ... there are minds more imbued with the feeling of unity, of human solidarity, more struck by the numerous contradictions of our social disorder who aspire to introduce order. Their conclusions are always the same: to make the government intervene in the industrial movement in order to regulate it...
>
> These dreamers are all guided by a profound instinct, that of the true role of government which should be the distributor and regulator of the industrial movement[39].

Not all such dreamers should be considered socialists. Any theory which failed to acknowledge that the principal social and economic problem was one of distribution could have only very limited applicability. Even the Saint-Simonians who, in the eyes of the Fourierists, were all too concerned with problems of production, had recognized that the essential function of credit was to transfer wealth in the interest of a fairer distribution of goods. There was little evidence of any such concern in Cieszkowski's *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* whose assumption seemed to be that the growth of national wealth through the mobilization of values would somehow benefit all strata of society equally. Nevertheless, *La Phalange* continued, Cieszkowski's ideas about the functions of government and credit were "most advanced". The reviewer added that Cieszkowski's system could be applied to the problem of compensating previous owners for land expropriated for

the sake of constructing phalansteries. This was perhaps the only suggestion that *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* should be treated as a concrete and workable proposal. Moreover, it may be relevant that this suggestion was made at a time when the Fourierists were seeking closer ties with Social Catholic groups and were exceptionally open to "outside" theorizing[40].

V

The most enthusiastic acclaim of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* belongs to Proudhon. The latter had declared himself a Hegelian without having read Hegel and frequented German émigrés in Paris to learn what he could about the master[41]. Proudhon's notebooks reveal that he knew Cieszkowski, corresponded with him, and was much impressed by the author of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.* At one point, Proudhon wrote:

> The true reformers of today are no longer a Numa, Solon, Jesus, Muhammed or Charlemagne. Even less are they people like Luther, Rousseau, Voltaire, They are rather men like Witt, Arkwright, Jacquand, Levoisier... It could be I with my philosophy of commerce and exchange – it could be a Cieszkowsky (*sic*), a Corvaja, an Andrè, if their projects were more practical[42].

In his *Système des contradictions économiques*, Proudhon abandons even these reservations. Amid the ever-present antinomies of economic life, Proudhon points to one area where a synthetic formula has been attained: the theory of credit. Although credit itself represents the seventh contradiction in the order of economic evolution, Cieszkowski's work has brought the concept of credit to the position of an internal equilibrium:

> The problem of credit is to find a combination where the circulating agent, would be, at the same time, and in an equal degree both a perfect guarantee – like money – and a perfect sign of credit – like a banknote. Moreover, it should be productive like the earth and capital, hence incapable of lying around uselessly.
>
> This combination exists, tells us Mr. Cieszkowski, and he proves it to us in the most beautiful philosophical language and with the most perfect experience. This double quality should certainly make him almost unintelligible to both economists and philosophers[43].

Proudhon then proceeds to explain the ideas of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* in some detail and with some modifications on behalf of his own providential scheme of development. Broadly speaking, Proudhon

sees Cieszkowski's intention as a development of his own maxim: to credit is to exchange[44]. Moreover, Cieszkowski's rejection of *both* liberal political economy and communism evokes a sympathetic echo in Proudhon. Indeed, the affinity is so close that Proudhon transfers his hopes to the ideas of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*:

> Will M. Cieszkowski's system be put into practice? If we are to rely on the economic movement which is sweeping society, we can certainly believe that it will be. All ideas in France revolve around mortgage reform and the organization of land credit, two things which in a more or less acknowledged form necessarily imply the application of this system. M. Cieszkowski, like a true artist, has traced the idea of this project. He has described the economic law to which all further reforms of society are subject. The different ways in which it will be applied and changes in details are not important; the idea is his in his capacity as theoretician and even, in the case of realization, in his capacity as prophet[45].

Proudhon's *Système des contradictions économiques* has had the misfortune of being remembered primarily as the object of Marx's savage attacks in *Misère de la Philosophie*. Marx summarized his critique of the work in the following terms:

> M. Proudhon flatters himself that he has given us a critique of political economy and of communism. In fact, he stands below both... He would wish to be a synthesis, he is nothing but a compound error. He wishes to play the man of science, standing above both bourgeois and proletarians. He is but a petit bourgeois thrown around between labour and capital[46].

However unfair Marx's critique may appear, he has correctly diagnosed both the book's intentions and its major weakness. The *Contradictions* were Proudhon's most ambitious attempt to prove his competence in Hegelian philosophy and to demonstrate its applicability to economic problems. In a sense, the *Contradictions* were intended for the "doctors across the Rhine" far more than for their potential French readers. Indeed, much of the *Contradictions* is unintelligible to anyone unfamiliar with the situation and vocabulary of the Young Hegelians[47]. The attempted synthesis of German metaphysics and French social theory floundered on Proudhon's philosophical naiveté. Marx's comments are again most pertinent:

> M. Proudhon thinks that he has the right to be a bad economist because he passes in France for a good German philosopher. In Germany, he has the right to be a bad philosopher because he passes for one of the best French economists.

Apparently, other German readers agreed with Marx's judgement regarding such efforts as the *Contradictions économiques* or *Du Crédit et*

de la Circulation to integrate a German form of thinking with French concerns. Although Cieszkowski's work is duly mentioned in later German tracts on the history of credit theory, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was not received favourably upon its appearance[48]. Thus, the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* pointed to the proliferation of economic schemes as a sign of the times:

> However tasteless the new systems promising universal happiness may be and however dangerous their principles and the extreme changes they propose, they are nevertheless of extreme importance as a sign of the changing times and they contain many truths which we should be happy to call lies because we are afraid of their consequences. From this point of view, the systems of the socialists, Chartists, St. Simonians, phalangists and communists seem to us to be highly worthy of critical consideration. Their origins and the object of their criticism lie in the inequality and unfairness of the contemporary division of wealth and in the lack of socialization of the industrial class[49].

This apparent comprehension was not matched by any sympathy. Indeed, even though the reviewer acknowledges that schemes like Cieszkowski's belonged to a different class of reforms, something of his disapproval for radical social engineering stuck to his assessment of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation.* It is an ironical comment on the difference between France and Germany that *La Phalange* should have refused to include Cieszkowski in the socialist camp, whereas the *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* should have reproached him for straying too close to socialism.

In further contrast to *La Phalange*, the *Jahrbücher* passed over the moral desirability of Cieszkowski's proposed changes and addressed themselves rather to the logic and feasibility of the project. In a dry and academic manner they listed eighteen objections to Cieszkowski's interest-bearing notes. The main weakness of the scheme lay in the difficulty of controlling the value of the notes. Cieszkowski had assumed that they would conveniently and regularly accumulate interest at 3.65% per annum, an assumption which had some relation to the existing interest rate but which was, in practice, subject to extremely unpredictable variations. Above all, Cieszkowski's notes failed to satisfy the conditions which he himself had imposed. In the final analysis, they were as dependent on the good will of the government and the confidence of the buyer as any other paper money. Each note was to be covered not by a specific parcel of immobile property but by land in an abstract sense. The reimbursability of the notes for land – whatever that actually meant – could be stopped at any moment.

Indeed, an implicit condition of the scheme's success was that reimbursability would not really be required. Thus, the element of confidence which Cieszkowski had sought to replace by a firm and substantial grounding for credit reappeared in practice. Furthermore, if the state issued land notes to the entire value of its holdings, it ran the risk of quite literally mortgaging itself away; if it restricted the issue, it would find itself with limited means and incapable of achieving one of the principal aims of Cieszkowski's reform, the paying off of the public debt. Finally, one might well ask how the interest on the land notes would be paid; would it be with further land notes or would it be with metal currency, thus defeating the purpose of the reform?

The questions raised are certainly pertinent. In this context, however, they betray a basic lack of understanding for Cieszkowski's intentions. Proudhon had understood much more readily that *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was essentially a philosophical work comprising a theory of value and a political dissertation on the delimitation of the public from the private spheres. The convoluted mechanics of the scheme which took up so much of the book were actually its most dispensable element. Of course, Cieszkowski himself bore responsibility for this failure to distinguish between the theoretical and the practical character of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation.* In a typically utopian manner, he assumed that the very rationality of the project would assure its eventual realization and that the multiplication of details within the scheme would somehow act to convince society of his project's seriousness and feasibility.

The *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik* concluded their analysis by calling upon Cieszkowski to familiarize himself with the German literature on the subject of credit. In this, they seemed to imply that the deficiencies of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* could be remedied by a little extra reading. They even acknowledged, somewhat grudgingly, the merits of the work as it stood:

> We have rarely had a book in our hands where so intricate a plan for the national economy is presented and organically developed. Here we encounter a seldom attained formal perfection... Everywhere in the book there is enthusiasm for the object described, combined with a singular detachment in the development... (*Ibid.*, p. 958).

Nevertheless, the final word was overwhelmingly negative. The book was rejected as a "pretty house built out of a deck of cards, standing on a plain bereft of foundations and capable of being destroyed by the first breath" (*Ibid.*, p. 959).

Other critics added to the list of objections compiled by the *Jahrbücher*. Thus, Karol Libelt, later a political colleague of Cieszkowski questioned one of the major advantages of the interest-bearing notes described in *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*. How, he asked, was it possible for the same capital to create two separate profits: one for its actual owner and one for the holder of the mortgage note which represents this capital? Indeed, it was not possible and the income of the one had to be a deduction from the income of the other. Otherwise, the income of the holder of the note was based on a purely fictitious value and thus came down to a particularly subtle form of speculation. In fact, Libelt wondered whether the whole scheme did not lend itself to a tremendous burst of barely concealed *agiotage*[50].

Libelt also asked a neglected question of a different order: who would be the beneficiaries of Cieszkowski's scheme?' *La Phalange* had assumed with the author of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* that credit reform would serve all strata of society. Proudhon had been content to note that small interests might gain access to credit. Libelt now showed that the size of the notes – 100 francs was to be the minimal value – excluded the neediest classes from sharing in the scheme. Thus, he pointed to the short-sightedness or unawareness which characterized Cieszkowski's well-intentioned first excursion into social salvation through monetary engineering.

Libelt's or the *Jahrbücher*'s criticism may be described as balanced and understanding. The comments of the well-known British economist, H. D. Macleod, provoked by what Macleod saw as the unjustified success of Cieszkowski's book, are pure invective:

> Under ordinary circumstances we should have passed over this work without notice, merely lamenting that the author had wasted so much ingenious labour in bringing forward as new, the doctrines of John Law, which have seduced so many persons. But when we find that several of the ablest economists on the continent have approved of Count Cieszkowski's doctrines, the matter assumes a very different aspect indeed, and is calculated to inspire some alarm, that these pernicious follies should become more popular. To our inexpressible amazement, economists so well known as M. Joseph Garnier, M. Baudrillart, the associate of M. Chevalier at the Collège de France, and Professor Boccardo, the author of the great Italian Dictionary of Political Economy, have all adopted the doctrines of Cieszkowski[51].

It is difficult to draw up a balance sheet for *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*. On the one hand, it may be considered Cieszkowski's most popular book. It went through three editions in his lifetime; it won him a certain reputation both within the French academic establishment

and among radical groups. As Macleod noted with alarm, this book carried Cieszkowski's reputation well beyond France. Indeed, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was discussed by the Russian Fourierists of the Petrashevskij circle, among whose prominent members was Dostoevskij[52]. On the other hand, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* must have been something of a disappointment both for its author and its readers. Cieszkowski complained to his editor that the book was not receiving the attention it deserved[53]. Certainly, he was not to witness any attempts to put the scheme proposed into effect. Today, the book strikes the reader as not simply unrealistic but somehow irresponsible. It is the classic case of a partial reform being represented as panacea. Moreover, in his anxiety to prove its worth the author ultimately ignores underlying problems of general welfare. In this respect, it is perhaps the least characteristic of Cieszkowski's works.

CHAPTER VII

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ARTICLES 1840–1848

The 1840's were years of intense activity for Cieszkowski. He continued his travels throughout Europe; lived semi-permanently in France, Warsaw, Posen; visited Italy and Germany frequently and at length. Thus, Cieszkowski might well have numbered among the cosmopolitan aristocrats who changed their residence every season if not for the fact that the goals of Cieszkowski's travels were quite different. He saw Europe not as a playground but as a laboratory where social ills could be observed and their remedies tested. In his curiosity, Cieszkowski sought out industrial establishments, charitable institutions, agricultural colonies[1]. He visited areas of poverty as well as those where misery had been mitigated.

Cieszkowski's reflections upon the economic and social conditions of the 1840's gave rise to a series of topical articles published in various journals in France, Germany and Poland. The theoretical character of these articles is uneven; some are simply specific proposals concerning local and narrow problems. Their importance lies precisely in their confrontation between theory and actual problems for here, more clearly than anywhere else, one can trace the interrelation between Cieszkowski's immediate preoccupations and his theoretical concerns. In 1840, Cieszkowski was the author of two philosophical treatises and a highly speculative work on economics. By 1848, he had amassed considerable experience as both a theoretician and participant in schemes of social engineering. The intervening years thus constitute a period of transition from his earlier, exclusively theoretical activity to his later career as politician, nationalist and reformer. They also form a bridge between his purely philosophical writings and the social doctrine of the *Our Father*. In this chapter, I propose to study the evolution of Cieszkowski's thought in this period by re-grouping his social and economic articles according to their subject matter, rather than their chronological sequence.

I

Characteristically, Cieszkowski never repudiated or even modified the principles of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*. By his own account, all his

writings were but branches of a single tree and thus inseparable from the rest[2]. More accurately, it might be said that Cieszkowski viewed his own work architectonically, and *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* represented the foundation stone of the economic structure. Consequently, Cieszkowski applied himself vigorously to the propagation and extension of the ideas of his first economic work. Whereas the fundamental and revolutionary innovation of interest-bearing notes stood too far from the mainstream of economic thought to receive serious consideration, the subsidiary but related notion of mobilizing land's credit value and facilitating credit for small landowners made considerable progress in the 1840's. It was in answer to the needs of this movement that Cieszkowski prepared his article *Du Crédit immobilier*[3].

The institutional framework in which the article first appeared deserves attention. It was read as a report of the agricultural credit committee to the Congres Central D'Agriculture held in Paris in February–March 1847, where Cieszkowski participated as a delegate from the department of the Basses-Alpes. A contemporary account describes the congress in the following terms:

> The assembly of rural proprietors and agronomists which has dubbed itself the Central Congress of Agriculture is the spontaneous product of a most curious intellectual flurry going on in the country since 1830. It is somewhat hostile to the bureaucracy which has perhaps not given agricultural work the attention it deserves; the bureaucracy, in turn, reciprocates this hostility. The Congress is a sort of *de facto* parliament, without any legal existence but tolerated, rather turbulent and passionate in nature, chafing at any discipline and noisily intolerant. Nevertheless, at the same time it is enlightened and well intentioned[4].

The account understates the causes leading to the convening of the Congress. In the period 1840–1846, capital was abundant and idle in France[5]. As Cieszkowski had noted in *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, however, agricultural credit was virtually non-existent. The only governmental institution which offered any sort of land credit, the *Caisse hypothécaire*, provided no facilities to the small rural proprietor. Moreover, it was a failure virtually from its creation in 1820 and was finally dissolved, bankrupt, in 1846[6]. The official consultative body for agricultural affairs of the Ministry of Public Works, Agriculture and Education, the *Conseil général d'agriculture* was swamped in a bureaucratic morass[7]. Thus, when Louis Wołwski in 1838 raised the question of land and agricultural credit by pointing to the successful

experiences of Germany and Poland, his suggestions were acclaimed enthusiastically. Their favourable reception exceeded by far that which *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was to experience the following year. The reasons for Wołowski's success seem to lie in his express rejection of Lawism and his very orthodox opinions concerning the need to provide paper notes with metal, rather than land or any other sort of backing. Otherwise, his theory of land credit based on the same historical experience as Cieszkowski's, was virtually identical to that of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*[8].

Talk of land credit created strange allies. The liberal economists of the *Journal des Économistes* saw the *crédit foncier* as a means of revitalizing the independence and entrepreneurial spirit of the rural proprietor. Rossi, for instance, contrasted this "fortunate application of the principle of association"[9] with other, illiberal applications. At the same time, the rural nobility realized that land credit could liberate it from the mortgages which threatened its holdings. Thus, the Central Congress of Agriculture, whose membership was a veritable roster of the French aristocracy, showed itself eager to learn more about land credit[10]. With more enthusiasm than knowledge – confusing, for instance, agricultural and land credit – it appointed the credit commission on whose behalf Cieszkowski presented his report.

To the chagrin of the liberals, the congress proved to be adamantly opposed to free trade. It voted by a two-thirds majority, over the injunctions of Wołowski and other leaders, to recommend the maintenance of the protective tariff on agricultural products. To demonstrate its solidarity with the manufacturers, it further voted to maintain the tariff on manufactured goods also[11]. Nevertheless, the liberals could find comfort in some of the proceedings of the Congress. A subsequent issue of the *Journal des Économistes* introduced Cieszkowski as "our learned collaborator"[12], and commenting ironically on the congress' suspicion of academic economists and economic theory, wrote of *Du Crédit immobilier*:

> We reproduce this report as one of the best to have been read to the congress since its foundation, even though it is the work of a *theoretician* and an *economist*. This work has not yet been printed but our readers will be grateful to find it in our collection before it appears in the proceedings of the agricultural congress where, in any case, it would be drowned in a sea of rubbish[13].

Cieszkowski's article raised two separate issues. First, he called for a reform of the legal provisions concerning mortgages, particularly in

regard to the publicity legally required of deeds and mortgages. Second, he proposed the creation of mortgage-bonds (*lettres de gage*) administered through an intermediary credit institution, as existed already in Prussia and Poland.

In France, the legal status of mortgages or land deeds was basically defective. The revolutionary régime had systematized the intricate and haphazard regulations surrounding the holding and the publication of mortgages and deeds under the ancien régime. Thus, the registering of such papers in a public record office became mandatory. Moreover, mortgages could only be issued on the basis of actually existing property, within strictly defined provisions for the security of both lender and borrower. In this way, the revolutionary legislators restored the integrity of the system of mortgages and prepared the way for an expansion of land and real-estate credit[14]. However, these beneficial reforms were partially nullified by certain provisions of the Napoleonic civil code pertaining to the property of married women, minors, convicts, lunatics and the mentally feeble. Whether by way of protection or restriction, the civil code exempted these classes from the obligation of registering their deeds and mortgages. Moreover, their mortgages were indeterminate, i.e., whatever their actual reference in property, the mortgages were covered by the entire property of the debtor, present and to come, as well as by the property of the husband or legal guardian[15]. As Cieszkowski pointed out, the insecurity created by these exceptions effectively prevented the extension of credit based on land and other non-transferable property. (*Du Crédit immobilier*, p. 4). Expressing his solicitude for the members of the categories granted exception in the civil code he suggested that a separate and special law be applied to the administration of the property of the incapacitated but he remained absolutely adamant about the necessity of making all land and property documents fully public and open. Other nations, he remarked, had reformed their property laws with this end in mind. Such reform was an essential pre-condition for the mobilization and revitalization of an enormous portion of France's national capital; indeed, it was the *sine qua non* of France's rise to the status of a modern economic power:

"In the absence of complete openness in regard to the civil status of non-transferable property, an openness which is alone capable of providing an indisputable guarantee for the investor, credit will never be found to re-vitalize this enormous portion of the national capital; . . .The abolition of hidden mortgages is the *delenda Carthago* in all

matters of land credit. Not before this stumbling-block has been removed will agriculture be able to cease mourning the absence of the benefits which credit has been called to lavish upon it... To propose any sort of vote about land credit before having voted favourably in the matter of open and public mortgage registration would be to put the cart before the horse" (*Du Crédit immobilier*, p. 4).

Cieszkowski's position on the standardization of the legal structure brought him into the liberal camp. It would have been a logical extension of his position to advocate the abolition of legal restrictions governing factory conditions or, generally speaking, governmental economic regulation as such. This Cieszkowski never did. As will become apparent, he tempered his liberalism with a host of other, practical as well as charitable, considerations. In fact, Cieszkowski was never as fully a liberal as in this article when he decried the Code Napoléon's retreat from the principles of perfect universality in the domain of mortgage and property law.

The second and more extensive part of the article *Du Crédit immobilier* assumed that the legal reform discussed above would be carried out and considered a possible mechanism for organizing land credit. Some members of the credit commission had proposed that each landowner be entitled to issue his own mortgage-notes, in the same way that a merchant or industrialist might issue stocks. Cieszkowski protested that this would open the way to abuses and risk discrediting the system of land credit as a whole. In a *reductio ad absurdum*, he compared the proposition to the idea of each owner of gold or silver ingots issuing money with his own effigy stamped on the metal (*Ibid.*, p. 7). Eventually the dissident members of the committee came to agree that some sort of *ad hoc* administrative institution was necessary to regulate the issue and disposal of mortgage bonds. This institution would evaluate the property offered and standardize the financial and legal conditions attached to all mortgages, thus facilitating their negotiability and transferral. Moreover, this institution would act as a guarantor for the property vis-à-vis the creditor. Cieszkowski pointed out that the mortgage bonds proposed were nothing other than the *letteres de gage* (*Pfandbriefe*) already in use in much of Central Europe. Historically, these instruments had arisen in Silesia after the seven years' war as a way of restoring the fortunes of a war-ravaged nobility by providing credit. Similar arrangements in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1825 and in the province of Posen in 1821 had fulfilled the same function. In the latter case, they had served as a means of

struggle against Germanization in allowing Polish landowners to maintain possession of their properties in difficult economic circumstances[16].

In his report to the congress, Cieszkowski did not dwell on these historical examples. He emphasized the particular quality which had attracted the participation of landowners in Germany and Poland: the intermediary body which received the interest paid by the mortgaged landowner in return for his loan set aside a portion of this interest towards the redemption of the loan. Through the judicious administration and the compounding of the interest thus received the total redemption of the loan was obtained in a relatively short time[17]. Thus, the landowner could borrow without the fear of finding himself called upon to repay the full amount of his loan in one payment at some future date. This concept may appear simple and virtually self-evident today. So it was too for Cieszkowski who had probably participated in the administration of the General Society of Land Credit in Warsaw as early as 1832[18]. Nevertheless, in France it was a bold and novel notion. Indeed. Cieszkowski's *Du Crédit immobilier* devoted considerable space to explaining, cajoling, persuading and refuting his skeptical and uncomprehending listeners[19].

In describing the role of the intermediary body it is evident that Cieszkowski considers this to be the very lynch-pin of the entire system. Since this body could be both a private, voluntary institution and/or a governmental institution, it is interesting that Cieszkowski should favour the latter option, basing his preference on considerations of size, continuity and security. Above all, he appears swayed by Wołowski's proposition that land credit could be connected with the land tax. Instead of paying an outright tax to the state, the landowner would pay to the central credit institution which through the process of compounding and investing the capital received would raise the revenues of the state and lower the tax liabilities of the landowner (*Du Crédit immobilier*, pp. 14–15).

In many ways, these considerations recall the scheme proposed for the liquidation of the public debt in *Du Crédit et de la Circulation.* Indeed, *Du Crédit immobilier* as a whole is a re-application of some of the ideas of the former on a smaller scale. Although the principles of the article were more amenable to liberal policy than those of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, in both cases Cieszkowski sought a synthesis of economic liberty and regulation. In steering this middle course it is

significant that he should have developed the project of the liberal Wołowski, but that his co-rapporteur should have been a Fourierist and Christian socialist[20]. Clearly, Cieszkowski's contribution to the congress earns him a place in the history of French *crédit foncier.* Both his suggestions were incorporated into the demands of the movement which five years later culminated in the creation of the *crédit foncier* bank with Wołowski as head of its Paris branch[21].

II

In *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* Cieszkowski attempted to steer a middle course between the Scylla of liberalism and the Charybidis of protectionism. He had occasion to reaffirm the possibility of such a course repeatedly in his economic writings. Thus, after a meeting of the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* where Cieszkowski had refused to give his opinion regarding a paper on differential tariffs, he wrote to Michelet to explain his untypical silence. Here, he once again drew a line between protection and encouragement of economic activity, condemning the former and advocating the latter. Against the liberal majority within the *Gesellschaft,* Cieszkowski dwelt at some length on the evils of the purely negative freedom offered by *laisser-faire*:

The free traders and, in general, the so-called Liberal School see only abstract freedom. They condemn every intrusion of government *a priori.* They would thus dissolve all ties rather than create an organic co-operation. It is as if each tie did not hold together something which would otherwise come apart... as if the main end of the state were not to care and develop the general good in conditions of positive freedom...[22].

Principles of economic liberty were, in fact, self-defeating:

I should show that the highly prized negative freedom is nothing more than blind chance; seen properly it necessarily turns into its contrary: equally blind necessity. Both belong only in the realm of nature and not in spirit... consequently, the standpoint of abstract *laisser-faire* is as inadmissible for the human spirit as external coercion... (*Ibid.*).

He explained his argument in a series of word-plays:

My system has nothing to do with the passive relation to the state so highly prized by an abstract science. It is not a *Geschehenlassen* whose final result is to let nothing happen truly or normally (*nichts normal und wahrhaft geschehen lässt*)... but at most allows existing forces, weak or strong, sound or sick, test and maintain each other (*währen und gewähren*), without worrying (*kümmern*) whether they are not wasting away (*verkümmern*), without according (*angedeihen*) them the support necessary for them to thrive (*Gedeihen*)... (*Ibid.*, p. 243)[23].

The proper alternatives to such policies were many. Cieszkowski named various institutions – insurances, credit foundations, "the so misunderstood organization of labour which must remain an illusion as long as it is attempted without the co-operation of the most perfect organic body, the state"[24]. However, Cieszkowski added, this was neither the time nor place to expound on the proper alternative. Nine years after the publication of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, at a time when – by his own assessment – the conflict between liberalism and protectionism was intensifying rather than diminishing, Cieszkowski refused to elaborate on his conception of the state's economic role. Characteristically, he saw his vision not as impractical but as premature:

If I have not taken the floor in the matter of differential tariffs, it is because I am neither a protectionist nor a free trader. The third course which I espouse, in this matter as in other questions of the day, has not been adequately prepared at the present time... Only when the struggle has long died down and the tired factions are yearning for a peace agreement will my time come. Then my position will be eagerly taken up by both parties and providing it has life in it, will be given life (*Ibid.*, pp. 238–239).

There is a curious mixture of optimism and resignation in this statement. As in other matters. Cieszkowski was reluctant to admit error or failure. He proposed to await the historical moment of his vindication in patient, or perhaps brooding, silence:

There is nothing for me to do but to wait in silence for a couple of years. This is, after all, not too difficult accustomed as I am to prematurity. A time will come to take the floor and develop in its own time what has been suggested too early (*Ibid.*, p. 240).

Of course, Cieszkowski did not wait silently. He repeated his economic theories often and, in fact, pointed to specific areas where the theory could be applied advantageously and immediately. His disregard of his own advice regarding silence reached back to the very premises of his attitude towards reality as expressed in the concept of *praxis*, already adumbrated in the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.* Even in his notebooks he had expressed the repugnance which the notion of theorizing without seeking to apply and connect these theories with reality inspired in him:

Every system referring to the future organization of society will be bad and impractical if we wish to construct it and close it *a priori.* True reality must develop in the area of facts. The role of today's theory is to lay the fundamental idea, open the horizons of a new system, sow the seeds which are to develop and impart life. Theory must not proceed as a servant of facts; it should precede them and direct them but never pre-judge them. Life develops out of life and a theory which prejudges life and organic phenomena excessively must turn into an empty formalism. (*Diary II*, p. 7, probably April 1838.)

Elsewhere he added:

> Theoretical truths are such that they always allow themselves to be applied to some extent, otherwise they would not be truths...[25].

This held particular validity for social life which was not a one-sided, simple mechanism subordinate to one law. The art of statecraft consisted of applying theoretical truths unconditionally in their own sphere and conditionally in their combinations[26]. Whatever this meant in general, Cieszkowski provided a minor example of its application in his proposals to reform the wood trade and industry.

III

The article on "the organization of the trade in wood and the forest industry" (quoted immediately above) appeared in the *Biblioteka Warszawska* in 1843. This monthly review had been created in an attempt to break out of the apathy which characterized Polish society after the failure of the insurrection of 1830–31. Naturally, Cieszkowski reacted favourably to a project which proposed to stimulate thought and discussion in Poland on a variety of literary, philosophical and social topics. Thus, upon his return to Poland from his first trip to France and Italy, he participated enthusiastically in the foundation of the *Biblioteka Warszawska.* I shall have occasion to look at this participation in more detail later in this work. Suffice it to say here that he supported the enterprise financially and contributed occasional articles, apparently seeing his role, here as elsewhere, as that of a mediator between his Polish readers and ideas or events abroad.

The article on the wood trade was addressed to a concrete and urgent question: why was the potentially rich Polish wood industry so underdeveloped? The answer, Cieszkowski concluded, lay in both external and internal circumstances.

The external causes of the underdevelopment of the wood industry lay in the trade policies and patterns of the two greatest consumers of wood, Great Britain and France. Britain imported primarily from its own colonies and imposed a heavy tariff on foreign wood. France, for no reason other than long-standing custom, satisfied its needs by imports from Norway. This situation, Cieszkowski argued, was both irrational and untenable. Britain's Canadian wood was of an inferior

quality to that available in Poland. Moreover, the one-sided development of the wood trade had stunted Canada's economic development. France's import policy, not even justifiable in terms of a mistaken conception of colonial protection was *a fortiori* irrational. Given the growing needs of the leading commercial, industrial and marine powers, such ill-founded policies could not hope to survive. As Cieszkowski put it: "With the progress of civilization, wood is ever more in demand and forests are ever less available" (*H.D.*, p. 117). Indeed, Peel's government had recognized this fact by recently lowering the import tariff and promising to lower it even further (*H.D.*, pp. 113–114)[27].

External obstacles were thus weakening by themselves. If internal reforms could be undertaken in Poland these obstacles would disappear entirely. The first of such reforms would have to be an intensive development of water communication within Poland. By digging canals, deepening streams, rechannelling rivers, the enormous potential of waterways – at present in so woefully "natural" a state – would be realized. Not only the wood trade but the country as a whole would benefit immensely. Within the wood trade specifically, however, two particular factors were lacking: expertise and capital. In fact, the trade was approached with considerable suspicion as a highly risky and capital-intensive undertaking. The result was that a very few Danzig merchants could monopolize the field by leasing wooded areas at low prices and exploiting these areas without regard for the long-term consequences of steady deforestation.

Cieszkowski tried to overcome these underlying suspicions by comparing the wood trade to the trade in grain. The latter, he argued, was much more susceptible to fluctuations of weather, changes in demand, conditions of perishability. The former had a remarkable permanence and stability. Nevertheless, Cieszkowski had to admit, the wood trade presented risks of a different order. An absolute glut in grain was inconceivable; it could always be sold at home at a lower price or to the Crown for export. A miscalculation of the demand for wood – whether it took the form of excessive felling or of misdirection of the cut timber – could leave the trader with an absolute surplus. Moreover, the annual production and consumption of grain assured the trader a regular return. The wood trade required considerably more capital not only because of the longer investment period but because of the higher transportation costs of shipping this bulky commodity to distant ports.

Ironically, therefore, in spite of its long-term security, the wood trade presented risks of a different order.

The greatest and yet seldom mentioned risk, however, was that of depleting the natural wealth of the country. To Cieszkowski's mind, this danger constituted an unambiguous justification for government regulation. As early as in his notebooks, he had cited forestry and mining as the classic case of public goods which could not be handed over to liberal policies:

> Mining and forestry are the two branches of industry which fall most perfectly under the administration of the government both because of the nature of government and their own character. The role of government is to protect the general interests of the nation, which means it should exploit only what refers to generality, leaving the areas of individuality to individual entrepreneurs. In forestry, the individual motivated by a desire of maximum gain will not pay attention to the losses he is inflicting on future generations. In mining, an opposite situation prevails; the individual entrepreneur will not undertake expenditures which will only prove profitable to future generations. If we leave our forests and mines in private hands we shall destroy our forests and find our mineral resources lying unexploited.

Playing categories against each other he concluded in a vaguely Hegelian paradox:

> The nation in general should assume losses for the sake of the general interest. Since this is the general good, the losses cease to be losses and become gains (*Diary II*, pp. 5–6).

At the same time, Cieszkowski distinguished between regulation and control. He criticized the *Königliche Preussische Haupt Nutz Holz Administration*[28], which functioned as a state monopoly, on the grounds that wherever the end of the enterprise was profit, as it undoubtedly was in the case of the wood trade, the individual could be better entrusted with the enterprise than could the government. The answer, therefore, which would satisfy all conflicting principles and desiderata lay in confiding the enterprise itself to individuals but its *organization* to a public body. Thus, Cieszkowski suggested that the responsibilities of the *Bank Polski* – already acting as a commercial and industrial bank – be extended to provide credit to forest owners. He did not attempt to minimize the amount of credit facilities which would have to be opened: in all likelihood, the circulating capital thus provided would be equal in value to the fixed capital which it was "fertilizing". The key to the success of the scheme lay not in credit, however, but in the creation of a staff of brokers, technically competent in the field of wood production and intimately acquainted with the world market for

wood. These experts would assess the credit needs of the owners, oversee the application of the credit and advise in the sale of the product. Their salary would be a percentage of the profits realized. Thus, unlike the present system where the interests of owners and lessors-traders clashed, a co-incidence of interests between owners and brokers would prevail.

In contrast to the intricacies of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, the article on the wood trade appears to be an eminently simple and sensible proposal. In fact, Cieszkowski was roundly criticized by the progressive *Przegląd Naukowy* on the grounds that the wood trade was not neglected, that water-ways were not underdeveloped, that neither capital nor knowledge were lacking since they were provided by the buyer wherever the owner lacked them. Cieszkowski's discovery of the need for more expertise and more capital was an obvious, and therefore trivial, truth. Moreover, he had misrepresented *laisser–faire* which preached not license as he would have it, but the doctrine that people should not be prevented from exercising their industry and talents. Finally, the commentary concluded, Cieszkowski's system strove to maintain a liberal form but in essence it was protectionism[29].

Whatever the factual merits of the article on the wood trade, it is important in providing an additional illustration of the synthetic economic philosophy which Cieszkowski expounded. It is also a vivid example of his concern with applying the principles of this philosophy to concrete, even trivial, contemporary problems. Such piece-meal and minor reforms were, in his view, steps on the road to utopia.

IV

In the same period, Cieszkowski contributed another article to the *Biblioteka Warszawska* somewhat modestly entitled: "Comments on the present state of English finances"[30]. The article shows that after having visited England in the 1830's, Cieszkowski kept closely abreast of English political and economic developments as well as of the current English economic literature. Above all, it demonstrates a certain insight into British politics during a period of industrialization and social strain.

In Cieszkowski's view, public finance in Great Britain had reached a crisis. Ostensibly, the government seemed to be able to raise credit easily since general conditions of security made government bonds an

attractive investment for private funds. In fact, the government was no longer able to meet even its current obligations. The magnitude of the national debt, successively augmented by short-sighted governments to avoid paying interest out of current receipts, was partially responsible. Above all, however, the growth rate had declined from the dizzying tempo which the inventions of Watt, Arkwright and Hargreave had helped to achieve at the end of the preceding century. Moreover, even if technical innovation could once again revolutionize the means of production, it was doubtful whether the human forces of production could be called upon to make sacrifices similar to the ones which had attended the earlier industrial expansion.

It was to Sir Robert Peel's credit that he had realized the depth of the crisis and proposed bold reform measures. Cieszkowski had little personal affection for the great Tory leader and arch-foe of Irish nationalists and British Roman Catholics. Nevertheless, he acknowledged Peel's personal and world-historical merits:

> (Peel is – AL) one of the slender number of truly right, straight (*prostopadły*), and even men which Providence sometimes bestows upon us when it seeks to introduce ideas properly into life... Although he has not hitherto shown himself to be acting on a grand scale for the future, he does not act for the sake of the present day only. His vision may not extend exceptionally far but at least it is broad and strong. He understands the past well, assesses the present well, and provides well for the future. Then he boldly waits for events, strong and confident that they will not crush him (*F.A.*, p. 388).

Above all, Peel has not ceded to the lure of popularity which had proved the undoing of so many earlier governments. Although finance was a part of politics, the difficult task of extricating it from the totality of political questions had to be undertaken. Peel's refusal to consolidate the national debt – a time-honoured and politically safe remedy for bankruptcy – was thus a truly statesmanlike act. Instead of consolidation, Peel sought to restructure customs and excise taxes. Unfortunately, he had misjudged the elasticity of demand for certain products. Thus, receipts from the tax on wine fell because the reduction of the tax had been too small. On the other hand, the postal receipts fell because the reduction proved too great. The problem, Cieszkowski maintained, lay in an inadequate knowledge of the existing market demand structure. Protracted, and admittedly costly, experimentation would eventually correct the error.

Cieszkowski thoroughly approved of Peel's most radical response to this crisis: the imposition of a direct property and income tax. In the

future, Cieszkowski hoped, referring to the sort of schemes advocated in *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, governments would create their revenues from new, as yet non-existent sources. In fact, the article had opened by pointing to the present financial woes of the United Kingdom as a vindication of the opinions expressed in *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*. At present, however, the income tax provided powerful and unique benefits:

> The principal characteristic and decisive advantage of this tax in the current situation in England is this: it will affect only the wealthier classes whereas almost all previous taxes filling the English budget had weighed to an extraordinary degree on the dispossessed (*F.A.*, p. 402).

Peel had done well to exempt all income under £150 and to set the tax rate at the very low uniform level of under 3%. Unfortunately, he had not seen fit to distinguish between personal and property income. According to Cieszkowski, the former – consisting primarily of income from commerce and the professions – was more variable, more meritorious and more profitable to the nation than the latter. As such, it deserved to be taxed at a more favourable rate[31].

Taken as a whole, however, Peel's reform programme had much to commend it. The general reduction in tariffs alone would create sufficient savings to cover the income tax of many households. Even the maintenance of colonial protectionism had to be seen as part of this general reduction[32]. Thus, England was evolving towards equilibrium commercially – wisely avoiding that theoretical commercial equality of the free traders which was the very contrary of equilibrium, and which had already been denounced in *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*. Here Cieszkowski reiterated his conception of the proper relation between interventionism and liberalism:

> Many influences, artificial as well as natural, act in different directions and with different force on the division and distribution of all the fruits of the world. We will be able to do away with artificial influences or rather replace harmful ones with beneficial ones, but the natural ones will always remain to some extent and thus will require the care and consideration of the government. This is why the abstract theory of unconditional commercial freedom which looks so fine on paper will never be realized in its present nudity and can only serve as one of the factors of that *organization* of trade and industry which is to be the outcome of two completely opposite, mutually exclusive and in equal degree false systems: the prohibitive or restrictive on the one hand – and unconditional freedom of trade on the other (*F.A.*, pp. 404–405).

Finally, mixing admiration with foreboding, Cieszkowski compared England to an old and often repaired machine:

> The present organization of finances, like the whole political, administrative, legal and industrial constitution, etc., is the result of a long formation and of thousands of practical changes with infinitely complex results. Each of these branches is an old machine, built on antique principles and renewed with constant discoveries and corrections. Hence, the innumerable quantity of constantly added pistons, wheels and bolts. Of course, this machine operates under constant friction and the costs of maintaining it must be staggering, but its strength and endurance cannot be compared with many other smooth, cheap and feeble machines (*F.A.*, p. 417).

Thus, the financial reform was but the framework in which a host of other problems would have to be solved: the national debt, the organization of banking, the colonial question, the grain controversy, the transformation of agriculture, and land-property relations. Above all, however one problem haunted England:

> Towering above all else is the most sensitive and disturbing problem which dominates all others and is so closely connected to them: the question of *pauperism*, the moral and material question bedevilling England's future – a question pregnant with disaster if a strong medicine is not found to cure elements poisoned with venom and to transform the festering grounds of illness into reserves of strength (*F.A.*, p. 418).

For this reason, Cieszkowski concluded his article with the solemn and ominous warning: "Yes, England is very strong but it is also very ill".

V

In evoking the terror of pauperism, Cieszkowski expressed the fear and bewilderment of a whole generation. At some point, the social observers of the Restoration realized that the character of poverty had changed. There had always been a *Pöbel*, as the German language of the estate age called those individuals living "outside the honour of work", as well as groups surviving on the very margin of existence. Now, their numbers were swelling with the accretion of formerly independent classes: ex-serfs or agricultural workers to whom emancipation had given personal liberty but no land; artisans displaced by the machine and superfluous even as factory hands because of industry's limited absorptive capacity[33].

Industrial progress advanced in paradoxes. Generally, the period 1815–1845 was one of overall European peace and prosperity. Factory production cheapened the price of many products and agricultural

improvements eliminated crop failures and ensured richer harvests. This, as well as improvements in medical and sanitary conditions, contributed to a substantial population growth. At the same time, generalized misery spread. The peasants of Central Europe found themselves without any means to counter the loss of security caused by the dissolution of the manorial economy. Industrial workers for a short while replaced artisans as the "aristocrats of labour". Then they too fell victims of a double competition: that of the capitalists among themselves seeking to drive down costs and that of the growing army of the ever more cheaply available unemployed[34].

The term "pauperism" was adopted throughout Europe to describe this material phenomenon and its attendant moral effects. The term itself suggests an unwillingness to recognize the novelty of the phenomenon inasmuch as the term had long been used in England to refer to those who under the old Poor Laws were given assistance by their parish. Thus, as late as 1854, pauperism could still be smugly characterized by serious economists as "collective misery which is amplified and general reducing entire categories of individuals to the status of the assisted indigent"[35], although others acknowledged that "pauperism is a state of need, suffering and inner unrest in a people where overwhelming inequality in the conditions of life and powerful class contradictions exist"[36]. Certainly, for the longest time both the apologists of liberal capitalism and some conservatives were content to argue that pauperism was eternal and ineluctable. Indeed, it was not until the problem of pauperism had been translated into a question of wage-earnings that one could speak of an understanding of the task at hand and see effective action taken towards remedying the ill[37]. Nevertheless, the question of pauperism generated some sympathetic consideration and well-intentioned reform efforts from the very beginning. Cieszkowski himself was strongly influenced by these early efforts and contributed to the search for a solution to pauperism, even as the category of paupers was being replaced by that of proletarians.

Cieszkowski's introduction to the problem seems to have been the Viscount de Villeneuve-Bargemont's *Économie politique chrétienne* which he read in the autumn of 1837[38]. The author – a legitimist and a distinguished functionary – was shocked by the misery he had encountered as prefect of Northern France into writing this three-volume work, published in Paris in 1834 and subtitled: "inquiries on the nature and causes of pauperism in France and in Europe and on the

means of alleviating and preventing it". Its scope as well as its analysis marks it as a milestone in the literature on the social question.

Villeneuve-Bargemont pointed to the fact that pauperism had progressed furthest in the richest and industrially most advanced countries, above all in England, a country which he viewed with deep-rooted suspicion[39]. The reasons for this correlation, he suggested, lay in the political economy preached by Smith, Say, Nassau senior and other English liberals whose exclusive concern was with the production of material wealth:

> English political economy maintains that the inducement to work offered by material pleasures suffices by itself to make the worker acquire the conditions of his leisure and happiness. He needs but an industrial education.

The result was that the problem of the just distribution of wealth was neglected, the worker was assimilated to the machine, and political economy was cut off from Christian precepts:

> The true social economy is that which induces both to work and to charity. It encourages the production of riches much less than the distribution and general diffusion of well-being. It prescribes a limitation of needs rather than their indefinite multiplication... Such a political economy is in agreement with Christian philosophy. It leads to the liberty, dignity and prosperity of all men, to the maintenance of the social order and consequently to the most perfect civilization[39].

Villeneuve-Bargemont represents a curious mixture of economic doctrine, theology and prejudice. After having accurately depicted the relation between mechanization, liberalism and impoverishment, he concludes that the true and basic cause of all human unhappiness is original sin[40]. His denunciation of English economics and English industrialism seems to be largely based on nationalist and religious distaste[41]. Above all, his solution to pauperism lies in a wholesale rejection of industrialism and development of the "national industry", i.e., the cultivation of the soil, through the establishment of agricultural colonies[42].

Cieszkowski returned repeatedly to the problem of pauperism. He pored over statistics, studied different aspects, noted different proposed solutions[43]. The phenomenon inspired horror in him as some sort of pathological growth. In considering the English workhouses, which for lack of a suitable Polish term he polonized as *workhausy*, he mixed revulsion at their present state with hope that pauperism might perhaps turn out to be a social sickness whose cure must be

homeopathic. In this case, he suggested – perhaps flirting with communist concepts – the wretched workhouses of the present had to be re-instituted as the rule of the future:

> They (the workhouses – AL) are internally ill, intended only as a drain for spoiled social juices. There, work is only an amortization undertaken to prevent harm to healthy work. These are hospitals of labour where hands are only amputated... Workhouses must become normal healthy institutions, a physiological organ. They must become the rule and private work the exception. Today, it is exactly the opposite... (*Diary II*, p. 39)[44].

Or perhaps, the problem was simply one of unemployment and hence readily soluble:

> ... if there is no work, as the government maintains, then providence and society should find work by opening the great and omnipresent fields of labour where working hands could find enough to live by and to cover their minimum costs and needs... (*Ibid.*).

Here, Cieszkowski seems to be thinking both of the agricultural colonies preached by Villeneuve-Bargemont and Buchez and of the vast projects of public works advanced by the Saint-Simonians and the Fourierists. Elsewhere, in his *Diary* he remarks: "The only way to speedily effect great public works in France is to use the army. Otherwise there is neither capital, nor time, nor labour enough" (*Diary, II*, p. 7).

In addition to guaranteeing work and encouraging agriculture, Cieszkowski seeks a remedy to pauperism in education. Curiously, he treats this in economic terms:

> For half the costs of the police, etc., we could introduce a system of free education (vid 6–4/9 37); with an associational organization and on so large a scale costs would fall to at least 50 francs (from 80,30 francs)... (*Diary, II*, p. 6).

He describes the establishments he is suggesting as "elementary educational institutions giving not only basic knowledge but providing the children of the poor and the proletarians with food and lodging, i.e., the minimal physical and spiritual needs" (*Diary, II*, p. 1, probably September 1837). These educational institutions would be largely self-financed from the contributions of the parents and the earnings of the children. Cieszkowski would require each parent to contribute equally to an educational fund upon marriage. Should they lack any capital at all, the parents would contribute their labour to a prescribed amount. The fund thus accumulated would be expended in the upkeep of the child and towards providing him/her with a certain capital to be transmitted to the child as it was leaving the school (*Diary, II*, p. 18).

Although the scheme was completely out of touch with the realities of pauperism – as Cieszkowski himself was later to acknowledge – it pointed to what Cieszkowski saw as one of the causes of the moral misery which engendered pauperism: the inequality of the marital relation. Elsewhere in his *Diaries*, he remarked cryptically that "in the present illness, the institution of marriage also will be unable to do without a homeopathic medicine"[45]. Whatever that remark meant, in his educational scheme he insisted that the contribution of each parent to the educational fund be equal so that the child would share an equal debt of gratitude to each parent. If only one parent possessed any capital, he/she would have to provide the other prospective parent with the fund necessary before they were married. In case of divorce – which was mandatory in cases of infidelity – the entire fund passed on to the children. Clearly, Cieszkowski's aim was to elevate the status of the women in order to enforce family values. In his later articles, Cieszkowski was to acknowledge the contradiction in his scheme between the aim of reinforcing family structures and the proposal to remove children from the aegis of their home and parents. At this point, however, he was unreservedly enthusiastic:

> It is easy to grasp the moral, industrial and intellectual consequences of this institution which alone is capable of undermining the catastrophe of pauperism – by freeing parents from the burden of their children, giving moral and intellectual education – and at the same time putting them among the owners of things at an age when they are just entering the world. Another consequence would be the abolition of the enormous expenses of nations caused by poverty, demoralization and a lack of enlightenment (*Diary, II*, p. 7).

Thus, Cieszkowski saw the overcoming of pauperism as both a moral and material task. In this way, he assimilated the theories of disparate reformers: the Owenites who stressed education and environment[46]; the Catholics and conservatives who called for a renewal of morality and charity[47]; the Fourierists who dismissed moral arguments and demanded obedience to the laws of material attraction[48]. Above all, Cieszkowski fervently shared the conviction of all these groups that whatever the method of curing pauperism, the road to their goals lay in association. Indeed, the period seemed obsessed with the principle of association. As traditional groupings disintegrated, the longing for a reestablishment of social ties and a semblance of security was channelled into the creation of a multitude of new organizations[49]. Initially, the term meant joint stock or commercial companies as well as

charitable foundations[50]. Soon, however, "association" came to refer to moral associations concerned with improving the lot of the poor. They belonged to no specific ideological camp and each group claimed associationism as its own, although conservatives were suspicious of tendencies towards self-help and liberals bemoaned the danger to free competition. Fourier grumbled that the "word association has been so prostituted and compromised that it has become a synonym for rebellion and disastrous machinations", adding that the culprits were the Saint-Simonians, "a philosophic coterie who has discredited and dishonoured the societarian spirit"[51], and thus obliged Fourier to take refuge in the word "combination". Nevertheless, Fourier's disciples attempted to build an alliance with the Social Catholics precisely by stressing their common belief in associationism, one of the least controversial aspects – along with "guarantism" and mutualism – of Fourier's system[52].

After 1848, the spirit of association was tamed and domesticated. In France, academic liberals, business magnates, Catholics and conservatives all joined in the foundation of Le Play's *Société des études d'économie sociale et des améliorations pratiques.* Its principles were reminiscent of those of earlier associations:

> ... to found a progressive future for the working classes by a conscientious study of their past and present conditions; to make comforts accessible to the slightly better-off classes and necessities available to the poorest; to lift the people towards God through well-being and gratitude[53].

In an age of conservatism the society's intentions were unabashedly conservative but even this did not save the society from turning into a mere study group regarding the conditions of labour. Clearly, association was no longer a dynamic concept.

In Germany, associations fared differently, though perhaps ultimately, no better. Although German Catholics had never embraced associationism as thoroughly as their French counterparts, through the unconsciously complementary efforts of conservatives like V. A. Huber, social nationalists like Rodbertus, and social democrats like Lassalle, German associationism too succumbed to conservative redefinition by becoming the appanage of a powerful state[54]. Perhaps the first step towards dependence and atrophy was the espousal by the government itself of the cause of associationism. A cabinet order of 25th November 1844 established the Prussian *Verein zum Wohl der*

arbeitenden Klassen whose purpose it defined as:

An endeavour to lighten the spiritual and physical need of the hand and factory workers through adjusting the lot of the factory worker and moderating it as through the establishment of schools and the spreading of generally useful knowledge...[55]

The task of the central *Verein* was that of "gradually raising the condition of the working classes, physically and morally, by the use of moral influence and through the recommendation of arrangements appropriate to this end". The statutes of the local branches of the *Verein* set themselves even more modest objectives: "not so much to alleviate existing misery but to prevent the breaking out of new misery"[56]. However inadequate these measures were – especially in view of the impending famine and economic crisis – they were acclaimed as enlightened and progressive in at least recognizing that a social ill, formerly identified uniquely with France and England, had reached critical proportions in Prussia[57].

Cieszkowski was present at the industrial exposition in Berlin which served as the occasion for the establishment of the *Verein.* Moreover, he was informed about its progress and consulted on its operation[58]. There is no doubt that he was enthusiastic about the institution, not least because it had been founded by the government[59]. Indeed, the spirit of *Vormärz* associationism realized in the *Verein zum Wohl der arbeitenden Klassen* constitutes the necessary background for an understanding of Cieszkowski's social articles of the 1840's.

VI

The article on "village shelters", which appeared in the *Biblioteka Warszawska,* is a profession of faith in what might be termed philanthropic associationism[60]. Addressing himself to the "friends of humanity", Cieszkowski calls for a general awakening to the fact that the era of indifference and the era of private charity have both passed. The words of the "greatest Christian of modern times", Pascal, who says that God is most pleased with the poor and humble service of the poor, are untrue:

The poor and humble service of the poor gives only poor fruit, and the meagreness of the results does not depend on the meagreness of means but on the lack of organization, the lack of a more extensive area of activity, and the failure to multiply individual strength through the strength of association (*V.S.*, p. 370).

Association is thus the means towards an end which Cieszkowski defines as "the social care which should exercise its beneficial effects over the individual from cradle to grave" (*V.S.*, p. 368). Evidently, this powerful instrument should first be applied to the initial step in the process of social care: the raising and education of children. Thus, Cieszkowski recommends that a network of infant schools or day-care centres be created throughout the Polish country-side.

The idea expounded here is derived directly from Robert Owen. Cieszkowski opens the article by explaining that he has just returned from England and lavishes the highest praise on the Owenite infant schools which he has inspected there. His praise stops short of endorsing Owenism as such; certainly Cieszkowski could not have approved either Owen's atheism or his labour exchange[61]. Nevertheless, he points to Owen, as he had pointed to Fourier in the concluding passages of the *Prolegomena*, to demonstrate that a grain of truth exists in even the most ill-conceived utopian conceptions:

> May this example prove how far those people stray into error who mindlessly and unconditionally condemn as daydreams the thoughts of great innovators whenever these thoughts do not fit directly and tightly into older conceptions. These people prefer to reject a system *in globo* rather than to search out carefully at which point it coincides with reality and to inquire whether a branch grafted into this point may not yield healthy fruit. They are not attentive to the fact that thought cannot ever generate a total falsehood. It is hence the theoretical task of the philosopher and the practical task of the statesman to seek out the healthy nerve of the system and to impart to it a vital development. (*V.S.*, p. 368).

Cieszkowski's impressions of Owenism are primarily first-hand. In Germany, Owen was virtually unknown. A translation of the *Book of the New Moral World* had appeared in 1840 and the conservative leader and first German theoretician of the co-operative movement, V. A. Huber, was studying Owenism in some detail[62]. The first German critique of Owen, however, was to be Marx's and Engels'[63]. In France, on the other hand, the Fourierists – if not Fourier himself – were avidly interested in Owen and, apparently on the basis of a feeling of underlying similarity, sought to convert him to Fourierism. Moreover, Cabet, author of the most popular utopian tract of the 1840's, the *Voyage en Icarie*, was so obviously influenced by Owen as to be accused of plagiarism. It may be safely assumed, therefore, that Cieszkowski was well-informed about Owenism and, given his closeness to the Fourierists, was favourably disposed towards it[64].

Cieszkowski took pains to point out that Owenite-like infant schools were flourishing outside England. Indeed, the country most like England in this respect were the Papal states; evidently, social needs transcended the gulf between Catholicism and Protestantism[65]. Elsewhere in Europe too, the educational principles of Pestalozzi, from whom Owen had derived many of his ideas, were being fruitfully applied[66]. Admittedly, conditions differed in various countries and since the blight of poverty had not yet attacked the continent with the same strength with which it had ravaged England, even where the urban population of the continent was impoverished, the rural population was considerably better off. Hence, rural infant schools were not a pressing necessity and – in spite of the doubts expressed in the *Diaries* about the viability of the family – the upbringing and education of very young children could be entrusted to the traditional family structure. In Poland, however, the breeding grounds of poverty were the villages. Cieszkowski expressed the difference between the land-holding French and British farmer and the imperfectly emancipated or unemancipated Polish peasant somewhat philosophically: "our peasant does not have the centre of his being inside himself but outside himself" (*V.S.*, p. 374). To be sure, a reformed land-tenure system was required but it had to be accompanied by an uplifting of the moral qualities and physical standards of the rural population[67].

Cieszkowski draws a truly dismal picture of Polish village life. In effect, he says, the Spartan law of the survival of only the fittest children rules (*V.S.*, p. 377). Inadequate protection against the severe climate, the lack of hygiene and preventive medicine condemn even these to a premature death. Regrettably, but understandably, the only solace of the peasant is vodka which degrades him and corrupts his children. As if this were not enough, parents unable to devote time to their infants, administer them poppy juice to keep them in a dazed state, ultimately impairing their minds and reducing them to cretin-like creatures. The sad result is that the countryside boasts far too few children and none of whom it can be proud. Under these conditions, even primary schools enter the childs life far too late to be able to prevent grevious harm. The only remedy lies in infant schools which would take the child virtually from the cradle and give him a moral rather than an academic education in a physically suitable environment:

Looking at the causes of the present condition everyone is in agreement that what the rural population lacks is *enlightenment.* I maintain that it would be more accurate to say

that it lacks *upbringing*. The people do not need information and the exclusive development of the mind. From their very infancy they need to be accustomed to a proper and normal life. They need that moral and practical development of the spirit which comes through religion, good example and the natural education of good habits. (*V.S.*, p. 380).

It is thus *Sittlichkeit* rather than *Aufklärung* which is lacking and the former is the concern of the infant schools. Although this premise is both Fourierist and Owenite, its development in Cieszkowski is reminiscent, if anything, of the latter. Cieszkowski continues:

The first impressions, the first examples, the first habits are decisive for the rest of one's life. The prevention of compulsion, the stifling of noxious impulses, through the removal of the circumstances causing them, the development of healthy and honest habits – in a word, the awakening of a human and not an animal life from the very cradle... (*V.S.*, p. 380).

Pedagogically, Cieszkowski's infant schools are modelled closely on Pestallozi's. Whatever is natural is to be the rule; constraint is excluded. Thus, the children play, sing, dance and exercise, all in a congenial and comfortable setting. Conversations, story-telling, perhaps a bit of catechism are primarily aimed not at imparting wisdom but at attracting the children's attention and giving them the habit of listening. Cieszkowski also adjusts his conception in accordance with the rural and lower-class character of the schools he is proposing[68]. Thus, he emphasizes the physical requirements for a building to house an infant school: it must be clean, easily ventilated, moderately warm, dry and gay. Moreover, Cieszkowski would have each child – although it is not perfectly clear that he includes female children – be given a tiny plot of land to cultivate in addition to his work on a common field. This innovation, Cieszkowski exclaims, might be the boldest means to the emancipation of future generations from the prejudices which peasants now bring to their labours. At the same time, girls would be introduced to housework under the supervision of the teacher-guardian. Almost evoking Fourier's armies of children delighting in usually unpleasant toil, Cieszkowski concludes:

It is easy to appreciate what tremendous excitement children will find in such emulation, such division of labour, its interchangeability, and the progress of their own labours. In this way, the children will come to be familiar with their work and like it since it has been made *agreeable* through having been undertaken socially. This will be one of the greatest benefits of this humble and unimpressive yet so influential institution (i.e., the infant schools – AL) (*V.S.*, p. 398–99).

Presumably, among the leading merits of the project as a whole is its practicality. It is thus incumbent upon Cieszkowski to prove the

applicability of his project by defining both the agents and the material means of its realization. As might be expected, he responds to this challenge with a detailed and systematic plan based on the generosity of the gentry and the labour power of existing orphanages. With the co-operation and protection of the government, the Warsaw Society of Good Works[69] should take advantage of its established position and financial means to launch an appeal to all landowners and pastors, explaining the needs of the villagers and the project at hand. From the contributions received, the society would create a fund and take the first steps to organize the infant schools. Finally, it would create an institution for the training of prospective teachers-guardians drawing its candidates from the existing orphanages in the cities. The transfer of urban orphans to rural infant schools as teachers would profit the schools by providing understanding and trained personnel, and would benefit the orphans by securing them a home-like environment, guaranteeing them employment and providing them with an opportunity to repay their debt to society. This original aspect of Cieszkowski's scheme is thus also a vindication of the institution of orphanages against their critics, as he goes into considerable statistical and bibliographic detail about orphanages taking issue with Brougham, one of the promoters of British infant schools, as well as with Chalmers, who denounced the very institution of infant schools from a Malthusian standpoint. (*V.S.*, p. 392).

Clearly, the whole project of village shelters relies heavily on the generosity of the gentry and clergy, who are expected to create and maintain the shelters by voluntarily contributing funds, facilities and time. Cieszkowski emphatically asserts that "to doubt (their generosity – AL) would be to insult the heart and good will of our compatriots" (*V.S.*, p. 388). In fact, the voluntary nature of the contributions is expected to insure their suitability to local conditions thus actually reducing the costs involved. Indeed, Cieszkowski even appeals to the wives of land-owners to do their part of social work and counts on village doctors to play an important administrative role in the scheme. On the other hand, he is very guarded in his references to state initiatives, pointing, for instance, to the development of shelters as well as village schools under the Austrian government, but evidently wary of urging reliance on the state which for many Poles, especially among the gentry in the Congress Kingdom, was a foreign and illegitimate power.

Cieszkowski wavers in his optimism at only one point, and then shrinks back from the implications of his doubts:

> Finally, even if these sacrifices were to be noticeable from time to time, how can a Christian and a citizen consider himself free from them? Humanity has not only the possibility but the right of appealing to his heart; it is not only his merit but his duty to listen to its voice. Truly, if I dared suppose that its call were to find but an indifferent reception among the wealthy, however regrettable I should consider the state of morals among the lower classes, I would consider it less corrupt than that of the upper classes, and the fall of the latter would be horrible beyond all expectation... At least the people suffer so unhuman a life without their knowledge and without their guilt, whereas the upper classes... I must not even finish because this supposition would already amount to slander (*V.S.*, p. 409).

This statement is intended as an affirmation. It is followed by further praise and exposition of British associationism implying that, at the very least, the Polish gentry should be able to emulate the English merchants. Mixing admiration and horror for English social and political life, as many of his contemporaries did, Cieszkowski points out that in spite of the weakness of the English Poor Laws even after 1833, the English upper classes managed to achieve a great deal in social welfare through their philanthropic and practical spirit. Ultimately, however, Cieszkowski's exhortation is founded on simple hopes rather than confidence. Here Cieszkowski is giving free rein to his faith in his own class, nowhere else was he to do so to the same extent – and even here one can sense a gnawing doubt.

As he is developing his scheme, Cieszkowski takes care to counter all possible criticism concerning the threats to family life. Whereas the *Diaries* harboured some doubts about the health of the traditional matrimonial and family structure, the "Village Shelters" emphasizes that "the children of the lower classes would be put under the united and mutually complementary influence of public as well as private education, i.e., they would participate in all the benefits of a common and organic education in public institutions without breaking such important private and family ties as exist" (*V.S.*, p. 381). Their position is in strong contrast to that of orphans or abandoned children who are only "abstract entities, sunk in exclusively public relations, stripped of all home influences feelings and elements, and hence a bare number for humanity as a whole" (*Ibid.*). In fact, the village shelters would even encourage a greater family life by making more numerous families possible and reducing the number of abandoned children.

In spite of such arguments and the generally well-presented merits of the case, the article on "Village Shelters" drew curious and unlikely criticism from the progressive *Przegląd Naukowy*. In a strange mixture of radical populism and traditionalism, the review attacked Cieszkowski as a "salon reformer" ignorant of the true nature or the needs of the people. Somewhat gratuitously, it commented that "the (presumably? – AL) primitive and crude nature of our peasantry is worth more than the self-loving nature of those who in a worldly glow have become indifferent to mankind". As for the shelters which Cieszkowski suggested:

> The introduction of shelters would not give any real direction to the development of the people's being. However unenlightened the people may be, it is energetic and virtuous. If the misery which keeps the people down were mitigated, the people would then develop by itself... Learn to know the people and you will love the people...

Since Cieszkowski had not understood the essence of the people, he did not see that external importations could do no good. Salvation lay only in the family:

> The shelters would introduce educated individuals into the villages, who in the words of the author (i.e., Cieszkowski – AL), love order and moral life. Yet they would not have our mentality or the peasant heart. We want enlightenment of the people but this can only come in the bosom of the family. Only the mother can develop the heart and mind of children[70].

Such criticism was echoed by reactionary Catholic elements, such as Rzewuska in *Pielgrzym Polski*. Both Right and Left converged not only in their defence of the supposedly natural state of the people, but also in their suspicion of foreign importations – particularly those originating in liberal, industrial and Protestant England. In this case, therefore, another of Cieszkowski's schemes floundered not on its own misjudgements – here, the excessive optimism regarding the transformability of human nature and the availability of material means – but on the ideological prejudices of its potential supporters.

VII

If Cieszkowski's article on 'village shelters' exemplifies a spirit of enlightened philanthropy, his paper entitled *Zur Verbesserung der Lage der Arbeiter auf dem Lande* represents a more sophisticated and modern form of co-operative associationism. Before dealing with this

article specifically, I propose to examine Cieszkowski's conception of property and agriculture with particular reference to the Polish situation.

It would appear that Cieszkowski's *Diaries* eulogize the institution of private property. Criticizing contemporary utopians as negative spirits who must themselves be negated before truth is attained, he writes:

> The task at hand is not the abolition of property but, on the contrary, its elevation and universalization. Property must be made accessible to all because a man without property is a literally nude and abstract being. He is apparently free, absolutely and ideally. In reality, he is all too dependent. Such abstract freedom is good for the bird in the air who has nothing better to *do*, who but seeks the means of its existence. Man has another destination and he must not *propter vitam vivendi perdere causas*. This is why he requires property giving a guarantee in life. Property is the extension of man himself (*Diary II*, p. 35).

In fact, this apotheosis of private property quickly turns into a negation of the institution thus combining Hegel's notion of property "as the translation of freedom into an external sphere"[71] with Marx's inveighings against a purely negative abolition of property[72]. Appealing to Aristotle's critique of Plato in book two of the *Politics* Cieszkowski interprets Aristotle as saying that in the most perfect system each citizen would own property but its utilization would be common. Although an Aristotelian legislator has not yet been found, Cieszkowski proposes a series of ruthless and far-reaching measures which would approximate this ideal and undermine the very premises of existing private property.

Government should be conceived of as "the association of associations" (*Diary II*, p. 34). From this commanding position, it should avail itself unsparingly of its right to expropriation "*pour cause d'utilité publique*". In effect this means that a punitive tax should be imposed on enterprises aggravating "the artificial state of industry". The alternative to payment would be transformation of the enterprise in accordance with the public interest. Thus the government could rapidly create public communications, workshops, forests and mines, trading establishments, and all manner of public works. No injustices would be done; on the contrary, the common good would be furthered for in this way each man could be guaranteed the "certain minimum" or "certain given" to which he is naturally entitled (*Diary II*, p. 22).

Several questions arise from this proposal. The guaranteed minimum is clearly independent of each individual's equally fundamental right to

the fruits of his labour. In effect, however, the scheme which essentially consists of creating employment suggests that the application of the latter right is the surest means of the realization of the former. Moreover, neither right guarantees the possession of property. Indeed, the means utilized by the government would even seem to discourage private property. By the logic of his argument Cieszkowski is forced to claim that the right to a "minimum given" ultimately rests on an absolute law of charity and is not tantamount to a right to property.

At the same time, however, Cieszkowski presents a theory of property which reconciles public and private ownership. The essential criterion may appear obscure: "only that can be private property which is inexhaustible and infinitely reproduceable" (*Diary, Ibid.*). In fact, this amounts to a differentiation between circulating capital with its potential of infinite multiplication and fixed capital, principally land – an obviously limited commodity. In simplest terms, the distinction lies between the two factors within Cieszkowski's concept of capital: nature and labour. The products of labour, infinitely multipliable, are unquestionably the possession of the individual. Significantly, Cieszkowski transposes this distinction to a comparison of urban and rural society. Whereas cities can expand indefinitely never lacking space, the area of cultivated soil is naturally limited. Thus, land ownership constitutes a sort of natural monopoly which, in the interests of all, cannot be left in the hands of individuals. Quoting the Old Testament (*Leviticus* XXV, 29–31) as well as Adam Smith and Rossi he declares that "*Dominium* of the earth is the Lord's: man's is only *ususfructus*", (*Diary, Ibid.*), and deduces that all previous agrarian laws aiming at equality of proprietorship were misguided. The inefficient and ultimately unjust principle of equal land parcels must be replaced by an equality in the exploitation of wealth on common land. *Non partem sed participationem*, he concludes.

From these observations, Cieszkowski also derives arguments for the inherent superiority of rural over urban modes of life. In a curiously resentful comment on industrialization, Cieszkowski makes the following, woefully incorrect, prognostication:

> An important phenomenon in the theory of humanity are the huge advances in factory industry and the very minor ones in agriculture. This is because it is now the destiny of humanity to gravitate violently towards agriculture, which alone is capable of raising the human race, degenerated by factory and urban life, to its normal strength and health.

Thus, factory mechanization freeing people from this deadening occupation is a grace of Providence as is the fact that no one has yet invented a steam plough (*Diary II*, p. 5 probably January 1838).

He further compares the nature of industry and agriculture, and decides:

The advances of agriculture, on the contrary, instead of reducing the need for hands as is the case in manufacture, create their ever greater utilization and attract people to this vital occupation. If the invention of a steam plough should ever occur, it would only be when the need arises of turning to even more pleasant and less arduous work. The advantage of the agricultural population is an unshakeable principle if only because factory products are more perfect when they proceed from mechanical procedures whereas agricultural goods are best straight from human hands. In any case, agronomy is the industry which directly feeds the nation... whereas factories are only mediators depending on consumption, demands, etc. (*Ibid.*).

Having thus mixed physiocratic, Hegelian, Catholic and even socialist influences to raise agriculture to special, almost mythical status Cieszkowski tempers his agrarianism with substantial respect for technical innovations. Thus, in reporting on the Industrial Exposition in Berlin in 1844, he is impressed with the abundance of cheap manufactured everyday goods comparing this favourably to a similar Parisian exhibition where fine and luxurious wares had been on display:

As for me, I must confess that the sight of a good, cheap piece of cloth, of a quality far surpassing its very low price, thus making it accessible to the poorest classes of society is a sight which gives me a hundred times more joy than the sumptuous cloths of Sedan... (*W.B.*, p. 708)[73].

No mention here of the suffering handworkers whose displacement had made cheap cloth possible and who were to rise in bloody and desperate revolt, above all in Silesia. Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile Cieszkowski's professed preference for agriculture with the opening statement of the same article:

I hasten to these great expositions of the fruits of industry with great pleasure and even enthusiasm because the creations of the human spirit always awaken satisfaction and respect in me. I never see in these olympian games a facile and superfluous show of industry... I see in them the living proof of the youthful ripening of industry... the great concentration of human labour... the means of obtaining bread for millions of our brothers, evidence of the ever greater refining of matter, proof of the strength of the spirit advancing in civilization... (*W.B.*, p. 705).

The explanation of this apparent contradiction between agrarianism and industrialism seems to lie in Cieszkowski's insistence on the

agricultural character of Poland specifically. Whereas his various economic writings acknowledge the achievements of foreign, particularly English, industrialism, he consistently stresses that Poland's destiny is to remain a land of rural cultivators. For example, in the article 'on the wood trade', already discussed, Cieszkowski emphasizes that he is suggesting the wood industry as an additional occupation for the Polish gentry and certainly not as a replacement for its proper role in cultivation. Now in his report from the Berlin exposition he writes:

> I shall speak to you of agriculture, this industry which is our true vocation and destination. By nature, we are cultivating agriculturalists, so we are by preference and by duty. We cultivate the lands of the Piasts (i.e., the first Polish dynasty – AL) as we have cultivated them for centuries. Our name comes from the word 'field' (*pole*), our education and our desires tend to the field and this we shall pass on to our descendents (*W.B.*, p. 705–706).

This simply begs the question of why Poland should be called upon to work the soil while other countries are expected and encouraged to industrialize. Reserving the answer for a fuller exposition in the *Our Father* of Poland's historical role, *Zur Verbesserung der Lage der Arbeiter auf dem Lande*, puts forth a plan for the optimal organization of each agricultural domain[74].

This article originated as a lecture taking issue with some of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the *Landwirtschaftliches Provinzial–Verein* of Brandenburg and the Niederlausitz, one of several such bodies which had sprung up throughout Germany[75]. The General Assembly had noted that the elimination of personal servitude and feudal labour dues had substantially improved the lot of the farmers, materially and socially and the ensuing upsurge of agricultural activity had affected both day labourers and handworkers very favourably; even the village rabble was better off! At the same time, however, there was much to deplore in the moral and social condition of the popular classes. Generally, they were stupid, lazy and negligent, ungrateful, suspicious, shifty, arrogant, given to sensual pleasures, and particularly jealous of the more prosperous classes. Based on such an analysis, it is not surprising that the ten resolutions of the General Assembly were not all uniformly enlightened. They expressed a wide range of possible solutions from the purely prohibitive, through charitable, moral, paternalist remedies to educational and economic proposals. It is to Cieszkowski's credit that he carefully differentiated among them.

The first resolution called upon the police and village authorities to forbid exceedingly frequent displays of public dancing and merriment on the grounds that this endangered the sobriety of the village rabble. Cieszkowski defended the "harmless joys . . . of a people who is sufficiently dispirited without being further suppressed" (*V.L.A.*, p. 9). Above all, he decried the purely negative character of this proposal recommending instead a more intensive development of anti-alcoholism associations and the introduction of substitutes for alcoholic beverages.

A second cluster of resolutions was primarily addressed to the charitable spirit of the landowners. It called upon them to require regular church attendance of their workers, and to facilitate this by avoiding work on Sundays and holidays, except in the harvest. It further called upon the landlords to show greater concern for their old and needy workers, to especially reward long and faithful service, to guarantee wages proportional to industriousness and ability, and finally, to show a good example and a true interest in the good of their workers (*V.L.A.*, pp. 4–5).

Cieszkowski passes over these resolutions impatiently, approving them as somehow self-evidently desirable, and yet insufficient. He stresses rather a resolution on infant schools, repeating their advantages and reminding the Congress that upon his motion the Provincial Diet of the Grand Duchy of Posen (where he had recently been appointed a substitute member for the equestrian order) had just submitted a petition to the throne calling for the creation of such schools. In contrast to his article on village shelters, however, here Cieszkowski emphasizes the insufficiency of purely pedagogic means without a profound change in the material base of the working population.

The Congress had approved several purely economic resolutions. Thus, savings accounts were to be opened for day workers primarily to enable them to save a small bit of capital for marriage and old age. A programme of winter-works consisting of piece and subsidiary jobs was urged. The practice of awarding money bonuses for particularly good work was to be extended. Finally, a careful record was to be kept of each worker's services.

While obviously sympathizing thoroughly with their intentions, Cieszkowski criticized the unrealistic character of the resolutions. It was nonsense to think that the day worker could possibly save anything

out of his very miserable wages. Reform would have to start at a step further back: before there could be savings accounts there would have to be higher wages. Similarly, the winter-works programme failed to realize the extent of the misery underlying the present unemployment of handworkers. Above all, it did not realize that a fundamental structural transformation had occurred through the mechanization of the cloth industry. Although consumers were gaining from mechanization, spinners and weavers were suffering because of the consequent change in the organization of labour. This could not be solved by such outmoded and purely supplementary, seasonal projects as winter cottage industry. Everywhere, individual work was being replaced by collective work. With improved communications, many industries were moving out of the cities into the country. Such trends should be carefully observed and encouraged for one of the pressing tasks of the present was the linking of agriculture with industrial occupations.

Turning now to his own alternative and complementary proposal to the above resolutions, Cieszkowski first reviews the pitiable state of the non-landowning village population. He rejects the granting of state land to the landless, or the sub-division of existing holdings on arguments of efficiency. Although sharply at odds with his position in the *Diaries*, Cieszkowski's stance here seems to be a logical deduction from the present trend towards collectively worked and large-scale industry. Instead of ownership, Cieszkowski's plan proposes proportionate participation in profits for all farm workers.

The article is quick to point out that this idea is not a new invention but, like most seemingly new and original schemes, simply the development of a well-known principle. Rails too, he recalls, long existed as a means of facilitating transport and now were finding new application through the invention of the steam engine. Similarly, it has long been common to allow an estate manager a percentage of the profits in addition to his salary. This principle should now be extended to all the estate workers down to the lowliest. Indeed, the finance minister of Anhalt-Gotha, Albert, and Adam Müller had both advocated similar plans[76]. Their weakness lay in reserving too small a proportion of the produce for the workers, in making their entire livelihood depend on the income from this small proportion, and in confining the workers' income to produce in kind without any supplementary monetary compensation. In short, these earlier plans were overwhelmingly disadvantageous to the workers.

In Cieszkowski's scheme, however, the benefits of a participatory economy would be acquired by making the share of profits a supplement to the fixed wages. As such, the share would be calculated on the basis of the input into total capital represented by the wages. Thus, it would constitute a reward and an incentive, creating a truly ethical bond between worker, land and landowner. However small the individual worker's share it would be as significant an addition to his wages as the estate manager's percentage is to his and, hence, would have the same impact in spurring on production, and deepening loyalty. To emphasize the moral character of the scheme, Cieszkowski dismisses the inclusion of participatory provisions in the worker's contract and would make the share dependent on the good word of the landowner. In this way, existing vital relations would not be sacrificed to legal formalism.

Anticipating the objections of his listeners, Cieszkowski assures them that there is no question of allowing workers to participate in decisions regarding the estate's management. He justifies this exclusion on the grounds that the workers share only in the profits and not in the losses of the enterprise. Whereas in discussing the attribution of special monetary prizes for exceptional work performance Cieszkowski had argued that the recipients be chosen by a vote of the workers, here he is careful not to let the improvement of the material conditions of the workers take place at the cost of existing authority relations. Finally, he assures the assembly of landowners that he has applied the scheme on his own land and found it effective. He explicitly disavows the imposition of the principle through the state or even through the means of a compulsory resolution of the *Landwirtschaftliches Verein.* His only intention, he concludes, has been to give an account of his own experience, hoping thereby to draw his colleagues' attention to a practical and profitable idea which they might consider implementing.

The article *Zur Verbesserung der Lage der Arbeiter* may have successfully obviated traditionalist objections but it left itself open to attacks from the left, such as the critique formulated by Karol Libelt[77]. Reviewing the conditions of agricultural labourers in chilling statistical terms, Libelt shows that the average village worker earned 44 thalers annually, hence considerably less than the 70 thalers required to maintain a family in the village. The difference has to be earned in various ways by the wife and children. He concludes bitterly that *corvée* labour has been only legally abolished and that inasmuch as

sub-subsistence wages and demeaning conditions are not better than servitude, the self-satisfaction of the gentlemen of the *Landwirtschaftliches Verein* is entirely misplaced.

Turning to Cieszkowski's proposal specifically, Libelt dismisses it as both materially and morally inadequate. Wages represent only a tiny fraction of capital outlay and even the best-run estates show no more than an 8% profit. On an estate where the capital outlay is 25,000 thalers and profit amounts to 2,000 thalers, the landlord may be expected, according to Cieszkowski's scheme, to take up to 1,960 thalers. Thus, the intensified labour of the worker will bring him only one groschen daily extra for each of the landowner's five thalers. Moreover, the larger the village, and hence the value of the landowner's possessions, the higher his dividend. Above all, Cieszkowski's proposal does nothing to affect the vitiated relations between landlord and worker. It does not recognize any of the worker's right to the fruits of his labour and, quite explicitly, relies for its implementation on the good faith of the landlord.

Nevertheless, Libelt is prepared to acknowledge that Cieszkowski's reform contains the germ of a radical transformation. It would accustom the worker to think of his labour as an input of capital and teach him to demand the profits of this capital. Similarly, it would teach the landlord to recognize the value of labour without which his land would have no value at all, to respect human labour and to consider its products not as his own but as joint property. Even though some of Libelt's premises seem to set him far apart from Cieszkowski – for instance, Libelt criticizes as essentially contradictory any land reform which does not affect property relations – one can assume that Cieszkowski would be sympathetic to Libelt's goal: the granting of land to the cultivators as a trust on behalf of the nation. Thus, Cieszkowski would probably be favourable to the specific reforms suggested by Libelt in reply to the *Verbesserung der Lage der Arbeiter.* Although stated only sketchily and theoretically, these consist of limiting the return of the landowner to 4% and distributing all the rest to the workers and, or perhaps alternatively, basing the worker's dividend on his total cost of maintenance rather than uniquely on his wages.

As if anticipating Libelt's criticism, Cieszkowski explicitly defends the gradual, cautious and minimalist character of his proposal. He answers the charge that his plan for a dividend is merely a system of

favours seemingly without a theoretical foundation, in the following terms:

> Of course this dividend has the character of gratification. It must maintain this character as long as the principle has not yet developed a natural character out of life itself. We must not wish to prejudice vital relations *a priori*. We must always allow them to take their own forms for the reciprocity of theory and practice will not allow itself to be ignored... (*V.L.A.*, p. 22).

In words which must have appeared inordinately abstruse to the assembled landowners, Cieszkowski returns to a favourite theme:

> Whenever theory wishes to advance normally it seizes an already existing practical fact which it generalizes and raises to a principle, displayed as such. Then *praxis* enters again and consistently led by thought develops this principle, until theory has absorbed the empirical in its extension, forms it organically and returns it, ripe and strong, into life (*Ibid.*).

The lesson which Cieszkowski draws is that life must never be poured into pre-existing moulds. Whereas the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* had deplored utopia's inability to extricate itself from existing reality, here Cieszkowski seems to argue the opposite: theory will never find realization if it seeks to precede reality. Contrary to what one might think, however, this principle is not conservative. Given Cieszkowski's optimism both in human nature and in the inexorable progress of history, it is an injunction to maintain patience and discipline in the pre-ordained march of the human spirit.

VIII

There is a certain thematic coherence to all of Cieszkowski's social and economic articles of the 1840's. They are all addressed to material and immediate questions, whether these be pauperism, the world market or economic policy. It is even possible to trace a certain substantive coherence among the treatments of these various themes. Explicitly recognizing an intimate connection between the material and the spiritual manifestations of human existence, Cieszkowski treats both as philosophical problems. Thus, the calls for organic association, for the organization of labour, for pacific means of reform, as well as the condemnation of *laisser-faire* liberalism and its attendant egoism, must all be seen as expressions of a formal philosophy of history, society and man.

It remains to define Cieszkowski's articles in a recognized position on the spectrum of progressive and reactionary thought. One is inclined to identify him as a pure conservative in the Mannheimian sense: a defender of "vital relations" stifled by consistent rationalization[78]. Indeed, even Cieszkowski's undeniable sympathy for the oppressed seems to be explicable in Marxian terms as part of a conservative strategy which Marx dubbed "feudal socialism: half lamentation, half lampoon, half echo of the past, half menace of the future; at times, by its bitter, witty and incisive criticism, shaking the bourgeoisie to its very heart's core but always ludicrous in its effect, through total incapacity to comprehend the march of modern history"[79].

Marx's comments are a telling indictment of some of the French legitimists, British tories, German romantics. They do not provide a plausible interpretation of Cieszkowski's writings for they ignore both the factual content and historical context. If one compares Cieszkowski to acknowledged socialist theorists, he appears neither less cogent nor, at times, less progressive. Buchez, for instance, planned a network of communities to be established in three intermediary steps: the creation of a public credit bank, the building of associational links in work, the mobilization of fixed property[80]. Lamennais wrote that his concern was "not to despoil those who already possess but to create a property for those who are now deprived of it"[81]. Finally, Pierre Leroux defined socialism as "the doctrine which teaches the association of diverse elements of production, which shows the iniquity of wage labour and the necessity of an industrial reorganization in the name of a better principle of work and distribution"[82].

There is little in these principles to which Cieszkowski did not or would not have subscribed. Moreover, when considered historically, he emerges as an even more modern theorist. Both the German *Vormärz* and the French July monarchy were characterized by a search for compromise between Christian and secular social principles[83], a search most pronounced in France between 1840–1848 when the earlier radicalism of both Fourierism and Saint-Simonianism had been moderated[84]. In the face of such generalized religiosity and in spite of his avowed commitment to Christianity, Cieszkowski consistently avoids appeals either to church authority or divine principles. Rather, he bases his proposals on truly modern arguments of economic rationality and natural justice. In short, Cieszkowski does not fit the conservative paradigm. Nor is he simply a Christian or feudal socialist. There is no

nostalgia in his analysis and little bitterness. He holds to a progressive concept of history and an optimistic theory of human nature. If anything, Cieszkowski can be reproached with *naiveté* for maintaining his faith in a Hegelian evolution of the spirit and assuming that men would be willing agents of this evolution.

CHAPTER VIII

DE LA PAIRIE ET DE L'ARISTOCRATIE MODERNE

I

All Cieszkowski's writings published in his lifetime are, to a certain extent, *oeuvres de circonstance* inasmuch as they all address themselves to the pressing problems of the moment. In fact, Cieszkowski's notion of the *deed* implies an insistence on dealing only with topical issues and advancing solutions of immediate applicability. Thus, the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* attacked head-on the burning question of the possibility for a post-Hegelian philosophy and *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* proposed to immediately rationalize the credit system through a monetary reform. The purpose of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* was to introduce a legislative innovation which would restore the vigor of the Upper House.

Yet the specific and concrete proposals of these three works draw their significance and even their validity from certain broad underlying themes. The *Prolegomena* takes as its point of departure a reclassification of Hegel's categories of history. This leads to a conception of philosophy as the handmaiden of the *deed* and the midwife of a third, synthetical historical era. The *deed* which both engenders and characterizes this third era acquires independent and virtually metaphysical status – thus allowing other Hegelians to detach it from the framework of the *Prolegomena*. In the final analysis, the *Prolegomena* is thus not a critique of Hegel but an original essay on the needs of the present and the character of the future.

In the case of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* the specific project – an interest-bearing and state issued banknote – derives from and leads to a more intensive mobilization of a nation's resources. The economic function of the state is redefined as that of fostering and actively encouraging the development of private industry. Finally, the rejection of bullionism and its opposite – Lawism or banking school theory – must be seen as depending on a radically concrete and original conception of value.

Similarly, the theme of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* transcends the mechanics of the legislative and electoral reforms it

advances. In general terms, the book is a sociological sketch; more specifically, it presents a theory of elites. Above all, it seeks to define the proper relationship between the leaders of civil society and the rulers of the state. Throughout the work, a recurrent tool of analysis is the concept of *merit.* Indeed, if the *Prolegomena* is about history and *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* can be called a treatise on value, *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* is, to a much greater extent, a discourse on merit.

It is not immediately clear why Cieszkowski chose to confront these wider questions through a reform project for the French Upper Chamber. To be sure, he spent long periods in France and, as has already been mentioned, he bought an estate in the Basses-Alpes, apparently as an investment to protect himself from political vicissitudes in Poland. It can be assumed that Cieszkowski continued to follow French politics closely with his characteristic curiosity. For all its imperfections, the bourgeois monarchy represented the highest achievement of continental constitutionalism and thus a rich political laboratory. On the other hand, and perhaps more significantly, it was about this time that Cieszkowski decided to enter politics in his native land. Realizing the impossibility of any political life in tsarist Poland, he moved to Posen, an ethnically Polish area under Prussian suzerainty. Without divesting himself of his former ties and estates, Cieszkowski acquired considerable holdings in Posen and had himself naturalized a Prussian citizen. His political career began in 1845, the year following the publication of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne,* when he was designated an alternate delegate for the noble estate of the provincial Diet[1].

Whatever the personal reasons for the specific proposals of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne,* its general themes are in no way new to Cieszkowski. Throughout his *Diaries* he seems to be struck by what he sees as the phenomenon of natural inequality. In an entry dated 27 July 1832, Cieszkowski remarks in an untypically callous note: "there are people who will never be capable of being anything in the world, not even instruments"[2]. Elsewhere he appears repeatedly perplexed by this perceived inequality and attempts to explain it first in terms of natural or divinely ordained causes, then in social terms. Thus, he writes:

> ... the cause and source of inequality among people of higher or lower remuneration or endowment (*uposażenie*) at birth. Metempsychosis depends on ... I Corinthians XV 22–3 ... [3].

The Biblical reference explains inequality in metaphysical terms. It reads: "And as all die in Adam so all shall revive in Christ but each *according to his rank.*" (emphasis mine – AL) At another point, however, he writes:

> The higher estates and the rabble (*pospólstwo*) – two social poles. The abolition of the rabble through its elevation – what creates a rabble? A lack of upbringing, both emotional and intellectual (*wychowania*) – and a lack of participation in the *res publica* – Only through social upbringing will the rabble eventually become a people[4].

Immediately, however, the tone of mixed complacency and uneasiness changes to indignation at the scorn of the higher estates for the populace:

> . . .the scorn with which the so-called upper classes look down upon it – but this scorn, in the final analysis, should it fall upon the people who willingly or unwillingly must remain a rabble, or on those whose vocation and duty it is to raise this populace to the dignity of a people and whose will it is to leave the populace in its dark and deep abyss in order to dominate by the greatest possible aloofness[5].

In a reflection on Montesquieu Cieszkowski remarks sarcastically: "In certain countries the aristocracy as the highest stratum of society gives itself the name of 'cream' . . . (it may become) whipped cream"[6]. Clearly, Cieszkowski's reflections on social polarity incline him to reject the existing gap.

Indeed, Cieszkowski's first published writings have a pronounced egalitarian thrust. Most striking is the *Prolegomena*'s assertion that the universality of philosophy must translate itself into the universal accessibility of philosophy. When all men have absorbed the practical philosophy of the future, intellectual inequality will be drastically reduced. Although his social and economic writings reject the equal distribution of material goods they seek to narrow the gap between the possessing classes and the dispossessed. In religious terms too, in sharp contrast to his reflections on *Corinthians* quoted above Cieszkowski advocates the egalitarianism of universal priesthood and universal salvation[7].

In the *Diaries*, Cieszkowski's acknowledgement of social distinctions evolves into a hypothesis concerning the nature or essence of nobility. From a classical source he writes: "nobility alone is also virtue"[8]. This is not to deny its potential universality for he adds: "we have a right to virtue; who will deny us this?" Moreover, virtue is not only a duty but a link among men. Thus, he quotes Montesquieu approvingly regarding

the impossibility of a republic without virtue. In short, nobility is identified with virtue and the two are the very cement of political life.

Yet the meaning of virtue – and hence nobility – is historically conditioned. Virtue in antiquity meant the application of given laws, and nobility was determined by birth[9]. Christianity transformed the very meaning of these two concepts. Although it sundered the unity characteristic of antiquity it replaced prescriptive morality with liberty, thus opening new potentials of moral fulfillment. In general, the analysis follows Hegel's description of the development of liberty in the introduction to the *Philosophy of History*. Significantly, however, Cieszkowski stresses the notion of merit which derives from this development. Indeed, he rejects the Christian concept of grace which, in his eyes, corresponds in the religious sphere to the political notion of a natural aristocracy or a nobility of birth; the sacraments are no longer seen as expression of divine grace but as achievements of personal spiritual merit. In Cieszkowski's formulation: "to work is to pray... in the religion of the spirit all real spiritual activities are sacraments"[10]. Thus, activity, virtue, and merit are drawn tightly together to become the determinants of nobility.

This sort of reasoning constitutes the background to the meritocracy advanced in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*. In view of Cieszkowski's own social background it must be emphasized that nowhere in this reasoning can one detect the slightest nostalgia for the hierarchial structure of feudal society. Even the apparent exception – a review article of manorial memoirs[11] – which waxes sentimental over the vanished "Republic of Nobles" provides confirmation. The qualities which Cieszkowski regrets as having disappeared are precisely the equality of relations between masters and retinue created by the common bond of nobility, the custom of choosing the playmates of noble children from among the peasants, and the ample opportunities for advancement of the impoverished but talented nobility. Above all, Cieszkowski praises the close connection between nobility and duty.

Such are Cieszkowski's reflections on the general problem treated in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*. The particular problem he faced in France was that of an upper chamber bereft of prestige, tradition, merit or utility. In a regime of uncertain legitimacy, the House of Peers was the least legitimate of institutions. It evoked the *ancien régime* without being rooted in the past. It was established by fiat in imitation of a British institution whose meaning was its tradition.

Even these shaky foundations were dealt a crippling blow in 1831 with the abolition of the hereditary principle, thus opening the Upper House to the ambitious and opportunistic class of parvenus so aptly caricatured by Stendhal in *Lucien Leuven* or throughout Balzac's *Comédie Humaine.* The royal power of appointment to the peerage was curbed by the designation of certain eligible categories. These included members of the Institute as well as men of intellectual distinction – thus opening the way to such men of unquestioned merit as Victor Hugo and Victor Cousin. These categories also included, however, the highest state functionaries and industrialists. The result was the creation not of a new aristocracy but the confirmation of a plutocracy which flocked to fill seats recently vacated by bishops and feudal lords[12]. In short, the peerage reflected the character of the regime; if anything, it emphasized that character and drew correspondingly greater scorn. The Saint-Simonian *Globe* expressed widespread sentiment when it dismissed a project of reforming the peerage through its enlargement as simply "adding more zeros to zeros"[13].

Clearly, Cieszkowski faced a difficult task in advancing a reform project for so discredited an institution. It is a measure of his faith in the perfectibility of the existing order that he intended to do so. It is a tribute to his realism that he curbed his imagination sufficiently to place his plans within the framework of a functioning political system.

II

As a literary type, *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* stands somewhere between the political pamphlet, the sociological tract, and the legislative proposal. In spite of this heterogeneous character it is by any standard a work of clarity, conciseness and persuasive force. Formally, it is divided into two parts – in familiar Cieszkowski fashion distinguished as "Critique" and "Organization." In fact, the book is more appropriately considered as consisting of three sections and two levels of analysis. Cieszkowski states a problem, presents a solution, and draws the consequences from its application. In the process, he simultaneously advances a general theory of society and a particular, limited project[14].

The general problem can be formulated in almost mathematical terms: given the imperfections of the existing order – primarily the unbridled play of private interests and the reign of abstract and

incomplete doctrines; given the state of French political life – the existence of a bicameral parliamentary régime and the nation's fierce adherence to the ideas of the Revolution – what sort of reorganization will overcome the present evils while remaining faithful to the spirit of the system?

Cieszkowski focusses immediately on the solution offered by a reorganization of the peerage. This rather summary dismissal of the reform potential of the Lower House is substantiated by two seemingly contradictory reasons. On the one hand, the author of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* argues that the Chamber of Deputies is so sacred to the French nation, that the electoral principle on which it reposes is so fundamental to both the ideas and mores of the French polity, and the particular interests it represents are so vital that the Chamber of Deputies should not be the object of any tampering. On the other hand, he argues that whatever changes are introduced, the Lower House will never be capable of rising above the partial interests which it incarnates; all tinkering with the electoral law is doomed to failure.

In a sense, the Chamber of Deputies is all that it can hope to be. The Chamber of Peers, however, falls well below its potential. It should represent precisely those elements which the Lower House lacks: "the permanent interests, the universal element and the substantial tendencies of the state." (*P.A.M.*, p. 22) Instead, it is not even a debating society but a recording machine; it has no political existence to speak of:

> The fact is that there is now in France a single legislative chamber: as for the body which in a bicameral régime is supposed to represent the conservative element (i.e., the Upper House – AL) it is itself nothing but a conservatory. (*P.A.M.*, p. 40)

Indeed, the irony prevails that not only has the Chamber of Peers been reduced to an assembly of notables chosen by the will of a monarch or minister, but the political standing of the individual notables is drastically depressed or paralyzed as soon as they are called to the peerage. Clearly, it is not the members themselves but the institution which is at fault. The radical vice of the Upper House has been its inability to find a principle of selection which would guarantee both its distinctiveness and its independence. Cieszkowski thus undertakes a critical review of the existing principles of selection before putting forth his own proposal.

The elective principle faithfully mirrors local or fluid alignments – perceptively defined by Cieszkowski as industrial or economic interests. These have their own dignity and place in the Chamber of Deputies. The purpose of an Upper House, however, is precisely to counterbalance, not to duplicate them. He considers and rejects the American solution – election of the two Houses by a different constituency. Although it may be feasible in the United States to have the Senate represent the federal element and the House of Representatives the provincial element, in France territorial divisions do not have the same meaning. The legitimists would be pleased to re-establish the autonomy of the *ancien régime's* provinces but "the homogeneity of France is one of the most glorious and most happy results of a half century of struggle". (*P.A.M.*, p. 18) The true divisions in France are the fluctuating alignments of regional economic groups. Similarly, the American principle of indirect election to the Senate would have a different, even opposite effect in France; instead of limiting the suffrage as in the United States, it would extend it and thus increase the voice of purely particular interests[15].

The alternative principle of selection and the one incorporated in the law of 1831 is the procedure of royal or ministerial appointments. If anything, this mode is even more defective than outright election for it fails to guarantee a legislative chamber's essential qualities, its representativity and its autonomy. In philosophical terms, Cieszkowski translates this problem as one of assuring the existence of the Upper House both in itself and for itself – conditions which cannot be met if that institution is inseparable from the wishes of the party in power or the caprice of the monarch. Indeed, Cieszkowski maintains that by this principle the Chamber of Peers has been reduced to an incarnation of arbitrariness, for the most part innocuous, often pathetic. In some circumstances, its impotence is dangerous: the Chamber of Peers cannot expect to exercise its function as a supreme court properly as long as it lacks autonomy. Above all, the present weakness of the peerage has created a sort of political vacuum and thus impaired the structure of that organic totality which is the state.

Cieszkowski defends himself vigorously against defenders of the existing order who would point to the success of the principle of royal appointments in Great Britain. The hereditary character of the lords, he explains, has two consequences: the lords enjoy an absolute security of tenure, far beyond that of the life-appointment. The heart of the

difference, however, lies in "the political mores, the respect for existing institutions, usages and the empire of opinion" (*P.A.M.*, p. 33)[16]. Ironically, this results in a contradiction between the legal and the actual or political aspects of royal appointment in both France and England: whereas in the former, "the abuse of this faculty (of appointment – AL) is still legal, in the latter, its legal usage is already an abuse" (*P.A.M.*, p. 34).

The classical mode of elevation to the peerage is the hereditary principle. Curiously, Cieszkowski develops a strong and impassioned argument in favour of this principle, only to dismiss it summarily. Thus, he describes the suitability of hereditary selection to the Upper House in unqualified terms:

> A distinctive principle (with) effective independence, intrinsic reproduction, the representation of real interests, a stability in the face of all trials, an *esprit de corps* and a spirit of conservation, a guarantee of enlightenment by virtue of a special education, a solidarity of traditions and of tendencies, a continuous participation in the glory and interests of the country, an absorption and consecration of all new superiorities and rising celebrities; finally, a material guarantee founded on the existence of extensive property and a moral guarantee founded on the principle: *noblesse oblige*. (*P.A.M.*, pp. 45–46)

Moreover, Cieszkowski continues, the implacable animosity to the principle of hereditary peerage which characterized debate before 1831 seems to have subsided. At present, public opinion is either indifferent to the matter or in doubt as to the wisdom of the existing scheme.

At this point, Cieszkowski executes an astounding *volte-face*. As if to shake himself out of the seduction of his own arguments he squarely affirms that he will not hesitate for a moment in rejecting the hereditary principle. First, because it would be anachronistic and unpopular:

> ... the actual state of opinions, mores and social elements in France and, above all this, the empire of accomplished facts and the power of the spirit of the age put their veto to any such notion. (*P.A.M.*, p. 46)

Although public opinion may not be unyieldingly opposed, public sentiment would be. Sentiments are more difficult to overcome and infinitely more important. Indeed, it is public sentiment which must be trusted as both true and legitimate. Quoting the eighteenth-century Junius, he concludes: "The people are seldom wrong in their opinions; in their sentiments they are never mistaken" (*P.A.M.*, p. 49).

Second, and somewhat rhetorically, Cieszkowski inquires whether there still exists an aristocracy in France "based simultaneously on both fact and right" (*P.A.M.*, p. 51). He concludes that what passes for an aristocracy consists of either "ghosts" or "creatures" – the vestiges of a feudal order or the arbitrary creations of recent monarchs and ministries. In short, historical conditions in France have not only destroyed the political conditions for a hereditary peerage but have actually eliminated that class as such.

Thus, the hereditary principle is no longer appropriate; election represents a duplication; appointment is arbitrary. In the face of this apparent impasse, Cieszkowski returns all the more insistently to the imperative need for an Upper House and the qualities it incarnates. He does so not only in the name of the substantial and universal element which cries for expression and which had been defended earlier in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, but also on behalf of the needs of the present era. The urgency of the question lies precisely in the fact that only a reformed and vigorous Upper House can counter-balance the noxious tendencies of the age.

A certain measure of *Zeitkritik* runs through all of Cieszkowski's earlier works. Nowhere, however, is this element as explicitly stated as in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* In previous denunciations of individualism, the underlying anti-bourgeois sentiments remained particularly veiled. Here, by contrast, Cieszkowski attacks mercilessly the very ethos of the middle class:

> An immense sore is threatening to spread over present day society. In general terms, this sore is known as *individualism*: It is the progressive isolation of individuals, places and specialities; it is the perpetual game of the egoism which has shaken all authority, all substantial ties. Whereas society is actually gravitating towards an ever more normal organization, individuals isolate themselves in their tendencies, opinions and acts. A spirit as petty as it is exclusive has seized the dominant mass of the nation, above all these *middle classes* which alone today constitute the *pays légal* (*P.A.M.*, pp. 83–84).

This petty exclusive spirit has sabotaged democracy. It has created a lack of faith in political institutions and opinions. Above all, it has replaced considerations of quality by quantity; whether this translates itself into sums of money or numbers of votes, it is always numbers which dominate. Ironically, the principle of equality which is praised so loudly and invoked so frequently to justify this reality is itself a dead letter: according to law, it may exist; in fact, it is but a lie and hollow abstraction. Moreover, it is not the enemies of equality which have

destroyed it but rather equality's blind and exclusive partisans who by compromising the principle uncover all its impotence.

With uncharacteristic nostalgia Cieszkowski contrasts the existing abstract and exclusive – hence false – egalitarianism with its medieval antecedents. The democratic and egalitarian principle, he maintains, was both posited and fully developed in the Church's solemn recognition of the absolute character of each individual's activity. Most significantly, however, this recognition was matched by a grand hierarchial principle which lent equality its organizing force and furnished it with positive instructions. Equally uncharacteristic is Cieszkowski's eulogy of Napoleon as the very incarnation of the rights of genius and merit in whose person equality bowed to superiority and the mass of individuals ceded to the pre-eminence of the single general individual (*P.A.M.*, pp. 88–89).

Cieszkowski quickly explains the relation between these assertions and his habitual disdain for both medieval and Napoleonic myth. In fact, he presents his explanation in the form of a quasi-scientific law which constitutes the very cornerstone of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* By combining a variable with an invariable principle Cieszkowski succeeds in marrying an otherwise irreconcilable pair of conservative and progressive principles. Neatly stated his proposition reads:

> We affirm that a democratic society cannot live and prosper without an aristocracy analogous to and corresponding to its state of development (*P.A.M.*, p. 91).

In this way, Cieszkowski reinforces his earlier belief in the necessity of a "substantial power" within the state. Once again he stresses that this power must be freed of all particularisms and personal influence. This condition can best be met if substantiality is incorporated in an institution "founded on the immutable sovereignty of reason and the nobility of merit" (*P.A.M.*, p. 92). Its permanent character is assured by the permanence of reason. Merit, however, is a variable reflecting the values and needs of each successive "state of development". Inasmuch as the form of merit mirrors society it imparts an essential ingredient for flexibility into the substantial institution. In this way, the form of the state and the particular reality of civil society remain inextricably united.

The substantial institution is also the faithful guardian of social traditions. Just as the concept of merit is elastic, however, tradition

itself acquires a dynamic connotation. In an extended metaphor Cieszkowski writes:

> Traditions are not a reservoir of stagnant water but a large stream which absorbs in its course all the sources of running water which spring from the regions which it runs through and carries them towards the plains of the future in order to water and fertilize them (*P.A.M.*, pp. 93–94).

There is apparently an intimate connection between aristocracy, tradition and greatness. Cieszkowski points to Britain's fidelity to its national traditions amid all party vacillations as the cause of its strength in the world. Immediately thereafter, he cites Tocqueville's *De la Démocratie en Amérique* (vol. II, chap. 5) on the importance of an aristocratic body – "a steady and enlightened man who never dies" (*P.A.M.*, p. 95) – in the conduct of external affairs. At the same time, he warns that hereditary aristocracy has a long-run tendency to degenerate into a particular form of individuality which expresses itself as an egoism of caste and race.

After having dwelt at such lengths on the need for an aristocracy and the defects of its existing variants, *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* forsakes critique and passes on to its positive or organic part: the creation of an aristocratic institution which is to be original and superior in its composition, its principle of selection, and even in its role. The new peerage would not be a caste; nor would it be drawn from a single class. Rather, it would embrace the elite of all the classes of the nation. In this sense, it would be a true aristocracy of merit or, as Cieszkowski insists, a "popular patriciate". It would be the *areopagus* where services rendered to the state would be judged and entrance to which would indicate the highest political reward. This new peerage would transform the vice of the age, what Tocqueville had called the *passion of place*, into a vital element of the state:

> This assembly would offer a wide outlet to the torrent of individual ambitions which we may consider impatient or inopportune but which are never inconsequential... In admitting the fact and even the right (of this ambition – AL) let us try to master the eruption of this torrent born yesterday... Let us turn it away from the direction of the ministerial office towards which it now rushes and let us try to have it flow into the vast and powerful reservoir of the new peerage. In a word, let us open to petty personal ambitions the wide road of *social ambition* (*P.A.M.*, pp. 78–79).

Cieszkowski's view seems to be that natural superiorities and ambitions are inescapable facts. The choice is between frustrating them or integrating them into the social framework as a new peerage.

Just as the new peerage is to co-opt potentially disruptive but gifted and meritorious individuals into fulfilling a social function, the internal method of selection within the House of Peers is to be co-optation. The new principle which is to unite heredity and appointment is that of "reproduction of self by self; the intrinsic renewal of the House of Peers by itself" (*P.A.M.*, p. 62). In the manner of an academy, whenever a seat falls vacant the remaining members are to choose a successor in the class and speciality of the defunct member. Cieszkowski justifies his absolute faith in the wisdom of this procedure by pointing to the very instinct of self-preservation of the new peerage:

> Out of respect for its own esteem, through this noble and energetic sentiment of corporate ambition which should constitute its intrinsic force, the peerage will be necessarily inclined to admit into its bosom recognized capacities, indispensable specialities, leading figures in society, true merit... It will thus be open in both fact and law to all the truly illustrious men of the nation whom public opinion has designated in advance. (*P.A.M.*, pp. 66–67).

The public opinion in question is not that of transient infatuation. It is rather that true opinion of which the peerage will eventually become both the source and the repository. Cieszkowski's argument here rests on a variety of implicit assumptions which might warrant closer consideration. On the other hand, the primary merit of co-optation – assuring the absolute independence of the Upper House – seems to have been demonstrated.

Having established the composition of the new peerage and its principle of selection *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* concludes with an summary of the immediate mission of this new institution:

> Formerly, a wall and an abyss stood between the people and the aristocracy... This wall of privilege crashed fifty years ago. The abyss remains wide open and we discover its depth by approaching it.
>
> This abyss is hunger and misery, physical and moral pauperism... the bread of life which the lower classes lack and which must be guaranteed them through the organization of work and through enlightenment (*P.A.M.*, pp. 156–157).

Who is capable of covering this abyss? Surely not the people themselves; they lack the necessary means and woe to them should they ever try to acquire them! Nor the bourgeoisie who is too busy picking the fruits of its recent victories. The former nobility? Perhaps... its careful education, its remaining position and prestige,

above all, the fortunes it possesses without working create an obligation to those who work without possessing.

In fact, it is no single class which can fulfill this mission. According to Cieszkowski, the concept of investing a single social class with power is as outmoded as the notion of noble castes. It is the elite of all classes, the new aristocracy, which must be entrusted with this most vital mission of the age:

> The future of the nobility lies in a providential patronage over the progress of the people, a progressive initiation of the lower classes to social life. It lies in the great social mission, in the initiatives which constituted the strength of the nobility in its finest days. It lies in guiding the advance of nations and opening the road of progress... (*P.A.M.*, pp. 160–161).

Thus, in its concluding pages *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* justifies the new peerage in terms of the social problem. Merit pays tribute to democracy by invoking paternalism.

III

The conclusion of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* in paternalism makes it all too easy to dismiss the work as a conservative tract which seeks to erect a last barrier to the march of democracy. Such a perspective, however, would be profoundly unhistorical in that it would overlook both the innovative character of Cieszkowski's conception and the nature of conservatism in his time.

Conservatism is certainly as difficult to define as it is easy to identify. As Mannheim has suggested there are styles of thought analogous to art styles[17]; familiarity with a style allows one to characterize phenomena in almost intuitive fashion. In the case of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* it is not only the actual agreements but the tone, the preoccupations and the reservations of the author which reveal a certain conservative style. More concretely speaking, in analyzing the underlying values of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, one discerns a close correspondence to the conservative model suggested by Rohden[18]. The latter's three basic conservative values are present in Cieszkowski's work: duration, differentiation, a qualitative concept of freedom. Other elements also appear – the organic notion of society, the principle of authority, the emphasis on order. So too, Cieszkowski's concept of the nobility as a *Gesinnungsgemeinschaft*

rather than a caste coincides with the conservative aristocracy's self-evaluation. Cieszkowski's condemnation of a functionless aristocracy matches the sentiments of outspoken conservatives of his period, as does his shock and anguish at the existing class disparities and antagonisms[19]. Finally, inasmuch as the projected House of Peers would regroup the elites from all classes it is reminiscent of corporatist or estate-based representational schemes, more closely identified with feudal vestiges still to be found in conservative Germany rather than anything existing in post-revolutionary France.

On the other hand, there is an essential ingredient missing in Cieszkowski's conservatism. To take a concrete and significant instance, the relation of nobility to property in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* is anything but conservative. Here it should be noted that Cieszkowski's unswerving – if usually tacit – endorsement of private property in no way isolates him from progressive thinkers as such or from the socialists of his own era. Fourier spoke of private property as a "powerful moral spring"[20]. Saint-Simon, if not the Saint-Simonians, limited the rights of private property only to the extent that they imposed the criterion of productivity as sole title to property. The difference between these thinkers and their conservative contemporaries lay in the latters' insistence on distinguishing two types of property – land and mercantile property; the first incarnating the idea of permanence, the second that of progress. The conservatives insisted on the absolute preeminence of the former; in Coleridge, for instance, the landlord must be free from any state control or regulation because he is presumed to have a sense of social responsibility which the manufacturer lacks[21].

Clearly, in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* both types of property are subject to the uniform criterion of merit. Indeed, property as such is so little esteemed as not to constitute a necessary qualification for entry into the peerage. *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* explicitly provides eligible peers with honoraria; Cieszkowski realistically assumes that most will be independent financially and will not require this income; many will assume ministerial or high bureaucratic posts and thus find themselves on salary. It is intolerable, however, that absence of property should stand in the way of any meritorious individual acceding to the peerage. If this body is to be truly an elite of all classes, it must be the elite of the non-propertied too (*P.A.M.*, p. 74).

Furthermore, the claims of inheritance to leadership, so closely connected to landholding, are rejected outright by Cieszkowski. Although inheritance as such is not contested in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, he insists that work provides the uniquely legitimate title to wealth: those who have not worked to acquire property have a duty to use this wealth on behalf of the working classes – in short, to justify their wealth through their work. Similarly, Cieszkowski remains singularly unmoved in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* by the substantial claims of family. Whereas elsewhere he is anxious to draw analogies between familial and political life, here he maintains a severe silence on the subject. Thus, in spite of his paternalism, Cieszkowski does not compare the role of the peerage with a fatherly function to avoid the implication that leadership in a family hierarchy creates claims to political leadership.

In all these respects, Cieszkowski's *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* proves itself to be thoroughly unconservative. This is not to say that the work is somehow sui generis; indeed, it is situated squarely in a familiar tradition, that of "meritocratic" theory. As such it draws on antique sources as well as Cieszkowski's contemporaries. Under the directoire, Madame de Staël had proposed a peerage drawn from the meritorious[22], and Cieszkowski's compatriot and acquaintance, Hoëné-Wroński, in 1830 advanced the idea of a bi-cameral legislature where one chamber would represent unconditional truth and the other unconditional virtue[23]. It is difficult, however, to speculate on the work's precise geneology for two reasons. First, because of the universality of the theme of merit in political literature, which recurs in different forms at all periods; surely, the question of who deserves to rule is among the oldest of political problems. Second, because of the formalistic character of the concept of merit; the notion merely provides a designation to which different qualities can be appended. The originality of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* lies not in calling for the rule of merit but in providing a particular definition of merit and balancing the claims of merit against others. Within the meritocratic tradition, however, this work appears to draw its outlook, values and method from three distinct sources: Tocqueville, who is cited flatteringly though sparingly; Saint-Simon, whose critique of contemporary France permeates Cieszkowski's analysis; Hegel, who remains uncited, but whose notion of the state underlies the legislative reforms of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.*

The link between Tocqueville and Cieszkowski lies first in their method. *De la Démocratie en Amérique* and *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* both originate in a sociological inquiry. In the opening passage Cieszkowski announces that he intends to examine the relation between the opinions, mores and institutions of France. Throughout, he reminds the reader that he has two basic data: first, his goal – the optimal composition, recruitment and role of the House of Peers; second, as he puts it, "the actual state of opinions, mores and social elements in France, and above all this, the empire of accomplished facts and the power of the spirit of the age" (*P.A.M.*, p. 54). Thus, Cieszkowski commits himself to an empirical investigation where the universality of his intentions would be tempered by the given particularities of specific social conditions.

Method colours conclusions and so it is hardly surprising that there should be an underlying similarity in Cieszkowski's and Tocqueville's attitudes to the phenomena they are studying. Both are foreigners exploring a society to which they react with mixed horror and admiration. If Cieszkowski subscribes somewhat uncritically to Tocqueville's description of America, the latter's comments on the state of affairs in his native land would lead one to suppose that Tocqueville could easily have endorsed Cieszkowski's *tableau* of France. The introduction to *De la Démocratie en Amérique* is quite explicit:

> There is no people in Europe among whom the great social revolution which I have just described has made greater progress than among ourselves, but it has always advanced haphazardly. Chiefs of state have not prepared anything in advance for it and so it took place in spite of them without their knowledge. The most powerful, most intelligent and most moral classes of the nation have not sought to seize control of it in order to direct it. Thus, democracy has been abandoned to its savage instincts. It has grown like children deprived of paternal care, who grow up themselves in the streets of our cities and know of society only its vices and miseries[24].

These words could well serve as the point of departure for *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*. Moreover, as the two authors deepen their analysis the same ambivalence towards the democratic revolution becomes apparent. Tocqueville insists that he has not "claimed to judge whether the social revolution whose march seems irresistible was advantageous or disastrous to humanity"[25]. Cieszkowski condemns some of the results of this revolution but refuses to undo it as such and even sings the praises of the glorious

events which began in 1789 (*P.A.M.*, p. 54). Indeed, he goes a step further than Tocqueville by attempting to resolve this ambivalence: the strict delimitation of the electoral principles of the two Houses of Parliament and the elimination of all criteria other than merit for entry into the peerage are the expression of this attempt.

Whereas the congruence of Cieszkowski's and Tocqueville's basic attitudes is startling, it would be easy to exaggerate their agreement on concrete issues. An air of resignation permeates *De la Démocratie en Amérique*; its author is so powerfully impressed with the advance of democracy that he cannot bring himself to believe that a democratic age would tolerate any sort of aristocracy, however necessary and however fresh and modern in outlook that aristocracy might be. Moreover, Tocqueville does not seem to be able to imagine a renewal or transformation of the aristocratic principle. First, he somewhat fatalistically assumes that whenever one class rises, another must decline[26]. Second, he insists that any true aristocracy must be – in the final analysis – territorially based because only landed property can assure the necessary continuity[27]. In this respect, Cieszkowski is a more optimistic, more original, perhaps a more liberal thinker than Tocqueville. The latter seeks recourse for the evils of the age in territorial and institutional decentralization while admitting, somewhat self-defeatingly, that such measures may not always be appropriate[28]. Cieszkowski, on the other hand, rejects all tinkering with checks and balances as "sterile" and refuses to sacrifice the real progress which a centralized state represents (*P.A.M.*, p. 107). In fact, *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* draws on Tocqueville primarily when it is criticizing democracy – as if Cieszkowski required the support of so eminent an authority whenever he chose to oppose the current of the age[29]. Thus, the Tocqueville who emerges from this analysis is not the bedazzled liberal who sings of America but the fearful conservative who cannot bring himself to share Cieszkowski's faith in the possibility of a new aristocracy.

In adopting and elaborating Tocqueville's critique of democracy, *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* reveals itself as an indictment of the bourgeois order. This conclusion, however, should be subjected to two qualifications: First, the work's anti-bourgeois character is of a romantic rather than a traditional sort[30]; Cieszkowski criticizes the bourgeoisie for being spiritually abject, venal and uncreative, not for having robbed the aristocracy of its privileges. Second, and in seeming paradox, the ultimate result of Cieszkowski's proposals would be

precisely to ennoble the eminently bourgeois virtues of industry and ambition. *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* calls for nothing less than the co-optation of the deserving bourgeois into the aristocracy.

The compatibility between these two positions can be understood in terms of Cieszkowski's debt to Saint-Simon, where a scathing critique of the liberal and the bourgeois goes hand-in-hand with an apotheosis of the industrialist. Although Saint-Simonianism had spent itself by the time Cieszkowski came to France,[31] he had undergone considerable exposure to the doctrine at the hands of his German teachers and his readings. The cultural lag between East-Central Europe and Paris spared him only some of the more eccentric variations of Saint-Simonianism but had not deprived him of access to the works of the father of the sect. Thus, even though *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* makes no reference to this outmoded doctrine, its premises reflect Cieszkowski's conversion to the principles of Saint-Simon's *Du système industriel* and *Le cathéchisme des industriels.*

Saint-Simon reserves no less scorn for the French political system than does Cieszkowski. The Saint-Simonian *Globe* speaks of French politics as "not even arousing curiosity" whereas *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* judges the existing system only "passably acclimatized" (*P.A.M.*, p. 7). Fourier, to whom Cieszkowski stands closer in other respects, was also a critic of both liberalism itself and of the gulf between liberal precepts and practice[32]. In contrast to Fourier, however, both Saint-Simon and Cieszkowski seek an alternative not in the abolition of hierarchy and the questioning of authority but in their regeneration; the result, instead, is nothing less than a reenforcement of these traditional principles under a new guise.

Both Cieszkowski and Saint-Simon share a romantic faith in the power of intuition and sentiment. Saint-Simon's dying words – "To do great things one has to have passion!" – reverberate in subdued tones throughout Cieszkowski's works. This had been evident in the *Gott und Palingenesie* as well as in the gist of its critique by K. L. Michelet who darkly hinted that Cieszkowski was a crypto-Schellingian for his unavowed but badly concealed romanticism. In *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* Cieszkowski enthrones public sentiment as the highest judge and oracle:

> Yes, public sentiment constitutes an authority far superior to public opinion itself. It is often both necessary and generous to defy the latter; it is always as dangerous as it is disloyal to ruffle the former. It is to public sentiment and not to public opinion that the adage refers: *vox populi, vox dei* (*P.A.M.*, p. 48).

Such affirmations find a solid foundation in Saint-Simonian theory; Eichthal, one of the more orthodox members, expresses his teacher's later thoughts clearly in a letter to John Stuart Mill:

> It is normally thought that it is through science that men are led yet there is nothing less true. It is through feeling alone, through a law of love, that men have always been led . . . science does no more than regularize the means of attainment[33].

Once again, it might appear that Fourier's works rather than Saint-Simon's should be cited as inspiration for *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* In Fourier, intuition is truly sovereign and universal harmony depends on the right mixture and matching of inclinations and sentiments. A similarly proto-behaviourist tendency appears among some of Saint-Simon's disciples also, notably in Comte, but the striking difference between all the Saint-Simonians and Fourier is the formers' respect – even reverence – for spiritual and moral reality. Whereas Fourier detested all talk of morality and ignored spirit, these concepts preoccupied – at times, confusedly – Saint-Simon and his disciples. Clearly, Cieszkowski as a Hegelian and a Catholic could not fail to identify himself with the latter.

There are innumerable further points of contact between Saint-Simon and the Cieszkowski of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* They both base their proposals on the assumption that the period of destruction has ended and that of construction has come. Indeed, Cieszkowski borrows Saint-Simon's very terms – organic and critical periods of history – to express this belief[34]. Both indicate a preference for reforming existing institutions rather than creating new ones; thus, they indicate their commitment to the existing order and their faith in the possibilities of its peaceful reform[35]. Finally, they agree that the present age is one of practical deeds and not theoretical knowledge; in an echo of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie,* one of the Saint-Simonians wrote: "the phase of doctors is finished; that of practitioners is beginning"[36].

Of course, it is in the character of their legislative proposals that there are specific similarities with Cieszkowski. Saint-Simon advances legislative reforms which seem to prefigure those of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* Saint-Simon's first work, *Lettres d'un habitant de Genève à ses contemporains,* proposes the creation of a "council of Newton" which should be composed of the most enlightened men in several disciplines and should guide the moral destinies of humanity[37] and he returns to similar themes throughout his writings. On the one

hand, he speaks of the privileges due to the creative, the enlightened and the industrious; on the other hand, he seeks to anchor their right to rule in institutionalization. Thus, in *L'Artiste, le Savant et l'Industriel* Saint-Simon's entire argument is that "the well-being of society depends uniquely on these three capacities[38], and in his *Parabole* he draws a bitter conclusion regarding the utility of the old parasitic ruling classes in comparison with the potential contribution of these new groups. In the *Organisateur* Saint-Simon proposes a tri-cameral parliament; a chamber of invention consisting primarily of civil engineers but also of "inventors in literature", i.e., poets, and artists, architects, musicians – all in closely specified numbers and with some non-voting foreign members thrown in for good measure; a chamber of examination consisting of mathematicians and physicists of different specialities in carefully delimited proportion; a chamber of execution corresponding to the House of Commons and made up of captains of industry in proportion to the branch of industry which they represent and its importance to the nation[39].

Thus, Saint-Simon and Cieszkowski reveal the same basic intention: to define the class of aristocrats appropriate to the age and to vindicate their right to rule. The key to their theory of elites is its evolutionary nature and its flexibility; indeed, Saint-Simon goes even further than Cieszkowski in affirming that property itself is a social fact and must evolve with everything else; both writers reject the reign of the *savants* alone and call for the inclusion of new social categories into the ruling element. Taking the principle of equality of opportunity as a point of departure, it is those who make best use of their opportunities who ought to be granted recognition by being asked to govern.

Specifically on the issue of a House of Peers, Saint-Simon is not consistent. He would probably agree with Cieszkowski's evaluation of the existing House of Peers; in his *Catéchisme des industriels* Saint-Simon had termed the upper chamber a body of "state pensioners"[40], and a bulwark against the just demands of the *industriels*. The reforms of 1831 which abolished the hereditary nature of the House would probably have mitigated his ire; even so, he could hardly have failed to condemn the inclusion of undeserving *industriels* and the vacuity of the institution as a whole. In short, he would have reserved for the peers of Louis-Philippe the same judgement which he accorded to the British lords: praise for their industrial capacities, regret for the stubborn feudal vestiges[41].

In the *Organisateur* and elsewhere, Saint-Simon does not mention the peerage but discusses a body very similar to that envisaged in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* Where he does speak of the peerage specifically, however, the institution is quite different from Cieszkowski's conception. In *De la réorganisation de la société européenne,* Saint-Simon proposes an European peerage to be hereditary and chosen by the king. The only concession to merit is the proviso that twenty peers must be selected among "those men or descendants of those men who, by their works in the sciences, industry, magistrature or administration, have been most useful to European society"[42]. Of course, the inclusion of descendants nullifies the essence of this resolution. Indeed, this scheme is nothing but an adaptation wholesale of the British peerage whose role Saint-Simon sees as one of balancing the general and the particular interests, the king and the commons.

This divergence between Saint-Simon and the author of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* can be attributed to the fluid, and occasionally opportunistic, character of Saint-Simon's writings[43]. It remains true that Cieszkowski and Saint-Simon are at one in their theory of elites. In fact, it should be noted that Cieszkowski is closer to Saint-Simon than to the Saint-Simonians. In *De la Pairie et l'Aristocratie moderne,* at least, he is also closer to Saint-Simon's political and practical works than to his mystical writings, such as the *Nouveau Christianisme,* which constitutes the charter of Saint-Simonianism. In this respect, Cieszkowski is the most faithful disciple of the great theoretician of the industrial system.

Hegel is not mentioned once in the entire *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* Nevertheless, his shadow falls across the work both because Hegel provides some of the fundamental concepts of the book and because the work itself is an implicit critique of Hegel's theory of the state. The demands which Cieszkowski makes of the new peerage in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* are rooted in Hegel's philosophical system, particularly the *Philosophy of Right.* Cieszkowski's new aristocracy is to be an absolutely autonomous body. It owes its existence to a wholly independent and objective principle or law – in this case, merit – and it is sustained by its own internal process – the reproduction of self through co-optation – which renders it immune to all foreign interference and assures its continuity. The modern peerage is to be a substantial power in the state because it embodies neither the arbitrariness of natural hereditary selection nor

the abstractness of a quantitative principle of election, but the rational law of merit as applied in the particularities of a given national substance. Merit is the bond of union within the new aristocracy just as love is the bond of the family[44]. However, merit is a superior bond because it rests on the consciousness of its own members, the peers, and the conscious recognition of the nation. Finally, the new peerage is absolutely universal because it is free of all individualism, all particular interests; it exists uniquely to interpret and defend the general interests of the state, so sorely neglected in this age of individualism.

It would be no exaggeration to say that this Hegelian vision is the foremost inspiration of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* There are further Hegelian echoes in Cieszkowski's repudiation of the principles of checks and balances; in their common impatience with the prejudice that "if birth and wealth give a man office they also give him brains"[45]; in the close relation between the new peerage, the universal class and the bureaucracy. At this point, however, the differences between Hegel and Cieszkowski also spring into prominence. *The Philosophy of Right* designates a certain unofficial class, the civil service, as universal because the sphere of its activities lies exclusively within the field of concrete universality, i.e., in politics. At the same time, Hegel maintains that one of the classes of civil society when given political significance and thus transformed into an estate, acquires something like an universal character. This is the agricultural estate, the landed nobility, on whose behalf Hegel makes wide claims resembling those of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* Hegel writes:

> This class is more particularly fitted for political position and significance in that its capital is independent alike of the state's capital, the uncertainty of business, the quest for profit and any sort of fluctuation in business. It is likewise independent of favour, whether from the executive or the mob. It is even fortified against its own willfulness . . .[46]

Obviously, in Cieszkowski's work the universal element is constituted very differently. Above all, his peerage is universal precisely because it is not a class but the elite of all classes. In this sense, it is not an estate although it occupies a legislative position corresponding to that of an estate. In Cieszkowski, the highest state functionaries can be chosen from the peerage; this is one of its functions as a reservoir of talent. Nevertheless, the peerage remains distinct from and superior to

the bureaucracy, contrary to Hegel's scheme. Moreover, the material independence of Cieszkowski's peerage is guaranteed not by the possession of land but by a system of honoraria, generous in scope and totally inviolable. Finally, the high ethical standards required of the universal element in the state are guaranteed differently: the hereditary peer is, so to speak, appointed at birth and becomes worthy through his upbringing; the modern peer attains worthiness and finds confirmation in his appointment.

In summary, the influence of Tocqueville, Saint-Simon and Hegel is clearly discernible in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* Together they provide the sociological perspective, the theory of the elite, and the concept of the state, which underpin the concrete legislative reforms proposed. Nevertheless, the work in no way mirrors its sources. Indeed, it stands apart in a strikingly consistent manner: it is more liberal, more optimistic, in the final analysis, more modern than any of its sources.

IV

There is only scant documentation on the reception accorded to *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* In a sense, critics could hardly decide whether to treat it as a practical project or a theoretical tract. Cieszkowski's friend, Zygmunt Krasiński, admitted that the "brochure" was well received in Paris "by those who understood it". The point of his comments, however, was that serious people did not like such petty schemes and little concepts, and that Cieszkowski should return to work on his *Our Father*[47]. A German colleague, Agathon Benary, had some warm words about the work in a personal letter. Agreeing wholeheartedly with the notion of supplementing the peerage through outside elements and co-optation, he suggested mildly that the exclusion of fresh youth from the Chamber was a regrettable oversight. At the same time, Benary expressed his surprise that the book had obtained so little publicity[48].

The most important review of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* appeared in *La Phalange* some two years after its publication. As in its review of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation,* this Fourierist organ stressed that even those outside the fold – like Cieszkowski – were coming to realize the complete absence of any rational organization in the existing structure of government[49]. It accused Cieszkowski,

however, of acting "like a mechanic who would judge a machine by assuring himself that it fulfills all the conditions of force and movement"[50]. According to the *Phalange,* this machine would be soon usurped for the benefit of interests less general than those which Cieszkowski intended. The new peerage would not be an academy nor an intellectual nobility, wrote the *Phalange* – exaggerating Cieszkowski's intellectual bias – but another instrument of the industrial feudalism which characterized the present phase of civilization. Cieszkowski's error lay in the "generous illusion" that in a society of antagonistic interests one could overcome the monopoly of social power by a given class; in other words, that Cieszkowski failed to recognize the class struggle[51].

De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne received more sympathetic consideration from the Berlin *Philosophische Gesellschaft.* Michelet commented on:

> ... the beauty of Cieszkowski's arguments which make the given material accord with the highest principles of reason and thus so broaden the object that the proposals constitute the very basis of a legislation worthy of the future[52].

In contrast to the French critic who chided Cieszkowski for his impracticality, Michelet complained that the arguments of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* were so concrete that they lost their generality. On the other hand, he declared himself enchanted and convinced by the dialectical reasoning which Cieszkowski employed to defend the principle of co-optation. Obviously, the *Phalange* had either not noticed or not understood these subtle Hegelianisms. In a final and important aspect, however, both Michelet and *Phalange* were in agreement; Cieszkowski had gravely exaggerated the disinterested nature, the universality, of his reconstituted Upper House. Indeed, Michelet pointed out that if the public spirit were as strong as Cieszkowski made it out to be, there would be no need for a constitution and hence for the elaborate – though ineffective – guarantees with which he surrounded the new House of Peers[53]. After all, if the new peerage was worthy of its vocation these guarantees were unnecessary; if not, no constitutional guarantees could make it rise to its true function.

In perspective, one can direct two principal points of critique at *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne.* The first is the objection raised by Cieszkowski's contemporaries: it is illusory to expect that true merit will necessarily find universal recognition and that a body of the

meritorious will develop no interests of its own. Above all, Cieszkowski's peers are not Platonic philosopher-kings. They are peers not because they have acquired true knowledge, but because they have risen to the top of their particular craft. Herein lies the second objection: the peers have skills in the most varied fields. None of them are skilled in politics. In other words, Cieszkowski assumes that specialized talents are transferable into a political capacity, implicitly denying the autonomy of a political science. One is thus led to wonder whether the contribution of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, this pre-eminently political work, is not simply an elaborate system of prizes for diversely deserving individuals. As in the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* where politics vanish in eschatology, so in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* politics disappear in a mystique of merit.

PART III

POLAND AND MESSIANISM

CHAPTER IX

EXILE AND THE MESSIANIC OPTION

I

As one tries to follow Cieszkowski in his travels at the turn of the 1840's, one finds him shuttling restlessly across Europe. Paris, Berlin, Warsaw are all equally home to him as, for varying periods, are Baden, Aix or Rome. In part, this instability can be explained by the devouring curiosity which finds its reflection in the multitude of observations and names recorded in the *Diaries*. To some extent, this mobility corresponds to the conventions of fashionable aristocratic life in the period. Above all, this rootlessness expresses a deep political dilemma: Cieszkowski seems to be wavering between the liberty in exile which Polish intellectual leaders had chosen after the ill-fated insurrection of 1830 and submission to an arbitrary and oppressive régime in his native land. Torn between these two alternatives, Cieszkowski attempted a sort of semi-emigration, a voluntary and partial exile from Poland, and adopted a peculiar relation to the dominant emigré ideology of Messianism. It was this peculiar relation which was to dominate the *Our Father* discussed in the concluding chapter. Here, I wish to study the exile milieu in which Messianism was born and the principal proponents of Messianism whose doctrines Cieszkowski did not espouse but whose influence is evident in his work.

The failure of the insurrection launched in November 1830 against Russian rule in the Congress kingdom of Poland and parts of Lithuania drove elements of the defeated army and insurrectionary government westward. Between 1831 and 1836 some eight to ten thousand Poles crossed Germany under the shadow of official disapproval and the accolades of romantics and liberals to seek refuge in France[1]. Thus, the cultural and political elite of the nation, accompanied by an officer corps originating primarily in the minor nobility, found itself abroad in the relatively free air of Louis-Philippe's France.

Liberals, democrats, republicans as well as legitimist Catholics and Bonapartists all acclaimed the refugees warmly. Ballanche, Montalembert, Lamennais, Tocqueville and Lafayette spared no praise or efforts

on behalf of the Poles. Each group saw in the Polish cause an incarnation of its own strivings; for some, this was the struggle against autocracy; for others, the defense of Catholicism against schismatics. Lamennais' liberal Catholic *L'Avenir* formulated only some of the contradictions of pro-Polish sympathy when it wrote:

> We admire Poland, Ireland and Belgium not because they are revolutionary but because they fight the real inciters of revolution, who if they were to triumph would bring about the downfall of the whole worldly order, and sink nations into atheism... God fulfills his work and peoples are his ministers[2].

It was through the strength of such diverse support that a French government, reluctant to encourage foreign revolutionaries on its own soil, was nevertheless obliged to grant regular allowances and the right of permanent asylum to its Polish guests.

In keeping with a seemingly universal emigré tendency towards divisiveness and factionalism, the Poles immediately split into two camps. The right wing led by Prince Adam Czartoryski offered an element of continuity with the past. Thus, it invoked the principles of the liberal constitution of 3rd May 1791 and, although Czartoryski moved towards acceptance of the need for transfer of property rights to the peasants, both the actual support and the ideological underpinnings of his party lay in the class of gentry or minor nobility known as the *szlachta*. The original left wing consisted of Joachim Lelewel's National Committee whose intimate links with the *Carbonari* were formalized in 1834 through the creation of "Young Poland". Beyond its commitment to the cause of international republican and liberal conspiracies, the ideology of the movement was ill-defined. The Lelewelites accepted their founder's interpretation of Polish history with his stress on the commune and the predominant role of the *szlachta*[3]. Consequently, their espousal of the principle of land redistribution was tempered by their deference to the need for aristocratic leadership in the coming revolution. It is little wonder that torn between the ideal of aristocratic revolutionism and radical social reform, the Lelewelites were never able to define their position adequately. In this respect, Lelewel – as much as Czartoryski – was heir to the contradictions and vacillations of the November insurrection.

It was not, however, the ideological hesitations of the National Committee which led to its demise. There is evidence that Lelewel himself steadily moved towards a consistently radical position on the peasant question, which would have provided a viable alternative to

Czartoryski's timid meliorism. The downfall of the National Committee was sealed by the failure of several Carbonari inspired revolts; hastily planned and clumsily executed, they only provoked repression and brought discredit to their instigators. Thus, the left-wing of the emigration was gradually taken over by the Polish Democratic Society which echoed the French utopian socialists in its emphasis on the rights of labour and the priority of social struggle over political issues, scorning all compromise with the aristocratic past and all attempts at suppressing the struggle between lord and peasant in the interests of "national unity"[4]. Clearly, this evolution estranged the two wings of the Polish emigration even more from each other.

It is the desperately bitter realities of exile which explain the extreme nature of all emigré programmes. The recovery of independence through insurrection was an unquestioned tenet of faith to all political groupings. Czartoryski advocated a highly organized revolt, launched in favourable international conditions – most probably involving Russia in war with one of the great powers. The Democratic Society placed its hopes in the formation of a mass popular army and national guard, preceded perhaps by a partisan struggle, all under the dictatorship of a central committee with dictatorial powers which would prepare the uprising through conspiratorial action. Whatever the divergences of strategy and goals, both the Right and the Left saw the accomplishment of their objectives in terms of bloody and violent struggle.

By the end of the 1830's, various attempts at insurrection had proven abortive and the enthusiasm of foreign sympathisers had waned. The political parties continued their agitation and rivalries, but their intrigues seemed petty in the face of the growing spectre of permanent exile. Amid the polarization of the camps, symptoms of withdrawal from politics as such began to appear. A deep depression, a loss of momentum and hope, crept over the most creative elements of the emigration even as they were giving birth to great literary works. This initially inchoate prejudice that "people with feeling and imagination should not soil themselves by contact with the parties"[5] transformed itself into a religious revival of a particular sort. Since the Papacy had condemned the November insurrection and urged an unquestioned acceptance of the *status quo*, this renewed religiosity refused to be directed into traditional Catholic channels[6]. Instead it assumed the form of a new mysticism which was to leave a permanent mark on the Polish national consciousness as a whole.

This new religiosity found accommodation in the mental structures of Polish Messianism. Indeed, the religious revival of the late 1830's brought Messianism to its culmination and – through the inflation of both claims and expectations – prepared its decline. During the period in which Cieszkowski was in direct contact with the Polish emigration, however, Messianism was its dominant ideology, affecting even the political parties against which it was reacting. Thus, even though Cieszkowski's, *Our Father* could be seen as an alternative rather than a contribution to this ideology, the problem of Messianism looms so large in his thought as to warrant an examination of the concept and its expression in Polish thought.

II

Broadly speaking, there are two possible approaches to the Messianic phenomenon: it can be interpreted as an universal tendency defined by the "expectation of universal regeneration"[7]. In this sense, J. L. Talmon is able to subsume the majority of romantic, utopian, socialist and nationalist ideologies between 1815 and 1848 under a single Messianic label. Clearly, such an approach provides a linkage system for the most diverse ideological expressions. In doing so, however, it reduces them to their lowest common denominator and ultimately deprives the concept of Messianism of any independent explanatory value. To say that an entire era is Messianic is to say little about either Messianism or the epoch. The alternative approach insists on the specificity of Messianism. Thus, the late Polish scholar Jøzef Ujejski analyzes so-called Messianic ideologies in terms of their adherence to the original Judaic paradigm. Here, Messianism refers to an eschatological vision in which a time of trials imposed by foreign nations as punishment for a selected but sinful people is to be overcome by a Messiah, a divine agent both revealer and executor of God's will, whose work is to restore the chosen people to its true position of leadership and hence inaugurate a time of universal peace and prosperity[8].

Recently, Walicki has continued this effort to apply a strict meaning to Messianism. He has stressed the religious, though usually heterodox, derivation of the term and has consequently refused to characterize a whole range of secular utopian creeds as Messianic[9]. Furthermore, he has rigorously separated millenerianism from Messianism. The

former refers to "a salvation which is collective, earthly, near, total and supernaturally aided"[10]. Drawing on Shepperson, Walicki distinguishes between pre-millenarianism where the coming of the paraclete inaugurates a thousand-year kingdom of God, and post-millenarianism where a lengthy evolutionary process working through traditional religions leads up to the kingdom of God[11]. In contrast, Messianism refers to the notion of an intermediary – individual, nation, or class – who opens the road to salvation. There exists a possible but not necessary correlation between Messianism and millenarianism. Walicki points out, for example, that traditional Christianity is Messianic but not millenial. Finally, both Messianism and millenarianism may cover a whole range of ideological positions; they can be revolutionary, evolutionary, or counter-revolutionary.

These clarifications are a particularly welcome antidote to the vagueness with which Polish Messianism has been traditionally discussed. One early observer defines it simply as patriotic mysticism and equates it wholly with Russian Slavophilism[12]. Another defines it as "the consciousness of a close link between theory and practice which makes a universal mission out of patriotic longing and gives patriotism a religious character"[13]. In this view, Messianism is not an expression of romanticism but its sublimation since it "organically joins the cult of the individual with the duty of social responsibility"[14]. Other interpretations point to similar traits – religiosity, spiritualization, transformation, regeneration – with occasional eccentric variations[15].

Walicki convincingly argues that such a loose construction inevitably leads to the indiscriminate assimilation of an entire generation of Polish thinkers as "Messianists", thus expressing in the Polish context the charge made here against Talmon in regard to European Messianism as a whole. However, the criterion which Walicki offers to distinguish Messianic from non-Messianic romanticism is disappointing: Polish romantics inspired by French thought were Messianists; the others, primarily German-influenced, were not[16]. Apart from the problems inherent to this sort of genetic approach in philosophy, the distinction simply does not hold. First, one can trace a Messianic undercurrent of significant proportions in German idealism[17]. Second, a case can be made on behalf of an independent tradition of Polish Messianism before the confrontation with France in the 1830's[18]. Third, one cannot possibly fit a whole range of heterogeneous thinkers – above all, August Cieszkowski with his very diverse intellectual debts – into so simplistic a scheme[19].

Consequently, one cannot assume an exclusive relationship between Polish Messianism and illuminist, Napoleonic or other French intellectual currents. Nevertheless, it can be agreed that the circumstances of a traumatic exile which brought the Poles into immediate contact with French thought favoured a pre-existing Messianic tendency which was to reach its culmination on French soil[20]. One can even argue that certain French circles consciously encouraged this tendency. Thus, *L'Avenir* wrote of the insurrection:

> This blood flows for France. It flows for Christ and for liberty. Poland all alone has risen; she has conquered all alone. God has proven to her that contrary to all hope she has a divine mission[21].

The Poles responded to such prompting with mixed feelings. Affirming the autonomy of Poland's mission, Mickiewicz wrote to Lelewel in 1832 that their strivings should be of a religious-moral character precisely to distinguish themselves from the liberalism of France[22]. However, it soon became clear that Polish Messianism needed no outside prompting. Even before reaching Paris, Mickiewicz had drafted the *Books of the Polish Nation and of the Polish Pilgrims*, a Messianic credo whose principles were to penetrate the national consciousness and whose justification of exile was the comfort of those who left their native land and the remorse of those who remained:

> He who stays in his fatherland and endures servitude in order to preserve his life loses both his fatherland and his life. But he who leaves his fatherland to defend liberty at the risk of his life saves his life and lives eternally. The Pole tells nations: *ubi male, ibi patria*[23].

It is not unduly speculative to suggest that such thoughts haunted Cieszkowski as they did other Polish intellectuals. Inasmuch as his frequent sojourns in Paris coincided with a period of intense political rivalry between the Democratic Society and the camp of Czartoryski as well as with the period of Messianism's transformation from a creed into an active pseudo-religious movement, it is surprising to find Cieszkowski both in contact with and yet ambiguously aloof from the emigration. The *Diaries* record visits to Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert[24]. The Polish Library in Paris – considered by the left-wing as a bastion of the aristocratic camp – counts Cieszkowski among its founders[25]. Nevertheless, there is not the least trace of any political commitment to the Hôtel Lambert on his part. On the other hand, his failure to enter into contact with Lelewel in Brussels should probably be

explained by the latter's anchoretic habits and deep suspicion of wealthy would-be patrons[26]. Certainly, Cieszkowski's French acquaintances included individuals allied with or close to Lelewel, such as Leroux, Quinet and certain Fourierists. Finally, Cieszkowski's silence regarding the Messianic movement of the early 1840's cannot be attributed to indifference. Not only did he keep closely informed of the movement's theses and politics, largely through his correspondence with Krasiński, but in the same period he produced the answer to Messianism which was to be the first volume of the *Our Father.*

Thus, it is at least a useful hypothesis that Cieszkowski's aloofness from the emigration indicated not disinterest but uncertainty. It may have well been a double uncertainty: the indecision among emigré alternatives was compounded by a wavering between home and exile, resulting in the sort of ambiguous situation which I have called a semi-emigration. However, although Cieszkowski eschewed factions he was close to several emigré figures who were at the centre of the emigration's controversies. It was through them – especially Hoëne-Wroński, Mickiewicz and Krasiński – that Messianic ideas filtered through to his own work. Here, I propose to discuss these three individuals both for the light they shed on the character of the Messianic ideology and for their influence on Cieszkowski as he floated loosely between Paris and Poland.

III

A look at the work of Joseph-Marie Hoëné-Wroński (1776–1852) clarifies much of the confusion surrounding both Polish Messianism and Cieszkowski's relation to Messianism[27]. First, it reveals that the original Polish thinker to employ the term understood Messianism in a distinctly universalist sense which set him at odds with later interpretations. Second, it explains how Cieszkowski could absorb obviously Messianic elements without succumbing to their religious, nationalist or partisan implications.

Hoëné-Wroński's biography presents an interesting parallel to his contemporary, Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon. Both forsook adventurous and promising military careers for the sake of the pursuit of truth. After an initial absorption in the sciences – for Hoëné-Wroński, mathematics; for Saint-Simon, physics – they turned to the study of

history and society. Here, their principal concern became the overcoming of the general social and philosophical anarchy of their age through the formulation of absolute principles of social and moral reorganization. Eventually, their doctrines acquired a religious colouring which culminated in total systems of both scientific and redemptive pretensions[28]. In spite of such superficial biographical similarities and an underlying identity of purpose – explicable by both psychological traits and the *Zeitgeist* of Napoleonic and Restoration France – the actual formulation of their doctrine is quite dissimilar. Hoëné-Wroński's work can only be understood as a French critique of German philosophy whose language and concerns it borrows. Indeed, Hoëné-Wroński's first work, published soon after his emigration to France in 1800, was also the first French study of Kant[29]. Here, Hoëné-Wroński mixed his admiration for Kant's affirmation of man's moral autonomy and active cognition with impatience at the supposed limits of human reason. Like so many of Kant's successors, Hoëné-Wroński set out to break through phenomenal boundaries in order to capture the Absolute.

Taking the separation of being and knowledge as his point of departure, Hoëné-Wroński seeks a single principle which could explain their actual integration in God or absolute reason and their potential integration in man. He finds such a principle in the law of creation wherein God is seen as a creator creating other creators and man is defined in terms of his creative capacity expressed in man's ability to choose and realize aims increasingly congruent with those of divine or absolute reason. Thus, Hoëné-Wroński's creationism is a philosophy of history tracing man's advance through physical, cultural, religious and intellectual goals. It culminates in a self-accomplished and merited immortality when man discovers by his own means that the Word or "creative virtuality" – which is the principle of man's independence – and the Absolute or determinate rationality–which is man's dependence on God's plans – are ultimately identical[30].

Hoëné-Wroński's philosophy thus presents the reconciliation between the divine and the human will towards which history is tending. As such, it shares the spirit of several German systems with which Hoëné-Wroński takes issue. He is quite mild in regard to Fichte: "this great genius who clearly recognized the supremacy of the absolute and believed he had recognized the absolute itself in our intimate subjectivity"[31]. If Fichte provided a first model or prototype for the absolute

philosophy, it was left to Schelling to discover its premises by intuiting the identity of the principle of creation and the absolute. Nevertheless, Schelling did not pursue his intuition and thus failed to discover the law of creation. In spite of this and other differences – Hoëné-Wroński's rationalism, his dismissal of evil – it is through Schelling rather than Fichte or Kant that Hoëné-Wroński can be best understood[32]. On the other hand, Hegel is condemned roundly as not grasping the true identity of Being and Knowledge. The whole Hegelian system, evolving through the unnecessarily devious path of contradiction, destroys the truth of Being in favour of the existing level of rationality. Inasmuch as the existing level of knowledge is not absolute knowledge, Hegel surrenders to the falsehood of partial truth. He does not look outside man's actual level of spiritual development and thus fails to see that man's destiny is to continue recreating himself as he rises towards the intimate essence of the Absolute to be attained.

Politically, Hoëné-Wroński's position is difficult to characterize. Like many of his contemporaries he bemoans the sharp division of society into warring camps. The present is an era of social antinomies where the party of reason and the party of faith, the reds and the blacks, both manipulated by "infernal bands of egoists" clash in ignorance of their true destinies. Hegel and others have but contributed to this sterile combat by negating Being totally in favour of Knowledge and thus siding unilaterally with the party of reason and liberty against that of divine order. Generally speaking, Hoëné-Wroński does not expect a reconciliation immediately. The present period is the fifth epoch of humanity to be followed by two more: the eras of the search for truth and virtue at the end of which absolute truth and virtue will be one. That will be the age of the Holy Ghost when men are truly divine and the books of revelation will read like mathematics[33].

Hoëné-Wroński increasingly came to see his task as that of announcing and advancing the future era. In 1818 he abandoned the earlier name for his doctrine, Schelianism, from the Hebrew word for reason, and renamed it Messianism. It appears that the renaming did not indicate a change in ideas but simply stressed the need of spreading and applying these same ideas. Soon this re-emphasis found expression in the Messianic Union, a synthesis of church and state, whose only past examples had been the Jesuits and the Freemasons, and whose creation is the absolute condition for transition into the future[34]. If

the notion of Messianism came late the notion of a national Messianism did not appear until even later. Originally, Hoëné-Wroński had considered nationalism destructive and divisive. By 1827, however, he had come about to seeing a Providential plan in mankind's national fragmentation and began assigning tasks and characteristics to various nationalities. It is thus that he discovered the Slavs[35]. Only they could unite the practical energy of the French and the mental strength of the Germans; only they could melt church and state into one; only they, in their innocence, could lead the way towards truth and virtue. With perfect logic but with no regard for the sensibilities of his former compatriots he assigned the leading role among the Slavs to the greatest Slavonic nation, the Russians, and called upon the Poles to desist from anything which would weaken or displease the tsar. It was not until 1848 that Hoëné-Wroński acknowledged that a process of decay seemed to have set in among the Muscovites and the mantle of Slavonic leadership should perhaps pass to the Poles[36].

It is somewhat pathetic to learn that Hoëné-Wroński's heralded Messianic Union never grew beyond occupying a corner of its founder's apartment. Moreover, the founder himself was so irrascible, even paranoic, as to quarrel with virtually anyone disposed to grant him a hearing. Thus, he found himself ostracized by official academic circles, shunned by the Poles as a Russian spy and ignored by the multitude of illuminist or socialist movements which swarmed about Paris, few of which were founded on principles less fantastic than his own. Yet it is this strange philosopher who first alighted upon the Messianic concept. True, Polish Messianism was to mean something quite different from what Hoëné-Wroński had intended. The Polish element itself which was to become so dominant among the émigrés of the 1830's and 1840's always remained subdued in his writings. In fact, one can ask whether a person who chose voluntary exile at twenty-five and wrote virtually exclusively in French should be considered Polish at all. Nevertheless, it was his inspiration – much modified and abused – which was to provide the point of departure for a national ideology.

It is in the light of the relationship between Hoëné-Wroński and Cieszkowski that one can understand the latter's ingrained suspicion of the émigré Messianists who exalted Poland in mystical terms. Cieszkowski had read Hoëné-Wroński extensively while preparing the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.* Indeed, the notion of the creative deed as the passage to the future can easily be linked to the historiosophical

law of creation as expounded by Hoëné-Wroński. In France, Cieszkowski recorded conversations with the aging father of Messianism and many years later he sought to interest Polish academics in Hoëné-Wroński's mathematical work[37]. Whatever other doctrinal or historical connections could be made, I would suggest that Hoëné-Wroński stamped his own universalist brand of Messianism on Cieszkowski. Since he did not convert Cieszkowski fully, the result of Hoëné-Wroński's influence was a muted and abstract sort of doctrine found in the *Our Father* which clung desperately to rationalist postulates and appeared rather embarrassed by the prevalent nationalist and religious frenzy to which it sought to offer an alternative.

IV

If Hoëné-Wroński is the unrecognized and unfollowed founder of Polish Messianism, Mickiewicz is its most celebrated exponent. In apparent acknowledgement of this fact, Cieszkowski introduces the *Our Father* with a critique of the principles underlying Mickiewicz's world view[38]. Nevertheless, as one probes into Mickiewicz's thought it becomes clear that he himself was not consistent in his Messianism. Indeed, it has been suggested that Mickiewicz's involvement with the Messianic vision was a passing phase, even during which he entertained reservations qualifying, and eventually undermining, his commitment to the vision[39]. The classic explanation is that Mickiewicz was infatuated or spell-bound by a mystical seer, Andrzej Towiański, whose hold on his eminent disciple eventually lapsed[40]. Whatever the case, it may be legitimately asked whether Cieszkowski's critique of Mickiewicz was in fact a critique of Towiański, whether it developed Mickiewicz's own doubts, or whether it represented a fundamental divergence between the Polish poet and the author of the *Our Father.* A full answer would require a reconstruction of Mickiewicz's innumerable, often journalistic, writings as well as his activities – academic, conspiratorial, political, even military – in the period of his exile from 1830 to 1855[41]. Here, it may suffice to refer to two works which together constitute a statement of Mickiewicz's Messianism in its different phases: *The Books of the Polish Nation and of the Polish Pilgrims* and the *Lectures on Slavonic Literature.*

The tragedy of 1830, possibly heightened by guilt at his own passivity during the crisis, transformed Mickiewicz from an acclaimed

romantic poet into a national priest and prophet. Among the first results of this deepened consciousness of national mission were the *Books of the Polish Nation and of the Polish Pilgrimage*, written in either Paris or Dresden and published in 1832[42]. Here, Mickiewicz mixed anguish and hope with thundering invocations of judgement. In rhythmic, deliberately Biblical language he presented an old testament: the history of man's fall from grace and the trials of the suffering Polish nation preyed upon by the forces of iniquity. Then, he established the gospels: a call upon the Polish pilgrims to act according to their mission and a promise of ultimate vindication.

The *Books of the Polish Nation* are the historiosophy of a world turned upside down. In the beginning, there was liberty and faith in one God. Then, kings and emperors declared themselves to be gods and erected false idols until Christ came, was killed and resurrected planting his cross on the earth, expelling the royal usurpers and making all men brothers. Justice prevailed for a time but once again the kings conspired to raise the Moloch of honour, commerce, political influence, prosperity and balance of power. Only one nation failed to worship these monsters and remained faithful to God, attached to liberty and governed by brotherhood. The corrupt monarchs, in the name of the idol of self-interest, murdered this nation and buried it saying "we have killed and buried liberty"[43]. They were wrong, however, for their crime ended their power: the body of the just nation died but its soul passed into the life of peoples suffering captivity, and on the third day the soul will return into the body and the peoples of Europe will be liberated from their oppression. Two days have passed – the second ended at the fall of Warsaw in 1831 – and the third day is dawning: Poland will be resurrected and all wars in Christendom will end.

At this point, the *Books of the Polish Nation* end and the *Books of the Polish Pilgrimage* begin. The pilgrims are the soul of the Polish nation and they are the heirs of liberty not because they are powerful or enlightened but because they love liberty most and have suffered most for it. The Poles have nothing to learn from other nations; indeed, other nations must learn from them. The struggles between aristocracy and democracy need not concern the Poles for the kingdom which they are preparing is that of a new order. The mission of the Polish pilgrims is to purify themselves, unite their forces and regain their homeland through their merit. The work ends with a prayer

which begins as a humble plea for divine help and ends with an exhortation:

> We pray to you, O Lord, for a universal war for the liberty of peoples,
> We pray to you, O Lord, for arms and national eagles,
> We pray to you, O Lord, for a happy death on the field of battle,
> We pray to you, O Lord, for a grave for our bones in our land,
> We pray to you, O Lord, for the independence, integrity and liberty of our fatherland,
> In the name of the Father, and the Son and the Holy Ghost – Amen[44].

Such are the tone and message of Mickiewicz's first explicit formulation of Messianism. The mystically religious style of this short treatise did nothing to diminish its strength or its popularity; indeed, the appeal of the *Books of the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage* extended beyond its immediate readership, influencing also the best-known work of Mickiewicz's friend, Lamennais, in *Paroles d'un Croyant*[45]. Moreover, behind the pathos of the *Books* one can discern certain constant themes in Mickiewicz's political and philosophical views: his critique of the West corrupted by materialism and rationalism; his recognition of the need for an united and probably violent struggle on the part of the emigration; his idealization of the former 'Republic of Nobles' coupled with the acknowledgement that the future Poland could not revert to its former form.

This first Messianic outburst had no immediate sequel. In the 1830's Mickiewicz wrote his great novel in verse, *Pan Tadeusz*, among whose harmonious and bittersweet scenes one finds nostalgia for a vanished way of life in Poland but no echo of Messianism. In 1840, calmly almost academically, he began a four year series of lectures at the *Collège de France* on the history of Slavonic literature from the earliest times. Yet it was in the course of these lectures that Mickiewicz returned to the problem of Messianism. In obvious inner turmoil he declared:

> All Slavonic nations in general are now in solemn expectation. All are awaiting the universal idea, the new idea. What will be this new idea? ... The aged West is also in expectation. All philosophers say that we are in an epoch of transformation. According

to some this will be an era of reconstruction, according to other writers it will be an era of rebirth. All, however, believe in some palingenesis, in some transformation. The present era appears to your poets (i.e., the French – AL) as a twilight. The question is what will tomorrow be like. Will it be the dawn of a new world, or the sunset of a world which is ending? Perhaps the idea which the West seeks to put out, and which the Slavs also expect will be an idea common to all peoples[46].

Evidently, Mickiewicz has no clear notion of the new idea. He has shed his confidence in Poland's imminent and exclusive mission as laid down in the *Books of the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage* without finding a substitute. In his confusion he abandons his own search for the key to the future and seeks someone who will reveal the secret to him:

It sometimes happens that when science strives for some important discovery, when all feel a change in opinions regarding nature or humanity, an unknown person appears, unfamiliar with science, working outside the circuit of academies and scientific societies, and this person overtakes the progress of science[47].

Columbus and Copernicus had been such persons and some three months earlier Mickiewicz had discovered a moral Copernicus in the person of Andrzej Towiański. The Messianism of the later parts of the *Lectures on Slavonic Literature* is the reflection of Towiański's impact on the poet.

Towiański's hold on his disciples was personal and not dogmatic. He was a charismatic, even magnetic personality comparable perhaps to Enfantin. Indeed, his enemies themselves provided testimony of his almost supernatural powers, moving Krasiński to write: "Truly, what is the magnetic strength of this Lithuanian noble which causes an extraordinary flow to pour over one as one receives his glance or shakes his hand"[48]. Certainly, no rationalist explanation can account for the immediate success of the "Master" as he was to be called by his followers. Towiański came to Paris from the most total obscurity, possessing some familiarity with mystical and illuminist philosophy and an unexceptional background as a lawyer and landlord in the remote Lithuanian provinces. Yet he managed to convert mature and brilliant intellectuals to his service and his "Cause".

The Cause itself remained misunderstood in spite of its overwhelming simplicity. Towiański introduced himself to the Polish émigré colony as an unlettered man who brought no new truths but whom God had appointed to announce the imminent realization of a long-awaited promise: the Divine Will had taken pity on long-suffering

mankind and the inauguration of the Kingdom of God was at hand[49]. Towiański's mission, the "Cause", was to prepare and hasten the coming of the new era through a reform of men's hearts which would kindle the light of the spirit within individuals, making them receptive to the grace which was to flow over them.

Underlying this revelation, however, is a highly developed metaphysics resting principally on the notion of metempsychosis. According to Towiański, man is the point of juncture of a material and a spiritual world. In the latter, wandering spirits – both good and evil – struggle chaotically to realize their disparate aims through successive generations of humanity. Christ introduced a momentary harmony between men and the higher spirits. Now, mankind is awaiting a "second jubilee of mercy and the fire lighted by Christ two thousand years ago will become a star. . ."[50]. In spite of its aggressively religious character Towiański's doctrine of metempsychosis is actually a secularization of Christianity. The doctrine entails a philosophy of history which excludes the possibility of eternal damnation, minimizes the role of Providence, and affirms man's ultimate aim as an ascent towards self-perfection. Its historical rather than theological character becomes even more apparent in Towiański's designation of individuals – for example, Napoleon – and nations – the Poles and the French – as Messianic agents. As in other contemporary eschatologies, even though regeneration is God's plan, it is man's accomplishment.

Nevertheless, in Towiański's own understanding his message was not a battle-cry nor his Cause a political party. In talking of action, he meant internal reform within each individual, self-purification and prayer. Although he spoke of his revelation in absolute terms, he prophesized that five great men were still to come before all mankind achieved its end. In spite of his belief that the passage from personal to collective Messiahs was a true progress, he stressed that only individuals can really enter into contact with God, i.e., perfect themselves. Finally, the "Master's" notions of "imminence" or "the present" were extremely broad; ultimately, they had little relation to the common understanding of temporal categories[51].

To Towiański's followers these nuances or ambiguities were simply contradictions. Many émigrés were willing to accept Towiański's critique of the *szlachta* as the cause of Poland's downfall; indeed, this was an established tenet of the Democratic party. Some disciples were even prepared to renounce armed struggle and seek reconciliation with or

even submission to Russia as Towiański urged, thus exposing themselves to accusations of being tsarist agents. They complied, however, in the expectation of instant gratification; indeed, many disciples sold whatever property they had in the certitude that their return to Poland would not be delayed[52]. The disappointment of their hopes broke Towiański's hold and led his disciples to abandon angrily the suddenly unpalatable and little understood doctrines.

Mickiewicz too broke with the "Master" in what might be called a fit of impatience. The thirst for immediate activity – violent and bloody if necessary – was a psychological imperative which triumphed over the passive preparation of some final but distant and perhaps intangible goal. In short, his encounter with Towiański was only an episode but one which found expression in the *Lectures on Slavonic Literature.* Although Mickiewicz's consciousness of national mission asserted itself over Towiański's universalism, here his national Messianism was broadened to include a leading role for France. Moreover, instead of apotheosizing the history of Poland as in the *Books of the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage*, the principal merit of the Poles was to be their total historical virginity[53]. Above all, however, the abandonment of Messianic national exclusiveness was a process of spiritualization. In the *Lectures*, the redeemer was no longer only Poland or France. The spirit – a concept understood only intuitively – was the Messiah.

Cieszkowski's relation to Mickiewicz in the period of the *Lectures* is not immediately apparent. One can assume that Cieszkowski would have shed his youthful adulation of the great romantic bard, particularly after his prolonged exposure to the anti-romanticism of the Berlin Hegelians. Certainly, Cieszkowski could not have subscribed to Mickiewicz's bitter denunciation of Hegel and, indeed, all philosophy[54]. In fact, one suspects that Cieszkowski was rather embarrassed by the praise of *Gott und Palingenesie* proclaimed in the *Lectures on Slavonic Literature*[55]. The poet praised the young philosopher's intuitionism, his notion of creative activity, his religiosity, without apparently realizing that these characteristics were grounded in precisely the sort of rationalism which he abhorred. Cieszkowski's intuitionism and his acknowledged element of mysticism were an extension of the Hegelian Idea; spirit stood above reason only because it had laboriously absorbed reason. For Mickiewicz, mysticism and intuition were exclusive, inexplicable and sovereign terms.

These differences were apparently no obstacle to a personal friendship and mutual respect. Cieszkowski was a welcome visitor in Mickiewicz's home and if Mickiewicz failed to understand his guest's works, he offered interesting insights into Cieszkowski's character[56]. On the one hand, he criticized Cieszkowski for his lack of faith and the "feminine spirit" which would prevent him from ever doing anything. In other words, he accused Cieszkowski of a paralysis of the deed caused by a tendency to reason rather than believe[57]. On the other hand, he recognized Cieszkowski's particular position among the hated rationalists:

> He (i.e., Cieszkowski – AL) is a person out of the ordinary. Through the work of his intelligence he has come to see the stupidity of all contemporary intelligence. He does not have the pride common to philosophers; at least he comes with a great amount of good faith. I doubt whether he is in the Cause but he can be useful to it in his own way. He can kill Germans and the Posen mind. He is like the man who during our last war came to the army and said: 'You fight and I shall write a proclamation but such a one... that it will defeat the whole army'[58].

This is a strange and remarkably accurate judgement of Cieszkowski. Nevertheless, it does not explain Cieszkowski's relation to Towiański and the Cause. There is no evidence that the author of the *Our Father* ever met the "Master" though it is likely that Mickiewicz would have tried to convert him. The character of the Cause – its anti-rationalism, anti-clericalism, servility to an individual, and eccentric mysticism – must have repelled Cieszkowski. Indeed, his repulsion was such as to compel him to formulate long dormant thoughts and add new arguments to a work oriented about many of the questions which Towiański was raising. The *Our Father* was written, at least in part, to provide an alternative revelation to that of Towiański and a cause other than the "Cause". It was written to convince people like Mickiewicz. It may well have been written to convince the author himself.

V

Zygmunt Krasiński (1812–1859) deserves attention in his own right as a great Polish romantic poet. Here he is of additional importance as Cieszkowski's closest friend, critic and counsel. The intimacy of their relationship expressed itself in concrete forms: Krasiński was the first

reader of that part of the *Our Father* manuscript published in 1848 and perhaps of other fragments as well. Moreover, Krasiński's correspondence provided a prism through which Cieszkowski saw the Polish emigration and particularly Towiański. Far from exercising these roles passively, Krasiński sought to influence Cieszkowski in the direction of romantic conservatism and towards a pessimistic variant of Messianism. In doing so he forced Cieszkowski to consider the possibility of history as tragedy and, to the extent that Krasiński succeeded, he pointed to a number of questions which the author of the *Our Father* was trying to leave unanswered.

The sources of Krasiński's thought are numerous but consistent. Critics have pointed to an echo of Schelling in Krasiński's awareness of the pervasive presence of evil and his equation of existence itself with suffering[59]. The notion of palingenesis – which appears in Krasiński as a slightly wistful alternative to apocalypse – is derived from Ballanche[60]. Finally, Krasiński's attitude to revolution, past and future, combines horror and regret with acceptance of its inevitability in much the manner of a de Maistre or Chateaubriand[61].

Krasiński's social thought is most fully expressed in the *Undivine Comedy* (1833), a vision of general, almost cosmic, struggle between the old and the new order, between aristocrats and democrats[62]. In the coming revolutionary conflagration victory must fall to the nihilistic masses but perhaps somehow the principles of the old Christian order will ultimately be vindicated. In his later works, *Iridion* (1836) and particularly the *Dawn* (1843), Krasiński strikes a stronger note of hope, inspired by Hegel and Cieszkowski[63]: the imminent annihilation of all that is good and true cannot be but a step in Providence's infinitely wise ways. Transposed to the national plane, this expresses itself in familiar Messianic conceptions of Poland's martyrdom and eventual reward. Curiously, however, even as his works evolved towards acceptance of the course of history Krasiński grew ever more fearful of the "infernal gangs"[64] and "pharisees of the future" who multiplied before his eyes[65]. As 1848 approached, his prophetic inveighings were turning into paroxysms of rage and despair. Thus, his letters scream:

> All that is happening is apocalyptic. Everything is falling through. It is as if all old forms were disintegrating into dust. But before August's harmony is reached, if it is necessary to pass through the rule of Mickiewicz and company, *abominatio desolationis*...[66].

To Cieszkowski himself he wrote:

I see and I foresee: in the name of absolute equality the world is marching towards slavery, in the name of fraternity among nations we have the most awful struggles of Slavs and Germans – in the name of freedom, extermination...[67].

These violent remarks belong to a later period when a rift had already developed about Cieszkowski's political activity. In the present context, one must point to the intense intellectual communion which characterized the relations between Cieszkowski and Krasiński as they drifted about Europe throughout the 1840's. In addition to their agreement on philosophical and theological matters, they shared a mutual sympathy and understanding of each other's vacillations. In his first letters to Cieszkowski, Krasiński defends his friend from malicious charges:

I have always supposed that the only visible and tangible infinity on our planet is human stupidity but I did not foresee that it would show itself to you and accuse you of godlessness! ...I who know your thoughts, who drew you away from excessive mortifications and penitences... find it laughable... I do not know upon this earth a spirit more thoroughly imbued with religious feelings[68].

Years later, Krasiński wrote:

If I were to draw your picture I would say that in you there is an agreement of contradictions – positivism and metaphysics – body and thought – householdry and philosophy – striving of activity and yet calm – the marital bed and the president's chair. You are fortunate in having enormous faith in yourself and in having the right to it... I have lived too much through myself, you perhaps too much through others[69].

The whole volume of Krasiński's letters to Cieszkowski covering the 1840's is a rich portrait of a cosmopolitan and privileged milieu in which French, German and Polish intellectuals of all ideological colours appear. Apparently, the Left still frequented the same salons as the Right, with partisanship constituting no insuperable obstacle to dialogue. Whatever differences arose were often personal rather than political; thus, Krasiński knew and respected Pierre Leroux and the Fourierist colony, but was offended by George Sand's "depravity" and Proudhon's blasphemies[70]. In the same letters, Krasiński is particularly given to facile comparison so that at different times he states that Cieszkowski is exactly like Mickiewicz[71] or Stoeffels[72] or Pierre Leroux, who in turn is just like David Strauss[73]. Although Krasiński is rapturous about the emerging *Our Father*[74], he is a jealous and tyrannical friend severely criticizing Cieszkowski for allowing himself

to be mesmerized by Hegelianism, for being narrowly rationalist, for seeking to organize everything[75]. Krasiński's entreaties are those of an older counsellor trying to keep a gifted but impressionable younger charge from succumbing to a natural inclination towards dull and dry ratiocination[76].

Beyond the intrinsic interest of Krasiński's letters and the light shed on Cieszkowski's character, the question of Krasiński's ultimate influence on the political activity and the system of the author of the *Our Father* must be left to a later point. Here, however, Krasiński's role as a conveyor of Towiański's ideas remains to be examined. The task is by no means an easy one for Krasiński's attitude to the "Master" was complex: while rejecting the form of his doctrine, particularly its hostility to the official Church, Krasiński seemed to find many aspects of Towiański's preaching sound and hoped that Cieszkowski would incorporate these aspects into the *Our Father*[77]. In fact, Krasiński's interest in the "Cause" was such as to arouse suspicion of secret sympathy. These suspicions were soon transferred to Krasiński's entourage, leading outside observers to write:

> Towiański's teachings coincide in many places with the philosophical movement in Germany and with the Slavonic movement. Zygmunt Krasiński and Danilewicz... *Cieszkowski*, Trentowski and all former Hegelians (*sic*) are moving in this direction. With this difference that in Towiański strong faith is the foundation, in them it is reason... (emphasis mine – AL)[78].

Krasiński's comments encouraged such speculation. As usual, he compared Towiański glibly, first with Fourier and then with Danilewicz and Cieszkowski[79]. Since Danilewicz was himself a disciple of Cieszkowski and, in any case, died prematurely in 1842, the shadow of crypto-Towiańskiism pointed all the more darkly at Cieszkowski alone[80]. Only several years later did Krasiński dilute his accusation by reducing Towiański, Cieszkowski and himself to parallel expressions of the spirit of the age:

> I read the whole book of Towiański's writings (writes Krasiński). Everything which is in August, everything which is in the *Dawn*, everything which is circulating in the ideas of the age, about which we speak so often is there, but it is not in the form of thought or knowledge, science or poetic inspiration but only as religious revelation, aiming with the highest calm almost indifference to overturning the world and destroying everything which is standing – the main principle is that the age of the deed is coming, the age of active flowing of Christ's rules into public life and the solution of religious mysteries...[81].

In spite of this self-identification with Towiański's notions, it is clear that Krasiński was by no means blind to their differences. Towiański had no regard for the historical past – Christ, Napoleon and Towiański summarized his notion of history. Nor did Towiański respect the *szlachta* or even the Polish nation as a whole. Instead, he extolled "simple peasant feeling" and spoke of Slavonic tribes. Yet, Krasiński was prepared to overlook all this, as well as the radical character of the Cause, for even in 1848 he wrote:

> . . . as for the Towiańskiites: I think that the world has not yet known people as radical as they – it is not their thought which is radical because they have no thoughts and they scorn thought; it is their faith[82].

Perhaps Krasiński had realized with Mickiewicz that the nature of the Cause was essentially passive. The degree of faith was apparently inversely proportional to the activity required of the faithful. Thus, faith, as both Krasiński and Towiański understood it, was to be an alternative to the destructive and negative revolutionism whose apocalyptic outburst Krasiński foresaw and dreaded. In regard to the *Our Father*, for which Krasiński felt almost an author's concern and hope, an infusion of faith would blunt the work's critical social content and transform it into a hymn to Providence. Hence, Krasiński's repeated injunctions to Cieszkowski to immerse himself more deeply in "the Parisian movement" – calls which stopped well short of asking for any commitment to the Cause itself. Cieszkowski seemed to take no heed never breaking his silence or his distance from the Towiański controversy. Only in the *Our Father* was he to enter into the polemic, proposing a counter-Messianism of which Krasiński could not have approved, but which in its sobriety and even timidity vindicated some of the latter's efforts.

In summary, Cieszkowski's encounter with the Polish emigration in the 1840's provoked a reaction both against the insurrectionist tactics of all its political groupings and the mystical Messianism of its influential undercurrent. Yet even as he rejected the ethos of the emigration, he proved himself susceptible to the influence of several leading émigrés. Thus, his rejection was only a partial one: in seeking to refute certain émigré tenets and to offer realistic and yet morally satisfactory alternatives Cieszkowski entered political life at home and developed the *Our Father*. To the extent that these were alternatives to Messianism he demonstrated that he had not emancipated himself completely from the Messianic option.

CHAPTER X

MESSIANISM REFUSED

In the course of the 1840's Cieszkowski decided to return to his native land and enter political life. His repatriation was neither easy nor lightly undertaken. Soon after having returned to Warsaw's literary circles in 1840–1841, Cieszkowski found himself compelled by various pressures to resume his itinerant way of life. In 1842–1843 he bought land in West Prussia and the Grand Duchy of Posen, both of mixed Polish–German population and under German rule. Not until 1845, however, did he accept a very minor political function in Posen. In 1848 it was the force of circumstances as much as conscious choice which propelled him to the centre of the political stage. Nevertheless, once the whirlwind of revolution had subsided, he remained at his post determined to probe the limits of peaceful reform. In this way, Cieszkowski's political *engagement* is the logical consequence both of his philosophy of the deed, proclaimed as early as the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, and of his insistence on peaceful alternatives to émigré and Messianic solutions of Poland's woes.

I

Ten years after the November insurrection Warsaw was barely beginning to shake off the shocked lethargy that had followed defeat. There was no question of reviving the flourishing political activity of the former Congress Kingdom of Poland. Nevertheless, intellectual life, formerly oriented exclusively towards the Parisian emigration, began to resume in its own right. Thus, poets published, salons prospered and thought returned to the political forum. One observer described the Warsaw of 1842 as "infected by the students of the university of Berlin with Hegelianism, socialism and demagogism to the highest degree"[1]. In this respect, it was but following the fashion set by St. Petersburg[2].

In Poland Hegelianism encountered stiffer resistance than elsewhere. The Russian authorities had reasons to be more sensitive to Hegelianism's radical associations in the turbulent province on the Vistula than they were at home[3]. Catholic militants led by Ziemięcka and Rzewuski

mounted an effective propaganda war against the atheistic or – equally unpalatable – Protestant, philosophy[4]. In contrast to the French theocrats, Polish Catholicism was unhampered by any enlightenment tradition which would oblige it to make concessions to the cult of reason[5]. To the extent that Polish Hegelians stoutly insisted on their philosophy's compatibility with Christian dogma they were forced into defensive positions. The hardier Hegelians, like Dembowski and Kamieński, broke with religion entirely, thus alienating themselves from public opinion and confirming the Catholics' intuition that idealism could lead to materialism and reconciliation would result in revolution. Above all, Hegelianism was a foreign import and to put it in the kindest possible terms, simply not relevant to Poland's national predicament. Hegel was quite explicit in this matter:

> In the existence of a *nation* the substantial aim is to be a state and preserve itself as such. A nation with no state formation (a *mere nation*), has strictly speaking no history – like the nations which existed before the rise of states and others which still exist in a condition of savagery. What happens to a nation, and takes place within it, has its essential significance in relation to the state . . . [6]

In short, Hegel raised problems and provided no answers to the most pressing questions. It is not surprising that Rzewuski in Warsaw – like Mickiewicz in Paris – should draw applause for their very different critiques of Hegel[7].

Cieszkowski did not return to Poland to spread the Hegelian gospel. On the contrary, he had avoided entanglement in Berlin's doctrinal disputes; notwithstanding the *Gott und Palingenesie* and his part in the defense of Hegelianism against Schelling, his position was clear: polemics must be replaced by deeds. Moreover, he was quite aware of the antagonism which his foreign language works had aroused both from nationalist and Catholic camps and he had not the least interest in deepening the gulf between himself and his compatriots[8]. Thus, it is only natural that he should have limited his activities to material support and article contributions to a promising new review, the *Biblioteka Warszawska.* Although there is some dispute over the extent of Cieszkowski's involvement, it may be accepted that this review was the focus of his hopes and efforts immediately after his return[9].

The *Biblioteka Warszawska* opened its pages to the most diverse subject matter and opinion. Cieszkowski himself contributed a poem, a

travelogue, a philosophical treatise and several economic articles discussed earlier in this work. A broad editorial tolerance matched the eclecticism of subject matter. It published not only articles by most of the Polish Hegelians but also Ziemięcka's 'Thought on Philosophy' – rabidly anti-Hegelian – as well as a satire on Hegelianism as a fad by Wilkoński[10]. All this is not to say that the *Biblioteka Warszawska* did not have a programme. In its first issue, a quasi-editorial article declared the review's belief in "industry" – understood, it would seem in the widest possible sense – "as an organ of the activity of the spirit on matter"[11]. The allegiance of the *Biblioteka Warszawska* was to progress, not as rationalism but as satisfaction of human needs. The progress of the spirit was seen as having a material even technological side. Thus, philosophy blended with the first traces of positivism[12].

There is something unique about the *Biblioteka Warszawska*'s commitment to progressive aims and moderate tactics in a period which altered between fanatic dogmatism and fatalistic indifference. The review sought to educate rather than to criticize or convert. Moreover, it did so efficiently. Its distribution extended into the most distant provinces. Separate projects were launched with complementary aims: the "foreign library" (*Biblioteka Zagraniczna*) translated foreign-language classics and contemporary works including authors as diverse as Schiller, Guizot, Adolphe Blanqui. This dynamic enterprise easily took on the proportions of a scientific society under the supervision of a ten-member board of owners-editors, one of whom was Cieszkowski. A testimony to its vigour is the fact that of the numerous periodicals which sprang up in the post-insurrection reawakening of the 1840's the *Biblioteka Warszawska* alone survived the decade. It did so, however, at the cost of yielding to contemporary trends and shedding itself of certain concerns – for example, the "foreign library", its philosophical interest – on behalf of which Cieszkowski had worked hardest[14].

Cieszkowski did not remain on the board of the *Biblioteka Warszawska* long enough to witness this evolution. In 1841 his father had bought him a large estate in West Prussia, probably as investment and insurance against the unstable conditions of Russian Poland[15]. Shortly thereafter Cieszkowski acquired a smaller property, Wierzenica near Posen[16]. Although he continued to own land in Russian Poland for some time and participated in various Warsaw-based projects, he took out Prussian citizenship and made Wierzenica his home base to the end

of his life[17]. The decision to move to Posen sometime in 1842–1843 was motivated by both personal reasons and general trends: on the one hand, Cieszkowski's brief imprisonment in the Warsaw citadel – perhaps only in error – had underlined the dangers to which he was exposed[18]. On the other hand, Posen was becoming the centre of Polish national activity, exercising a magnetic attraction on a whole range of young intellectuals eager to act.

II

The social and intellectual movement which drew Cieszkowski to Posen is conveniently summarized as "organicism". The term describes a whole period in Polish development but one initially formulated and applied to Posen in the 1840's. Philosophically, organicism tended towards positivism; socially, it meant an alliance of bourgeoisie and gentry; economically, it implied industrialization; politically, it was a call for patience. One convert to organicism summarized its message thus:

> Encourage the nation by word and example to industriousness and moderation, to husbandry and industry so that favourable days may find us endowed in wealth, virtue and virility because such are the pillars of the independence of the nation[19].

Although it is customary to treat the phenomenon as a reaction to romanticism, one student has defined "organic work" as "the level at which pre-positivist and romantic philosophy interacted"[20]. Certainly, the term "organic" is common to both and, in spite of overwhelming differences of context, always suggests the need for harmonious, and hence gradual, social development. Moreover, organicism – at least in the form which it took in Posen in the 1840's – did not exclude the enthusiasm which one associates with the romantics. It did not denounce religion but rendered it more pragmatic[21]. Far from stifling political and intellectual life, it evoked lyrical comments from those familiar with Warsaw:

> In our dear native Great Poland (i.e., Posen province) I must admit there is a great deal of noise, nonsense and foolishness. On the other hand, I encountered here two of the most precious jewels of future nationality: public reason and public opinion. As to the first, it is like a school at recess: they play at decrees, statutes, conferences, and may God grant that when the time for important things comes the children will have acquired experience from their games.

As for public opinion... I was so starved for it in poor Congress Poland that here I cannot get my fill of it. True, there we find hardier, prouder spirits... (Here) there is obstinacy, quarrels, passions are aroused, sometimes personality, but at least all this has life and movement, as it prepares some splendid future[22].

The essential framework for this auspicious situation was set, sometimes inadvertently, by German policies. The Congress of Vienna had awarded the province to Prussia – although with guarantees of a distinctive status. Thereafter, it had participated fully in the principal social transformation of the *Vormärz*: the implementation of the agrarian reform of 1811. In its immediate consequences the reform was unjust and disruptive. It imposed heavy commutation duties on the wealthier peasants and excluded both the poorer peasants and the *Lassbauern*[23]. Moreover, it was used as an instrument of Germanization driving a wedge between the Polish peasantry and landlords and serving as a pretext for the dispossession of Polish properties[24]. Nevertheless, in the long run the reform hastened the abolition of feudal vestiges well ahead of similar processes in other parts of Poland[25].

Throughout the 1830's, the government pursued energetic and efficient efforts to develop Posen economically, partly on the assumption that a higher material and cultural level could not but hasten Germanization[26]. In the same period and for much the same reasons a clash between church and state occurred over the confiscation of church property and questions of civil jurisdiction[27]. One must not exaggerate, however, the tempo of modernization. The first railroad was not to come until 1848 and rail communication with Berlin not until 1864. Feudal restrictions governing handicraft industries were only lifted in 1845 and the first factory was not established until 1854. Thus, although organicism was born in a climate of economic modernization, capitalism in Posen was a product rather than a cause of organic activity[28].

The most critical political changes took place in the years immediately after 1840. In Posen, as elsewhere in Prussia, the accession of Frederick Wilhelm IV raised liberal and national hopes. An amnesty lifted restrictions on such diverse individuals as Archbishop Dunin, the conservative patriot Count Titus Działyński and the revolutionary Karol Libelt[29]. Measures guaranteeing Polish education and the administrative equality of Polish and German were matched by the

granting of civil rights to Jews and an unprecedented freedom of the press[30]. The Germanizing president of the 1830's was recalled in disgrace upon Polish insistence and his successor actively sought to maintain good relations with the Polish nobility. Not least important was the abolition of the extradition agreement between Prussia and Russia in 1842–1843, thus making Posen a convenient haven for refugee Poles[31]. All in all, these changes were of short duration. By late 1841, the king was denying his earlier recognition of Posen's special status and in 1846 Polish journals were again singled out for censorship[32]. Nevertheless, the general ferment could not be easily suppressed.

Polish response to Prussian rule took both legal and extra-legal forms. Among the former, a strong Catholic movement during the period of church-state clash reaffirmed the Church's character as a national institution[33]. After 1827 Posen had a provincial Diet where representatives of the three estates met every three years and, even though its power was limited to issuing petitions, it still served as a focus for public opinion. In 1821 a Land Credit Society was founded although there is some dispute whether it served as a protection of Polish property or as a German instrument for the co-optation of the gentry[34]. In 1828, a Society of Friends of Agriculture, Industry and Enlightenment arose but was refused official authorization after failing to quell suspicions that it was really a nationalist society[35]. As a substitute the so-called citizens' *Casino* came into being where the ostensible aim of entertainment was in fact very secondary to national considerations.

After 1840 the number of associations multiplied. In addition to important charitable enterprises[36], a society of scientific help for the youth of the Grand Duchy of Posen was set up and long thereafter provided scholarship funds for poor youths and thus influenced the development priorities of the province[37]. A particularly important creation, the *Bazar*, soon became the physical centre of Posen organic work. This was a commercial building erected in 1841 as a joint-stock venture for the purpose of facilitating public meetings and providing premises for expositions and other projects connected with the development of agriculture and industry[38]. Even in the 1840's, however, a project such as the Agronomical Society failed to secure full governmental approval, despite its inclusion of Germans, for its aim of

cooperation between landlords and peasants was viewed as dangerous to Prussian interests. Even after having been disbanded centrally, however, the society continued work at the county level[39]. Similarly, although a project for the creation of a Polish university was turned down, several courses of public lectures were organized as a substitute[40].

Journals mushroomed as quickly as associations. Only one survived the reimposition of censorship after 1846 but several made brilliant, if ephemeral, contributions to the vigorous debates of the period[41]. The *Dziennik Poznański* and *Orędownik Naukowy* were the journals of the organicists and for a time enjoyed official favour, probably for their occasional anti-French and anti-émigré stance[42]. Far more daring was the *Tygodnik Literacki* founded in 1838 as a review of "literature, the fine arts and critique" and initially welcomed by the censor for its anti-clericalism[43]. Soon, it was politicized and radicalized, briefly regrouping the Polish left wing both at home and in exile but eventually developing in the direction of a non-revolutionary Christian socialism. Thus, in spite of its thorough critiques of organicism, the *Tygodnik Literacki* eventually came to a no less peaceful and restrained position, reflected perhaps in its editorial motto: "to serve an honest cause"[44]. An equally significant periodical was *Rok*, whose vacillations between radicalism and liberalism will be discussed in greater detail below.

Among Posen leaders in the period, two quite contrasting figures stand out: Jan Karol Marcinkowski and Karol Libelt. The former, a much beloved medical doctor, had returned from exile to Posen as Czartoryski's emissary. Instead of insurrection he launched the organicist orientation, throwing himself wholeheartedly into all aspects of associational, charitable and organizational activity. Thus, what the Hôtel Lambert had conceived as a means towards revolt became an end in itself for Marcinkowski's name became synonymous with organic activity. Karol Libelt, an esteemed former student of Hegel, was the Posen representative of the Democratic Society. In spite of his stronger commitment to insurrection, he rejected a social revolution both for strategic and ideological reasons. In regard to agrarian reform, for instance, he believed not in transferring property to the peasants but in maintaining and reviving the village commune as a truly Slavonic institution morally superior to the individual ownership of the West. Moreover, he was quite willing to co-operate in organic activity thus incurring the wrath of the revolutionary Left[45].

III

Such were the circumstances and the individuals Cieszkowski encountered in Posen. Apparently, he entered enthusiastically into the spirit of the period participating in a number of social projects, notably the quickly suppressed Central Agronomical Society, as well as contributing to the *Orędownik Naukowy*[46]. In 1843, he summarized both his hopes and fears for the development of the province in an article published in *Rok* entitled 'On the coordination of aims and intellectual work in the Grand Duchy of Posen'[47].

Essentially, the article argues for the creation of a Society of Friends of Progress as "a hearth of scientific life" in the province. The various aims of such a society are straightforward enough: the constitution of a forum for reports and lectures of general interest; the publication of these activities in a quarterly or monthly journal; the establishment of popular courses in both "the spiritual and physical sciences" on the model of certain English experiments; the designation of academic contests and prizes; the assumption of responsibility for scientific enterprise whose scope exceeds private means. In short, the new Society is to be something of a surrogate academy and university – a timely proposal in view of the official prohibition of a normal university in Posen. At another level, however, the article is a plea for ideological unity. There is no lack of weeklies or dailies, Cieszkowski remarks, but the result is "much friction and little movement" (*Rok Art*, p. 134). The province is too small for its efforts to be dispersed in so many directions. Elsewhere, it may be a normal division of labour for each shade of opinion to have its own organ but here this would be merely fragmentation; parties become nothing but coteries. Stated otherwise, Cieszkowski is warning that common Polish interests in Posen are so vital and the field of manoeuvre so narrowly circumscribed as to leave no room for the luxury of party bickering.

The projected Society will thus transcend factionalism. When asked to which party it will belong, Cieszkowski replies grandly: which party will not belong to it? This is not to say that the new society will be apolitical. On the contrary, it will be concerned with the higher politics "which treat of the main elements of the state of nations and peoples both from the moral and material aspects (rather than) the politics of gossip, personalities, demands and novelties" (*Rok art*, p. 135). The society will not be a coalition involving mutual concessions instead of

mutual progress; nor will it rest on eclecticism which "in its nature is most one-sided since it takes its origin in individual, subjective consciousness" (*Rok art*, p. 138). Rather, it will be a unification – not a unity – of opposing elements which, like the conjunction of fire and water in the steam engine will produce unprecedented power.

Above all, Cieszkowski returns to his cherished themes of negativity and association. Negations, he reminds his readers, are transitions never positions. Thus, although polemics and criticism are welcome it must not be forgotten that a spirit of critique belongs to immature or overly mature societies; organic collectivities are creative, not critical. On the other hand, the spirit of association accelerates progress away from criticism for whereas individual efforts can only combine algebraically, association multiplies results geometrically. At the same time, Cieszkowski refers to Posen in terms which suggest that the province may not yet be ripe for the sort of organic and creative fusion he is urging. At its present level of development it should perhaps concentrate on the sheer accumulation of knowledge – historical, scientific, and other – until it has come to know itself. In fact, however, he makes a virtue of underdevelopment by implying that two stages can be telescoped: the attainment of self-consciousness and the transition to the creative deed[48]. The point of his article is that this ambitious programme can only be realized under conditions of internal unity.

The appearance of the article in the first volume of *Rok* underlined Cieszkowski's point. The new monthly, entitled in full: "The Year: its enlightenment, industry, events, (*Rok pod względem óswiaty, przemysłu, i wydarzén czasowych*) had just been founded by Libelt in disgust over the leftward trend of the *Tygodnik Literacki*[49]. In its scope *Rok* was modelled on the *Biblioteka Warszawska*; its editorial policy promised to shun "all separate, exclusive colour", thus provoking accusations of eclecticism from Dembowski[50]. In fact, the journal was consistently progressive; not only was it the first to review Engels in Polish but it was the first to fall under the censor's axe[51]. *Rok* represented the interests of the majority of the Democratic Society, both at home and in exile, who sought to join forces with the widest possible spectrum of opinion. Thus, the sort of organ which Cieszkowski was describing already existed in the very journal in which he was writing. One can legitimately suggest, therefore, that beneath Cieszkowski's ostensible concern for an unified scientific society and review he was chiefly anxious to warn of the fratricidal consequences of disunity among the various Polish political groupings[52].

If such were Cieszkowski's intentions they remained unheeded. After 1843, political movements split repeatedly as they debated the awaited – or dreaded – revolution and insurrection. Soon new names burst the existing framework of political activity whose outer limits were defined by the organicists and the Hôtel Lambert on the right and the Democratic Society on the left. Groups such as the Union of Peasants and the Union of Plebians prepared for social upheaval as well as national revolt[53]. The result was peasant agitation and perpetual conspiracy culminating in 1846 in an abortive attack on the Posen citadel and the arrest of some six hundred suspected conspirators, including Libelt. In Galicia, the same movement resulted in a bloody *jacquerie* directed more at the Polish landlords than the foreign authorities[54]. In short, the revolutionary plans of the émigrés and their home allies misfired tragically.

These failures, especially the Galician butchery with its frightening implications for national unity and the national struggle, shook Mickiewicz out of Towiański's spell, re-enforced Krasiński's apocalyptic gloom, and discredited the very premises of émigré thinking[55]. At the same time, they strengthened Cieszkowski in his decision to enter politics, albeit in the modest capacity of a second substitute deputy for the knightly estate of the provincial Diet[56]. This is not to say that he shared Michelet's smug Hegelianizing about the manifestation of "the strong hand of world order" in Poland's fate[57]. If Cieszkowski concerned himself with such "foreign" matters as the correct position to adopt vis-à-vis Friedrich Wilhelm's new constitution or the fusion of the estates into an united Diet it was not out of oblivion for national problems but of conviction that change must come piecemeal, that given conditions must not be ignored, and that patience was a greater virtue than courage[58]. In the aftermath of 1846, Cieszkowski limited himself to discrete intercession on behalf of the imprisoned Poles in Berlin and bade his time[59]. It would be presumptuous to suggest that he foresaw 1848, but his writings reveal that he clearly expected important transformations and, consequently, had faith in the future.

IV

The year 1848 shook Europe to its profoundest roots[60]. To be sure, the eruption varied in intensity, character and consequences. In France, the events of 1848 toppled the comfortable bourgeois monarchy and made predictions of class-war a reality. In Central Europe, they

proclaimed the principle of nationality, realizing the hopes of some and awakening those of many others. Everywhere, however, 1848 belonged to the intellectuals. In a sense, all their earlier efforts had tended towards the undermining of the established order and its illegitimate offspring, the culture of the *Vormärz* and the polity of the July monarchy. Now, the ferment of the preceding decades yielded a strong and bitter potion from which the intellectuals themselves were to shrink away. Perhaps they should have heeded the prophets of pessimism like Krasiński who wrote to Cieszkowski in 1847 – with perhaps a veiled resentment at the latter's complicity – of "fires and other sorts of lofty practical ideologies", adding:

> Napoleon was right in spitting into the eyes of the ideologues because the ideologues are those who talk of the idea and when called to realize it, they execute it by complelely different means than those required. Thus, they only deform ... they are apes, not spirits[61].

Amid the universal upheaval one looks in vain for a concerted revolutionary movement or a wholesale insurrection in the most incendiary nation of Europe, Poland. Since the November insurrection the main efforts of the Poles had been expended towards the preparation of armed action in favourable conditions. When such conditions arose, however, the Poles hesitated, bickered and split. The only concrete effort at all-Polish action, the Breslau Congress in May, was a sorry and half-hearted affair[62]. Thus, the *anus mirabilis* ended with no gains for the Polish cause. The *status quo ante*, in the majority of its oppressive features, eventually prevailed here as elsewhere; the point is that there had been no serious attempt to shake it off.

This strangely uncharacteristic passivity can be variously explained. The trauma of the Galician *jacquerie* cast a long shadow on all schemes to enlist the peasantry in the cause of national liberation. The long-standing schism within the emigration between the Right and the Left proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of presumably common goals. Moreover, the intervening years had created a chasm between the émigrés of 1830 and the Poles of 1848. The former were accused, in a typical neologism, of having been "denationalized" (*Wynarodowieni*) by their absence from their native land and their aping of foreign trends and ideologies. Indeed, the émigrés were even accused of having forgotten how to speak their native language properly[63]. The émigrés responded with equal vehemence against those who had made their peace with the existing order in Poland, and

particularly against those Poles, like the Posen organicists, who were collaborating actively with the partitioning powers[64]. Above all, in a mixture of naiveté and realism, the Poles placed their expectations for the recovery of national independence outside themselves. All lucid parties agreed that Poland alone could not impose its will and that consequently it was essential to obtain the cooperation of other powers. Furthermore, in the conditions of 1848 it was not unreasonable to expect that the general sympathy for the Polish cause throughout revolutionary Europe would give rise to some corresponding political, diplomatic and even military measures. It was unreasonable, however, to expect that the commitment of foreign revolutionaries and nationalists to the Polish cause would exceed or even equal their commitment to their own revolution and their own nation. Indeed, polonophilia proved the most expendable of the many sentiments agitating Europe.

The Poles can be charged with gullibility but not with misinterpretation for the rhetoric of both the French and German revolutions fed their wildest hopes. Although the lukewarm nature of Lamartine's Polish policy should have been gleaned even from his friendly but guarded pronouncements, there was no mistaking the pro-Polish fervour of the Left and of the Parisian masses which stormed the National Assembly under cries of "*Vive la Pologne*!"[65] In Germany, too, the Left spared no claims on behalf of Poland; Marx thus expressed a self-evident truth for his camp in writing: "the establishment of a democratic Poland... within at least the frontiers of 1772... is a primary condition for the establishment of a democratic Germany"[66]. Moreover, the German liberals agreed, at least for a time, to the extent that they saw the historical necessity of recreating a Polish state as a bulwark against Russia. Thus, both the all-German National Assembly in Frankfurt and the Prussian Assembly in Berlin convened with the intention of rectifying the crime of Polish partition[67].

In short, the revolution of 1848 promised to found a European order guided by justice for all and no one denied the justice of Poland's restoration. This universal concurrence must be credited to the émigrés who had expressed their demands so forcefully in moral terms and had kept enlightened public opinion aware of Poland's rights. Having convinced Europe of the worthiness of their cause they found themselves incapable of doing anything more. The initiative thus passed to the Poles at home who instead of fomenting a general revolt decided to put their faith in the good intentions of their occupiers and

work through the newly arisen and apparently promising, though foreign, channels. At that time, it seemed that the greatest anomaly was that Russian Poland had remained unaffected by the Revolution. In fact, German constitutionalism and Austro-Slavism, into which the Poles of Posen and Galicia respectively had directed their efforts, turned out to be no lesser obstacles.

All in Cieszkowski's previous writings and activities predisposed him to seek a pacific solution to Poland's predicament in the fateful year of 1848. Thus, he rejoiced in the triumph of the German liberals and welcomed the opportunity of submitting his nation's cause to them, even if he had to do so as a representative of Posen and not of Poland. After all, for him as for so many German Hegelians, historical opportunities such as those of 1848 expressed the rational aims of history. For the same reasons, Cieszkowski did not shy away from association with the extreme Left as its star rose and fell in the course of the revolution. The alliance with radical elements did not pose the same problem for him as it did for others torn between nationalist hopes and conservative fears[68]. Cieszkowski's close contacts with utopian socialists, his faith in the fundamental goodness of the masses and, ultimately, his conviction that the Left too was tending towards rational historical goals, all moved him to accept the paradox of an alliance between his own moderation and the radicals. Others were to take the same course, but it is characteristic of Cieszkowski that his choices were motivated by conviction and not by opportunism. For this reason, the failure of German constitutionalism to solve the Polish problem and its eventual abandonment of the Polish cause marked Cieszkowski permanently and profoundly.

Cieszkowski does not seem to have been in the forefront of the first phase of the Revolution. In Posen, this phase culminated in the formation of a Polish National Committee of notables led by the archbishop which petitioned Friedrich Wilhelm IV for a "national re-organization" in Posnania as a first step towards Poland's resurrection. In the circumstances of the moment, the request was not exorbitant: the unified Germany which had just been proclaimed could hardly incorporate the million or so Prussian Poles without flouting its own national principles; moreover, German public opinion – if not the king himself – was enthusiastically in favour of a Polish restoration on both moral and tactical i.e., anti-Russian grounds. As a result, the Prussian government acceded immediately though reluctantly to the Polish

request. At this point, however, the liberal euphoria which had united Posen Poles and Germans dissipated quickly when the Germans, according to the inexorable logic of the national principle, were denied admittance to the Polish National Committee. Thereafter, support of Poland in German minds was fatally linked to the abandonment of four hundred thousand Germans. Without formally repudiating its promises, the Prussian government sought a solution by drawing demarcation lines between German and Polish parts of the Grand Duchy. These demarcation lines were to be altered frequently in the coming months and each change marked the receding of some Polish hopes[69].

There can be no doubt that Cieszkowski favoured the Polish National Committee although there is no evidence as to which of its widely divergent factions he belonged. Furthermore, in April at the last meeting of the Posen Provincial Estates he joined the Polish majority in voting against partition of the province through demarcation[70]. Immediately thereafter all the Prussian Provincial Estates were abolished to make way for the National Assembly. Shortly afterwards the Polish National Committee was disbanded in the face of acute tension between Poles and Germans, and growing anarchy[71]. At this point, Cieszkowski could choose between joining the all-Polish movement which was organizing a congress in Breslau, and entering the electoral lists as a Polish candidate for the Prussian Assembly. Instead of choosing he made each option his own, first appearing as a delegate in Breslau and then hurrying back to stand for election to Berlin.

Scholars appear confused about who called the Breslau Congress, and for what precise reasons[72]. The initiative seems to have come from several sources simultaneously: the Hôtel Lambert, a group of conservative Russian Poles, the politicians of Posen's National Committee. They came together to discuss a number of topical questions – the international situation, the formation of a unified military command – as well as long-term problems such as the peasant question and relations with national minorities. Above all, they gathered to explore the possibility of setting up a single Polish government. More accurately stated, however, the majority of delegates came in order to ensure that no single government would be constituted.

Virtually all parties at Breslau had reason to sabotage the Congress' purported intentions. Czartoryski was unwilling to let the political initiative pass from émigré hands. Inasmuch as the emigration alone

claimed to represent Poland integrally, his delegates could denounce the other parties as mere regional representatives. The delegation from Russian Poland led by Helcel and Wielopolski, a conservative closely co-operating with the tsarist governor, was unwilling to upset the province for the sake of an adventure. The Galicians, too, were led by conservatives for whom social peace took precedence over all else. Finally, the Posnanians themselves realized that success at Breslau could only lead to a further degeneration of their relations with the Prussians and the Posen Germans. Moreover, unification would mean the subordination of elements represented in the late Polish National Committee to an outside authority.

In short, the Breslau Congress vindicated those Poles who had expected the worst. When given an opportunity to unite, the three zones of Poland found their regional interests to be preeminent. For this reason, it is difficult to accept interpretations of the congress which stress the struggle between the Right and the Left. Both the Right and Left within Poland were at one in countering attempts by the emigration to impose itself. Beyond that, the Left worked for a revolutionary unified government but, failing this, it was quite willing to join the Right in not agreeing to any unified government at all[73].

This background may explain Cieszkowski's position at the Congress where he came in an ideologically mixed delegation from Posen including both Libelt, recently released from Moabit prison, and Raczyński, a local magnate[74]. Cieszkowski first questioned the representative character of the Congress and demanded to know who had mandated the delegates. The question was as pertinent to himself as it was to any other delegate; it was particularly pointed at the émigrés of both the Democratic Society and the Hôtel Lambert. After having thus contributed to undermining the meeting, Cieszkowski set to work to salvage something out of it. Thus, he entered the drafting committee of a bureau of correspondence, which had been suggested by the Right as a real alternative to an inter-zonal government. There, he proposed the creation of another central organization of a non-political character, a "Corn League" which could operate within the legal framework of the new Austrian and German constitutions[75]. One cannot help noting, however, that inasmuch as this project was not relevant to Russian Poland, the League would be a tool of divisiveness rather than of unity. In retrospect, it is difficult to see what Cieszkowski hoped to accomplish at Breslau. One can conclude that his interest in unity was

real but that he hesitated to place his faith in such an *ad hoc* body as the Congress, especially since legal alternatives still seemed available.

The Congress dispersed without approving the idea of a Corn League; as a parting word, however, it adopted an appeal written by Cieszkowski and addressed to "the representatives of free peoples"[76]. This opened with a resounding declaration of the historical meaning of the ongoing revolution:

> God has willed that the politics of European states, long established on lies, injustice and self-love, shaken in their very principles for the last half-century but restored to equilibrium through cunning or deception, at last collapse definitively and give birth to a new order of relations among nations[77].

Thus, the voice of Providence had spoken through the nations. Unhampered by debts towards the past, the representatives of now free people had a solemn obligation to realize "the free and normal development of all states and social elements simultaneously" as well as "the free and normal development of all nations"[78]. External wars proceeded from the same causes as internal revolution: the oppression of one class or nation by another[79]. If law was to reign it had to be universal; injustice was indivisible.

Thus, the nature of international relations must be transformed. Peace must be founded on truth which is "the mutual recognition among nations of their freedom and independence" rather than on the paltry principle of balance of power[80]. War must be avoided by universal disarmament which, in addition to its main purpose would also relieve nations of a crippling financial burden[81]. This new order would be inaugurated and maintained by people's congresses which would replace old-style diplomacy. Any disputes would be submitted to "a jury of nations".

Many nations might appeal to this new body – the Italians in Austria and the Irish under British rule, to name but two. The nation which had suffered most, however, deserved satisfaction before all others; indeed, its restitution was a condition and not a consequence of the new order. Here, Cieszkowski launched into the purest Messianic themes, comparing Poland to the crucified Christ and reminding his listeners of Poland's ancient role as a bulwark of civilization[82]. Furthermore, he refuted those who would have Poland win back her independence unaided by comparing their arguments to the mockeries of Roman soldiers at Calvary. The sacred nature of Poland's cause

could hardly be clearer. At the same time, Cieszkowski issued a warning. Again resorting to Biblical imagery he compared Poland to Samson: she too could bring down the temple of the existing order with her own bare but strong hands and bury the Philistines who had defiled that edifice. The appeal ended, however, on a more optimistic note: war may be necessary to see justice realized for Poland but it would be a short, swift and final crusade for all peoples would join in it crying *Deus vult.*

It may seem difficult to see in this document anything more than the fruit of frustration. Indeed, the force of its demands perhaps indicates the despair of its origins. Thematically, it is also one of the final manifestoes of Polish Messianism as here the national obsession is absorbed in international hopes. Historically, it concludes one of the last attempts at Messianic politics. The signatories of the appeal dispersed in different directions: some continued on to Prague for the Pan-Slav congress thus transferring their national ambitions to another plane; others returned to their own provinces to see what could be salvaged of the Polish idea in Posen, Cracow or Warsaw. Thus, Cieszkowski's appeal stands as a tombstone to Messianism; one could perhaps say that its author succumbed to Messianism as he saw that it was dying.

Cieszkowski did not proceed to Prague but he was, so to speak, carried there vicariously. A friend and co-participant at Breslau, Jerzy Lubomirski, reprinted part of the *Our Father* in Prague as an anonymous brochure entitled *Prophetic Words of a Pole*[84], in the conviction that Cieszkowski's ideas could provide an historiosophical underpinning for the hopes of Slavonic unity. The author himself wholeheartedly approved this use of his recently published work. Among his criticisms of Polish Messianism had been its exclusion of other Slavonic nations, its scorn for the unhistorical Czechs and its hatred of the Russians[85]. The selection now reprinted spoke of the original unity and the common destinies of all Slavs and the Prague Congress was the very vindication of these ideas. Unfortunately, the Congress failed on most counts; there was no chance of agreement between social revolutionaries like Bakunin and conservative nationalists, between Slavs loyal to the Habsburgs and those who sought to incarnate their nationality in separate states, between the less-developed Slavonic nations like the Ruthenes and their equally Slavonic oppressors[86]. Thus, the *Prophetic Words of a Pole* proved to be a sadly ironical title.

The failure of both Polish unity and Pan-Slavism confirmed the wisdom of working through the narrower channels of German constitutionalism. In the absence of unity, at the very least, it seemed that Posen could be maintained as a hearth of national life. Even here, however, conditions worsened rapidly. An armed revolt of Polish adventurers was suppressed in early May, underscoring the failure of the recently disbanded National Committee to control its constituency and destroying whatever remained of Polono-German amity in the province[87].

Even earlier, however, German public opinion had begun to take on increasingly anti-Polish tones. Whereas the Pre-Parliament preparing the Frankfurt Assembly had considered Poland's restoration as an issue above partisan debate, the succeeding Committee of Fifty, the Federal Diet and the Frankfurt Assembly itself increasingly qualified their support. By the summer of 1848, there were three clearly defined positions: the Left advocated the restoration of Poland through an European congress; the Centre called for a temporary demarcation line between Polish and German territory in Posnania, leaving a final solution to the future; the Right demanded the wholesale incorporation of the province into the German Union[88]. Nowhere is the intricate enmeshing of ideological and national positions more evident. At Frankfurt, the radical leader Arnold Ruge led a spirited defense of Poland; although he had no use for Slav nationalism he identified Poland's cause with the revolution[89]. Curiously enough, he found support outside his own faction in the small ultramontanist contingent[90]. Ruge's position was soundly defeated but in Berlin the Prussian National Assembly, dominated by the Left, refused to take account of the resolution of the all-German Right, preferring to refer the matter to a commission of its own[91].

This was the climate in which Cieszkowski entered the mainstream of the revolution in Germany. In May 1848 he was elected as a deputy from Posen to the Lower House of the Prussian National Assembly. The elections were carried out under a cautious electoral law and at a time when many Polish leaders were in prison or in hiding[92]. Nevertheless, both the Left and the Poles found themselves strongly represented. Ironically, the Poles were freer to defend their national interest in Berlin than in Posen, which remained officially under a state of seige. Moreover, in the generally radical atmosphere of the Assembly they received a sympathetic hearing. Thus, even as the Prussian

government whittled away at the boundaries of Posnania without any regard to the National Assembly, the Polish deputies continued to harbour the illusion that they were wielding a potent parliamentary weapon. For a time, they did not constitute a single unit, seating themselves for the most part in the centre and dispersing their votes. The logic of the situation was such, however, that most frequently they found themselves allied to the Left.

Among the most vigorous Polish deputies and among the most consistently on the left was August Cieszkowski. He was elected a secretary of the assembly upon the nomination of the Left. One of his first parliamentary acts was to push through the principle of the freedom of interpellation for the minority, thus guaranteeing a voice to the most radical elements[93]. Thereafter, he was active in setting up the specialized committees of the chamber. Throughout the life of the Assembly he fought pitched parliamentary battles on behalf of the Polish cause in which, despite his weak voice and his nagging insistence on the same themes and principles, he became a popular and respected speaker[94]. In recognition of his leading role he was appointed as one of the two Polish members of the plenipotentiary commission which was to study the Posen question. Outside the strict limits of Polish interests, Cieszkowski also cooperated with the Left. Thus, he sat on the editorial board of the democratic *Die Reform* with such unlikely colleagues as Libelt and Bakunin[95]. Finally, during a crucial debate in October 1848 on the abolition of titles and aristocratic privileges, Cieszkowski joined the Left and declared on behalf of his compatriots – although with questionable mandate: "The Polish *szlachta* renounces all privileges and all distinctions in general; it wishes only to retain its obligations for the weal of the people"[96].

Predictably, some of Cieszkowski's friends were aghast at the turn he had taken. Throughout 1848, Krasiński especially bombarded his correspondent with admonitions and reproaches. Some comments were well-founded for he had seen earlier than Cieszkowski that "just as many who cry Christ! Christ! do not have him in their hearts, so many who cry Poland! Poland! do not have her in theirs' either but seek dirty aims through this sacred name"[97]. Other comments simply expressed Krasinski's disgust at the mobs in whom his friend saw the stuff "from which a republic could arise whose first condition is universal virtue"[98]. The whole exercise in parliamentarianism seemed futile to Krasiński, for if change had to come it would be only through a bloody and

horrible upheaval[99]. Thus, he could not understand why his friend would want to play the secretary in Berlin and ruin his lungs for the sake of German ears[100], when all that he did today would disappear tomorrow like so many ephemera[101]. Above all, Cieszkowski's position on the abolition of titles cut Krasiński to the core; not only because he was shocked by the idea itself but because he had good reason to suspect that Cieszkowski had not acted out of conviction but, subordinating principle to party interest, in order to obtain the continued support of the Left in other matters. His letter bears citation:

> ... listen, August! you hear the whistle of bullets around you, the clanking of bayonets and the furious screams of the proletariat. All that is nothing for I know that you have a great destiny. That destiny, however, may be of two types: it may be that of the angels or of anti-Christ! It depends on the road which you choose and (now) you have fallen into political Machiavellianism, acted à la Talleyrand and à la Metternich, not like the guardian and bearer of the ideal of humanity. You have voted against your own profound conviction, in favour of the destruction and levelling of all souvenirs of the past. You who wrote me that you will never renounce certain native jewels; you who called yourself count (*coś się hrabił*) while there were still counts in the world; you have voted against instinct and belief in order to repay a faction to which you have attached yourself in return for their vote in the Posen question. You have reciprocated with a service to the devil in return for a service, and the devil's services are worth only the devil; you have voted thus under the external pressure of the riffraff and in the most unaesthetic chamber of Europe ... This is a first false step. I point it out to you and I warn you[102].

Krasiński implored Cieszkowski to break with the Left "while there is time" comparing his friend's attachment to that of a drunkard hanging on to a fence[103]. In this, however, he was wrong for Cieszkowski was acting in the utmost sobriety convinced that present sacrifices would be eventually rewarded, that his own vision of the future and that of the Left were ultimately one. Above all, it did not seem possible that the events of 1848 were anything but the birth of a new era – a painful birth perhaps but full of the potential of life; it did not occur to him, as it did to Krasiński, that these events might be a historical miscarriage.

V

The revolutionary year 1848 ended in Berlin on December 5th when the king dissolved the unruly National Assembly and imposed a new electoral law[104]. Ever undaunted, Cieszkowski turned his full energy to

the Polish League, a widespread and heterogeneous national organization, on which he had already been working and whose execution he now deemed both feasible and necessary. Thus, the Polish League was born in revolutionary conditions which it could hardly hope to outlive. Its short life marks the transition from a period of revolution to disillusion for Posen, as well as for Cieszkowski himself.

Cieszkowski professed to draw the idea of a Polish League from the experience of Cobden's Anti-Corn Law League in Great Britain. Both were early attempts at the mass organization of political pressure. Thus, they innovated in the area of propaganda and agitation, combining statistical information with moral arguments, distributing innumerable pamphlets and popular lectures, mobilizing across class lines and even party allegiances, and enlisting grass-roots support through local organization[105]. The strength of the Corn League lay not only in its organization but in its aims. The specificity of its goal – the dismantling of restrictions on the import of corn – made it into an aggressive, monolithic machine[106]. The favourable political circumstances of newly reformed British parliamentarianism and economic conditions of industrialization injected it with a rare vigour. The Polish League was necessarily diffuse and defensive in its purpose, which it defined as "the open and legal protection, support and development of the Polish national cause"[107]. Moreover, it was faction-ridden, understaffed and politically crippled. Indeed, in its largely conservative aims and its inefficiency the Polish League was perhaps more akin to the Agricultural Protection Society, an anti-Cobden organization of peers and farmers, whose record hardly made it worthy of emulation[108].

Cieszkowski stressed that he was borrowing only the structure and organization of the Anti-Corn Law League as the factors responsible for its dynamism and success. In goals and character, however, he envisaged the Polish League as being closer to Daniel O'Connell's Irish Repeal Association, a massive movement of Irish Catholics working through legal channels for national and civil rights, particularly the revocation of the Act of Union with Great Britain[109]. By characterizing the Poles as Germany's Irish problem Cieszkowski evoked a powerful and, unfortunately, accurate image[110]. At the time, however, it seemed that a fusion of the modern and effective organizational means of the Anti-Corn Law League with the just and noble principles of Irish Repeal corresponded perfectly to Poland's immediate needs.

Beyond inspiration from foreign models Cieszkowski drew on his

own writings as well as on previous experience in the non-revolutionary organization of Polish national life. His social and economic articles of the 1840's had expressed faith in the power of association to multiply the fruits of human effort. This faith had been enthroned in the *Rok* article which proposed an umbrella association of non-partisan character to coordinate intellectual activities throughout Posen. Even in the liberal 1840's, there was no chance of legally constituting such an association; if the potentially nationalist Central Agricultural Society was banned, clearly there was no hope for "the friends of progress" who would devote themselves to "politics in the highest sense"[111]. Under the changed conditions of 1848, however, the "friends of progress" could become a Polish League, openly political not only in the highest but in every sense.

Cieszkowski launched the project of a Polish League at the Breslau Congress in May 1848. Predictably, many delegates did not consider an economic weapon of particular interests such as the Anti-Corn Law League to be a fitting model for the political and diplomatic instrument they were seeking, particularly as the League seemed to be an alternative to a more familiar "federative commission". Lubomirski insisted that one did not exclude the other; if the commission collapsed – as seemed likely – at least something would be left in the League. The collapse of the Congress, prompted by a narrowly based behind-the-scenes agreement on a third sort of common body which most delegates had neither discussed nor approved, left the question of the League in the air[112].

The further evolution of the Polish situation impelled Cieszkowski to push through his project. The Polish League was officially constituted on June 25th and soon afterwards it published a draft of its statutes, information circulars and instructions to would-be local organizers[113]. At this early stage, even before it had begun serious recruitment or activities, the new organization found itself the recipient of a tremendous amount of good will from all quarters. The press described the plans of the League in minute detail and enthusiastically endorsed the idea of transforming the province into a "great national workshop"[114]. The Posen *Czas* marvelled at the prevalent mood:

> It is difficult to believe the extent to which everyone in the Duchy is thinking of the League. In the whole province you hear of nothing but general meetings, assemblies, elections, delegates... This legal agitation is all the more extraordinary in view of the strict regimentation and repression of the province... [115]

All this activity reached its culmination in the first general assembly of January 1849, held in a freezing church outside Posen since the city itself was still legally under siege. Here, the members of the League approved its statute and elected its chief officers. The preamble summarized their general purposes:

> ... having been granted and guaranteed for the future the right of association, (we) resolve to create a society to be known as the Polish National League with the aim of gathering together in one hearth moral and material forces both at home and abroad in order to act openly and legally on behalf of Polish nationality... [116]

The limitations of the League were carefully spelled out for the sake of the authorities who, in any case, had already received formal assurances of the League's peaceful and law-abiding intentions[117]. Thus, the preamble continued:

> ... the League is a private association; consequently it has not the least intention of seeking political authority or of speaking officially in the name of the land, and under no circumstances will it represent anything else than the good cause and the good will of those who join it... [118]

More specifically, the League promised to act on "the untrodden path" of public opinion which "today is an authority above all others"[119]. In addition, it would defend national rights and freedoms wherever these were endangered; it would advance national enlightenment through books, schools, shelters; it would strengthen public spirit and fraternal ties among Poles; it would improve material conditions through mutual help and organic institutions. At the same time, the League affirmed its non-partisan character by electing a diverse executive board. Cieszkowski became director of the division of national rights and external correspondence.

Of course, partisan considerations could not be prevented from coming to the fore. The general assembly fought bitterly over a seemingly semantic point: whether the League was to serve "the national cause" (*sprawie narodowej*) or "nationality". Cieszkowski defended the former formulation on the grounds that the principle of nationality was too great a sphere for so limited an organization. In fact, the debate was one between radicals who emphasized the continuity between the League and previous struggles for Polish independence, and moderates, like Cieszkowski, who spoke of "the happy publicity which can now succeed tragic plots, the strenuous toil which replaces bloody sacrifices"[120]. Afterwards, ideological intrigues of this

sort continued with Potworowski, the General Director, and Libelt, the Director of Publications, at two opposing poles. Cieszkowski was caught in the middle and used by both[121].

The pretense of supra-partisanship and the reality of factional struggle created tension but the League was even more seriously undermined by contradictions and ambiguities in its very definition[122]. Formally, it had no political existence but even Cieszkowski was forced to admit that it was no less a political organization. Indeed, even though the League explicitly renounced political authority it was considered by friends and foes alike as a "state within a state"; not only was its executive seen as a shadow government but its external section, headed by Cieszkowski, was viewed as a pseudo-ministry of foreign affairs[123].

The greatest weakness of the Polish League was its inability to combat disinterest and boredom. After the tumultuous general assembly of January 1849 it demonstrated considerable organizational ability in the election campaign to the Prussian Diet. Ironically, success contributed to its downfall: the leaders of the League departed for Berlin as deputies, leaving local organizations without coordination while the leaders concentrated on the parliamentary arena. Without guidance or inspiration from above, one can hardly be surprised that the local leadership turned out to be inadequate and the rank-and-file proved fickle. Certainly, it was much more difficult to sustain the prosaic, even humdrum endeavours of the League than the heroic conspiracies of the past. In spite of Cieszkowski's efforts to patch matters up within the League during the summer of 1849, apathy eventually triumphed over enthusiasm[124].

In this situation the enemies of the League could act at will. The Russian government put pressure on Berlin to disband this potential seedbed of Polish agitation in its own provinces[125]. The Prussian government, fearful of the League's involuntarily acquired semi-official status and suspicious of its foreign links, was happy to listen to the complaints of Posen Germans. In February 1850, the League was declared contrary to the interests of the state. In March, a new law on associations dictated the dismantling of the central organs of the League. Only a few local chapters deprived of all *raison d'être* remained[126].

In spite of its short and circumscribed existence, the League accomplished a good deal. It planned schools and parish reading-rooms; it

provided legal and economic counselling as well as subsidies to agriculture, industry and commerce; it organized insurances and savings banks[127]. Moreover, it integrated large numbers of peasants into its membership, thus heightening their national awareness and countering German efforts to deepen the rift between the Polish intelligentsia or landed classes and the peasantry. Clearly, it could not hope to compensate for the non-existence of a Polish state – partly because it never dared to proclaim this as its aim. Nevertheless, the Polish League and its founder deserve credit for having launched one of the nation's first broadly-based, non-revolutionary mass organizations.

VI

Even before the dissolution of the League, Cieszkowski was devoting himself totally to the parliamentary duties which were to dominate his next two decades. He was to serve in the Lower House at Berlin through a number of elections from 1849–1855 and again from 1859–1866. In this context, Cieszkowski's activities must be considered as part of the politics of the Polish Circle, a grouping of Polish deputies whose vice-president he was from 1850–1855, and president from 1860–1866. In addition, however, his work was also the expression of an independent stance which provoked contradictory criticism; among his closest friends, Krasiński reiterated accusations of subservience to the Left while Michelet denounced his compromises with reactionary governments[128]. Once again, Cieszkowski's attempt to operate within existing limitations was misunderstood both by his compatriots and his erstwhile sympathizers.

On the eve of the opening of the legislature in February 1849, the thirty-two elected Polish deputies met to discuss the possibility for concerted action[129]. The steady deterioration of the situation in Posen and the reduced strength of the German Left, the Poles' most consistent allies, made such unity an urgent necessity. Only this can explain the suspension of ideological strife which saw Libelt and the peasant deputies cooperating with Potworowski and other landlords to find an effective framework for maximizing the impact of Polish votes in the House. Even here, however, party divergences surfaced in the debate over the degree of discipline to be imposed on the future Polish faction. The Left advocated obligatory abstention from all purely

German matters in order to avoid any legitimization of the *status quo* in Prussian Poland. The majority, including both Libelt and Cieszkowski, argued for a looser organization which would band together on all vital national matters, but leave individual members free to join the German parties of their choice in all else.

Curiously enough, the same question arose in August 1849 with a complete reversal of positions. The left deputies continued to urge that all Poles sit together as a single body on the extreme left to emphasize their alienation from Prussian parliamentarianism as a whole. At the same time, and quite inconsistently, these same deputies demanded the right to act individually "in all questions affecting freedom". In short, the Left – mindful of its minority position within the Polish faction – was seeking to loosen the organizational bonds which it would have wished tied so tightly a few months earlier. It was now the turn of the Right to insist on strict discipline and on national solidarity on all issues.

In this situation, Cieszkowski acted successfully as mediator. He objected to the proposed seating arrangements on the eminently sensible grounds of bad acoustics and visibility! He suggested as a compromise that no member of the Polish faction be allowed to take an independent position on questions which the faction had discussed previously and that no member be permitted to put forward a motion in the House without prior consultation with the faction. Regarding the correct stance vis-à-vis purely German questions, Cieszkowski advanced an original and ill-understood notion. Beyond the defense of national interests, he attributed a moral role to his compatriots in this German legislature. As he put it: "Let us, as long as the Germans have lost their conscience be the guardians of a just conscience and present a shade of opposition"[130]. This, perhaps more than all else, explains his participation in politics long after all hopes for the Polish cause had been lost.

Eventually, the deputies agreed on a statute for what was to be known as the Polish Circle. Like the Polish League, the Circle was divided over its aims and a similar semantic debate broke out over the terms "Polish nationality" and "Polish cause". Here, Cieszkowski contradicted his earlier view in the League by arguing now that "Polish cause" was a wider and hence more supple formula, but the majority of his colleagues chose to restrict themselves to the problem of "Polish nationality". In its final form, the Polish Circle was a closely-knit grouping run by a three-member commission with substantial

authority; indeed, the commission, where Cieszkowski sat without interruption, was accused both in the press and by disgruntled members of wielding dictatorial power. The strength of the Circle fluctuated between five and over thirty deputies, but it was always eagerly courted by the German parties and factions[131]. The nature of the situation inclined the Circle to alliance with opposition elements and the Left but it soon developed a remarkable adeptness at parliamentary bargaining, with Cieszkowski as the most skilled negotiator of the many deals and compromises worked out[132].

There was very little, however, which could be done in the face of overwhelmingly adverse circumstances. Even had the legislature been favourable to Polish demands, the controlling levers of Prussian political life lay outside it. Thus, in January 1850, directly violating its international obligations under the Treaty of Vienna and its own assurances of 1848, the Prussian government declared the wholesale incorporation of the Grand Duchy of Posen into Prussia. The Polish deputies reacted vigorously but fruitlessly: they resigned their seats only to return a few months later, convinced that boycott was even less effective than protest. Thereafter, their occasional outbursts on behalf of Polish rights were as futile as the dwindling voices of the radical opposition. Indeed, the two coincided but it must have been small comfort for Cieszkowski to hear from Lassalle that "the only democratic words which the Chamber has heard in recent years have fallen from Polish lips"[133].

Cieszkowski himself continued to work with his habitual calm and vigour[134]. In a revealing outburst, Krasiński wrote of his friend's political patience:

> ... I envy you your reason and your robustness. Come the first revolution and having become feeble minded I will try to have you hang or lose your head for having remained reasonable ... [135]

With a sense of realism exceeding that of many of his colleagues, Cieszkowski combatted inflammatory motions calling for the immediate liberation of Prussian Poland; as he put it, a notion with which no one could disagree but which circumstances would not allow. Quite typically, he qualified his refusal to take the parliamentary oath after the incorporation of the Grand Duchy by suggesting that this refusal be discussed with the government and that a petition be sent to the

king to assure him that refusal was by no means tantamount to revolt. Similarly, he was quite willing to cooperate with the government to the extent of voting war credits in 1859 on the grounds that the Poles never wanted to prevent others from exercising their right of defense but only sought to achieve recognition of their own rights[136].

In this period, Cieszkowski produced several tracts whose intellectual level rises well above that expected of political propaganda. His compilation and commentary on the legal status of the Grand Duchy of Posen provided strong ammunition for the claims of the Polish Circle[137]. Here, he rejected the official translation of the "*existence politique*" guaranteed to Posen in 1815 as "*Bürgerliches Dasein*" and substituted "*politische Selbstständigkeit*", a mandate for independent political activity[138]. Moreover, he stressed the purely personal nature of the tie between the Prussian Crown and the Grand Duchy and, to the embarrassment of the Germans, referred to the once-promised commercial unity among the formerly Polish territories as a *Zollverein*. In two proposals, more representative of his wider interests, Cieszkowski argued for the creation of a Polish university in Posen[139]. His case was buttressed by substantial statistical and comparative evidence as well as practical suggestions for the financing of the project. Above all, he admitted, his request was based on principles of distributive justice which demanded that the Posen Poles be granted at least the same educational opportunities in their own language as the Germans had in theirs'. In thus posing the problem, Cieszkowski had already defined the main obstacles to the achievement of his aims.

It is difficult to measure Cieszkowski's concrete parliamentary achievements. Certainly, he was able to exercise influence in many particular problems such as the appointment of functionaries in the Polish provinces or the defense of Polish political prisoners[140]. Neither in his obvious purpose, the safeguarding of Polish nationality rights, nor in his own peculiar aim of serving as "the conscience of the German nation" was he successful. The decision to remain a deputy when any possibility of change had disappeared can only be explained by one overriding consideration: given the inadmissibility of passivity, Cieszkowski's choice was between the insurrectionary Messianism dear to his compatriots and the frustrations of parliamentary activity. Quite consistently with all he had ever written, Cieszkowski opted for the latter.

VII

In the 1840's, Cieszkowski had abandoned his writing, travels and intellectual aloofness to enter the forum of practice. His departure from politics in 1866 meant a return to reflection and small-scale social planning. Although it did not signify retirement from the world as such, it marked the beginning of the last period of his life – years of restless travel, growing isolation and secret work on the *Our Father.* Having rushed into history impetuously and confidently in 1848, he now withdrew, no less convinced of the strength or rightness of his ideas but aware that their time had not yet come. The *Our Father* is a persistent monument to his faith. Here, I propose to look at certain continuities in Cieszkowski's views and activities during the period when the *Our Father*, conceived and partially completed many years earlier, was being written.

Personal considerations contribute to explaining the re-orientation in Cieszkowski's life in the mid-1860's. In 1857 he had married a sixteen-year old cousin to whom he was apparently utterly devoted. Between 1859 and 1862, however, he lost his closest friend, Zygmunt Krasiński, his father and his wife who left him with two small sons whose upbringing and education Cieszkowski personally assumed. The revolt of 1863 in Russian Poland was not only a blow to his hopes of peaceful evolution, but also deprived him of much of his remaining patrimony[141]. Finally, his health – so frail in his childhood and later fortified by rigorous supervision[142] – obliged him to reduce his work load. He escaped from Berlin to warmer climes, spending several years in Cannes and Venice. Thereafter, he lived in Posen but passed long periods in Italy.

Even as his physical health declined, Cieszkowski's intellectual vigour continued unabated. In Venice he set to work on a monumental work of historical research, sifting through archives in search of materials concerning Polish–Venetian relations in the middle ages[143]. During the Vatican Council he travelled to Rome to lobby against the prevalent trends in the Church, exemplified in such recent documents as the Syllabus of Errors and the imminent doctrine of papal infallibility[144]. Into his last years, he was an inveterate participant at the most diverse congresses and a curious visitor to that most typical of nineteenth-century celebrations, the international exposition[145]. At the age of seventy-eight he travelled to Paris for an electrotechnical

congress; some eleven years later he took part in a conference of Polish jurists and national economists[146].

In spite of his prolonged stays abroad, Cieszkowski's home continued to be Wierzenica. Here, he amassed an impressive library, estimated at between 10,000 and 40,000 volumes[147]. As might be expected, the German idealists were fully represented; indeed, Cieszkowski apparently had a copy of Hegel's complete works in each of his several houses. The theological collection was also particularly strong with a wealth of materials on Augustine, concordances and exegetical studies. Cieszkowski was fortunate in having two highly qualified and devoted protestant theologians in his service, C. Brade and K. Lehmann[148]. Both acted as secretaries, librarians and researchers for over thirty years; Brade lived in Wierzenica whereas Lehmann acted as Cieszkowski's agent in Berlin, supplying him with information on Ionian philosophy in the 1830's, working on a German translation of the first volume of the *Our Father* in the early 1850's – against Cieszkowski's wishes – and still providing him with works on eschatology almost twenty years later![149]

While at home, one of the main foci of Cieszkowski's activities was the Posen Society of the Friends of Learning, (*Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk*). In fact, it was nothing but the realization of the notion of a society of "friends of progress" as sketched in the *Rok* article. This notion had been politicized in the Polish League; in 1857, it was reintellectualized to emerge as a scientific society in two sections, the moral-historical and the natural-scientific, and comparable in both spirit and style to an eighteenth-century provincial academy[150]. Cieszkowski served briefly as the Society's first president and, as long as he was a deputy, defended the Society against German pressures and chicanery[151]. He presided again between 1861 and 1868 as well as between 1885 and 1894. Clearly, the Society, which still exists today, bears him an unique debt as its founder, patron and – for so many years – its principal organizer.

In his later years and within the framework of the Posen Society, Cieszkowski returned to an early interest in the natural sciences. He lectured on earthquakes, problems of ether and matter, electromagnetism. He opened the Society to discussions of Darwinism, personally maintaining that this presented no problems of compatibility for Christian dogma inasmuch as even Darwin would have to admit that God had planted the seeds of all things and would have to treat evolution

teleologically[152]. Just as the sugar beet had excited his imagination in his youth, so in his old age he was absorbed in the eucalyptus with its tremendous medicinal value and sought to acclimatize it in Europe[153]. The scientific study of social problems was also among his concerns; in his last years, he studied and lectured on hygiene and alcoholism[154].

At the same time, and in spite of a dwindling fortune, Cieszkowski continued to fund various schemes which combined science with charity. He created several stipends in statistics, administration and cameral studies for students at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow who knew only Polish[155]. He offered a generous prize for a history of the peasants and of economic conditions in Poland, vitally needed since – as he put it – "our history teaches us only the history of one class formerly ruling the nation"[156]. Cieszkowski's pet project was the creation of an agricultural school which he named after his late wife. The need for a better knowledge of agricultural methods was particularly acute because of the competition to Polish agriculture from American and even Egyptian wheat. The founder spared no expense or effort, putting at the school's disposition land as well as the entire revenue from Wierzenica and seeking to attract to the school's faculty such prominent intellectuals as his former gymnasium teacher and well-known philosopher, Bronisław Trentowski. The school prospered quickly between 1870 and 1878, even drawing many students from outside Posen. In 1875, however, the government expelled a number of teachers and students, and three years later it ordered the liquidation of the school as a whole[157]. Given Cieszkowski's earlier experience with the Central Agricultural Society, the Polish League and other organizations, this heavy blow could hardly have come as a surprise.

After having withdrawn from politics, Cieszkowski abstained from any political gestures. Nevertheless, he could not resist two futile, even whimsical acts. In the 1860's he posed his candidacy for the Prussian House of Lords – a curious wish for someone who had twice voted in favour of the abolition of the nobility. The minister of the interior coldly replied that Cieszkowski was not eligible for membership in the *Grafensverband* inasmuch as his title was based on a foreign patent[158]. After the Franco–Prussian war, Cieszkowski wrote to Bismarck personally pleading with him not to take Alsace-Lorraine and suggesting that he seize Algeria instead[159]. Although his pleas were supported not only by moral agruments but by practical reasons, Cieszkowski could have had few illusions about the Iron Chancellor. Indeed, in an

unfinished and unpublished poem of the same period he drew an ironical but accurate portrait of Bismarck which shows that Cieszkowski had well understood the meaning of *Realpolitik*[160].

It is difficult to imagine Cieszkowski's own assessment of his life and achievements. He was accorded wide respect and various honours but he had never felt at ease in society and his contemporaries describe him in his later years as morose, lonely, rustic and unkempt in almost Tolstoyan fashion[161]. The dominant ideology was a positivism very distant from Cieszkowski's own views but in its emphasis on small-scale, non-political, organic work it descended directly, if unconsciously, from Cieszkowski's writings and pioneering activities. The new generation would have repudiated any connection with a highly religious, Hegelian idealist but it was none the less indebted to him, as Cieszkowski himself must have been aware. Cieszkowski's national hopes, the aims of 1830 and 1848, remained not only unrealized but immeasurably less attainable than ever before. Nevertheless, he defended to the end the road of peaceful construction and reform which he had chosen. Indeed, he reconciled himself with Poland's political non-existence to the extent of justifying it as a blessing. In one of his last recorded statements on the subject, he replied to a young Polish intellectual:

> Sleep is a necessary condition of maintaining the human organism, strengthening it and making it grow. It is not in vain that Providence has made Poland leave the community of living nations in this century when merchantdom and material strength dominate spiritual law... Providence wanted to protect us from an orgy of destruction, from a baccanalia of licence, from a pagan bazaar and a prostitution of the spirit. Let us not complain of our impotence and slavery. It will be the source of our strength, rebirth and grandeur. If we sleep through this century we alone shall preserve what other nations will lose: the spiritual heritage of our fathers, the purity of intentions and a faith in the future. We shall wake up strong again and healthy for action in the twentieth century when a new era will come alive for humanity. Let us only maintain the normal functions of the bodily organism. As a man breathes in his sleep, so we shall work economically and culturally in our political sleep – such are the ways of the spirit... let us not remember ourselves to the world for the world will oppress us... *faisons les morts, inertia sapientiae*... [162]

Thus, in a typically organic analogy, Cieszkowski manages to combine his regret, even horror, of existing reality with another expression of infinite faith in the future. This position explains in part why Cieszkowski refused to publish the bulk of the *Our Father*, and would not even acknowledge authorship of the parts which had already

appeared. In fact, it throws light on his writings as a whole, which are so many steps in the preparation of the new era. Moreover, it explains Cieszkowski's willingness to work slowly for the changes he foresaw and his patience in the face of failure. Above all, it is a tribute to the generosity of his vision that for a period of over fifty years, from the appearance of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* to the last manuscript notes of the *Our Father*, Cieszkowski persevered undaunted along the same path, convinced that the rationality and goodness inherent in his conception of history were sufficient guarantees of realization.

CHAPTER XI

OUR FATHER

The *Our Father* deserves both more and less attention than I propose to give it. On the one hand, this work is usually considered the culmination of Cieszkowski's life and writings. Apparently, the author himself gave rise to such interpretation on his deathbed by referring to it as "the trunk of which all else (he) wrote or did are but branches"[1]. By extension – and with scant regard to the text itself – the *Our Father* is considered sometimes as a summary or even an apogee of Polish Messianism[2]. Certainly, in terms of scope, ambition and its author's devotion to it, this work surpasses any of Cieszkowski's single publications. It is a grand, and even moving, vision which commands attention if one is to understand the impulse behind Cieszkowski's numerous writings and activities. On the other hand, one cannot escape the fact that the *Our Father*, in spite of its three or four volumes, is an unfinished, and in large part, unpublished work whose posthumous publication the author hardly encouraged[3]. I would suggest that this reluctance goes well beyond the reasons suggested by his contemporaries – the fear of scandalizing the Church and the *salons*[4]. It resides in the intensely personal character of the *Our Father*, which makes it less a treatise than a systematic series of notes and meditations organized under the guiding inspiration of a single, powerful idea: the Dominical Prayer as a prophecy of the third era of history.

Above all, it is difficult to say precisely what the *Our Father* adds to Cieszkowski's ideas and outlook. The arguments are familiar to anyone acquainted with his previous writings; its spirit echoes his lifelong attitudes. Indeed, in this study I have consistently presumed that a biographical examination and analysis of his numerous, even minor, works casts light on Cieszkowski – and incidentally illuminates the *Our Father* – more than concentration on this important but complementary work. The *Our Father* is Cieszkowski's crowning achievement only in the sense that it crowns a pre-existing and self-sufficient structure.

With this much said, one can begin to assess the place of the *Our Father* within the whole of Cieszkowski's life and works. It is a systematization and often an elaboration of his ideas. Above all, it is a

key to his thought. Figuratively speaking, the *Our Father* does not so much add to the store of knowledge about the author but opens the door towards an understanding of him. In integrating Cieszkowski's diverse contributions under a single heading, it reveals the ethical and epistemological basis of his world view. More simply stated, it does not add to *what* Cieszkowski thought or did but explains *why*. For this reason, an examination of the *Our Father* is a fitting conclusion to this study.

I

The project of the *Our Father* undoubtedly arose very early. One can discount the version recounted by Cieszkowski Junior according to which his father had been suddenly inspired, in the purest mystical tradition, while reciting the Lord's Prayer at Mass in 1831–32, and had sat down immediately to writing the work under the same divine guidance, finally completing it in 1836[5]. Nevertheless, it is true that the origins of the *Our Father* can be traced back to the 1830's. The *Diaries* of those years contain numerous passages reproduced without alteration in the manuscript of the work, as well as hints and allusions which suggest a belief in the prophetical value of the Dominical Prayer specifically[6]. Thus, although it is impossible to determine the date of the work's genesis, one must concede a certain precocity in the formation of Cieszkowski's ideas. On the other hand, one can only marvel at the steadfastness with which he clung to his original inspiration. There is evidence that Cieszkowski was working on the third volume in the late 1870's[7]. There is strong reason to suspect that he was still writing in the 1890's[8]. In short, a project conceived when he was virtually an adolescent still occupied Cieszkowski some sixty years later and even then remained unfinished and unannounced. Clearly, the writing took place in fits and starts. Throughout the 1850's, for example – years of political activity and matrimonial happiness – the work does not seem to have advanced at all. Nevertheless, the sheer duration of the inspiration points to a high degree of continuity in Cieszkowski's thought and an overriding commitment to this particular project.

This continuity can be explained by what I would call the agglutinative character of the *Our Father*. The basic structure of the work allowed Cieszkowski to add bits and pieces virtually indefinitely. Thus, the

conclusion, the *Amen*, dated 1836, was composed well before the bulk of the work[9]. The second volume probably antedates the first[10]. Significantly, the component parts are most unequal in length. Thus, the first introductory volume is over two hundred pages long; the discussion of the first part of the prayer runs to over four hundred pages while the second through seventh parts together make up no more than three hundred pages. It would seem that Cieszkowski intended each part to constitute a separate volume. The extent to which the manuscript falls short of this plan is an indication of the fragmentary nature of the work as it has come down to us.

The only personal and direct influence on the composition of the *Our Father* seems to have been Zygmunt Krasiński's. Indeed, he seems to be the only person with whom the author ever discussed his project at all. Throughout the 1840's, Krasiński read whatever was available of the manuscript and offered both encouragement and criticism. Cieszkowski allowed himself to be swayed by the poet's insistence that the prayers be preceded by the lengthy historiosophical introduction which was to become Volume I[11]. Upon Krasiński's urging, and over his own reluctance, Cieszkowski allowed this part to be published separately and anonymously in Paris in 1848. Apparently, it was only Krasiński's intervention which prevented Cieszkowski from burning the entirety of the manuscript[12]. If one is to take Krasiński's letters at face value, it was his entreaties which kept the *Our Father* from degenerating into a communistic work akin in spirit to the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, and saved the manuscript from falling into doctrinal errors and perhaps even losing sight of Christianity entirely[13]. Obviously, both the author and the readers of the *Our Father* owe a very mixed debt to Krasiński: his exhortations may have spurred Cieszkowski on but they clearly deflected him from his original intentions. It is hypothetical to inquire what the *Our Father* might have been otherwise, but it is proper to keep in mind the social and theological radicalism of its pristine form.

The indirect influences can be more categorically identified for they are those which mark Cieszkowski's other works. Above all, Hegel dominates in every way. The *Our Father* is an exercise in dialectical reasoning, however forced or simplified this application may appear to be, for Cieszkowski not only seeks truth through the use of the dialectical weapon but uses this arm as sufficient proof for his conclusions. The philosophy of history which underlies the *Our Father* is

borrowed for the most part from Hegel, and here too its derivation is taken as evidence of its truth. Indeed, even the fundamental historiosophical notion of the *Our Father* – the division of history into eras of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost – is an existing though subordinate theme in Hegel[14].

The second source for the *Our Father* lies not so much in the doctrines as in the spirit of the French socialists. True, one can pinpoint certain specific theories: the search for a Christian philosophy of history is to be found in Buchez[15]; the imminence of a second Revelation is a notion of Fourier, and Leroux develops this into a theory of successive revelations[16]; the highly stylized, Biblical prose of the *Our Father* finds its model in Lamennais. Finally, naive theories of a coming Kingdom of God abound in such diverse thinkers as Cabet, or the French inspired German, Weitling, or the Polish émigré, Królikowski[17]. Common to all these theories is the problem of infusing properly religious concepts with social meaning. Acutely conscious of living in an age of transition, the utopian socialists sought to adapt familiar values and even doctrines to changed circumstances. They, like Cieszkowski, implicitly believed in the archetypal character of the religious bond and the progressive or cumulative nature of revelation. In all likelihood, they would have both understood and warmly approved Cieszkowski's intention of proving the relevance of the Dominical Prayer for the present day and particularly for the future.

Going beyond specific influences, the *Our Father* invites comparison with several classic attempts to grasp history as a whole in Christian terms. Augustine's *Civitas Dei* can be compared with Cieszkowski's work only in terms of their common scope and intention: to offer a unified vision of history which would explain God's ways to men. In their actual content, they are antithetical for the reconciliation which Augustine offers is actually a resignation from this-worldly hopes while Cieszkowski's vision breathes optimism regarding the possibility of transcendence within this world[18]. Methodologically, the *Our Father* may be inspired by Joachim di Fiore, a medieval mystic and exegetist, who sought to divine the future by a careful study of prophetical elements in the Old Testament much as Cieszkowski looked for a key to the future in the Dominical Prayer. Indeed, Joachim proceeded dialectically, showing the concordance between the Old and the New Testaments and concluding therefrom that a third, synthetical era was at hand[19].

Closer in both time and spirit to the *Our Father* is Lessing's *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*. Here, the Enlightenment touches Christian eschatology respectfully, even sympathetically. According to Lessing, "revelation is education which has come and is yet coming to the human race"[20]. In an organic analogy dear also to Cieszkowski, Lessing speaks of the Old Testament as a primer of mankind's childhood and the New Testament as a textbook of mankind's youth. As man approaches maturity he discovers that the truths of revelation which he has long accepted are also truths of reason. In words which converge entirely with Cieszkowski's claims on behalf of the Dominical Prayer, Lessing says of the New Testament: "Might there not also be in this Book... truths... prefigured, mirrored as it were which we are to marvel at as revelations, exactly so long as the time when reason shall come to educe them..."[21]. At that future moment, mankind will enter into a new, a third era; Joachim di Fiore's Eternal Gospel, Lessing concludes, was not erroneous but simply premature.

The *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* belongs to a specific Enlightenment undercurrent which affected thinkers as important in Cieszkowski's philosophical formation as Schelling and even Hegel[22]. Moreover, the work finds its way into Saint-Simonianism, whose founder had produced independently a quite different but complementary project for the adaptation of Christianity to the modern era, a project which he justified in historiosophical terms. Saint-Simon's *Nouveau Christianisme* repeats Lessing's belief in the incompleteness of existing Christianity and the passage to a higher form of religion[23]. Whereas Lessing had expressed this historical development as the progress of reason, Saint-Simon gives it a predominantly social formulation. The aim of history is no longer the co-incidence of reason and revelation but the realization of an original and forgotten Christian value: the improvement of the lot of the class which is most numerous and poorest[24].

The point of departure of both the *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts* and the *Nouveau Christianisme* is the same. The latter declares:

> The people of God (i.e., the Jews – AL) have always felt that the Christian doctrine founded by the Fathers of the Church was incomplete. They have always proclaimed that a great epoch would come to which they have given the name *Messianic* when religious doctrine would be presented with all the generality of which it is capable and both spiritual and temporal power would be equally regulated. Then, the whole human race would have but a single religion and the same organization[25].

However, Saint-Simon brushes aside Lessing's cautious and tentative hypotheses to assert that he sees the new doctrine clearly and will, in fact, produce it himself. In an address to the pope and cardinals, he contrasts it with existing religion:

> You should no longer turn the attention of the faithful to abstract ideas. Only in properly employing sensual ideas, in combining them in such a way as to obtain the highest degree of felicity possible on earth, will you be able to constitute Christianity as a general, universal and unique religion[26].

Thus, Saint-Simon's attempt at a Christian philosophy of history turns out to be little more than a rationalization of social goals in religious terms. In this respect, the *Nouveau Christianisme* is a prelude to the fusion of religion and socialism in the following generation, Cieszkowski's contemporaries and indeed, Cieszkowski himself.

The author of the *Our Father* was obviously aware of his own participation in a tradition of Christian historiosophy. He spoke of Augustine with the respect due to a Father of the Church and a great philosopher but without committing himself to an Augustinian view on any subject of importance (*O.F.*, vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 40–42). For Joachim di Fiore, he reserved the slightly condescending affection of a scientist for a pre-scientific precursor (*O.F.*, vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 17ff). Lessing commanded unqualified respect but he too represented the rationalism of a dying era (*Ibid.*, p. 25ff). Curiously, Cieszkowski specifically disassociated himself from Saint-Simon's *Nouveau Christianisme* (*O.F.*, vol. III, 1st ed., p. 260). Perhaps it is easier to acknowledge distant ancestors than one's immediate teachers, particularly when the latter have presented not sources for one's own work but alternative variations on the same theme.

With this much said by way of background to the *Our Father*, in the following sections I propose to review the elements of the work in the order in which they appear and then reconstitute the arguments in their natural sequence. Hopefully, this procedure will allow the reader to form his own judgements not only regarding the *Our Father* itself, but regarding the positions I have advanced in respect to the intellectual genealogy of the work as well as its place in Cieszkowski's life and thought.

II

The first volume of the *Our Father* in the posthumous editions is preceded by a short tract entitled 'The Ways of the Spirit', which was

written in 1863 and read to a meeting of the Posen Society of the Friends of Learning[27]. The tract is a programmatic declaration stated in philosophical terms. Essentially, its message is very simple: the ways of the spirit are many but their aim is one – the elevation of humanity to the level of a free, social and practical spirit (*O.F.*, vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. XXXII–XXXVII). Hence, even the most humble human efforts contribute in the construction of the "fortresses of the spirit" (*Ibid.*, p. XXXV). Quite rightly, the 'Ways of the Spirit' has been called "the most profoundly argued philosophical manifestation of organic work"[28].

In addition to re-stating the metaphysical assumptions behind Cieszkowski's political and social activity, the 'Ways of the Spirit' is more specifically relevant to the *Our Father* in exposing a basic premise of the work as a whole. "All the secrets of thought are accessible to the Word" (*Ibid.*, p. III), Cieszkowski begins, and he concludes therefrom that the time of mysteries is over. Chiding Mickiewicz gently for his mysticism, the author of the *Our Father* declares that the inchoate truths of mysticism must be absorbed and reformulated in the idiom of absolute knowledge. Only then will the mysteries of being and the truths of thought coincide: being will be internalized and *logos* will be externalized (*Ibid.*, p. V). When all men realize this, the realm of being itself will be transformed according to the dictates of truth. The unstated but implicit conclusion is that the Dominical Prayer, long recited as a divine mystery, will become the rational guide to that transformation.

The *Our Father* itself opens with an expression of horror at the universal crisis which is raging at present:

> Holy God! what is happening in the world? Everything is so splendid and yet so terrible!... What seas of delight and what oceans of suffering... What privation in public affairs and what ignominy in private things – idleness is sanctified and virtue lies idle – the secular arm has fallen back and the spiritual arm has withered – Everyone uses God's word but everyone abuses it and no one lives in it nor it in anyone – the fraternity of people and peoples is loudly proclaimed – and the crimes of Cain pass from people to peoples... Before us we have unimaginable miracles of industry and unbelievable treasures of science – In front of our eyes rise the monuments of an enormous and feverish work... yet in the face of all this, people and peoples are yearning, sighing and groaning – What has been the sense of all these accomplishments? What has the gold of the rich brought? What has the heroism of nations won? Finally, what have the tears of so many generations achieved? (*Ibid.*, p. I).

This note of anguish runs through the whole of the *Our Father.* However, it is by no means an expression of despair for the present

crisis contains within itself the seeds of its own overcoming. A similar crisis occurred only once before in history and, at that time, it ushered in Christianity. Today, as Cieszkowski intends to show, the crisis promises the dawn of a new era. The proof of this assertion constitutes the first volume of the *Our Father*; the nature of the new era is the subject of the remainder of the work. At this point, however, the author cannot refrain from providing a word of encouragement and a challenge to humanity:

> Today the salvation of men and peoples – of the masses and of humanity depends on them alone. The age of grace is over; the age of merit is at hand... (*Ibid.*, p. 3).

Comparing mankind's passage from the old era to the new to a journey over stormy seas, Cieszkowski writes:

> Your helmsman is Christ – your magnetic compass is fraternal love – and your guiding star is the holy prayer which He has given you. This prayer contains everything *which you will require in the future.* It has shown you everything which you have sought till now, everything to which you should incline, and which today, with the fulfillment of the ages, you must grasp and achieve... In your memory (Christ) left a record of your future heritage for the time when you will come of age. This legacy of Christ – this eternal testament – this monument left so as to show you the way to safe harbor – is the last expression of the series of divine revelations to the human race. It is the fulfillment and accomplishment of all previous revelations. It is the *revelation of revelations* (*Ibid.*, p. 4).

The prayer in question is obviously the *Our Father* which humanity has so often recited as a series of private requests without realizing that it is, in fact, a sequence of social prophecies which together constitute the essence of the historical future. Cieszkowski states this crucial hypothesis on which he is to build his *Our Father*:

> The Lord's Prayer is a succession of social petitions. Hence, it is the expression of the needs and strivings of all society. It was given to us by the Saviour Himself in order to indicate to us the essential aims of humanity and to give us a pledge of their attainment for He has said "Ask and you shall receive". It thus constitutes God's true revelation for it reveals not that which is but that which will be, not that which a single Christian but that which all humanity seeks... (*Ibid.*, p. 13).

Having thus stated his premises and his intentions, Cieszkowski turns to a review of the historical past and the principles of the philosophy of history. The periodization and characterization of the three historical eras are those of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*; the details draw closely on Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. Thus, Cieszkowski contrasts the organic, substantial era of antiquity with the critical and reflective Christian age. For Cieszkowski as for Hegel, the

coming of Christ constitutes the midpoint of history. For the author of the *Our Father*, however, the crises of the last three centuries – from the Protestant Reformation to the French Revolution – mark the end of an era rather than a beginning. Napoleon is to Christianity what Caesar is to antiquity: not a harbinger of freedom but a destructive genius who prepares the future only to the extent that he dissolves the bonds of the present (*Ibid.*, p. 35).

In the *Our Father*, the entire Christian era is depicted in terms of pure and complete antithesis. Thus, Cieszkowski veers much closer to Young Hegelian radicals who stressed the negativity of the dialectic, than to Hegel himself. In fact, however, this negativity is subordinated to Cieszkowski's main purpose: to show the incompleteness of the reconciliation effected by Christianity. Thus, the resurrection of Christ is extolled as a prefiguration of the coming regeneration of humanity. Indeed, Christ's historical role – and with it perhaps his ontological status – is tacitly minimized by declaring Him to be the symbol of the second era, just as Adam was of the first, and the Paraclete will be in the coming third era (*Ibid.*, pp. 36–38). At times, Cieszkowski comes close to suggesting that Christianity like the Fall is a *felix culpa*, a foil against which mankind must struggle if it is to attain its destiny. More often, and somewhat inconsistently, he argues that the future will see the perfection or the fulfillment of Christianity. In any case, his meaning is clear: the Christian era, as men have known it, is over; the future calls, at the very least, for a new explosion of Christianity and perhaps for a new religion of the spirit[29].

The precise nature of the coming era is to be deduced from the seven petitions which make up the Lord's Prayer. *A priori*, however, the application of the dialectic to history can give an idea of its overall character. Not only will the future be the antithesis of the Christian antithesis, but it will be a synthesis of Antiquity and Christianity. Thus, the objective spirit of the *polis* and Roman law will merge with subjective morality to form a new and free sociability. Hegel had an inkling of the coming synthesis which he had referred to as *Sittlichkeit*. According to Cieszkowski, however, *Sittlichkeit* clings too closely to the past and hence, "sociability" conveys more fully the practical, public, and generalized spirit of the future (*Ibid.*, p. 87).

Whatever else Cieszkowski says of the nature of the future in this first volume of the *Our Father* harks back to the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*. Of course, one of the key arguments of this earlier

work, the knowability of the future, is integrated into the *Our Father* as its premise. Indeed, in Cieszkowski's view, the Dominical Prayer itself is the most perfect illustration of the truth of this argument inasmuch as it foretells the future. As might be expected, the future "sociability" is closely linked to the notions of *praxis* and the deed. In fact, the relation is complex: mankind must merit the third era through its deeds. As Cieszkowski puts it, "there is no promised land; it must be created" (*Ibid.*, p. 140). Thus, the deed is the midwife of the third era. Once it has fulfilled this function, however, the deed will not pass into history but will continue to be the salient characteristic of the third age. In other words, the aim of history is neither to integrate man within existing being nor to attain absolute knowledge but to create an utopia which will serve as a framework for man's infinite practical activity or work. Here, the Will – a faculty which enables man to transform wishes and knowledge into concrete reality – which is a dominant theme of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, finds its place within the structure of the *Our Father.*

Certain subordinate themes of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* come to the fore in the historiosophical part of the *Our Father*'s first volume. Earlier, Cieszkowski had hinted at a "new migration of nations" which would announce the passage to the era of the deed (*PzH*, p. 30). Here, he points specifically to the Slavs as agents of the third era. Applying the same rigid dialectical scheme which he uses elsewhere, Cieszkowski proves the historical necessity of the future pre-eminence of the Slavonic nations and demonstrates that they are a perfect antithesis to the Germanic nations who inaugurated and dominated the Christian era. The first part of the argument rests on the assumption that since the Slavs are the only major group of nations which has not yet played a historical role, as have the Latins and the Germans, its mission must lie in the future. Moreover, the peaceful and profoundly social nature of the Slavs, which contrasts so vividly with the belligerence and individualism of the Germans, provides confirmation of their fitness to lead all humanity into a peaceful and social future.

The first volume of the *Our Father* ends with a lengthy aside on the concepts of time and space. Cieszkowski's argument is that both these concepts must be seen in terms of a continuum. There can be no radical disjuncture between past, present and future for time is a single steady flow, a perpetual process of becoming. Hence, eternity cannot be opposed to finite time; rather, time as men experience it – the

historical past, for instance – is related to eternity as a part is to a whole. Similarly, the other-worldly does not lie in a separate temporal, or even spatial dimension. The other-worldly co-exists with the this-worldly as a series of planets at different stages of development co-exist in a single cosmos. Initially, these affirmations seem to fly in the face of Cieszkowski's earlier strict periodization of history. In fact, they confirm his central point: that history as a whole constitutes one organic unit. It is precisely for that reason that the future can be deduced from the past. More important is the polemical and critical aspect of Cieszkowski's assertions: if eternity (Latin: *aeternitas* from *aeviterus*; Polish: *wieczność*) is but the sum of the ages (Latin: *aevum*; Polish: *wiek*), then mankind is already participating in eternity. If the earth is an integral part of that evolving cosmic whole known as "the heavens", then the notion of otherworldliness loses its connotation of earthly trascendence and comes to refer to the future, more perfect form of this earth itself. In short, the Christian dualism which opposes this life to an eternal after-life and this world to a heavenly paradise must be abolished.

The inspiration for these notions would seem to lie in Fourier who, like Fontenelle and Kent before him, had spoken of a spiralling palingenetical transmigration of souls from one planet to another[30]. As usual, Cieszkowski is cautious for although he quotes Ecclesiastes', "there is nothing new under the sun", he refrains from pursuing the hypothesis that all future history has already been played out on some other higher planet. Rather, he asserts that humanity's immortal spirit is progressively being reborn without needing to leave this planet. Moreover, Cieszkowski refuses to speculate about what he calls absolute eschatology, i.e., the post-historical. He suggests that the dawning third era, the age of mankind's maturity, may not be the final step in man's evolution; perhaps mankind has an angelic future. However, the *Our Father* does not pretend to offer a new revelation; its author merely presumes to draw out the truths hidden in the Lord's Prayer, to make its implicit meaning explicit. Thus, Cieszkowski puts aside absolute eschatology and continues with his exegesis of the blueprint for the third era.

III

The second volume of the *Our Father* begins with an analysis of its invocation. What is the meaning of divine paternity? Above all,

according to Cieszkowski, it indicates a relation between God and man based on paternal and filial love. Indeed, the bond of love is the organic equivalent of the physical principle of attraction. As appropriate to the third era, love is a powerful practical force: "whereas faith redeems and hope confirms, love fulfills, executes and accomplishes" (*O.F.*, vol. II, 1st ed. p. 42). Thus, the Lord's Prayer precedes its prophecies not with counsel or dogma but with an affirmation that the third era will be permeated by the eminently social virtue of charity.

The rest of this first part dealing with the notion of "Father" exemplifies Cieszkowski's method throughout the work. Studying all the current and possible uses of the term in its etymological derivation, Cieszkowski reconstructs not only the actual but the potential connotations of the term. Thus, he speaks at length and admiringly of patriotism which is both an imitation and a foreshadowing of the divine and paternal tie. By contrast, he pities heartless cosmopolitans and atheists as spiritual orphans. Similarly, Cieszkowski refers to the maternal nature of various institutions: the university, one's *alma mater*; the earth, which is correctly referred to as our natural mother; above all, the Church, a prefiguration of that highest motherland and fatherland towards which mankind is tending – the *plenitudo gentium* which will encompass all humanity. Thus, for Cieszkowski, as for the Saint-Simonians, the divine form does not transcend sexuality but glories in being both male and female: our father is also mother. In praying "Our Father", one is invoking all possible meanings of parenthood.

The notion of divine paternity implies human fraternity, Cieszkowski continues, but to emphasize still further the social solidarity which Christianity has announced and which the third era will realize, the address to the "Father" in the Lord's Prayer is preceded by the invocation "Our". Earlier in the same volume, Cieszkowski had pointed to various institutions – English Friendly Societies; the Red Cross; his own Polish League – as expressions of a growing consciousness of the power of association and the need for solidarity to achieve practical reforms. Religion, as Cieszkowski never tires of reminding his readers, comes from *re-ligare*, to tie together. It refers to the establishment of harmony within man, between man and God and among men. Thus, religion in its very essence is a social tie.

The natural consequences of our divinely founded brotherhood have been grasped in the modern call for "liberty, equality, fraternity". Men perceive themselves not as God's servants, as they did in antiquity,

but as His beloved offspring endowed with the quality of free agents. Inasmuch as they recognize the universality of this relationship they must acknowledge the equal dignity of all other men. Finally, the proclamation of fraternity summarizes the sense of active solidarity which is required to transform the world. Typical of the present age of crisis, however, men have failed to recognize these true foundations of "liberty, equality, fraternity". Thus, they have interpreted the noble motto in a purely negative way as a call for destruction, class-hatred and egoism. Here, however, Cieszkowski turns his anger not on these misguided revolutionaries but on the men in power who recite the "Our Father" without acknowledging that it too is a declaration of liberty, equality, fraternity. Thus, the chapter develops into a critique of existing abstract freedom and abstract equality, a denunciation of economic exploitation and a call for a "social Providence which will take care of God's children from cradle to grave" (*Ibid.*, p. 181). Inasmuch as all these points belong to, and indeed reappear, in a later chapter, Cieszkowski – quite typically – has allowed himself to be carried away from the main course of his argument. It is significant, however, that a section which began as a discussion of solidarity and developed into a critique of modern revolutionism should conclude with an indictment of the existing order. In short, even the movement of revolution would seem to promise more than the stagnation of the present.

The following chapter, entitled "The present crisis", lies somewhat *hors texte.* Instead of repeating the *Weltschmerz* of the opening of the *Our Father,* it examines the problem of revolution as a means of overcoming this crisis. According to Cieszkowski, violence belongs to periods of historical immaturity; the present day calls for organic processes of change. Especially today, amid the marvellous technical and social accomplishments of modernity, revolution is far too crude and costly a means of achieving one's goals. Indeed, revolutions are never causes but consequences of progress. They are merely external manifestations in the social world of that which has already occurred within the spirit. Here, the argument turns into an appeal. On the one hand, Cieszkowski begs the "elder brothers", as he calls both leading nations and men in power, to repeat the noble gesture of August 4, 1789, to renounce their privileges and reform their ways, to show that *noblesse oblige,* and to do this before it is too late. On the other hand, he turns to the unhappy, the oppressed, the "Reds" who are dialectical

opposites of the "Blacks", which include socialists, formerly but no longer distinguishable from communists and demagogues. In a familiar image, he compares them to moles whose underground burrowing undermines the social order. He implores these new socialists to relinquish for a moment their deep and justified suspicions and to seek their goals through peaceful association not conspiracy or war. As he has stated so many times before, Cieszkowski insists once again that nothing is irreconcilable: the steam engine has managed to conciliate the two most unlikely elements, fire and water, and their combination is a source of power for mankind. The socialists could be the salt of the earth, he concludes, instead they are the Jesuits of progress.

The last chapter of the second volume is somewhat *pro forma*, for the analysis of the phrase "who art in heaven" repeats most of the arguments about time and space summarized at the end of the first volume. In fact, this passage illustrates both the unfinished character and the confining nature of the structure which Cieszkowski has imposed on his work: the sequence of the Lord's Prayer requires this analysis at this point, even if it is redundant. Thus, once again, Cieszkowski criticizes the empty eternity without time and the abstract omnipresence without place which dominate the thought of Christianity. He explains his notion of planetary development figuratively: the Sunday of one world may be the Monday or Tuesday of another. Moreover, he emphasizes that what we call the "end of the world" is actually a transformation and not an abolition. Finally, he hints that in a post-historical, absolutely eschatological age even the paternal relationship of God to man will be replaced by one more akin to the marital relationship as prefigured by Christ's mystic marriage to the Church. Even in God's fatherly love a certain dualism persists, for the relationship is not one of absolute equality; God is still above men, the divine spirit does not yet dwell within men and among them. In the distant future, humanity will see itself as the Body of God, not just ideally but absolutely, and consequently any wickedness will become sacrilege. Clearly, the unstated implication is that man will become God.

IV

In a sense, the *Our Father* only properly begins with the third volume (of the first edition) where Cieszkowski turns to analysis of the seven

petitions which constitute the essence of the prayer. As if to underline the transition into the heart of his work, the author precedes the third volume with a short personal prayer – a theological equivalent of an invocation to the muses. The passage is important in defining the author's perception of his own relation to his work. As Cieszkowski understands it, the Holy Spirit has allowed him to grasp that a great hour is at hand, the promises and pleas of the Lord's Prayer are on the verge of fulfillment. Indeed, Cieszkowski claims that long before he had subjected this intelligence to the rational exposition of the *Our Father*, divine inspiration had given him an intuition of the future. Although he himself clearly sees the dawn of the divine sun, Cieszkowski continues, his contemporaries are unable to peer through the mist. Thus, if God has truly chosen him as His herald, may God also guide his words so as to move men's hearts and souls. For a moment, a doubt flickers: perhaps the inspiration is not really divine; perhaps the *Our Father* will not be a work of redemption but of perdition, a new trial for mankind. However, doubts of this sort are sinful for if the author doubts the *Our Father*, what then can he believe? Moreover, Cieszkowski declares that he has found confirmation of his intuition in divine revelation, in learned works of all ages – indeed – in all that he has seen and known. Now, the force of circumstances itself will provide the final confirmation.

The first petition – "hallowed be Thy name" – presents two questions: what is the name of God? How should it be sanctified? Together they constitute a question about religion's two components – the theoretical which involves knowledge of God, and the practical which calls for service to Him. A preliminary question is whether the name of God can be known. Is not all determination a limitation and negation? Cieszkowski answers that one must distinguish between knowledge of an object and knowledge of its name; the latter depends on the consciousness of the knowing subject. Hence, as mankind has developed its consciousness it has adopted ever more perfect names for the Divine Being. Thus, *Jehova* succeeded *Elohim*, and was itself followed by *Logos*. Finally, mankind reached God's highest name: Spirit.

The concept of Spirit is central to the *Our Father* as it was to the *Gott und Palingenesie*. Spirit is the synthesis of absolute being and absolute thought; it is the unity of *Jehova* and *Logos*. It is not enough, however, to say that God is Spirit; each individual is a spirit as is each

nation, and even mankind as a whole. It is not even enough to say that God is Absolute Spirit for this acknowledges only a quantitative pre-eminence of the Divine Spirit over all others. The fullest and most perfect name of God is Holy Spirit which is mystically prefigured – although in an imperfect, disembodied form – in the Christian doctrine of the Holy Ghost.

Here, Cieszkowski applies his notion of a "revelation of the revelation", which is so typical of Fourier but which he attributes to de Maistre. Christ spoke of the Holy Spirit but only with the second revelation of the *Our Father* is His meaning understood. Similarly, the revelations of the Old and New Testaments only now coincide with the discoveries of science and philosophy. Both the earth and the spirit yield their secrets, without exposing any new truths but explaining and fulfilling dimly understood earlier revelations. The coming of Christ fulfilled the words of the prophets and the coming of the Holy Spirit fulfills the words of Christ. With every prophet God has revealed Himself further; indeed, even heresies are partial revelations. Apparently, the *Our Father* is to be taken as the last prophecy of history.

Cieszkowski tries scrupulously to remain within the realm of theological orthodoxy. Contrary to what he has suggested in the privacy of his *Diaries*, here he insists that God Himself does not develop in the course of history but only man's knowledge of Him. To buttress his various arguments, Cieszkowski abundantly cites the most unimpeachable patristic sources and carefully disassociates himself from a succession of heresies. Here, as elsewhere in the *Our Father*, Cieszkowski's scholarship is impressive but it does not quite succeed in convincing the reader that the *Our Father* is really drawing the obvious consequences from a long and venerable tradition nor in minimizing Cieszkowski's divergences from conventional Christianity. For instance, in discussing the question of how the name of God is to be sanctified, Cieszkowski is careful to mark the distance between himself and contemporary religious innovators, especially mentioning Swedenborg's *New Jerusalem*, Saint-Simonianism and Irwingism (*O.F.*, vol. III, 1st ed., p. 260). All these misguided experiments are symptoms of the times. Just as in Antiquity men required miracles to prove the authenticity of the Old Testament and in Christianity men sought rational proofs for the truth of the New Testament, so today men create new religions dimly sensing that the deeds of experimental religious practice can authenticate the revelation of the revelation

which men are awaiting and open the new era for which they are yearning.

Christianity is already the absolute religion, but it has only founded and not developed the truths which men need for salvation. Consequently, in response to the needs of the age, Cieszkowski too offers his blueprint of a religious reform. In distinction to all others this religion will not be truly new but rather it will be the sum and product of all religions. In this sense it will be the most universal, the most catholic for it will distill all preceding religions within itself to produce the essence of religiosity. This will be the religion of the Holy Spirit awaited throughout history. As Cieszkowski himself puts it:

> All myths and all rites, all prophecies and all revelations, all dogmas and all commandments, even all errors and heresies, pointed only to this, prophesized only this, gradually foretold it and serially exposed its essence...
>
> Thus, the history of all religions, the panorama of faiths and rites seemingly so incompatible is only the process of development and the progress of the Holy Spirit's self-revelation and the maturing of finite spirits as they approached Him (*Ibid.*, pp. 262–263).

Like all other religions, the religion of the Holy Spirit has its own dogmas and rites. As might be expected, its theology is that of the *Our Father*, with an overriding emphasis on practical deeds. Thus, its liturgy is one of pure social practice: the Holy Spirit does not call for mortification and withdrawal but for social service and active citizenship. Within the church hierarchy, position will be determined solely by merit as measured by one's contribution to the community. However, all men will be priests for all men must participate actively in that sacred and priestly function which is social life. The religious duties of the future, the coming social sacraments are to be discussed in the remaining six petitions of the *Our Father*. Here, Cieszkowski summarizes the impact of the religious revolution and its significance:

> The religious permeation of all life's activities, the sanctification of all vital matters, the vivification of religiosity itself is the very nature, the very destiny of man, born for society, called from his cradle to the sociability of the Holy Spirit and treading towards this goal weakly and slowly in the past but with progressively greater steps (*Ibid.*, p. 290).

Thus, the first petition of the *Our Father* which is an inquiry into the nature of God shades off into a discussion of social organization. The last volume opens with an analysis of the second petition – "Thy kingdom come" – whose purpose is obviously and exclusively social. First, Cieszkowski dispels the apparent contradiction between this

petition and Christ's declaration that His kingdom is not *now* of this world. Then, Cieszkowski studies the concept of a divine kingdom as it has manifested itself in Christian consciousness; he examines the relevant Scriptural passages, chiliastic interpretations, and finally the working out of the notion of tradition. Three possible explanations have come down to the present day: the Kingdom of God as the visible Church, as the communion of saints, and as a future afterlife. However, these notions fail to penetrate to the essence of the Kingdom of God because they are conditioned by the dualism of the second era. Christianity has assumed two worlds, a *Civitas Dei* and a *Civitas terrena.* It has posited their absolute contradiction by a rigid separation of religion and politics and institutionalized this contradiction in the dichotomy of church and state. This radical antagonism has been fatal to both: religion has lost its power and politics has lost its soul. The result is a morbid indifference of each for the other. Typically, Cieszkowski draws an elaborate analogy with the natural world to illustrate this problem:

> Can these two opposite poles of human existence, these two opposing electrical charges – whose aim is to flow into each other as they did during the dynamic harmony of the middle ages – long maintain themselves in the indifference in which we see them...
>
> If, because of time or the humidity of the social atmosphere, you should think that one of these electric charges has already spent itself and you need no longer concern yourselves with it, then learn that the other one has also disappeared, because one is the condition of the other. Otherwise your whole battery is dead (*O.F.*, vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 47–48).

The Kingdom of God to be inaugurated in the age of the Holy Spirit will unite religion and politics in a new synthesis. Christianity, hitherto an ideal, ethereal generality will be completed by the particularity characteristic of antiquity. Humanity's dismembered religious soul and its truncated political body will both be revitalized. In a tentative definition, Cieszkowski states that the Kingdom of God will be "the organic state of societies – the unification of the world – the harmony of nations – the political church of mankind" (*Ibid.*, p. 54). Here, religion and politics will be explicitly complementary as they have always been implicitly complementary:

> Religion *qua* soul and the political state *qua* body have always coincided with each other; once without consciousness of unity (i.e., in antiquity – *AL*); once in the consciousness of their distinctness (in Christianity – *AL*). Only today in the recognition of the full unification and harmony of the spirit, does the soul confirm itself in the body and the body in the soul (*Ibid.*, p. 85).

All this does not say very much about the actual form which the coming Kingdom of God will take. In spite of the tinge of medieval nostalgia, it will obviously bear no resemblance to the Holy Roman Empire or to the Papal States. By the very nature of the concept, one can assume a certain theocratic quality but this too will be without precedent and hence remains to be defined. Initially, Cieszkowski refuses to draw up an *a priori* constitution for the Kingdom; in a statement reminiscent of the conclusion of the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, he declares that he has no intention of adding to the lengthy list of utopias. However, he does go beyond the profound but insufficient assertion that in the Kingdom of God, religious and public duties will merge into one and public life will be sanctified.

The first principle of the Kingdom of God is communal self-government – also characterized as the subjective condition presumably because it governs the lives of individual citizens. As liberty defines the subjective essence of the Kingdom, so order must define its objective core: a strong central government is essential. Indeed, the coercive function of government will remain vital for a harmony without struggle or opposition would deprive the Kingdom of the ferment of progress. Cieszkowski maintains that election is the most natural and appropriate means of mandating a government. However, he refuses to advocate this single, uniform procedure for all nations and all offices. Above all, whatever principle of selection is chosen it must be self-created. In other words, it must arise naturally from the essence of the community and the function it is called upon to serve. Finally, Cieszkowski states the absolute, subjective-objective condition for the Kingdom of God. That is, in fact, a reminder: all guarantees and institutions will come to naught unless the Spirit reigns among men.

Throughout, Cieszkowski seeks to compare the Kingdom of God to its closest pre-figuration, the Catholic Church. Thus, he refers to the principle of election of the Supreme Pontiff and the earlier tradition of episcopal election. He sees monastic organization as the precursor of trade unions, fraternities and social-economic societies. Finally, he even fantasizes about a College for the Propagation of the Good which would be the historical offspring of the Roman College for the Propagation of the Faith and accomplish the same missionary work on behalf of the religion of the Holy Spirit which the former devotes to the spreading of Christianity. In spite of these comparisons, however, even Cieszkowski himself remains unconvinced: the originality of the Kingdom of God precludes its identification with any existing body.

The Kingdom of God will not really exist until its three organs – a world government, a parliament of humanity, and a tribunal of nations – embrace all mankind. In spite of this tendency towards a world state, Cieszkowski is clearly thinking of a confederative structure; he cites the Polish-Lithuanian union as a faint example of the sort of relation which he envisages. As he sees it, each nation contributes a certain particularity to the whole; indeed, nations in imitation of natural phenomena are divided into male and female which complement each other. This persistence of particularity explains more readily why the element of struggle will remain within the Kingdom of God. However, just as the unification of people within nations by the power of association is to be followed by the unification of nations among themselves, ever-present struggle will be transformed into harmonious contention. To put it in more modern terms, this Kantian league of nations will be governed by the rules of peaceful but competitive coexistence among nations.

As the first petition dealt with God and the second with humanity, so the third petition – "Thy will be done" – essentially concerns freedom. Much of the argument is familiar from the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.* Here too, the will is the unity of thought and being whose fruit is the deed of social practice. The free activity of the will which is freedom itself must be described, for want of better terms, as self-creation and self-development. The whole discussion of free will culminates in the definition of the person as a full and concrete individual actively willing the realization of his essential nature. The person finds his freedom in objective social institutions. Through and above them, he synthesizes duties and rights in the absolute category of virtue. Among the many manifestations of virtue Cieszkowski emphasizes the dedicated, even religious, accomplishment of public duties. Among the many characteristics of a fully developed free will is the integration of love of self and love of other into a love of species. Above all, however, the key to freedom lies in the harmonization of the human and the divine will:

> . . . the will of God is the Good of the world, universal happiness, the spiritual perfection of all. . . Men must come to the realization that a particular, limited good cannot be *good* because by its very nature the Good is a harmony, an accord. . . Thus, the good of an individual depends on the good of humanity and of nations, peoples as well as people, on the *community* of goods and not on that abstract *community* of some misguided communists. . .

> Only when men realize that true progress depends on *co-participation*, on mutual ties and obligations, on the harmonious unity of all sides, . . . only then will the will of men become the will of God and vice-versa . . . this will be the *happiness*, this will be the *health* of God Himself (*Ibid.*, pp. 189–190).

It is unfortunate for the social import as well as the formal equilibrium of the *Our Father* that the exposition of the fourth petition – "give us this day our daily bread" – should have remained a fragment. Nevertheless, one can reconstitute the author's intentions by virtue of the close similarity which existing fragments bear to the premises and projects of Cieszkowski's social and economic articles of the 1840's. In the *Our Father*, the discussion opens with an apology for Christianity's traditional indifference to men's corporeal needs. This must be attributed not to callousness, Cieszkowski maintains, but to the antithetical nature of Christianity vis-à-vis the worldliness of antiquity. As a result, the powerful have been allowed to oppress the neediest; private charity, the only existing remedy, has ministered to the indigent without attending to the causes of indigence, thus perpetuating their dependence on the unjust order responsible for their misery. Even government policies have been biased against those who cry for their daily bread – witness existing taxes on the necessities of life, rapacious public and private monopolies, iniquitous economic policies such as the Corn Laws. No one has realized that poor need to be given not doles but the means to overcome the causes of poverty itself.

As in his articles and his various practical projects, Cieszkowski returns here to the principle of association. Thus, he speaks of the organization of labour – a topical phrase – and the virtues of universal moral and intellectual education. He lavishes praise on the Saint-Simonians who "first attracted the attention of the friends of humanity upon the woeful state of the proletariat" (*Ibid.*, p. 206), and Fourier who formulated the notion of the *proportionate minimum*, which would guarantee to each member of society the means of his subsistence, thus making each individual a true and concrete person. Moreover, he rebuts standard arguments against socialism – the encouragement of idleness, etc. – with an indictment of the alternative, existing order. In the *Our Father*, however, Cieszkowski goes a step beyond his articles and projects. Whereas in the latter the principle of association was itself the premise and the underlying common thread, here he fastens on the rehabilitation of the category of labour as the root of reform. In the future, he maintains, "we must recognize that the notion of

working in order to live is social blasphemy; living in order to work is the destiny of humanity" (*Ibid.*). Thus, work, which was imposed upon man as a punishment when he left the earthly paradise will become his reward as he returns to paradise. He concludes with a powerful image of mankind organized in the peaceful battalions of labour which will replace all armies and which will joyfully realize ever greater conquests over nature. As men work, the sphere of needs itself will expand; swimming pools and gymnasia, for instance, will become basic necessities. Consequently, the proportionate minimum too will grow assuring all men an ever more comfortable and happier existence.

VI

The remaining three petitions – "forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us; lead us not into temptation; deliver us from evil" – constitute a single logical unit. Together they make up but sixty pages of the entirety of the *Our Father.* Moreover, they are interesting only as an elaboration of certain theological premises of Cieszkowski's work and as an elaboration of the historiosophy of the first volume, adding very little to the social doctrine of the *Our Father.* For these reasons, I propose to treat the last three petitions as a whole and in somewhat summary terms.

In contrast to the first four petitions, the last three invocations are negative in both formulation and intent. Cieszkowski explains their negative quality by their relevance to the second historical era, i.e., the Christian present rather than the future Kingdom of God. Thus, the notions of fault, temptation, and evil are antitheses to themselves. They have served mankind well as a spur and foil in its progress; their time, however, is drawing to a close. Only if these negative notions are themselves interpreted negatively can the unity of the Lord's Prayer *qua* prophecy be maintained.

Thus, the mutual forgiveness of faults must be read as a statement about merit. In antiquity, a primitive, even inverted, form of this notion existed in the Old Testament injunction of proportional vengeance – an eye for an eye; the corresponding principle regulating the relation between God and man was sacrifice. In Christianity, reciprocity of any sort was drowned in a flood of grace, won by Christ on behalf of an undeserving humanity; religion called for contrition. Today, mankind must earn its passage into the Kingdom of God where

rewards will be proportional to accomplishments as measured by socially useful labour; here religious and social principles will coincide. As Cieszkowski has argued in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* the only perfect principle of political organization is a meritocracy. Thus, the Kingdom of God is founded on merit both in the sense that men will only enter it through their merit and enjoy it in proportion to their merit. The last historical manifestation of the principle of forgiveness will occur at the inauguration of the third era when mankind will enjoy a general and universal amnesty. Even the notion of amnesty is superfluous, however, for men will have fully deserved forgiveness and the disappearance of evil thereafter will obviate the need of subsequent forgiveness.

The problems of temptation and evil which make up the sixth and seventh petitions are virtually identical. The temptation to do evil dominates the second era to such an extent that Christian asceticism presupposes and requires it in order to fulfill itself. Indeed, temptation is nothing else than the possibility of contradiction. Its presence is a constant reminder of the imperfections of the existing order and hence a challenge, even a command, to overcome these imperfections. History, as Cieszkowski has argued throughout, is a dialectical progress whose outcome depends on its antithetical moments. True to its prophetical character, however, the Dominical Prayer invites us to pray for the end of temptation, thus offering the hope and promise that perfect synthesis can and will be attained. Accordingly, Cieszkowski points out, the content of the sixth petition deals with the present but its formulation points to the future.

Evil, too, must be understood dialectically as the purest negation. True to Christian tradition, Cieszkowski presents the concept of evil as a privation or absence of good. In classically teleological and Hegelian terms he describes evil as a refusal to develop. This characteristic alone is a sufficient guarantee of evil's ultimate disappearance for the destiny of all things is to develop to the fullest degree. Interestingly, Cieszkowski postulates a dialectical evolution of evil along the familiar stages of thought, being and practice. Inasmuch as evil is only an absence, however, its practice is a self-contradictory notion. Evil *qua* absence cannot be actualized but only transcended. Thence, Cieszkowski deduces that in the third era evil itself will be transformed into its opposite, the good. In an organic analogy, he compares the fulfillment of mankind's goals to health. Evil has acted as a

homeopathic treatment; its success has immunized men in the future to the diseases which it has cured.

The "Amen" is a short summary of the *Our Father.* Cieszkowski restates his operative assumption:

> It (i.e., the "*Our Father*" – AL) is a prayer intended for Christians whose petitions aim at the expected new state of society where the barriers of Christianity will be taken down and its insufficiencies fulfilled. Each of the determinations composing the prayer is a ray of light cast into the future (*Ibid.*, p. 284).

In the future, God will no longer be an other-worldly being but will live and participate in humanity as mystically foreshadowed by Christ's sojourn on earth. The grasping of the only true speculative conception of God will lead to the sanctification of His name and with it the unity of faith will be universally realized. The warm faith of the early Christians in the approach of the Kingdom of God will be fulfilled and with the reign of the Holy Spirit the prophesized return of the Messiah will be accomplished. At that time, the will of God will not collide with the will of individuals; in addition to manifesting itself in history as it has always done, the Divine will permeate all private relations also. The state of proletarians, men without bread, and hence without the preconditions for achieving any higher purpose will disappear. The equality which ensues will rise above the abstract and exaggerated principles of the French Revolution and offer men the practical possibility of attaining the highest goals immanent to the Spirit. It follows that in this state men will be liberated from all dualism, all contradiction and all evil. The future promises harmony and the promise is contained in the Lord's Prayer, Christianity's Book of Daniel, which has now been opened in the *Our Father.* Appropriately, Cieszkowski ends his work with a reminder of the strict meaning of "Amen": so be it and so, he concludes, will it be.

VII

The complexity of the *Our Father* cannot be adequately conveyed even in a lengthy summary. On the one hand, the work is a magnificent conceit and as such a personal *tour de force.* By building on the words of the Lord's Prayer Cieszkowski claims to have constructed a model of the future. More pertinently, through an ostensible exegesis of this prayer he has presented an all-inclusive, elaborate and internally

consistent world-view. It is thus of little importance that the nature of his hypothesis regarding the prophetic value of the *Our Father* should be unverifiable. Nor need one accept that the several volumes of the *Our Father* present objective, historical confirmation of the author's subjective intuition for the personal nature of both the hypothesis and the proofs make it virtually self-fulfilling. The importance of the *Our Father* lies in its systematization of Cieszkowski's views and the elaboration of these views through its rich historical and philosophical details. Above all, its importance resides in its statement of the underlying motivation and assumption of his life's work. As such, it has both the limitations and the authenticity of a statement of faith and purpose.

Moreover, the *Our Father* has an objective value and validity which cannot be ignored. In spite of its overwhelmingly personal nature, the work can by no means be defined as a mystical project. Quite to the contrary, Cieszkowski's intention is precisely the dispelling of all elements of mysticism in a triple process of rationalization. First, the *Our Father* verbalizes the author's own intuition. Thus, it is an exercise in self-definition and even self-criticism to the extent that it subjects his forebodings to the rigorous test of dialectical logic and the light of historical reason. If the inspiration for the work is mystical, then the work itself aims at freeing itself of the inspiration. Second, the *Our Father* is conceived as having a historical function of clarification and rationalization of a prayer whose true meaning has hitherto remained obscure for all mankind. As such, it is the key to the only non-mythical understanding of the Our Father possible. Third, the work is an articulation of the unconscious and barely conscious aspirations of mankind throughout history. Men can only really understand their collective hopes when they have understood the Dominical Prayer. In summary, if the essence of mysticism is the incommunicability of a given vision or experience, then the several volumes of the *Our Father* represent both a personal and collective triumph over mysticism. To repeat the already cited opening statement, "all the secrets of thought are accessible to the Word" (*O.F.*, vol. I, 2nd ed., p. III) and the work itself provides confirmation to this.

As one looks back on the whole of Cieszkowski's writings, it is evident that they all tend towards utopia. To some extent, they provide its formal preconditions. Thus, the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* develops a view of history which rescues the possibility of utopia from

its Hegelian neglect and, in formulating the notion of the post-theoretical deed, points to the means of its attainment. The *Gott und Palingenesie* defines God as a historically evolving personality in such a way as to provide a model for a perfected and regenerated man. The economic and social works are sub-utopian in tone but they too are concerned with the means necessary to overcome present evil and the creation of institutions appropriate to the future. Thus, the economic and political reforms of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* and *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* are both prerequisites and prefigurations of the great institutional reforms which will define the utopian third era. Similarly, the various projects of economic, social and intellectual associations are small steps towards the same goal.

The *Our Father* incorporates all these elements. It formulates a concept of God or Providence which is obviously the ontological point of departure for all speculation and practical reform. It reviews the course of history, deducing the imminence of a great transformation as well as the finality of the resulting historical phase. It examines the present age as a function of this historical process and identifies the agents of transformation. Finally, it offers a blueprint of the Kingdom of God. Thus, the *Our Father* culminates in utopia suggesting that it is this vision of utopia which is the explanation and justification of Cieszkowski's life and writings.

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, this study of Cieszkowski's life and writings has come to involve the examination of a complex personality, a curiously consistent system of thought and an extremely rich and fluid intellectual milieu. Thus, it has attempted to fulfill at least two obvious purposes: first, to provide a fairly definitive intellectual biography and an analysis of an admittedly secondary, but not negligible, figure; second, to relate this figure to the intellectual and political currents of his age. These goals suggest two other less apparent but more far-reaching purposes. First, it has been my hope that a study of Cieszkowski would serve as an instrument to the understanding of a critical period in European social thought. Second, it has been my intention to question the adequacy of a dichotomous interpretation of this period and, by extension, of dichotomous models of social thought as such. In these concluding pages I should like to summarize whatever insights a study of Cieszkowski can contribute into these general problems and to offer a hypothesis which might explain the difficulties of classifying Cieszkowski in terms of familiar models.

As one reviews Cieszkowski's numerous activities and writings, one cannot but be impressed by the extent to which his peculiar and original projects or ideas partook of the central concerns of his contemporaries. However one assesses the extent of his influence, be it on the Young Hegelians, the French social movement or on the Polish national consciousness – and abstracting from the epistemological problems posed by the very notion of influence – it seems clear that Cieszkowski fits into the thought structures characteristic of his age. This is not to say that he is somehow paradigmatic of his age – whatever that may mean – but simply that his efforts constitute a component of the general European outlook of the period 1830 to 1848. In this sense, a study of Cieszkowski is an examination of the European consciousness and not only reflects but underlines certain assumptions less readily apparent in more celebrated representatives of the period.

First among these assumptions is the supposition that religious

categories can be fruitfully translated into social terms. Perhaps the single most conspicuous affinity among the Young Hegelians, the French utopians and the Polish Messianists is their common conviction that the rationalism of the Enlightenment provides an insufficient foundation for the good society. In part, they see the political problem as one of transforming burghers into believers. However, in contrast to a later period, Cieszkowski's contemporaries do not treat religion in purely instrumental terms. For them, it is not simply a question of injecting a religious dosage into prefabricated social and political desiderata. Rather, the religious categories – though certainly not religious doctrines – retain a certain logical priority. Moreover, for all their radical repudiation of the existing order, these thinkers of a romantic age anxiously seek to demonstrate their continuity with the past. Thus, the language, thought structures and hopes of Christianity are not merely brought down from heaven to earth but integrated completely in the new consciousness which sometimes prides itself on having surpassed Christianity and yet always relies on its affinity to Christianity for its validity and even its comprehensibility. This is certainly the case for works such as Saint-Simon's *Nouveau Christianisme*, Lamennais' *Paroles d'un croyant* or Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. I would suggest that nowhere is the intermeshing of religious and social categories and concepts as completely and harmoniously evident as in Cieszkowski's *Our Father*. Indeed, their interrelationship is so explicit that it strikes the modern reader as unnatural. In fact, the *Our Father* is a marvellous exemplification of this general phenomenon, particularly when considered as the underpinning for Cieszkowski's other writings, often so contrastingly topical and "modern" in character.

The second assumption which Cieszkowski shares with his contemporaries and which is readily apparent throughout his writings is his profound faith in history and the dependence of his system on a progressive notion of history. With some exaggeration it may be said that the preceding generation had discovered the laws of history whereas its successors had transformed these laws into an opiate and an escape mechanism. The assumption that ignorance, poverty and social conflict were doomed by history to eventual, or even imminent, extinction created an ambivalence regarding one's own responsibilities in this transformation. Thus, for the orthodox Hegelians or for the Fourierists it meant a confident but quietistic awaiting of the historically inevitable. For the Left Hegelians or the Polish revolutionaries it

signified a moral commitment to participate in this transformation. For all sides, however, it implied a transfer of acutely present problems to a future dimension. Even those who longed for an immediate revolution divided time into past and future and thus renounced the possibilities of the present for the promises of the future.

Cieszkowski appears to have been more aware of the dilemma posed by historicist teleology than most of his contemporaries. Nevertheless, quite typically of his age, he fails to resolve the dilemma and thus remains ambivalent in regard to the relation between means and ends in history. Thus, the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie* attempts to reconcile historical hopes and immediate, concrete activity through the concept of a post-theoretical *praxis* or deed which both brings about and characterizes the coming historical era. In the *Prolegomena* the deed remains a postulate without substance whereas in the *Our Father* the deed is pre-supposed and only the metaphysics of *praxis* and its creation, the future Kingdom of God, are described. Thus, the actual content of the deed must be gleaned from the intervening writings: its economic dimension from *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, its political principle from *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, its social character from the articles of the 1840's. Whatever praise these works deserve for a skillful integration of common sense and imagination, taken together they do not constitute a sufficient programme for the realization of Cieszkowski's goals. In other words, Cieszkowski realizes that the future must be the product of men's own efforts but, in the final analysis, he shows himself incapable of doing without the intervention of super-human, historical or Providential forces.

The third assumption which situates Cieszkowski squarely within the mainstream of European thought in his time lies in his consciousness of crisis. A similarly unhappy consciousness unites the most diverse of early and mid-nineteenth-century thinkers. Theocrats like de Maistre and the pre-1830 Lamennais reflect on the subversion of religious ties and the sclerosis of existing religious structures. Conservatives and socialists – Baader and the Saint-Simonians, for instance – point to the disintegration of traditional social relations and the exploitation inherent in the process of industrialization with its concomitant economic liberalism. Since all agree in dating the crisis from the French Revolution, the underlying problem of the period is that of determining the legacy of the Revolution. The problem allows of two possible formulations: what can be salvaged from pre-revolutionary ruins? Which of the revolutionary innovations still require completion? The answers to

each are equally inconclusive for they are both unsatisfactory attempts at self-definition. It is hardly surprising that the period should speculatively pin its hopes on the future and flee from itself in utopian constructions. Nor is it surprising that different attitudes to the revolution should be crystallized in political divisions which dominate the nineteenth century.

In regard to an explanation of the existing crisis, Cieszkowski's record is no worse than that of his contemporaries. He is purposely ambiguous about the Revolution itself; in the *Our Father*, for example, he extolls its ideals and bemoans their application. He manages to push the Revolution into the past and minimize its relevance to the present by treating it as the conclusion of a crisis which began with the Reformation and whose last tremours are still being felt. Although he sees the present crisis as an essentially religious one, he is sensitive to its economic character. Although he recognizes his debt to Christianity, he is not the least nostalgic about the Christian past. Moreover, in reflecting on the factions born of the French Revolution Cieszkowski roundly condemns both the "blacks" and the "reds". In short, he is able to express his perception of the age's unhappy consciousness without committing himself to any political camp and, in fact, sidestepping the political expression of that crisis: the division of Europe into irreconcilable parties of the Right and Left.

The impossibility of identifying Cieszkowski's party position brings me back to the recurrent problem of this work: how is Cieszkowski to be defined in terms of "ideology" versus "utopia"? Clearly, the problem is one which extends to many of Cieszkowski's contemporaries. If one is to rely on an exegesis of the writings of the Social Catholics, the Christian or utopian socialists, or the Polish Messianists and organicists, none can be neatly accommodated in Mannheim's mold. However, in Mannheim's construct the terms "ideology" and "utopia" do not refer only to the content of thought but to an impulse of personality. His utopians – Thomas Münzer, for example – deserve their name not because they wrote utopian tracts but because they partook of a utopian mentality. Thus, Mannheim would concede that philosophy as such, even political philosophy, cannot be inherently "left" or "utopian" unless it is tied to a political position and attitude. Fortunately, with most thinkers there is a close correspondence between the degree to which their philosophy allows for the possibility of worldly transcendence, their political commitments and their desire for

radical change. In the case of Cieszkowski, however, there is a profound gap – what his contemporaries would have called an *écart absolu* – between his politics and his philosophy. Obviously, the age of the Holy Spirit could not be expected to spring from the creation of credit unions nor could the Kingdom of God be legislated in the Prussian Assembly. This is not to say that Cieszkowski somehow lacked the courage of his convictions or that he managed to divorce his theories from his life. On the contrary, he consistently sought to relate his activities and projects to his overall vision. To be sure, this effort rested on questionable foundations: an unreserved faith in Providence, both divine and historical, and a belief in the inherent goodness of man. The validity of these foundations, however, in no way detracts from the sincerity and seriousness of the attempt.

Mannheim would have diagnosed Cieszkowski as a case of seeking utopian goals through ideological means. The structure of his model would have forced Mannheim to dismiss this combination as a logical absurdity. In fact, the case of Cieszkowski points to a flaw in Mannheim's system. By postulating a necessary choice between revolution and *immobilisme*, Mannheim is neglecting one of the principal currents of a period which he claims to explain: the search for a third force or a middle way, that of radical but non-revolutionary reform. The fact that Mannheim can pass over this alternative in silence is evidence of the failure of Cieszkowski and those like him. Yet surely if one is to understand the evolution of political theory one cannot apply success as an unique criterion. The history of hopes which failed belongs to the study of political theory as thoroughly as those which succeeded. Thus, Cieszkowski deserves attention, if for no other reason, than as an expression of the unexploited possibilities of the past.

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION (NOTES TO PP. 1–6)

[1] For an exposition and application of this principle see Lucien Goldmann, *Le dieu caché*, Paris, 1959. For reflections on political theory in these terms see also Sir Isaiah Berlin, 'Does Political Theory still exist?' in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.), *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (second series), Oxford, 1962, pp. 19–28 and Leszek Kołakowski, *Chrétiens sans églises*, Paris, 1969, especially pp. 799–800.

[2] Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils, 1st ed., New York, 1936.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 55, and 56.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] See Hanno Kesting, 'Utopie und Eschatologie', *Archiv für Rechts und Sozial-philosophie*, XLI, 1954–55, pp. 220–242.

[7] 'Conservative Thought', in Kurt H. Wolff, ed., *From Karl Mannheim*, New York, 1971, pp. 148–149.

[8] Marx offers an explanation for this phenomenon: "In order to arouse sympathy the aristocracy was obliged to lose sight, apparently of its own interests and to formulate its indictment against the bourgeoisie in the interest of the exploited working class alone..." Karl Marx, 'The Communist Manifesto', in E. Burns, ed., *Handbook of Marxism*, New York, 1935, p. 47.

[9] See i.a. *Roczniki Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk*, XX, 1894, dedicated to Cieszkowski to record his jubilee but which was in fact to constitute a necrology.

[10] August Cieszkowski Junior (1865–1932) was almost fanatically devoted to his father's memory. See Teresa Garnysz-Kozłowska, 'Z dziejów francuskiego prezekładu *Ojcze Nasz* Augusta Cieszkowskiego', *Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej*, XVI, 1970, pp. 173–183, and Paul Cazin, 'Un souvenir de Paul Cazin: la Madame Venus de Monsieur Guga', *Peuples-Amis: Revue de l'Amitié franco-polonaise*, nr. 115, April 1959. See also part III, chapter 2 of this work.

Cieszkowski Junior's efforts included: a translation of the *Prolegomena* into Polish (Posen, 1908); republication in German and translation into Polish of *Gott und Palingenesie* with supplementary materials (Posen, 1911), republication, and translation of the *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* (Paris and Posen, 1908); a translation of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* into Polish (Posen, 1909); a four-volume edition of the manuscripts to what became *Our Father* (Posen, 1899–1906); co-translation of the entire four volumes into French (Paris, 1906, 1927–29). Moreover, he facilitated William John Rose's abridged English edition of the *Our Father* which appeared as *The Desire of All Nations* (London, 1919). See *The Polish Memoirs of William John Rose*, ed. Daniel Stone, Toronto, 1975. He naturally underwrote the costs of this whole collection –

no mean task for a man wealthy but so parsimonious as to always ride third class! Cazin, *op. cit.* Above all, he preserved the entire Cieszkowski *Nachlass* with the utmost piety and readily made it available to interested scholars.

[11] See August Cieszkowski Junior's introduction to both 1908 editions of *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, where he expresses his own and, by implication, his father's disapproval of proposed Prussian land reforms. Garnysz–Kozłowska, *op. cit.*, p. 180, citing Cazin on a conversation with Cieszkowski Junior recounts the indignation with which Cieszkowski Junior received any criticism of his father's orthodoxy: "Montanus considered himself to be the Holy Spirit; my daddy did not!" he declared in a debate on Sanctospiritualism with Cazin. For August Cieszkowski Junior's mysticizing tendencies see his introduction to the several volumes of the *Our Father.*

[12] Bishop Likowski, *Roczniki Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk*, XXI, p. 494. Morawski, Introduction, to Michal Klepacz, *Idea Boga w historiozofii Augusta Cieszkowskiego na tle ówczesnych prądów umysłowych*, Kielce, 1933. Ignacy Chrzanowski, 'Ojcze Nasz Augusta Cieszkowskiego', *Rok Polski*, VII, nr. 13, 1916, cites Cieszkowski himself: "People will judge the accuracy of the reasoning but (Lord) You alone are witness to the purity of the feelings and intentions".

[13] R. Koppens, reviewing volume II, *Przegląd Powszechny*, LXVII, 1900, pp. 243–253. Kazimierz Kowalski, *Filozofia Augusta hr Cieszkowskiego w świetle zasad filozofii św Tomasza z Akwinu*, Posen, 1929. Gabryl X., *Polska filozofia religijna w wieku XIX*, vol. I, Warsaw, 1913, pp. 280.

[14] Partripassianism by Gabryl, *ibid.*, and Sabellianism by Nicholas Berdiaev, *The Russian Idea*, New York, 1948, pp. 212.

[15] See Chrzanowski, *op. cit.*; Cywiński, *Romantyzm a Mesjanizm*, Vilno, 1914; Nicholas Lossky, *Three Polish Messianists*, Prague, 1937; V. Lutosławski, 'Le messianisme polonais', IV congrès international de philosophie, Bologna, 1911.

[16] This was matched by disinterest in what Cieszkowski had actually written and concentration on biographical anecdota. Apart from a new edition of the *Ojcze Nasz*, there were no other re-editions of his works until as recently as 1972 when August Cieszkowski, *Prolegomena do historiozofii; Bóg i Palingeneza; oraz mniejsze pisma filozoficzne*, edited by Andrzej Walicki and Jan Garewicz, with introduction by Andrzej Walicki, appeared in the series: Biblioteka Klasyków Filozofii, Warsaw, 1972.

[17] (William John Rose?), 'A Polish Prophet: the Kingdom of the Spirit', *The New Poland*, nr. 33, 1919, p. 649.

[18] Adam Zóltowski, *Graf August Cieszkowskis 'Philosophie der Tat'*, Münchener Inaugural Dissertation, Posen, 1904. A Jakubisiak, *Principes de la morale d'après August Cieszkowski*, Paris, 1914.

[19] Klepacz, *op. cit.*, Kowalski, *op. cit.*; also Albert Wojtczak, *Philosophie der Freiheit bei August Cieszkowski*, Niepokalanów, 1933.

[20] Walter Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski, ein Schüler Hegels und des deutschen Geistes*, Veröffentlichungen des Slavischen Instituts an des Friedrich Wilhelm Universität, XX, Leipzig, 1938, (Kraus reprint, Liechtenstein, 1972); see also his 'Neue Einblicke ins Leben und Werke Cieszkowskis', *Jahrbücher für die Kultur und Geschichte der Slaven*, (Neue Folge) VI, nr. 1, pp. 54–66, and VII, nr. 1, 1930–31, pp. 3–36.

[21] Among the former, Benedetto Croce, *Saggio sullo Hegel*, Bari, 1913, who calls Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena* "the strangest effort which I know (to put off the end of

history)" p. 151 and describes Cieszkowski as "a real abbot Joachim", p. 156. Among the latter, see Karl Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, trans. by David E. Green, from the third German edition, New York, 1964, 1st ed., 1941, p. 144.

[22] *The Russian Idea*, New York, 1948, pp. 211–214. See also Berdiaev's *Essai de métaphysique eschatologique*, Paris, 1941, p. 229.

[23] *The Russian Idea*, p. 212.

[24] I am grateful to Mr. S. A. Zdziechowski who communicated this detail to me concerning the visit of his uncle, the noted literary historian, M. Zdziechowski, to Tolstoy.

[25] See Dmitrij Čyževskij, ed., *Hegel bei den Slaven*, second edition, Bad Homburg, 1961, 1st ed., 1934, and Boris Jakowenko, *Geschichte des Hegelianismus in Russland*, volume I, Prague 1938. Also W. Kühne's article, 'Hegel und die Polen' in Čyževskij, *op. cit.*

[26] Čyževskij, *op. cit.*, p. 3. The most recent study on the subject, Guy Planty-Bonjour, *Hegel et la pensée philosophique en Russie*, The Hague, 1974, does not share this favourable view perhaps because the author considers only Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena* and underestimates even this work, p. 160.

[27] Most notably, Auguste Cornu, *La Jeunesse de Karl Marx* and *Moses Hess et la gauche hégélienne*, both Paris, 1934. Following Cornu more recently, Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, Cambridge, 1968, and David McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx*, London, 1969.

[28] 'Moses Hess und die Probleme der idealistischen Dialektik', *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, XII, 1926, pp. 103–155, translated in *Telos*, number 10, 1971, pp. 23–35.

[29] Reinhard Lauth, 'Einflüsse slawischer Denker auf die Genesis der marxschen Weltanschauung', *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, XXII, 1955, nr. 2, pp. 413–448 Jan Ostrowski, 'A Christian Contribution to the Origins of Marxism', *Kongres współczesnej nauki i kultury polskiej na obczyźnie*, vol. I, pp. 45–47.

[30] See G. Hillmann, *Marx und Hegel*, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1966; especially, Horst Stuke, *Philosophie der Tat: Studien zur 'Verwirklichung der Philosophie' bei den Junghegelianern und den Wahren Sozialisten*, Industrielle Welt, vol. II, Stuttgart, 1963; not sympathetic but original is Jürgen Gebhardt, *Politik und Eschatologie*, Münchner Studien zur Politik I, 1963, esp. pp. 130–152.

[31] Among these, Benoit Hepner, 'History and the Future: the Vision of August Cieszkowski', *Review of Politics*, XV, 1952, pp. 328–350; Nicholas Lobkowicz, *Theory and Practice: the History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx*, Notre Dame – London, 1967, chapter 13; Most recently, Leszek Kołakowski, *Główne Nurty Marksizmu*, vol. I, Paris, 1976, pp. 89–92; L. S. Stepelovich, 'August von Cieszkowski: From Theory to Practice', *History and Theory*, XIII, 1974, pp. 39–53, as well as my own 'Prolégomènes à une théorie de la praxis', *Economies et Sociétés*, série S, VIII, number 10, 1974, pp. 1487–1506.

[32] Tadeusz Kroński, 'Koncepcje filozoficzne mesjanistów polskich w połowie XIX wieku', *Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej*, vol. II, 1957, pp. 108 and his 'Reakcja mesjanistyczna i katolicka w Polsce polowy XIX-go wieku' in Bronisław Baczko *Z dziejów polskiej myśli filozoficznej*, vol. III, Warsaw, 1957.

[33] See Jerzy Szacki, 'Etudes récentes sur l'histoire de la pensée sociale polonaise au XIXe siècle', *Annali*, 1963, Istituto Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Milan, 1964, pp. 708–724

and Bronislaw Baczko, 'Problemy rozwoju myśli filozoficznej XIX-go wieku', in Baczko, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–61.

[34] Compare Zdzisław Grot's, 'Koło polskie w Berlinie w dobie Wiosny Ludów', *Przegląd Zachodni*, VII, nr. 9, 1952, pp. 126–172, with his introduction to his edition, *Protokoły Posiedzeń Koła polskiego w Berlinie*, vol. I, 1849–51, Posen, 1956. Also Witold Jakóbczyk 'Cieszkowski i Liga Polska', *in Przegląd Historyczny*, XXXVIII, 1948, pp. 137–168.

[35] Barbara Skarga, 'Praca organiczna a filozofia narodowa i konserwatywna katolicka przed 1864 r.', *Archiwum Historii Filozofii i Myśli Społecznej*, VIII, 1962. pp. 171–213.

[36] See, for example, A. I. Volodin, *Gegel' i russkaja socialističeskaja mysl' XIX veka*, Moscow, 1973.

[37] *Antologija mirovoj filosofii v četyrex tomax*, volume III, Moscow, 1971.

[38] *Bol'šaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, volume XLVI, Moscow, 1957, p. 588.

[39] *Filosofskaja Enciklopedija*, ed. F. Konstantinov, volume V, Moscow, 1970, p. 464. The summary bibliography given here does not list a single Soviet work on Cieszkowski.

[40] Andrzej Walicki, 'Cieszkowski a Hercen' in *Polskie Spory o Hegla*, ed. Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warsaw, 1966, pp. 153–205.

[41] Most recently, Justin Kremes 'Filozofia społeczna Augusta Cieszkowskiego', *Zeszyty Naukowe WSP Katow Filoz*, XX, nr. 3, 1968, pp. 115–128; Irena Curyło, 'Historia i Moralność w filozofii Augusta Cieszkowskiego', *Etyka*, VIII, 1971, pp. 25–40. Particularly valuable is the article by Jan Garewicz, 'August Cieszkowski w oczach Niemców w latach trzydziestych-czterdziestych XIX wieku', in *Polskie Spory o Hegla*, *op. cit.* pp. 205–243.

[42] On Messianism, see Walicki's collection of essays, *Filozofia a Mesjanizm*, Warsaw, 1970, which contains an expanded version of his article, 'Two Polish Messianists: Adam Mickiewicz and August Cieszkowski', *Oxford Slavonic Papers* (new series), II, 1969, pp. 77–105; see also his article, 'Milenaryzm i mesjanizm religijny a romantyczny mesjanizm polski', *Pamiętnik Literacki*, LXII, nr. 4, 1971, pp. 23–40. On the French sources of Cieszkowski's thought, see Walicki's, 'Francuskie inspiracje myśli filozoficzno-religijnej Augusta Cieszkowskiego', '*Archiwum Historii Filozfii i Myśli Społecznej*, XVI, 1970, pp. 127–171. The one previous work to consider these sources and one which focussed chiefly on Cieszkowski's socio-economic thought had been Antoni Roszkowski, *Poglady społeczne i ekonomiczne Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, Posen, 1923.

[43] *Bibliographia filozofii polskiej*, ed. Instytut Filozofii i Sociologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk, vol. II, Warsaw, 1961, pp. 34–51.

CHAPTER I

[1] Cieszkowski's birthdate is given as 12th September in Andrzej Wojtkowski's excellent biographical article in Witold Jakóbczyk, ed., *Wielkopolanie XIX-go wieku*, vol. I, Posen, 1969, pp. 141–175. In Cieszkowski's own *curriculum vitae*, however, as reprinted in Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, *op. cit.*, p. 426, the birthdate is 6th September.

[2] Cieszkowski family file, Archiwum Państwowe w Poznaniu, Posen; this contains papers, letters and deeds from the beginning of the eighteenth to the twentieth century. I

am grateful to the Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych in Warsaw for having granted me permission to examine the file.

[3] Concerning Cieszkowski's father: Kühne. 'Das Bibliothek des Grafen August Cieszkowski', *Zentrallblatt fur das Bibliotheks-Wesen*, L, nr. 6, June 1933, pp. 413–418; Adam Zółtowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–2; Zółtowski, 'Cieszkowski', in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. IV, Cracow, 1937, pp. 62. Zółtowski maintains that Cieszkowski had Niccola Monti (d. 1795), sculptor, decorator of churches and palaces come to Poland from Ascoli.

[4] Papal patent of nobility granted to Paweł Cieszkowski preserved in Wydział Rekopisów, Biblioteka uniwersytecka, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Posen.

[5] The Archiwum Państwowe, Posen, contains the following letters: a nomination addressed to Paweł Cieszkowski for the post of marshal of the diet of the district of Krasnosteński (1824); a certificate that Paweł Cieszkowski, squire (*dziedzic*) of Sucha, is registered on a list of the nobility of Chełm (1828); a note informing him that he has been elected president of the *Towarzystwo kredytowe ziemskie* (1832). In view of August Cieszkowski's later activity precisely in land credit and the fact that this note is signed by the vice-president, Cieszkowski, who, judging by the handwriting, may be August, it is of some interest.

[6] There appear to be no letters extant between Paweł and August Cieszkowski although we know from the latter's Paris diary that they carried on an extensive correspondence. See, however, Zygmunt Krasiński's comments on their relations: Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, J. Kallenbach, ed., vols, I and II, Cracow, 1912. Also Krasiński's *Listy do Konstantego Gapczyńskiego*, ed., Sudolski, Warsaw, 1971, p. 470.

[7] Among the former was Tomasz Dziekoński, author of numerous pedagogical works; among the latter was the Baronne de la Haye, also Zygmunt Krasiński's governess. See Jakóbczyk, *Wielkopolanie, op. cit.*

[8] The status of the Kingdom of Poland was particular within the Russian empire. Moreover, it was not uncommon for upper class native Russians not to know their own language or, at least, to prefer others.

[9] Bronisław Trentowski, *Listy*, Cracow, 1937, letter 88.

[10] Adam Bar, 'Die ersten Einflüsse Hegels in der polnischen Zeitschriftenliteratur', *Germanoslavica*, I, 1931–32, pp. 76ff. The article 'Czy język nasz jest filozoficzny?' was published in the *Haliczanin*, 1820.

[11] Marceli Handelsman, *Les idées françaises et la mentalité politique en Pologne au XIXème siècle*, Paris, 1927.

[12] Adam Zóltowski, 'Cieszkowski' in *Sto lat filozofii polskiej: wiek XIX*, vol. V, Cracow, 1909, ed. S. Chlebowski *et al.*, p. 422.

[13] The poem is printed and discussed by Janina Znamirowska, '0 nieznanych wierszach Augusta Cieszkowskiego', in *Ruch Literacki*, IV, nr. 2, 1929, pp. 44–46, sources given as 'Wiersze patryjotyczne z roku 1831; Printed and handwritten pieces from the Biblioteka Krasińskich'.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] These semi-legendary accounts are repeated by Zółtowski, Wojtkowski, as well as by Walicki in the 1972 edition of the *Prolegomena, op. cit.*

[16] See Adam Wrzosek, 'Przyczynek do życiorysu Augustra Cieszkowskiego' in *Dziennik Poznański*, 1924, nr. 10, nr. 11, where the memoirs of a Dr. Skobel, Cieszkowski's personal physician in 1831–33 are quoted. See also Krasiński, *Listy do Gapczyńskiego*, *op. cit.*, p. 470, letter of 19th April 1847, where he writes: "Just as Demosthenes developed his speaking ability artificially by putting pebbles into his mouth so Cieszkowski developed his health artificially".

[17] Some significant Polish figures who sympathized with the Insurrection did not actually play an active role in it. Mickiewicz was in Switzerland at its outbreak; Chopin was also too frail to act. The stigma of non-participation did not affect them because of their unquestionable devotion to the national cause. It did, however, affect Cieszkowski's close friend, Zygmunt Krasiński, whose father as one of the leading military figures collaborating with the Russians in 1830–31 disastrously compromised the younger Krasiński's standing among his contemporaries. It is thus important for those who would see Cieszkowski as a patriot to establish him as an insurgent – even though his friendship with Krasiński dates from a later period. Kühne, 'Das Bibliothek . . .', *op cit.* writes that Cieszkowski collected all literature on the 1830 Insurrection.

[18] Wojtkowski, *op cit.*

[19] From *curriculum vitae* in Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, pp. 426–427.

[20] Cieszkowski's mentor in Cracow was Józef Emanuel Jankowski, a Kantian of no particular standing. See the *curriculum vitae* cited above as well as Walicki's biographical sketch in *Prolegomena*, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. XLVIII.

[21] *Curriculum vitae.* Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 427.

[22] Georg Andreas Gabler (1786–1853) had been a *gymnasium* professor since 1811. His first lectures were so immensely popular that no hall was large enough to contain all his students. Soon, however, his audience dwindled to a very few to whom Gabler lectured primarily on the Platonic dialogues. Apart from his unfinished *Propadeutik der Philosophie* he wrote *Hegelsche Philosophie: Beiträge zu ihrer richtigen Beurteilung.* See *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. VII, Leipzig, 1878; also Max Lenz, *Geschichte der königlichen Friedrich-Wilhelm Universität zu Berlin*, vol. III, Halle, 1910. The lists of deans and rectors between 1831 and 1837 reflect the end of an era of intellectual giants. No longer do names such as Humboldt, Fichte and Hegel appear.

[23] G. W. F. Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. III, trans. by E. S. Haldane, London, 1896, p. 551; 1st ed. by K. L. Michelet, Berlin, 1833.

[24] Karl Rosenkrantz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben*, Berlin, 1844, p. 552, cites Förster's funeral oration for Hegel: "It is now our profession to protect, to preach and to strengthen his teaching . . . No successor will mount the vacated throne of Alexander and satraps will divide the deserted provinces among themselves . . ."

[25] Richard Kroner, *Von Kant bis Hegel*, vol. I, Tubingen, 1921, describes the eschatological mood and the fantastic speed with which philosophical systems succeeded each other in Germany after 1800. The point has been reiterated in all discussions of Young Hegelian *Zeitbewusstsein*, such as, Löwith, Stuke, Gebhardt, *op. cit.*, and especially Heinrich Popitz, *Der entfremdete Mensch*, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1968. Hegel can be quoted freely to support the point: *Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. by J. B. Baillie, New York, 1967, p. 75: "It is not difficult to see that our time is a time of birth and of transition to a new period. The spirit is working out its transformation". His sense of the historical significance of his age is evident too in the lyrical comments on the French

Revolution: "Never since the sun had stood in the firmament and the planets revolved around him had it been perceived that man's existence centres in his head... This was accordingly a glorious mental dawn. All thinking beings shared in the jubilation of the epoch. Emotions of a lofty character stirred men's minds at that time; a spiritual enthusiasm thrilled through the world as if the reconcilation between the Divine and the Secular was now first accomplished". *Philosophy of History*, trans. by J. B. Sibree, New York, 1956, p. 447.

[26] The twin terms "epochal" and "epigonal" are used effectively by Popitz, *op. cit.*, to describe the tensions inherent in the Young Hegelians' predicament. He treats the early post-Hegel period rather scantily, however, as do virtually all other commentators except Gebhardt, *op. cit.*; even here the eccentricity of the treatment impairs its value. For a comment on the Hegelians' concept of a philosophical mission of the Prussian state, see B. Groethuysen, 'Les jeunes hégéliens et les origines du socialisme contemporain en Allemagne', *Revue Philosophique*, XLVIII, 1923, pp. 379–395.

[27] Hermann Lübbe, 'Die politische Theorie der Hegelschen Rechte', *Archiv für Philosophie*, X, 1960, p. 187.

[28] Rudolf Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit*, Berlin, 1857, p. 4.

[29] Most notoriously in the Preface to the *Philosophy of Right*, trans. by T. M. Knox, Oxford, 1952.

[30] Haym, *op cit.*, p. 4.

[31] Edgar Quinet, 'La vie de Jésus par le Dr. Strauss', *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1838, nr 4, p. 463, already realized that Strauss had not said much that was new and wondered at the stir that had been created. Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest for the Historical Jesus*, 3rd ed., London, 1954, trans. by W. Montgomery, pp. 68–120, emphatically declares that Strauss' work is indeed a milestone in Bible criticism but primarily because of its synthesis of earlier conflicting interpretations.

[32] Schweitzer calls "semi-rationalists" that group of theologians which did not deliberately reject all miracles but tried to reduce their number by offering naturalistic explanations; it was quite ahistorical and interested primarily in showing Jesus as an enlightened burgher and great teacher of virtue. *Op. cit.*, pp. 27–68. The supernaturalists led by Hengstenberg of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* took the position that "what God has joined together no man should divide; Scripture and Spirit, external and internal word". See *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, Vol. XII, pp. 737–747.

[33] Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[35] Schweitzer maintains that the main difference between Strauss and his predecessors is that in asking whether an application of myth to the gospels would leave anything of the historical Jesus, Strauss felt no terror and it was Hegel's philosophy which had set him free; *Ibid.*, p. 79. However, Strauss's incautious blasphemies, e.g., entitling the chapter on nature miracles "Sea Stories and Fish Stories" shocked churchmen, making some wish that the book had been written in Latin (!) *Ibid.*, p. 100, citing Ullmann in *Studien und Kritike*. It is a revealing reflection on the liberalism of Prussian cultural policy that Strauss' book, although first subjected to review by the theologian Neander – who disagreed with Strauss but urged publication – was actually published. In the same period Hengstenberg's fundamentalist *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* had considerable difficulty in obtaining a permit to publish. Gebhardt, *op cit.*, p. 22, points out the special role of

the theological faculties for German Protestantism, thus explaining the easy transition from church dispute to university debate.

[36] Gebhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

[37] Karl Barth, introductory essay to Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. by George Eliot, New York, 1957, p. xxiii, explains the problem in these terms and concludes that Hegel "showed himself perhaps only too good a Lutheran". Hegel makes his position quite clear in the introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of religion, reprinted in J. Glenn Gray, ed., *On Art, Religion, Philosophy: GWF Hegel*, New York and Evanston, 1970, p. 145: "Thus religion and philosophy come to be one. Philosophy is itself, in fact, worship; it is religion, for in the same way it renounces subjective notions and opinions in order to occupy itself with God. Philosophy is thus identical with religion, but the distinction is that it is so in a peculiar manner, distinct from the manner of looking at things which is commonly called religion as such. What they have in common is that they are religion; what distinguishes them from each other is merely the kind and manner of religion we find in each".

[38] Phillip Friedrich Marheineke, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1827, was perhaps the first to consider the problem of the agreement of Christian dogma and its speculative content. Marheineke later edited Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of religion.

[39] Friedrich Richter, *Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen*, part I, Breslau, 1833, expressly denied that personal immortality is a necessary consequence of Hegel's philosophy. See Willy Moog, *Hegel und die hegelsche Schule*, München, 1930, pp. 410ff, for an account of these early revisionists.

[40] The classification was coined by Strauss in his *Streitschriften zur Verteidigung meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu*, III, and picked up by K. L. Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland*, Berlin 1837, vol. II, p. 659. Cited in Löwith, *op. cit.*, p. 53. It is significant that the classification should have been coined by the revisionists, thus putting the orthodox Hegelians on the defensive, at least terminologically. See Bronisław Baczko, 'Lewica i Prawica heglowska w Polsce' in Baczko, ed., *Człowiek i Swiatopoglądy*, Warsaw, 1965, pp. 212–272. An alternative classification which unfortunately never acquired common usage was Heinrich Leo's "Hegelingen" and "Hegeliten" to describe what Strauss called "left" and "right". *Die Hegelingen*, Halle, 1838.

[41] Lobkowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 188; the confusion within the school was such that Strauss earnestly affirmed that he preferred to deal with the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung* where at least "one knows where one is" than with other Hegelians. Schweitzer, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

[42] William J. Brazill, *The Young Hegelians*, New Haven–London, 1970, quite rightly stresses the religious concerns of the Young Hegelians.

[43] That the theology of the Young Hegelians was simply Aesopian language for their politics is the argument of Friedrich Engels in *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, and is often repeated, for example by Sir Isaiah Berlin, *Karl Marx*, Oxford, 1963. However, Brazill, *op. cit.*, points out that religious deviation was at least as great a crime as political unorthodoxy. Ruge, even after having served a sentence for political *engagement* in the *Burschenschaften*, was allowed to teach; Bruno Bauer and Feurebach were eventually dismissed from their posts not for political sins but for their religious heresies.

[44] Feuerbach, basically apolitical, was elected to the National Assembly in 1848 and proved to be its least outspoken member. Strauss, a firm monarchist, fell out with the Left Hegelians as soon as political issues came to the fore.

[45] Gebhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 82: "In the years 1833–35 Christian symbols were thrown away as inadequate for their speculative content and, parallel to this, the eschatological reality of the transfigured and redeemed man was experienced as an innerworldly one". Gebhardt's whole study shows, however, that the Young Hegelians were shackled to the forms they had rejected. This is also the point of Marx's ironical religious analogies in *The German Ideology*.

[46] In the dispute between the government and the Archbishop of Cologne over the church's revocation of its permission to allow children of mixed marriages to be brought up outside the Catholic faith Ruge unambiguously supported the government. See Lauth, *op. cit.*, p. 434 and Cornu, *op. cit.*, p. 90. Ruge gave up his teaching (presumably voluntarily) in November 1839 to devote himself full-time to the *Hallische Jahrbücher*. At the same time, Bruno Bauer raised a storm with the first part of his *Kritik der Geschichte der Offenbarung:* he was not dismissed but quietly shuffled off to teach in Bonn.

[47] Stuke, *op. cit.*, pp. 32–33, is most emphatic on this point, and the confusion becomes apparent upon comparing classifications: Baczko calls Michelet orthodox and Brazill calls Gans a Right Hegelian. However, Michelet identifies himself with Strauss and mentions Gans as holding views similar to his own. Michelet is described in 1848 as "left-right", in Lübbe's article cited above as in his, *Die Hegelsche Rechte*, Stuttgart, 1962, introduction, p. 15. The problem is obviously one of differentiating time periods and defending the strictness of definition of right and left.

[48] Bruno Bauer's letter to Marx of April 5th, 1840 has been much quoted in this respect: "The catastrophe will be enormous and frightening. I would almost say that it will be more terrible and more colossal than the one which heralded Christianity's entry into the world". *Marx–Engels Gesamtausgabe*, vol. I, 2, Berlin 1927, p. 241.

[49] Brazill, *op. cit.*, p. 73, calls this the "party organ" of the Left Hegelians. One could argue that it was the organ which created the party.

[50] Arnold Ruge, *Aus Früherer Zeit*, vol. 4, Berlin, 1867, p. 444.

[51] *Hallische Jahrbücher*, 1st November 1839, p. 2101, 'Karl Streckfuss und das Preussentum', quoted in Cornu, *op. cit.*, p. 90: "Prussia is today in most of its tendencies and in its state of existence Catholic". Cornu pinpoints this as the moment of transition from the critique of philosophy to that of politics.

[52] Hegel to Niethammer, 28th October 1808, quoted in Walter Kaufmann, *Hegel*, London, 1962, p. 323. Many years earlier Hegel seemed to have considered the question which his disciples sought to answer: "... It has been reserved in the main for our epoch to vindicate at least in theory the human ownership of the treasures formerly squandered on heaven; but what age will have the strength to validate this right in practice and make itself its possessor?" 'Positivity of the Christian Religion', in *Early Theological Writings*, trans. by T. M. Knox with introduction and fragments by Richard Kroner, Philadelphia, 1971, 1st English ed., 1948, 1st ed., 1907, p. 159.

[53] Feuerbach to Hegel, *Briefe an und von Hegel*, III, Glöckner Jubiläumsausgabe, Stuttgart, 1927–30 pp. 244–248.

[54] Paul Achatius Pfinzer, *Briefwechsel zweier Deutschen*, 1831, cited in Stuke, *op. cit.*, p. 32. An equally obscure Karl Bayerhoffer wrote: "World history has entered a time when

the spirit celebrates its last reconciliation with itself and all reality. Thus, the question is now one regarding the being or non-being of philosophy". *Idee und Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, 1837, cited in Stuke, *ibid.*

[55] *Philosophy of Right*, p. 13.

[56] Hermann Hinrich, *Politische Vorlesungen*, I, 1843, p. VII.

[57] Karl Ludwig Michelet, *Jahrbücher fur Wissenschaftliche Kritik*, 1831, cited in Stuke, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

[58] There is evidence to support both arguments in Groethuysen, *op. cit.*; also in Jacques d'Hondt, *De Hegel à Marx*, Paris, 1972, esp. pp. 121–192 and Charles Rihs, 'La pénétration du saint-simonisme en Allemagne', *Mélanges de la faculté des sciences économiques de Genève*, XVIII, pp. 187–209.

[59] Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 444; Michelet writing in 1837 writes of these national characteristics as virtually self-evident: "This brilliance (of the Germans – A. L.) in the history of philosophy finds its counterpart in the contemporary political development of a neighbour. This development took as much time as our philosophical revolution and followed directly upon it. As in our time the most active political life is to be found there so the most active philosophical life is to be found among the Germans". *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland*, vol. I, p. 10.

[60] Hegel, *Berliner Schriften*, makes occasional reference to Saint-Simon from his reading of French papers. Rihs, *op. cit.*, points out that Saint-Simonianism penetrated into Germany before the revolution of 1830 but was only effective later. He could have said as much of Saint-Simonian influence in France.

[61] Marx's *Poverty of Philosophy*, is perhaps the most lavish outpouring of Young Hegelian scorn at French pretensions to philosophical discourse. Garewicz, *op. cit.*, remarks that the only article which the *Hallische Jahrbücher* devoted to Fourier was a mocking discussion of sexual life in the Fourierist harmony, p. 226, See also E. M. Butler, *The Saint-Simonian Religion in Germany*, Cambridge, 1926, pp. 60f.

[62] Engels, 'Progress of Social Reform on the Continent', in *Marx–Engels. Werke*, vol. I, Berlin, 1969, p. 487, D. McLellan, *op. cit.*, has graphically described the surprise of the Young Hegelians who made their pilgrimage to Paris only to find the socialists they had admired exhorting them to the most naive sort of Christianity.

[63] George Lichtheim, *The Origins of Socialism*, New York, 1969, p. 54.

[64] Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, p. 55, and Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 433; the latter writes of Saint-Simonianism: "This curious religion was romantic in its origins but it absorbed other elements as it grew which were incompatible with romance. It became logical, practical, socialist and dogmatic where German romanticism had been visionary . . ."

[65] Butler, *ibid.*

[66] L. A. Willoughby, *The Romantic Movement in Germany*, Oxford, 1930, pp. 126–145, discusses the importance of Rahel Varnhagen von Ense's salon – a salon much frequented by Hegel and his pupils – for the rise of Young Germany. The name arose in 1833 with Weinberg's dedication of *Aesthetische Feldzüge:* "Dem jungen Deutschland, nicht dem Alten!"

[67] Heinrich Heine, *The Romantic School*, in *Works*, vol. VI, London, 1892, trans. by G. Leland, p. 101. "It often seems to me as if the heads of the French were furnished internally like their cafés with innumerable mirrors so that every idea which gets in reflects itself countless times by which optical arrangement the narrowest scantiest heads

appear to be broad and enlightened". See also his sarcasms regarding Victor Cousin's purported familiarity with German philosophy. On the other hand, Heine defended Saint-Simonianism in the *Augsburger Zeitung* from 1832 and Henry René d'Allemagne, *Les saint simoniens*, Paris, 1930, p. 152, cites Heine: "Saint-Simonianism is accomplishing what religion, philosophy, politics and education have attempted for centuries".

[68] Rihs, *op. cit.*, p. 190, cites the Saint-Simonian *Globe*, 16th April, 1832: "Prussia is a model of political government, it is the enemy of all disorderly and unconsidered liberalism. (Prussia) is preparing for social and individual regeneration", Also K. W. Swart, *The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth-Century France*, The Hague, 1964, p. 60, writes of the Germanomania which began with Madame de Staël and had Gerard de Nerval speak of "la vieille Allemagne notre mère à tous".

[69] See also Cornu, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[70] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, paragraph 244: "When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls . . . the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers . . . etc.".

[71] See Werner Conze's article, 'Vom "Pöbel" zum "Proletariat"' *Vierteljahreschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XLI, 1954, pp. 333–364. For details on Radowitz, see *Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, vol. XXVII, Leipzig, 1888, p. 14. Conze cites Rodowitz in 1825: "Now with the proletariat the lord takes the essence of his body and his strength for himself and leaves the rest to him in bitter irony. This is the result of the fact that the correct understanding of service and work has been lost – the new process of liberation is often enough only a passage from a subordination to persons to a subordination of things, needs and money".

[72] On Baader and the proletariat see Ernst Benz, 'Franz von Baaders Gedanken über den Proletair', in *Zeitschrift fur Religions- und Geistesgeschichte*, I, 1948, pp. 97–105. Also the anthology *Franz von Baaders Gesellschaftslehre*, Munich, 1957. The full and staggering title of his twenty-page article was: "Uber das dermalige Missverhältnis der Vermögenlosen oder Proletairs zu den Vermögen besitzenden Classen der Societät in Betreff ihres Auskommens sowohl in materieller als intellectueller Hinsicht aus dem Standpunkte des Rechts betrachtet", Munich, 1835.

[73] In Baader's concept of exploitation as a crime against the divine order one sees perhaps most clearly the merger of feudal nostalgia and social criticism. Baader's statement that "Christentum ist Menschentum" can be compared to Feuerbach's "Religion or at least the Christian religion is the relation of man to his own nature . . . the divine is nothing else than the human being". *Essence of Christianity*, p. 14; the obvious similarities are thus couched in clearly different language.

[74] Lübbe, *Hegelsche Rechte*; Rihs, *op. cit.*, summarizes Carové's *Der Saint Simonismus und die neuere französische Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1831, as affirming that Bazard's and Enfantin's doctrines were all contained *in nuce* in Rousseau and in Fichte, thus presenting nothing really new. Instead of discrediting Saint-Simonianism this made it more palatable to Carové's German readers. Similarly, the *Gesellschafter* announced Rodrigues' translation of Lessing's *Education of the Human Race* as proof of Saint-Simonians' seriousness; d'Allemagne, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

[75] *Der Messianismus, die neuen Templar und einige anders merkwürdige Erscheinungen auf dem Gebiete der Religion und Philosophie in Frankreich . . .*, Leipzig, 1834. *Zur Beurtheilung des Buches der polnischen Pilgrime von Mickiewicz*. Zurich, 1835. See the Carové bibliography in Lübbe, *Hegelsche Rechte*, pp. 321–322.

[76] See Hanns Günther Reissner, *Edouard Gans. Ein Leben in Vormärz*, Tübingen, 1965.

[77] Gans' *Tagesgeschichtliche Vorträge*, given in 1833–34 were suspended and then permitted once again in 1838–39. Lübbe, *Archiv fur Philosophie, op. cit.*, p. 197.

[78] Edouard Gans, *Rückblicke auf Personen und Zustände*, Berlin, 1838, pp. 91–105.

[79] Cornu, *op. cit.*, p. 49, mentions that Gans was a member of the Club des amis de la Pologne in 1831.

[80] Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, pp. 357ff for text of the Cieszkowski–Michelet correspondence.

[81] *Curriculum vitae* in Kühne, *ibid.*, p. 426.

[82] Karl-Ludwig Michelet, *Wahrheit aus meinem Leben*, Berlin, 1884, are Michelet's memoirs and give a picture both of the man and of the Hegelian school as it disintegrated. Michelet's Parisian experiences are described there on pp. 129ff.

[83] Gebhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[84] Michelet, *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie*, vol. II, p. 799.

[85] Michelet, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der neuesten deutschen Philosophie*, Berlin, 1843, p. 399.

[86] On Michelet, see also Löwith, *op. cit.*, p. 65 and chapter three below.

[87] *Curriculum vitae, op. cit.* There are no further details concerning this trip, although there are scattered confirmations that Cieszkowski did actually visit England before 1842 – e.g., A. Cieszkowski, 'Wrażenia z Rzymu', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, 1842, I, pp. 642–657. The omission of France can probably be explained politically. Tsarist subjects, and particularly students, often had difficulties in obtaining passports to France. Sir Isaiah Berlin has commented on the irony of "Young Russian anarchists who dutifully went to Germany (and) were infected by dangerous ideas far more violently than they would have been had they gone to Paris in the easygoing early years of Louis-Philippe". 'A Marvellous Decade', *Encounter*, nr 31, June 1955, p. 28. Berlin overestimates, I feel, the tranquility of Paris in these days as I shall try to show in part two of this work.

[88] This consisted of three farms in Surchow in the Kransnystaw area of Lublin province. Wojtkowski in Jakóbczyk, ed., *op. cit.*

[89] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 1, 20th June 1836, in Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, p. 357.

[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 357–358.

[91] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr. 2, 10th October 1836, *ibid.*, p. 360. The entire correspondence, moreover, is in French.

[92] G. Lefèbvre, *La monarchie de juillet*, n.d., typescript of Sorbonne (?) lectures, available at St. Antony's College, Oxford, p. 202. Beet sugar had been introduced under the empire because of the blockade. It had been maintained under the Restoration and had made great progress under the July Monarchy to the extent that virtually every farm had its sugar beet production. In response to pressure from colonial cane growers and their refiners the French government from 1839 imposed heavy taxes on beet sugar.

[93] These unpublished diaries, referred to by Walicki occasionally as *Dzienniki*, are available in the Manuscript Division of the University Library, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mckiewicza w Poznaniu, Poznan. As the actual manuscripts are barely legible, I am grateful to Dr. T. Kozanecki, Director, Biblioteka Sejmu, Warsaw, for having allowed me to compare the originals with his typescript of the greater part of the diaries. It is not until Dr. Kozanecki finishes and publishes his work that they can be properly evaluated

and related to Cieszkowski's published work. Here I intend to use the diaries only as auxiliary material. I shall title them *Diary I* and *Diary II* and refer to page numbers within each original notebook. These page numbers have no chronological significance. Moreover, there are numerous blank pages which are also numbered.

[94] Entry for 18th November 1837, cited by Walicki in his introduction to Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena*, 1972, p. XXXIII.

[95] *Diary II*, p. 3.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[97] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr. 3, 18th March 1837; Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 365: "... I have been so absorbed by pseudosocial activities that I am happy, now that Lent has come, that at least my mornings are free ... You will doubtlessly smile, wondering how it was possible for me, whom you knew as someone totally absorbed by his work and studying so pedantically, to decide to forsake his books and pen for white gloves and a top hat". The aberration appears to have been short-lived.

[98] Jozef Szaniawski (1764–1843) after having taken part in Kościusko's uprising became a councillor of state in 1821 and after the insurrection of 1830 took part in a Russian criminal court judging the conspirators. See Gabryl, *op. cit.*, pp. 20ff.

[99] *Diary II*, p. 4, Cieszkowski reports having attended a ball at the Warsaw citadel given by the governor. In the context of the day this indicates a compromising attitude vis-à-vis the Russian administration.

[100] *Diary II*, p. 11, dated September 1838.

[101] Clearly, Cieszkowski tried to keep up to date with the development of the Hegelian school. It is surprising, therefore, that he had not read Richter's well-known book earlier. Cieszkowski also complains that he has not been able to get hold of "Strauss' famous work" because the edition had been promptly sold out. Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 2, 10th October, 1836, Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 360–361.

[102] *Diary I*, p. 4.

[103] *Diary I*, p. 25.

[104] Paragraph 389, *Philosophy of Mind*, being part three of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. by William Wallace with introduction by J. N. Findlay, Oxford, 1971, p. 29.

[105] *Diary I*, pp. 8–9.

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[107] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 1, Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

[108] *Ibid.*

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 359.

[110] *Ibid.*, Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 2, *Ibid.*, p. 361.

[111] *Ibid.*

[112] Although this letter is apparently lost, we can reconstruct Michelet's arguments from Cieszkowski's reply to Michelet, letter nr 3, 18th March 1837, *Ibid.*, pp. 366–367 as well as Michelet to Cieszkowski, letter nr, 4, 6th April 1838, *Ibid.*, pp. 369–370.

[113] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 3, *Ibid.*, pp. 366–367.

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 366.

[115] Michelet to Cieszkowski, letter nr 4, *Ibid.*, p. 370.

[116] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 3, *Ibid.*, p. 365.

[117] *Ibid.*

[118] *Ibid.*

[119] See Cieszkowski's notes to the *Prolegomena*, in *Ibid.*, pp. 427–428.

[120] August Cieszkowski Junior has argued that the "historiosophic system appeared to Cieszkowski during midnight mass in Cracow in 1832". See Wojtkowski in Jakóbczyk, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 144. The evidence presented here would seem to discount that theory entirely.

[121] *Diary II*, p. 9, 7th June 1838: "Visited professors I know – looked with Lehmann over the final copy – read it to Michelet & Werder – notes & conclusion – Werder's lectures on logic & hist of philosophy – closer acquaintance with him – persuading him of my views ... Faust in the theatre – dinner for Gans, Michelet, Henning & Benary".

[122] Moritz Veit had previously published *Polenlieder* during the wave of enthusiasm for the Polish cause in 1830/31. In 1838 he submitted a thesis to Jena on "Saint Simonismus' Allgemeiner Völkerbund und ewiger Friede". Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

CHAPTER II

[1] 'Nicht veröffentlichte Vorrede Cieszkowskis zu seiner Schrift Prolegomena zur Historiosophie', in Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, pp. 430–431.

[2] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 6, 2nd February 1839, *Ibid.* p. 378.

[3] Unless otherwise stated, all references to the *Prolegomena* refer to the original German edition of 1838 and in this section are abbreviated immediately following citation as *PzH.*

[4] *Philosophy of Mind*, paragraph 554, p. 292.

[5] *Philosophy of History*, p. 173.

[6] Hegel's celebrated metaphor comparing philosophy to the Owl of Minerva is preceded by an explicit statement: "One word more about giving instruction as to what the world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world, it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process of formation has been completed. The teaching of the concept which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal first appears over against the real ..." *Philosophy of Right*, p. 13.

[7] *Philosophy of History*, p. 6: "But what experience and history teach is this – that peoples and governments have never learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it. Each period is involved in such peculiar circumstances, exhibits a condition of things so strictly idiosyncratic, that its conduct must be regulated by considerations, connected with itself, and itself alone".

[8] See Ostrowski, *op. cit.*, p. 53 for a discussion of these views citing Łukasiewicz and Kotarbiński.

[9] In the *Prolegomena* p. 31, Cieszkowski refers to Hegel's essay, 'The Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy in General', citing "*Gesammelte Werke I*," pp. 311–315. This work has been proven to be Schelling's. See Xavier Tilliette *Schelling: une philosophie en devenir*, Paris, 1970, p. 296.

[10] For instance, in the *Philosophy of History:* "This new principle (i.e., God recognized as Spirit) is the axis on which the History of the World turns. This is *the goal* and the *starting point* of History" (p. 319). Hegel makes it equally clear that the appearance of

Christ is unique, in contrast to Cieszkowski's expectation of a second, comparable event: "The appearance of the Christian God involves further its being *unique* in its kind; it can occur only once, for God is realized as Subject, and as manifested Subjectivity is exclusively One Individual" (p. 325).

[11] A brave defence of Hegel's philosophy of nature, not so much on its own terms as on historical principles and in relation to the integrity of Hegel's system, has been carried out by J. N. Findlay in *Hegel: A re-examination*, New York, 1962, chapter 9, as well as in his Foreword to Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*, being part two of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* (1830), translated by A. V. Miller, Oxford, 1970.

[12] Croce, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[13] Most generally perhaps in the very conclusion of the *Encyclopedia*. See *Philosophy of Mind*, paragraph 575, p. 314: "Nature standing between the Mind and its essence, sunders itself, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction, nor itself to something away from them and independent – which, as other than they, only serves as a link between them: for the syllogism is *in the Idea* and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor, and as implicitly the Idea".

[14] As will be shown below, this comparison appealed immensely to Cieszkowski's readers. For a similar statement by Hegel, see *Philosophy of History*, p. 15: "It was for a while the fashion to profess admiration for the wisdom of God as displayed in animals, plants, and isolated occurrences. But if it be allowed that Providence manifests itself in such objects and forms of existence, why not also in Universal History?"

[15] The Introduction to the *Philosophy of Right*, pp. 21–29, carefully develops the notion of the will as the unity of pure indeterminacy and the particularization of the ego, thus distinguishing between the will which is but implicitly free, the natural will – presumably corresponding in a general way to Cieszkowski's pre-theoretical will – and that will which has had reflection brought to bear on impulse – the post-theoretical will for Cieszkowski.

[16] Cieszkowski's post-theoretical will is indeterminate because, in Hegel's terms, it has overcome the alleged preponderance of necessity in Hegel's conception of the will (*PzH*, p. 120) and thus returned to a position of immediate arbitrariness. Cieszkowski, of course, maintains that he has not returned but advanced to a more perfect synthesis.

[17] For instance Cieszkowski prefaces Chapter III of the *Prolegomena* with an epigrammatic paraphrase of a well-known verse from Goethe's *Faust*: "Spirit helps me! Suddenly I see and write in confidence: at the end will be the deed!" The term appears in Hegel also but without any overtones. For instance, in the *Philosophy of Mind*, p. 277, paragraph 459: "This movement (of a nation passing into universal history – AL) is the path of liberation for the spiritual substance, the *deed* by which the absolute final aim of the world is realized in it . . ." (emphasis mine – AL).

[18] *Philosophy of History*, p. 30; *PzH*, p. 39, states: "Great men stand in relation not only to their own time but reach beyond to future and past ages. When a great man is to appear on the scene of the world we feel his need from afar. When he leaves we profit long from his activity's fruits; hence, a long awaiting of him in the past, dominant influence in the present and fame in the future".

[19] *PzH*, *Ibid.*, "The whole expanse of history is necessarily *calibrated* in terms of such personalities . . . Humanity can in no way do without them. Their incommensurability depends on the incommensurability of the positions which they occupy, and particularly on the fact that their magnified spirit leaves little, often nothing to do for those of normal stature other than the finishing of their own work".

[20] In Hegel's *Philosophy of History*, the world historical individuals are themselves driven by passion: "They attained no calm enjoyment; their whole life was labour and trouble; their whole nature was nought else but their master passion" (p. 31). A few pages earlier he asserts: "Nothing great has been accomplished in the world without passion" (p. 23). Most generally he declares: "The first glance at History convinces us that the actions of men proceed from their needs, their passions, their characters and talents; and impresses us with the belief that such needs, passions and interests are the sole springs of action – the efficient agents in this scene of activity" (p. 20). Cieszkowski takes this to mean that men's desires are only the first and not the ultimate springs of action but this is a somewhat arbitrary interpretation of Hegel's remarks which Cieszkowski does not develop. Findlay has pointed to the inadequacy of Hegel's treatment of volition, hence Cieszkowski can perhaps be forgiven for having misunderstood him. Forward to *Philosophy of Mind*, p. xviii.

[21] There are some eight references to Herder in the second and third chapters of the *Prolegomena*. Cieszkowski speaks of Herder and Montesquieu; in the context of environmental influences in history then discusses Herder with Schiller as having attained only an aesthetic concept of history; finally, he criticizes Herder for not having seen the necessity but only the possibility of historical development. For a recent analysis of Herder's thought see F. M. Barnard, *Herder's Social and Political Thought*, Oxford, 1965. For a summary of his *Ideen*..., see Chapters II and III of G. A. Wells, *Herder and After*, Gravenhage, 1959.

[22] Lukács, *op. cit.*, pp. 107ff.

[23] Among the earliest entries in the *Diaries* that dated 9th August, 1832, appears to be a comment on a reading of Fichte: "All that exists seems to come under two influences, an external universal one from the world, and an inner individual one from one's ego..." *Diary I*, p. 25. Also Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter number 3, 18th March 1837, Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, pp. 364–365.

[24] J. E. Erdmann, *A History of Philosophy*, translated by W. S. Hough, 4th ed., New York, 1897, vol. II, p. 497.

[25] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 3, 18th March 1837, Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 364–365.

[26] J. G. Fichte, *Characteristics of the Present Age*, translated by William Smith, London, 1847, pp. 3–17.

[27] Xavier Leon, *Fichte et son Temps*, Paris, 1929, vol. II, p. 433.

[28] Fichte, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–250 and 267.

[29] This anguish is no less intense in being less apparent. One can apply to the present age what Cieszkowski states in another context: "If the contradiction between art and philosophy is less *striking* than other contradictions of lower order, it is only the more important,... contradictions are lowest where they *only seem* highest. This is why the quiet despair of the heart and inner psychic contradictions are so intensive and difficult, since they appear least openly" (*PzH*, p. 110).

[30] J. G. Fichte, *The Vocation of Man*, translated by William Smith, London, 1849, p. 131.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[33] *Die Wissenschaftslehre in ihrem allgemeinen Umrisse*, cited in Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[34] Compare Cieszkowski's appeal to Cuvier and the argument about the knowability of an organism from a single tooth cited above with Fichte, *Vocation of Man*, p. 37: "Give to nature the determination of one single element of a person, let it seem ever so trivial – the course of a muscle, the turn of a hair, and she could tell thee all the thoughts which could belong to this person during the whole period of his conscious existence".

[35] Baczko, *op. cit.*, p. 250, discusses Cieszkowski's borrowing of the difference between *Tatsache* and *Tathandlung*. Baczko also points out the analogy between Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* ending in the *Weisheitslehre* and Cieszkowski's raising of a philosophy of history to a historiosophy.

[36] Fichte, *Vocation of Man*, p. 44, speaks of freedom in terms of active self-creation: "To be free ... means that I myself will make myself whatever I am to be ... I am as a thinking being, what I am as an active being. I create myself ..."

[37] Lukàcs, *op. cit.*

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 111.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] Avineri and MacLellan, *op. cit.*, both recognize Cieszkowski's primacy in the development of the concept of *praxis*, but they are not very clear on the way in which Cieszkowski's *praxis* differed from, and marked a step beyond the notions of the Young Hegelian mainstream.

[41] Hilmann, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[42] Karl Friedrich Biedermann, *Fundamental Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1838, p. 411.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 471.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 411.

[45] Biedermann was a liberal deputy in 1848, a precursor of the *Arbeiterschulbewegung*, and a great advocate of female education; in sum, an inveterate liberal and idealist. See *Neue Deutsche Biographie*, Vol. II, p. 224.

[46] Philippe Joseph Buchez, *Introduction à la science de l'histoire*, 2nd ed., 1843, 1st ed., Paris, 1833; Vol. I, p. 60.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 71.

[48] Quoted in Gaston Castella, *Buchez Historien*, Fribourg, 1909, p. 38.

[49] Quoted from Saint-Simonian Doctrine by Walicki in 'Francuskie inspiracje ...' *op. cit.*, p. 133.

[50] Buchez, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

[52] *Diaries I*, p. 4.

[53] See Jean Baptiste Duroselle's *Les débuts du catholicisme social en France*, Paris, 1951, for a splendid treatment of the phenomenon and definitions of Social Catholicism.

[54] Buchez, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–40.

[55] Quoted in Castella, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[56] Buchez, *op. cit.*, pp. 74 and 170.

[57] *Diary I*, p. 11: "The world is the body of God. God is the soul of the world ... all things are limited by God's organs but they do not constitute His essence as our members do not constitute ourselves ... Naturally, when a collision takes place between a finite being and an infinite being it is like a collision occurring within and among the organs of the body. God is pained and, just as our heart or head aches, so we ache God (in the original: *Bóg choruje na nas* – AL). The result is that God's state of bliss or

happiness is dependent on the history of the world and absolute harmony of God is only to be established when we have reached the harmonious era of society". Cieszkowski defends this concept by a specific appeal to Hegel: "Is the notion of God becoming happy less probable than the Hegelian postulate of His becoming conscious in human consciousness?" *Ibid.* This idea is repeated in the *Ojcze Nasz*, vol. III, 2nd edition, p. 190.

[58] Walicki 'Francuskie inspiracje . . .', and previously Kowalski, *op. cit.* It is difficult to refer to Fourier's numerous and widely scattered texts here. For some suggestions, substantive and bibliographical, on Fourier's theodicy, see *Selections from the Works of Fourier*, trans. by J. Franklin, introduction by C. Gide, London, 1921, pp. 47–50.

[59] Lobkowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 202, is quite correct in criticizing Cieszkowski for confining his illustration of "social practice" to "a bashful reference to the system of Fourier". I am suggesting that Cieszkowski quite intentionally did not spell out the meaning of social practice: first, in order to avoid the pitfalls of utopianism; second, not to alienate himself unnecessarily from his Hegelian readers.

[60] This omission cannot be explained as resting on the assumption that his readers would have read Fourier themselves. On the contrary, although Gans had mentioned Fourier in his *Rückblicke auf Persone und Zustände*, p. 115, the first German studies on Fourier appeared in 1840, prompted by a wave of interest in non-Saint-Simonian socialism following Blanqui's abortive coup of 1839. Cornu, *Moses Hess . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 45. In fact, Cieszkowski seems consciously to avoid defending any specific Fourierist notions. His exhortations to read Fourier rest on his conviction that Fourier's concerns themselves are important.

[61] Although Cieszkowski refers to Saint-Simon frequently in his *Diaries* there is only one indirect and critical allusion in the *Prolegomena* (p. 127) to Saint-Simonianism, more specifically to its doctrine of the rehabilitation of matter. Cieszkowski's borrowings from Buchez, however, constitute a specifically Saint-Simonian element. Walicki, "Francuskie inspiracje . . .", *op. cit.*, p. 135, emphasizes that "the critique of Hegel by the author of the *Prolegomena* coincided with the Saint-Simonian critique of Christian spiritualism and philosophic rationalism", and affirms that "generally speaking Cieszkowski's conceptions were closer to the Saint-Simonians (than to Fourier's), *ibid.*, p. 144. He does not explain why the latter is cited and recommended to the readers of the *Prolegomena* while the former are not mentioned. I am suggesting that in 1838 Saint-Simonianism, well past the peak of its popularity, already belonged to the past. Fourierism, on the other hand, unknown and more "modern" or emergent, was a more appropriate symbol of the theory of the future. In terms of substantive theory both schools could have served equally well inasmuch as they both claimed scientific status and emphasized the practical and social sphere over the theoretical.

[62] Both in his *Diaries* and in the *Prolegomena* Cieszkowski had expressed his ambivalence regarding the Hegelian dictum "What is real is rational and what is rational is real". In the former he had written: "It is only a half-truth . . . what should be should not be precisely because it only should be and is not . . . what should be truly, if it really should be, would be for it would have strength, right and reason . . ." *Diaries II*, p. 31. In the latter he wrote more explicitly: "What is rational as well as what is real are nothing other than instances of development. In other words, at certain stages of the spirit reason and reality coincide so that subsequently one precedes the other dialectically. Hence the eras of perplexity in history. Reality ceaselessly *adjusts* itself to reason and their two-sided

process of development only falls into two so as to unite at a higher level". *PzH*, pp. 145–146.

[63] *PzH*, p. 148: Cieszkowski writes of "the essential errors which make of Fourier's system to this day an utopia . . . the basic error of utopia is that instead of developing with reality it tries to enter into reality, which it will never be allowed . . ." On the other hand, in his *Diaries* Cieszkowski had written: "What are utopias? They are longings which cease ever more to be longings, becoming the dreams of mankind and (then) the deductions of reason's calculations".

[64] *Diary, II*, p. 35: "Today's utopians, the so-called communists, want to abolish property. They are terribly wrong in this. In this they are terribly wrong; this great negation qua negation is false and only as the negation of a negation or a true affirmation does it belong to truth. It is not all a question of abolishing property but of renewing and universalizing it . . .". Compare this to Marx's IInd Paris Manuscript of 1844, on the relation of private property, *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, trans. and ed. by T. B. Bottomore, New York – London – Toronto, 1963, pp. 136–144.

[65] *PzH*, p. 148: "Utopias never sin in being *too* rational for reality but in *not* being rational enough. Instead of approaching reality, as it imagines it is doing, utopia withdraws from reality. One can never be sufficiently *ideal* in developing any truth, for the true good is only the other side of truth . . ."

[66] *Ibid.*: "Fourier is the greatest utopian but also the last . . . it is not the future which belongs to Fourier's system as he imagines but rather the system itself belongs to the future . . .".

[67] *Ibid.*

[68] Cieszkowski is trying to use the concept of utopia as a tool to overcome the dichotomy between facts and values, a dichotomy unacceptable within his Hegelian framework. He had struggled with the problem in his *Diary II*, p. 7: "True reality must develop in the area of facts. The role of today's theory is to lay the fundamental idea, open the horizons of the new system and sow the seeds which are to impart life. Theory is the servant of facts but it must precede them as well as follow them and direct them but it must never prejudice facts because life develops out of life and theory must not change living phenomena into dead formalism". Utopia satisfies the need for a theory which can lead facts but not impose itself upon them.

[69] *Allgemeine preussische Staatszeitung*, 12th October 1838, pp. 1167–1168.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] Garewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 215, compares the *Allgemeine preussische Staatszeitung* to the Parisian *Monitor* and attributes the early inclusion of this review to "powerful influences".

[72] *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, November 1838, nr 99, pp. 785–792 and nr 100, pp. 793–798.

[73] Although Cieszkowski's *vita* in Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 426, puts him down as having studied modern philosophy with Erdmann, it is probable that, in view of his close relation with Michelet, he was kept aware of the contents of the latter's lectures in the period 1832/34 which constituted the basis of the *Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie.*

[74] See Cieszkowski–Michelet correspondence in Kühne, *op. cit.*, *passim* and *Diary, II*, p. 9.

[75] Michelet's summary explains Cieszkowski's claim to having brought the theory of

history to completion. It mentions his praise as well as his criticism of Hegel. Then it passes on to a discussion of the future in the *Prolegomena* and a detailed exposition of the categories of spirit – the logical, physical, pneumatic – and the triarchic division of history as it appears in Cieszkowski. Michelet's review may be useful to the reader as a supplement to the summary contained in the first section of this chapter.

[76] Michelet, *Jahrbücher . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 794.

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 794–795.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 795.

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 797, quoting *PzH*, p. 134.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 786. Michelet is wrong about the success of Hegel's system abroad or at least misled. In France, no work had yet appeared about Hegel in spite of a prize offered in 1836 by the philosophical section of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences for a critical study of Kant and Hegel. In Russia, Hegel was only becoming fashionable but, in any case, it is unlikely that Michelet would have recognized Russian Hegelianism as the system he professed. Thus, Michelet's proselytizing enthusiasm seems to be making much out of what was actually very little. See Illeana Bauer, "Einige Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der Hegel Beschäftigung in Frankreich" in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, XVIII, 1970, p. 861.

[82] *Hallische Jahrbücher für deutsche Wissenschaft und Kunst*, 11th March 1839, nr 60, pp. 476–488. For information regarding this journal see chapter I, section ii of this work. Julius Frauenstadt was later to become a leading Schopenhauer scholar. In 1838 he was writing a book entitled *Freiheit des Menschen und die Persönlichkeit Gottes* and in 1842 he published one of many Young Hegelian criticisms of Schelling's Berlin lectures.

[83] Frauenstadt, *Hallische Jahrbücher*, *op. cit.*, p. 479.

[84] *Ibid.*: "It is the task of the poet to seek and find in the natural the symbol of the spiritual but the symbol is very far from the concept of the thing which is the concern of philosophy . . . the concept is different from the symbol in that the concept is immanent to the thing itself while the symbol points to a third object".

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

[86] Garewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 219, concludes from his examination of the German reaction to the *Prolegomena* that the Hegelian Left rejected the work while the Centre "accepted it without qualification". I have tried to show that this conclusion is incorrect for, in fact, the *Prolegomena's* attempt to stand above party divisions led to its being rejected by all parties, the Centre included.

[87] There are several short but adequate studies on Moses Hess. See Cornu's *Moses Hess et la Gauche hégélienne*, *op. cit.*, and Sir Isaiah Berlin's *The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess*, London, 1959. A more substantial biography is Edmund Silberner's *Moses Hess: Geschichte seines Lebens*, Leiden, 1966. For a Hess anthology see Horst Lademacher ed., *Moses Hess: Ausgewählte Schriften*, Cologne, 1962. Garewicz, *op. cit.*, discusses Hess' relation to Cieszkowski in some detail, pp. 226–241.

[88] Moses Hess, *Die Europäische Triarchie*, Leipzig, 1841, abridgement in Lademacher, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[89] *Ibid.*

[90] Hess referring to *PzH*, pp. 124, cited in Garewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

[91] Lademacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–85: "The author of the *Prolegomena* goes to extraordinary

pains to remove this prejudice (regarding the possibility of cognition of the future – AL). Alone this seems almost superfluous: the thing speaks for itself and requires no external argumentation . . ."

[92] *Ibid.*

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

[94] Berlin, *Moses Hess*; Cornu, *Karl Marx*, as quoted in Garewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 229. Cornu also writes in his *Moses Hess*, p. 27, of the singular lack of success of the *Heilige Geschichte*: "Its only effect was to aggravate the disagreement between Hess and his father, unhappy with his son's unorthodox interpretation of Judaism and critique of property".

[95] Hess had written: "As approached till now, history . . . was not yet a systematic science but a mass of experiences out of which individual truths could certainly be drawn but as a whole could have no consequences. In these pages effort will be made to bring order into chaos. A first attempt to grasp history in its entirety and regularity will be made". Cited in Cornu, *Moses Hess*, p. 12. Compare with the first chapter of the *Prolegomena*.

[96] Adam had been followed by a flood; Christ by a flood of nations; Spinoza by a flood of ideas. The main difference with Cieszkowski is that Hess substitutes Spinoza for Hegel's role in the *Prolegomena*. In anticipation of the *Our Father*, it is interesting to observe that Hess also calls the three eras the age of the father – an era of passivity, social harmony – the age of the son – consciousness of union of spirit and nature – and that of the holy spirit – where reason re-establishes social harmony. The underlying idea is that of progressive revelation of God. See excerpts from the *Heilige Geschichte* in Lademacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 59–61, and Cornu, *Moses Hess*, p. 13.

[97] Cornu's discussion of the influences inspiring the *Heilige Geschichte* reveal further similarities with Cieszkowski particularly in respect to the influence of Fichte, Schelling and the Schellingian interpretation of Spinoza recalling Cieszkowski's attachment of Spinoza's notion of the connection between the spiritual and the natural order. Even though the *Heilige Geschichte* appeared (anonymously) a year before the *Prolegomena* it should be remarked that Cieszkowski had not read the work and Hess himself seems to maintain that Cieszkowski came to hold views similar to his own independently. See Lademacher, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[98] *Die Europäische Triarchie*, Leipzig, 1841, appeared anonymously also and was originally to be called the *Europäische Wiedergeburt*. Its final title was chosen in polemical retort to an *Europäische Pentarchie*, Leipzig, 1839, by an unknown Goldmann, a Russian police official. The "Pentarchist" urged a union of the five European powers with Russia especially, and Austria – the two most reactionary states – at its head. Hess' triarchy consisted of the three liberal and potentially revolutionary powers: primarily England, then France and Germany. The *Triarchie* takes a stand on all the political issues concerning the Young Hegelians at the time: the fear of war with France, the Archbishop of Cologne affair. In fact, Hess excuses himself for mixing "talk of the kingdom of God on earth with such very mundane matters". Cited in Garewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 231; for further information on the *Triarchie*, see Silberner, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

[99] 'Die Philosophie der Tat' appeared in *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz*, Zurich, 1843, again anonymously. This article set the tone of the whole volume. Contributors included Herwegh, Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Engels. See Silberner, *op. cit.*,

pp. 123ff, for a summary and study of the development of the concept of the deed in Hess.

[100] It is very important to keep track of the dates at which these various works appeared. The *Prolegomena* was original and even daring in 1838. By 1843 its concepts were self-evident and outmoded. It must be remembered that the *Heilige Geschichte*, which pays the most homage to Cieszkowski, was largely already written in 1839 though it did not appear until 1841. Hess had re-studied Fichte thoroughly after having written the *Triarchie* and Silberner discerns a strong Fichtean influence in the article 'Philosophy of the Deed', *ibid.*

[101] Garewicz, *op cit.*, p. 227. Hess' later Zionism is treated in the discussion of Hess' *Rom und Jerusalem: die letzte Nationalfrage* (1862), in Silberner, *op. cit.*, pp. 388–445. Garewicz explains the affinity between Hess and Cieszkowski by maintaining that the former was "never really a Young Hegelian *sensu stricto*", p. 227, and connecting this with his earlier assertion that Cieszkowski also remained excluded from the left Young Hegelians. He thus suggests that they share the fate of being outsiders. This argument seems unconvincing to me inasmuch as it denies that Hess, in spite of the poor philosophical training he had, influenced profoundly the Young Hegelian movement, see Cornu, *op. cit.*, *passim*. There is no indication that Cieszkowski met Hess, although a letter to Cieszkowski from the latter's secretary informs him of the content of the *Triarchie*, Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 196, and both were members of the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* in the 1860's

[102] Garewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 240 makes the interesting comment that perhaps Hess may be seen as moving from a Saint-Simonian to a Fourierist position whereas Cieszkowski's thought evolves in the contrary direction. The comment is provocative, as he himself points out, but unproven.

[103] Marx to Engels, 12th January 1882, *Marx–Engels Werke*, XXXV, p. 35. The "Swiss Bürkli" had reproached Marx for not mentioning Cieszkowski's work on credit.

[104] Engels to Marx, 13th January 1882, *Ibid.*, p. 37. Engels is, in fact, mistaken about Cieszkowski's collaboration in these journals.

[105] See Stepelovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–53, concerning Werder whose pupils included Bakunin; *Diary II*, p. 9, for Cieszkowski's comments on Werder.

[106] See Cornu, *Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels*, vol. II, pp. 106–228, *passim*.

[107] See Liebich, *op. cit.*, p. 1503.

[108] See H. Opitz, *Philosophie und Praxis: eine Untersuchung zur Herausbildung der marxschen Praxisbegriff*, Berlin, 1967; also R. Panasiuk, *Lewica heglowska*, Warsaw, 1969, esp. pp. 54–93, *passim*, as well as Lobkowicz, *op. cit.*, esp. chapter 14.

[109] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1968, p. 30.

[110] This thesis is more or less explicitly stated in Ostrowski and Lobkowicz, *op. cit.*

[111] For instance, Garewicz and Opitz, *op. cit.* The latter writes, p. 26: "According to Cieszkowski, praxis is but the reproduction of the spirit from thought to being. This conception gave birth among many Young Hegelians to the naive faith – which perfectly suited the German *Spiessburgers* – that through pure reflection, through the correction of false notions in 'the calm of cognition' or through the purely theoretical critique of evils they could transform an existing reality and suppress present wrongs".

[112] Most recently, this has been the balanced assessment of L. Kołakowski, *Główne Nurty Marksizmu*, vol. I, pp. 89–92. A similar view has been expressed in less reserved

form by Avineri, *op. cit.*, pp. 124–131, who rightly points out that Cieszkowski differs from Marx in that in the *Prolegomena* "he does not envisage an historical subject that can carry out his postulate of radical change, and hence he cannot, in the last resort, develop a theory of social action" (p. 130).

[113] The best account of the atmosphere of Hegelianism in Russia remains V. Annenkov's *The Extraordinary Decade*, trans. by I. Titunik, Ann Arbor, 1968. Sir Isaiah Berlin's *Encounter* articles cite some of Herzen's ironical retrospective comments on this period from the latter's memoirs, *My Past and Thoughts*, trans. by G. Garnett, London 1924–27 revised by H. Higgins, New York 1968. Especially part IV, succeeds in recapturing the mood of the period.

[114] Nikolai Vladimirovitch Stankevitch (1813–40) and Nikolai Platonovitch Ogarev (1813–77) were among the leaders of Russian Hegelianism with Stankevitch exercising a particularly strong personal influence on his entire generation. Stankevitch wrote in his last letter to Bakunin, dated 7 May 1840: "The idea must of necessity become the *deed*, conscious and delighting in the deed. There is a brochure by Cieszkowski *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*... his division (of history) is not good, since it does not rest on the idea of history, but the last thought, that knowledge must pass into the deed and realize itself, in it is correct. A general striving expresses itself today towards the highest unification of separate categories..." Quoted in Čyževskij, *op. cit.*, p. 212. Stankevitch connects this to Feuerbach's materialism in the same letter, see Walicki, 'Cieszkowski a Hercen', *op. cit.*, pp. 180ff. Herzen's letter to Ogarev about the *Prolegomena* has not survived but the latter's reply has: "The *Prolegomena* is an important study, thank you for it... the *Historiosophie* is a remarkable book. Katkov & Co. consider the analogy between material nature and history to be far-fetched; I do not agree with that". *Russkaya Mysl*, 1888, nr 11, pp. 2 and 5, cited in Walicki, *op. cit.*, p. 154. Bakunin should have heard of the *Prolegomena* not only from Stankevitch but also from his tutor, K. Werder. Bakunin probably met Cieszkowski himself in 1848. Benoit Hepner, *Bakounine et le Panslavisme révolutionnaire*, Paris, 1950, pp. 162 and 265.

[115] The best general biography on Herzen is Martin Malia's *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1961. Most complete for the period under consideration here is Raoul Labry's *Alexandre Ivanovič Herzen* 1812–1870*: essai sur la formation et le développement de ses idées*, Paris, 1928. The Cieszkowski–Herzen relation was first explored by Gustav Shpet in *Filosofskoe Mirovozzrenie* Gercena, Petrograd, 1921. Its most thorough treatment is in the Walicki article cited above.

[116] Herzen to A. L. Vitberg, 28th July 1839, in *A. I. Gercen: Polnoe Sobranie Sočinenii i Pism*, ed. Lemke, vol. XXII (additions), Leningrad, 1925, p. 33. Aleksandr Lavrentevitch Vitberg (1787–1855) was primarily an architect in the classical style though with Masonic and mystic inclinations. See *Bolšaja Sovetskaja Enciklopedija*, 1951, vol. 8, p. 191.

[117] Labry, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

[118] Walicki points to this in comparing the *Prolegomena's*, "Christ is the central point of the past ages... however significant the reforms begun in the XVth century, they do not constitute an extreme opposition or a radical turnover in all relations of life like those two opposite periods" with Herzen's 'Letters on the Study of Nature': "Many consider the three last centuries to be as cut off from the middle ages as the middle ages are from antiquity. They are not correct; the ages of reformation and enlightenment are the last

phase of the development of catholicism and feudalism", in Walicki, *op. cit.*, pp. 164–165.

[119] *Ibid.*, Herzen was particularly fascinated by the analogy between the end of antiquity and the present day. This is a theme throughout the *Our Father* and is present as a sub-theme in the *Prolegomena*. Walicki attributes both Cieszkowski's and Herzen's inspiration in this respect to Pierre Leroux.

[120] Labry, *op cit.*, pp. 203–204, referring to the Cuvier analogy, claims that "in this demonstration of Cieszkowski, Herzen found the very substance of his spirit".

[121] *Ibid.*; see also Ogarev–Herzen letter cited above.

[122] Walicki, *op. cit.*, pp. 171 and 186.

[123] It might be misleading to suggest that Cieszkowski and Herzen shared a common standpoint here. The former after having studied Hegel had discarded romanticism and rejected Schelling perhaps even before knowing him thoroughly. Herzen, on the other hand, did not yet know Hegel and was moving away from Schelling under other influences. See Labry *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[124] See Walicki, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Herzen attempted to come to terms with Hegel critically in his articles 'Dilettantism in Science', (1843), published in Lemke, *op. cit.*, vol. III. Petrograd, 1919, pp. 163–234.

[125] Even Bakunin advocated reconciliation – indeed more ferociously than his colleagues. See Cyzevsky, *op. cit.*, and Annenkov, *op. cit.*, esp. chapter 4.

[126] 'Buddhism in Science' in Lemke, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 218. Compare also with Cieszkowski's views in *Gott und Palingenesie.*

[127] This is Walicki's conclusion in 'Cieszkowski a Herzen'. He writes, *op. cit.*, p. 171, that the closest single point of contact between Cieszkowski and Herzen lies in the conclusions they drew regarding the free and creative deed from Schiller's conciliation of immediacy and reflection. See also Labry, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[128] Both were well acquainted with Cuvier, Herbart, Schelling and Bacon and maintained a lively interest in the discoveries of the natural sciences. Herzen had also read Buchez, Fourier, Saint-Simon and George Sand; Pierre Leroux particularly appears to be important to both, see Walicki, *op. cit.*, *passim*, and Alexandre Koyré, *La Philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIXe siècle*, Paris, 1928.

[124] Shpet, *op. cit.*, p. 79, notes that "the possible influence of Cieszkowski is restricted only to the formal side of his 'practical' deductions. In content, Herzen is as little bound with Cieszkowski as the left Hegelians". At the same time, however, Shpet lists four points of influence: Cieszkowski fortified Herzen's inclination "to translate philosophy into life"; Herzen borrowed some terms; Herzen drew his criticism of Hegel from Cieszkowski at least partially; Cieszkowski provided a link between Hegel and the Young Hegelians for Herzen.

[130] *My Past and Thoughts*, part V.

[131] "Buddhism in Science" in Lemke, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 22. "German philosophers have seemed somehow to forsee that activity and not science is the aim of man. This was often a brilliant, prophetic inconsistency, forcefully pushing its way into severe and passionless logical constructions".

[132] Quoted by Volodin, *op. cit.*, p. 274, from Gercen A. I., *Sobranie sočinenii v tridsati tomah*, vol. XXX, Moscow, 1962, pp. 487–488.

[133] Edgar Quinet had written in 1831 of the reaction to philosophy in the form not of a

rejection of the principles of philosophy but of the vita contemplativa. Stuke, *op. cit.*, p. 50, citing Quinet's *Revue des Deux Mondes*, article quoted already. He had also realized the importance of Strauss' work. As the French translator of Herder, Quinet could have been particularly predisposed to accept the importance of Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena*. See Henri Tronchon, *La fortune intellectuelle de Herder en France*, Paris, 1920. See especially Z. L. Zaleski, 'Edgar Quinet et Auguste Cieszkowski' in *Mélanges d'histoire littéraire générale et comparée offerts à Fernand Baldensperger*, vol. II, Paris, 1930, pp. 361–374.

[134] Henryk Kamieński, *Filozofia ekonomii materialnej ludzkiego społeczeństwa*, 1st ed., 1843, ed. B. Baczko, Warsaw, 1959, p. 139, calls Cieszkowski a "German writer" in obvious scorn. Karol Libelt, later a political ally of Cieszkowski, is even more explicit in his disapproval and connects it with alienation from the Polish nation, an abstract position, etc., in *Samowładstwo Rozumu i Objawy Filozofji Slowiańskiej*, 1st ed., 1845; ed. Andrzej Walicki, in Biblioteka Klasyków Filozofii, Warsaw, 1967, pp. 268ff.

[135] Henryk Kamieński (1813–1865) and Edward Dembowski (1822–1846) were, coincidentally, first cousins. For an introduction to their thought, see Baczko's article about the former and Ładyka's article about the latter in the volume *Filozofia Polska*, vol. II, ed. B. Baczko, Warsaw, 1967.

[136] Dembowski, 'Rys rozwinięcia sie pojęć filozoficznych w Niemczech', originally published in *Przegląd Naukowy*, 1842, reprinted in Dembowski's *Pisma*, vol. I, Warsaw, 1955, p. 405.

[137] Dembowski, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

[138] *Ibid.*, pp. 410–411.

[139] *Ibid.*

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 412,

[141] Dembowski, 'Kilka myśli o eklektyźmie', *Rok*, IV, 1843, reprinted in *Pisma*, vol. III, p. 341.

[142] Kamieński, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[143] *Ibid.*

[144] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[145] *Diary II*, p. 10, entry for 24th August – 9th September records his trip to Heidelberg for his doctoral promotion without explaining why he chose to be promoted there rather than at Berlin. On 3rd November, he records a letter from Heidelberg awarding him the doctorate, *Diary II*, p. 12. The dissertation itself appears to have been lost. Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, pp. 431–440, has published pp. 9–16 of the German manuscript. An unfinished, but most complete version available is the Polish translation in *Biblioteka Warszawska, I*, 1841, pp. 287–306 and 536–561, entitled 'Rzecz o filozofii jonskiej jako wstęp do historii filozofii'. This is the version I shall cite as *I.P.* It is reprinted in Walicki and Garewicz, eds., *Prolegomena do Historiozofii . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–291. The pages published by Kühne continue the Polish version thus providing a reasonably complete, if not very homogeneous, whole.

[146] Hegel's exposition of logic comes in two distinct versions: the *Science of Logic* and the so-called Lesser Logic, which is *part one* of *the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, trans. by William Wallace as the *Logic of Hegel*, 2nd ed. revised, London, 1892. I have consulted only the latter and I believe that Cieszkowski is also referring to the Lesser Logic although he at no time specifically says so. I have found W. T. Stace, *The*

Philosophy of Hegel, London, 1924, Dover ed., 1955, to be an invaluable guide through the arguments of the *Logic*.

[147] Hegel discusses the Ionians in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, part I, section I, first period, first chapter.

[148] 'Notes to German manuscript of the Dissertation', Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 435.

[149] *Ibid.*, p. 438.

[150] *Ibid.*, p. 439.

[151] Hegel, *Philosophy of Nature*, para. 337–376, pp. 272–441.

[152] It is not even certain what sort of organism Cieszkowski is referring to. He compares the unity of philosophy with plant life and its ultimate unity after having gone through various, sometimes contradictory stages. Following Hegel, however, it would seem that if philosophy is to be compared with any sort of organism it should be animal organisms as organics' highest form. See note, *Ionian Philosophy*, pp. 288–289.

[153] Walter Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–176, gives an excellent evaluation of the actual role of the triad in Hegel. See also the 'Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit*' with Kaufmann's comments, *ibid.*, pp. 428–439. Kaufmann concludes that whereas Hegel has a certain predilection for triads he himself refuted the empty and schematic formalism of those who would erect the triad into a dogma.

[154] It may be recalled that in the *Prolegomena* Cieszkowski draws on paragraph 554 of the *Encyclopedia* to show that religion encompasses all other spheres of absolute spirit. It is more consistent with Hegel's general position, however, to see religion as a moment in the development of absolute spirit subordinate to philosophy. See Gray, ed., *op. cit.*, *passim*. This is also the position of the *Ionian Philosophy* which treats the birth of philosophy as a progress over religion.

[155] In describing the reconcilation between faith and knowledge which Christ effected, *Ionian Philosophy*, p. 539, Cieszkowski is simply repeating the position of Hegel's 'Introduction' to his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, in Gray, ed., *op. cit.*, pp. 271–272 and *passim*.

[156] Hegel, *ibid.*, in Gray, *ibid.*, p. 311: "We have altogether two philosophies – the Greek and the Teutonic . . ." etc.

[157] It is true that upon closer inspection the *Prolegomena* suggests an attitude to Hegel compatible with the *Ionian Philosophy*: "This highest position of philosophy has maintained itself up to our days where the era of intelligence has attained its height. This is understood even by those who do not clearly realize what a task awaits philosophy after the discovery of the absolute method. We would fail to recognize Hegel's greatness if we did not see in him the *beginning of the end* of philosophy as in Aristotle we recognize the end of the beginning. Uncontestably, with Hegel thought has solved its basic task and though development of philosophy does not end with this it will now have to descend from its apogee . . ." *PzH*, p. 101.

[158] Cieszkowski–Michelet, letter nr 1, 30th June 1836, Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 358. In this letter Cieszkowski also writes: "In his (i.e., Hegel's logic) as you have asserted yourself, one could undoubtedly make several changes in the presentation of its categories . . . nevertheless the structure is entirely built". One could perhaps look for the germ of Cieszkowski's redefinition of Hegel's logical categories here but the purely concessive character of Cieszkowski's statement and his immoderate praise of Hegel's logic which immediately precedes the quoted section set the dominant tone.

[159] Cieszkowski had already played with the possibility of replacing the category of quality with that of quantity as prior in logic in 1834. At that time, however, he had put the proposition in the form of a question. Thus, *Diary I*, p. 3, 2nd October 1834: "The beginning of philosophy from nothingness is still more proper than beginning it from being since being is not nothingness and precisely for that reason, Is," *Diary I*, p. 4, 12th December 1834: "In the progressive development of logical categories, should not quantity (in Hegel the second moment of the general sphere of being) precede the category of quality, as Braun (?) reputedly argues? – In that case, instead of beginning philosophy with the name of Parmenides as Hegel does we could withdraw its beginnings back to Pythagoras. In that case, the whole structure of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* would be set upon a mathematical base . . . In the present shape of Hegel's philosophy mathematics do not really find their proper place . . ."

[160] Hegel, 'Introduction' to *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* in Gray, *op. cit.*, p. 250, chides Brucker and Ritter for leaping to conclusions from limited evidence. At the same time, however, the work on the Ionians by Heinrich Ritter. *Geschichte der Ionischen Philosophie*, Hamburg, 1821, is praised by Hegel as "carefully written and . . . on the whole . . . cautious not to introduce foreign matter" in Gray, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 249. Cieszkowski polemicizes on several minor points with Ritter – e.g., for failing to see that the difference between Thales and Anaximander is precisely what unites them; for misplacing Anaximenes by putting him immediately alongside Thales; for taking Anaximander out of his generally recognized middle position in the Ionian school etc.

[161] A note to the *Ionian Philosophy* acknowledges Hegel's part in raising mathematics to a philosophical level: "The foundation of the system of philosophy on a mathematical basis, as well as a truly scientific deduction of what we have here said in a temporary and superficial form is too distant from our object and would take us too far astray. To any reader who insists on more we add: an extremely important preparation for this will be found in the very logic of Hegel under the category of quantity where we find insufficiently appreciated insights into the essence of mathematics. Even in regard to the transition from the category of quality into quantity we find important data in Hegel, but in the form of a logical return to quality out of quantity. Thus, what in Hegel is an advance, with us would become a return; what is a regression for him, would be a dialectical transition for us". *I.P.*, p. 300.

[162] The translation into mathematical terms rests on Cieszkowski's immediately preceding exposition: *PzH*, p. 104 "To the extent that we have defined philosophy above as the '*thought* of the identity of being and thought', so the truest definition of art is in contradiction to the former: 'the *being* of the identity of thought and being'." "In the same way, we put art higher than abstract-finite being, because it is not only *something being*, but *Being* itself, which corresponds in all ways to its internal meaning. On the other hand, we put philosophy higher than abstract-finite thought, because it is not only *something* thought, but precisely *Thought* itself, which is grounded in the most concrete objectivity".

[163] Cieszkowski notes his discovery of algebra as the most appropriate mathematical operation for his purposes in his *Diary I*, p. 3, 4th January 1835.

[164] *Diary I*, p. 7.

[165] *Diary I*, p. 4.

CHAPTER III

[1] I quote from the Polish edition of 1911, *op. cit.*, as *GuP.*

[2] Michelet's book was dated Berlin, 1841, and carried as a further subtitle: *Vorlesungen . . . erhalten an der Friedrich-Wilhelm Universität zu Berlin im Sommerhalbjahre* 1840.

[3] Michelet–Cieszkowski, letter nr 9, 1st September 1840, in Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, pp. 386–387.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Cieszkowski–Michelet, letter nr 11, 20th December 1841, *ibid.* pp. 389–390.

[6] A perusal of Michelet's *Vorlesungen . . .* reveals no mention of Cieszkowski, although it is of course possible that Michelet had referred to him, without including the reference in the published text. Michelet–Cieszkowski, letter nr 9, 1st September 1840, *ibid.* p. 387.

[7] Cieszkowski–Michelet, letter nr 11, 20th December 1841, *ibid.* p. 389, Julius Schaller, customarily classified as a right-wing Hegelian, had written *Die Philosophie unserer Zeit; zur Apologie und Erläuterung des Hegelschen Systems*, Berlin, 1837, as well as a critique of Strauss, *Der historische Christus und die Philosophie.*

[8] Cieszkowski–Michelet, *ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.* L. von Henning, incidentally, was a close friend of Cieszkowski. Their correspondence has been brought to light in Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke . . .'.

[10] Logic, nature and spirit are, of course, the three divisions of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia.* Cieszkowski is thus proclaiming his fidelity to the method and the categories of the master even as he attacks one of Hegel's most loyal followers.

[11] See A. Zółtówski's introduction to Zygmunt Krasiński's *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego.*

[12] These notes were left in manuscript form by Cieszkowski himself; they have been published as an appendix to Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, Appendix VI and VIII, pp. 440–444 and 446–454, as well as in Walicki's edition, *op. cit.*

[13] "This had to occur in some mortal and this mortal was Christ". He notes that this event was also its opposite: God became man, but out of this particularization a universalization followed, mankind came to participate in God. "Nachgelassene Materialen . . .", Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

[14] It is not quite clear how, if merit is the issue grace can be won on someone else's behalf and presumably converted into merit – even by Christ.

[15] *Diary, II*, pp. 14 and 18: "Aristotle's three goods: of the soul, the body, the external correspond to three states of palingenesis". "Palingenetical conjecture – in Christianity, Origen's *De Prime.* In Antiquity, in Plato: *Phaedrus, Timaeus, Republic X* (603) *Gorgias* (113), *Phaedo* (109). Conclusions from this regarding the present life *Phaedo* 72, *Tim* 41, *Meno* 80, *Phaedo* 249C. In spite of certain rules of knowledge, says Plato . . . he did not consider these as myths but as essential dogmas and shows this philosophically in *Gorgias* 523A 524, *Phaedo, Republic* X, etc.". "The Pharisees professed palingenesis; the Redeemer praised their doctrine and only condemned them for not living as they preached". . . . (illegible – AL) lib, IV c 19 tells us of the Polesianie (ancient Slavic tribe – AL) that they believed in metempsychosis . . . . Immortality of the soul among the Jews: Maimonides, Hilchoth, T'alub IX, 2, Abranael . . . (illegible – AL) . . . "In firmis

hoc volunt permadere, non interiore animas sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios – atque hoc . . ? . . ad virtutem castare putant, metru mortis negluto (Caesar, Commentare *de bello gallico*, VI, 14 vide Mela II 2)." "This dogma of the druidic religion is also proof that the Celts constitute a link between antiquity and the middle ages. They already possessed synthetic elements belonging to the third era".

[16] Cieszkowski had read G. Lessing, *Education of the Human Race*, and P. S. Ballanche, *Essais de Palingenesie sociale* as recorded in his diaries. Hegel mentions the two concepts i.a. in his *Philosophy of History*, p. 73, metempsychosis appears as characteristic of Oriental religion; p. 107, palingenesis is used as an image: "Morality has not yet passed the struggle of subjective freedom, in its second birth, *its palingenesis*".

[17] Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 446–454.

[18] For a possible indication of Cieszkowski's views here, see Michelet, *Epiphanie der ewigen Persönlichkeit des Geistes*, Berlin, 1852, pp. 99–135, where Michelet presents a debate in dialogue form on this question. Cieszkowski appears under the guise of Teleophanes' Eastern Friend. The bulk of the debate, however, simply reproduces the arguments of the negative part of *Gott und Palingenesie*. This debate from Michelet is also published as an appendix to both Polish editions of *Gott und Palingenesie*.

[19] Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. III, p. 94. Cieszkowski himself referred to the debate as a scholastic one (*GuP*, pp. 28–29). For the most biting criticism of Hegelian polemics as intellectual charlatanry see the opening to Marx's own contribution to those polemics, *The German Ideology*.

[20] By far the best discussion of this question is in Erdmann's *History of Philosophy*, vol. III, pp. 70ff.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 72; Strauss' *Christliche Glaubenslehre* appeared in Tübingen, 1841–42.

[22] D. Barth, introduction to *Essence of Christianity*, p. XV.

[23] Michelet, *Vorlesungen* . . . , p. 15.

[24] Erdmann, *ibid.*

[25] The phrase is actually Vatke's. It applies equally well to Michelet.

[26] Feuerbach, *Essence of Christianity*, p. 146.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[28] Cieszkowski was to make much use of etymology generally and the concept of *religare* specifically in the *Our Father*, esp. vol. II. Engels ridiculed this particular connection in his *Ludwig Feuerbach* . . .

[29] See the extensive development of these ideas in Feuerbach's *Philosophy of the Future*.

[30] For a Thomist criticism of Cieszkowski's theological position vis-à-vis Catholicism, which attacks him both as a pantheist and a sort of crypto-materialist, see Kowalski, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[31] This is among the main points of Löwith's *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, which is appropriately subtitled: *Studies in the dissolution of bourgeois-christian culture*. Cieszkowski, however, appears to have been unique in recognizing the nature of the problem, if not its dimensions. Although Löwith discusses Cieszkowski briefly, he is obviously only superficially acquainted with his works and thus fails to see this affinity between Cieszkowski's position and his own.

[32] Bruno Bauer's *Posaune* was written anonymously purporting to be an anti-Hegelian pamphlet which set out to prove Hegel's atheism by a series of quotations. The ingenious

form allowed Bauer to put forth his views without appearing to be an atheist himself. He would have endeared himself to the anti-Hegelians even more, however, had he dispensed with the disguise. They would have been heartened to find that a Hegelian agreed with them in their assessment of Hegel's irreligiosity.

[33] For biographical notes on the contemporary political figures whom Cieszkowski mentions in his comparisons, see Walicki's edition of *Gott und Palingenesie*. For more detailed commentary on the French political spectrum and the personages involved, see Lefèbvre. *La monarchie de juillet*, Cieszkowski met Passy in Paris and from *Diary II*, it would appear that Passy gave a report on Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena* to the Académie des sciences morales in October 1839. There is no further record of this report.

[34] See Cieszkowski's *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne* as well as his notes to the "Ionian Philosophy" in his *Diary I*, p. 80, where he speaks of Aristotle's principle that the beginning of all things is neither water nor air, as a miserable principle, a *juste-milieu* leading nowhere.

[35] Hans Barth, ed., *Konservative Denken*, Stuttgart, 1958, discusses this particular variant of conservatism, He quotes from *Die Konservative Partei in Deutschland*, Marburg, 1841, by Victor Aimé Huber which appeared anonymously at the same time as Cieszkowski's *Gott und Palingenesie*: "Conservation in its higher and proper sense is precisely the opposite of rigidity and stagnation. It is the development and advance of everything which requires and conditions the highest aims, right and duties . . ." Quoting Lagarde's article 'Konservative?' in *Deutsche Schriften*, 1853: "A conservative is someone who knows how to and wishes to maintain the living forces of a nation or a state . . . our liberalism suffers in lacking a conservative party". Ernst Benz, in 'Franz von Baader's Gedanken über den Proletair', *op. cit.*, points to the same conception of Baader: "A true conservative is someone who does not allow the thread of history to be cut . . . he aims at a true balance of the past with the future through their constant interaction". In relation to Christianity particularly, he distinguishes those who would make a mummy out of their religion and those who believe, as he does, that Christianity should constantly be bringing something new into play.

[36] For the clearest exposition of the distinction between "traditionalism" and "conservatism", see Mannheim's article 'Conservative Thought', *op. cit.*, Unless this distinction is maintained one gathers paradoxes at will. Proudhon, for instance, frequently referred to himself as a "true conservative" or "profoundly conservative". See Henri de Lubac, *Proudhon et le christianisme*, Paris, 1945.

CHAPTER IV

[1] Although Zygmunt Krasiński, who seemed to detest the Hegelian school if not Hegel himself, was perhaps not to be trusted entirely, his letter of 29th October 1843 deserves to be cited: "Yesterday I met an old friend coming from Berlin who knows everyone there and told me: 1 – Michelet, your 'werthester Freund' (Cieszkowski's form of address to Michelet in *GuP* – AL) hates you. 2 – The Hegelianized Poles there are against you. 3 – They are all impatiently awaiting the second part of the *Palingenesis* maintaining that there . . . is no sense in negating without affirming . . . as if they ever did anything else". Krasiński added some advice to his gossip: "I see these philosophers

surrounding you with the curiosity of envy and wanting you to palingenesize them. Lead them astray with small talk. Do not cast them any pearls"! Krasiński contrasted the situation in Berlin with the extraordinary respect which people showed Cieszkowski in Warsaw. Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. I, pp. 91–96.

[2] K. L. Michelet, *Entwicklungsgeschichte der neuesten Deutschen Philosophie, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf den gegenwärtigen Kampf Schellings mit der Hegelschen Schule*, Berlin, 1843, pp. 394–395.

[3] Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, vol. III, p. 20.

[4] C. H. Weisse, *Über das Verhältnis des Publikums zur Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1832, quoted in Erdmann, *ibid.*, p. 8.

[5] C. H. Weisse, *Das Buchlein der Wiedererstehung*, Dresden, 1836, quoted in Erdmann, *ibid.*, p. 61.

[6] Schelling had written a preface to Becker's translation of a fragment of Cousin, the "great eclectic", and this preface of 1834 appears to have been something of a preliminary skirmish to the later struggle between Hegelians and Schellingians. I. H. Fichte hailed this preface immediately. Erdmann, *ibid.*, p. 17.

[7] Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. VII, New York, 1965. 1st ed., 1963, p. 130. P. Hayner, *Reason and Existence: Schellings's Philosophy of History*, Leiden, 1967, p. 37, describes the intellectual intuition as "withdrawal into one's innermost self where in the form of absolute immutability we intuit the eternal in us ... this is not a postulate but an immediate experience independent of objective causality".

[8] E. Benz, 'Die Mystik in der Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus', *Eophorion*, XLVI, 1952, p. 258, quoting *Schellings Leben aus seinen Briefen*, II, p. 248, letter to Georgii, Easter 1811: "We cannot be satisfied with a general continuation of our dead self. We would want to keep the whole personality, losing nothing. How good is the belief that even the weakest part of our nature is taken up by God, how good is the certainty of our divinization through Christ ... death allows us to curse our dependence on nature". Coppelston also describes Schelling's concept of man winning his personality in terms very similar to Cieszkowski's, pp. 162–164. In Cieszkowski, however, there is none of the deep primeval and pre-conscious urges which seem to dominate Schelling's system.

[9] Under the previous reign, the worst that could happen to dissident academic Hegelians was transfer to a more secluded post as happened to Bruno Bauer when he was sent off to Bonn. Now, Bauer lost his job.

[10] Lenz, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 47ff, gives a most detailed account of the whole operation of drawing Schelling to Berlin and the resultant academic atmosphere.

[11] Friedrich Engels writing under pseudonym Friedrich Oswald in *Telegraph für Deutschland*, December 1841, reprinted in *MEGA*, I, 2 pp. 174ff. Engels also wrote an important pamphlet entitled 'Schelling und die Offenbarung; Kritik des neuesten Reaktionsversuchs gegen die freie Philosophie', Leipzig, 1842 (anonymous) also in *MEGA*, I, pp. 230–272. Apart from the subsequent career of their author, these are extremely incisive and valuable sources for the Hegelian reaction to the problem posed by Schelling.

[12] Löwith, *op. cit.*, pp. 115–121.

[13] See Coppleston, Hayner, *op. cit.*; also S. H. Bergman, 'Schelling on the Source of Eternal Truths', *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, II, nr 2, 1964, pp. 17–28.

[14] Coppleston, *op. cit.*, pp. 121–182, *passim.*

[15] The first criticism came in 1842 from Frauenstadt, who had reviewed Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena* several years earlier in the *Hallische Jahrbücher.* He wrote *Schelling's Vorlesungen in Berlin*, Hirschwald, 1842. Karl Rosenkrantz praised Frauenstadt's account as the most faithful rendering of what Schelling actually said and, in spite of his own promise to wait until Schelling came out with his views in "black and white", Rosenkrantz published his own, *Schelling; Vorlesungen gehalten im Sommer* 1842 *an der Universität zu Königsberg*, Danzig, 1843.

[16] Lenz, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 50.

[17] *Ibid.* Lenz adds that even though Schelling's students proposed to organize a torchlight procession in his honour (!) at the end of his first semester – an honour which he refused – within a very short time he had lost the admiration of theologians of all convictions. Never having had the allegiance of the anti-theologians, this left Schelling somewhat isolated. At a time when Michelet's course on the development of modern philosophy, in which Schelling's two major periods played a major role, drew some 100 students and Marheineke's lectures on the meaning of Hegel's philosophy for Christian theology drew about as many students, Schelling was attracting a mere handful. Lenz adds drily that Hegel's greatest fortune was to have died at the height of his fame.

[18] Schelling distinguishes between the untutored, natural impulse and the will as "idealizing activity" much as Cieszkowski differentiates natural practice and the attendant determination of the will from post-theoretical practice and the absolute will. See Coppleston, *op. cit.*, pp. 145ff, and K. Rosenkrantz, *op. cit., passim.*

[19] "The state, which only because of the omnipotence of the spirit, has achieved so high a position and at whose head, deciding its fate and development, stands a monarch so loftily disposed, so educated and endowed with so strong a will, will doubtlessly give full recognition for such an enterprise and will impart to it an active support. The means are there, the need is great". Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, appendix B, VI: 'Nachlass zu Gott und Palingenesie', p. 442. Actually the cited passage refers to the project of a *Philosophische Gesellschaft* rather than the *Gott und Palingenesie.*

[20] Cieszkowski–Michelet, letter nr 11, 20th December 1841: "... What are our good friends in Berlin doing? Tell me also something about Schelling. I am expecting any day (a text) of his first lecture which has not yet arrived. Is there any life in this ghost? (in original: "ce revenant" – AL). Is there any future in this past?..." Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

[21] Article signed 'A.C.' which followed the summary of Schelling's lecture, *Biblioteka Warszawska*, II, 1842, pp. 424–425.

[22] Cieszkowski's German letter as well as Michelet's unsent collective letter are reproduced in Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–88. The former is very similar to the text cited from *Biblioteka Warszawska*, the latter is a challenge to open polemic.

[23] Cieszkowski, 'Über die Deutschen', in Kühne, *op. cit.*, appendix B, fragment III, pp. 429–430.

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] Compare for instance Marx's remarks in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. by Jolin and O'Malley, eds., Cambridge, 1970, as well as Hess' *Europäische Triarchie, op. cit., passim*, and Arnold Ruge, *Zwei Jahre in Paris, op. cit., passim.* All these writers shared a common conviction that the German philosophy and German

politics reflected each other. This was linked to the notion that each major European nation had a particular mission, the Germans' was philosophical as the French was political.

[26] 'Über die Deutschen', Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 430.

[27] Cieszkowski, 'Über seine Zeit und Zeitgenossen', in Kühne, *op. cit.*, appendix B, fragment VII, pp. 444–445.

[28] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 13, 12 December 1842, in Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 391–392.

[29] See M. Laubert, 'Presse und Zensur in neupreussicher Zeit, 1815–1847', *Studien zur Geschichte der Provinz Posen*, Posen, 1908, pp. 200ff. In December 1841, Friedrich Wilhelm IV had removed all "improper restrictions on literary activity" and in October of 1842 he removed all works of over twenty printers' signature sheets'. Restrictions were being reimposed by 1846.

[30] Michelet gives an account of the recruiting process in his *Wahrheit aus meinem Leben*, Berlin, 1884, pp. 189ff.

[31] The original group consisted of Michelet, Cieszkowski, Gabler, Henning, Hotho, Vatke, Benary I, Benary II, Werder, Heydemann I, A. Schmidt, Boumann, Althaus, Förster, O. L. Heydemann; as the senior member, Marheineke presided with Göschel as vice-president. From the minutes of the first meeting, reproduced in Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–143.

[32] Michelet to Cieszkowski, letter nr 9, 1st September 1840, in Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 387: "As to your honorable proposition towards Hegel's friends and editors of his works, I regret not having known earlier about your proposition. ... You will already have in hand the second edition of the philosophy of history which we were obliged to hand over to the care of the son of the philosopher (i.e., Charles Hegel – AL), not knowing of your generous offer at the time." It is difficult to tell whether Michelet is simply putting off Cieszkowski or whether he is sincere in his regrets. One can only speculate.

[33] Minutes of first meeting, 5 January 1843, in Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

[34] Michelet, *Wahrheit aus meinem Leben*, p. 190. Gabler as Hegel's apostolic successor in the chair of philosophy was particularly prudent.

[35] Veit had published the *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie.*

[36] Michelet, *Ibid.*, Eichhorn's educational policies are considered and described by Lenz, *op. cit.*

[37] Ludwig Noack, 'Vorrede', *Jahrbücher für spekulative Philosophie und die philosophische Bearbeitung der empirischen Wissenschaften*, I, 1, 1846.

[38] Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

[39] Michelet, *Wahrheit aus meinem Leben*, p. 193.

[40] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 15, 30 October 1844 in Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 393–394, "... I was just going to write, worried as I am about the outcome of your affair with the society. Finally, all went better than I had hoped. I must confess that I saw implacable rancour – above all from Loipoteles (the Greek name Michelet had given to Vatke – AL) who, speaking between ourselves, plays a really sad role in your book ... The news about Marheineke's retirement worries me very much. I would very much want us to keep him as president, and I earnestly call upon you to support his re-election, in spite of all his protests and refusals. Such a re-election could not but flatter him ... If it were only for the good name of the society itself I would still consider his election a duty ... If

he leaves the chair it will be a leave-taking of the society. Let him remain honorary president if he does not wish otherwise ... You know whom I would want as secretary, but at the moment we must not even think of it, to nominate you would be implicitly to approve your book ... this would be too hard a nut for the society! For this year we have to forget about it. Benary would be quite suitable and who knows whether it would not be desirable for the society to give him this chance of re-habilitating himself ... and on your part, it would be very handsome if you offered him your support ..." Cieszkowski's skillful handling of the crisis here is a foretaste of his later activities in the Polish fraction in Berlin.

[41] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 16, 10 February 1845, *Ibid.*, pp. 395–396.

[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 160–161.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 144–145.

[44] From 1 March to 1 November, the society discussed Michelet's 'History of the development of philosophy since Hegel's death' and Cieszkowski planned to give a talk on 'The new shape of international law'; in November 1843, Vatke gave a paper on 'State and Society'; in December, Göschel read a paper 'Transcendence and Immanence' and later the society debated Gabler's 'Theses on the relation of spiritual development to the Absolute'; Erdmann contributed a paper on 'The Philosophy of Religion as a phenomenon of the religious consciousness'; Vatke spoke on 'The self-development of the absolute'. In the discussion of Michelet's lecture, Cieszkowski apologized for his presumption as the youngest member of the group in criticizing their work but reiterated his ideas about the need of making philosophy practical with an analogy: "We are the bakers of science. It is our holy social duty to offer palatable bread. Society has the right to demand nourishment from us ..." *Ibid.*, pp. 163–169.

[45] *Noacks' Jahrbücher*, vol. I, nr 2, 1846, cited in Kühne, p. 203.

[46] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 19, 17 December 1846 in *Ibid.*, pp. 399–400.

[47] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 27, 1 November 1854 in *Ibid.*, pp. 407–408.

[48] Michelet, *Wahrheit aus meinem Leben*, p. 202.

[49] Silberner, *Moses Hess*, p. 438; Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke ...', p. 24, reproduces a letter from Lassalle to Cieszkowski where the former calls upon their "philosophical collegiality". See also Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 30, 17 August 1860, Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski* pp. 410–411, as well as Michelet to Cieszkowski, letter nr 28, 11 April 1858, *Ibid.*, pp. 408–409 where Michelet mentions Lassalle's entry into the society and describes him as "author of a very good two volume work on Heraclitus" as well as many other new members: "Would you believe it? The ex-president of the council of ministers in 1848, Gen. Pfuel".

[50] Michelet, *Wahrheit aus meinem Leben*, p. 195.

[51] Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 35, 26 November 1869 in Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 414: "... My (cheque) is at your disposition. ... I have no doubt that the friends, disciples and admirers of Hegel will manage to set up a monument to him but I do not think that they should make up the deficit or double their offerings because this would dampen the zeal of others and make the government lose interest in a project to which it should contribute. I must confess that the initiative was taken at a bad moment. It was either too early or too late – Hegel's popularity had already diminished and his fame *sub specie aeternitatis* had not yet been sufficiently established. Once undertaken, however, this project must be completed ..." Also, Cieszkowski to Michelet, letter nr 30, 17 August

1860, in Kühne, pp. 410–411: "I hasten to assure you of my sincere joy upon seeing that our philosophical society is finally showing signs of life. We were so used to seeing it vegetate by itself that this piece of news is as pleasant as it is unexpected. I will not hide my apprehension about its chances of success for the simple reason that ... I hardly see any collaborators ... Mr. Lassalle will perhaps give something from time to time ... I doubt whether all our emeriti in philosophy, without excluding myself (Cieszkowski was 46 at the time! – AL) have enough leisure if not good will to attain the result you seek ... Since you have the courage to undertake this task, I will not discourage you, on the contrary I hasten to offer you my material assistance, the only sort of which I dipose at the moment ..."

[52] Michelet, *Wahrheit aus meinem Leben*, p. 195.

[53] For bibliography and comment on the various editions of Hegel's work, see Kaufmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 467–478.

[54] Lobkowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 190, writes appropriately: "That Hegel was a coward is only of biographical interest, that he was able to justify his accommodation theoretically throws light on his entire system ..."

CHAPTER V

[1] Walter Benjamin has caught the spirit of this phenomenon in 'Paris capital of the nineteenth century', *Dissent*, XVII, September/October, 1970.

[2] Lefèbvre, *La Monarchie de Juillet*, *op. cit.*, pp. 92–95. I have relied heavily on this excellent source for the historical part of this work.

[3] To publish a newspaper under the Restoration and the July monarchy the publisher had to obtain an official *brevet*, set a bond and obtain a permit of *colportage*. It became much more difficult to satisfy these conditions under the new laws of September 1835 which put an end to a five-year period of relative liberalism. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[4] According to the law of 21 March 1831 municipal elections were instituted with approximately 10% of the smaller villages and 20% in towns over 15,000 eligible to vote. Mayors, however, were still appointed from Paris. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[5] Benjamin, *op. cit.*, p. 443.

[6] Cited in Lefèbvre, *op. cit.*, p. 107. Admittedly, quotation of the full sentence puts Guizot's much quoted '*enrichissez-vous*' in a different perspective.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 208.

[8] Indeed, the railway assumed almost religious proportions for many of the Saint-Simonians. In 1841 Michel Chevalier had priests come to Strassburg to bless a new line but the public imagination was not in the least fired by the first lines. In fact, there was very little interest in this mode of travel perhaps because the first railway was used exclusively for the transport of goods. The first line, Paris–St. Germain, was built privately between 1835 and 1837. Politicians remained long skeptical both because of the expenses involved and the interests affected. They finally adopted a compromise solution between public and private ownership of the railroad. At the same time, peasants resented passing trains out of fear that they would burn the crops and as late as 1848 there were riots in Paris directed against the railway. See Lefèbvre, *op. cit.*, pp. 193ff.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 232 and D. O. Evans, *Social Romanticism in France*, Oxford, 1951, p. 5.
[10] Benjamin, *op. cit.*
[11] Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 7.
[12] Lefèbvre, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–201, *passim.*
[13] Dominique Bagge, *Les idées politiques en France sous la Restauration*, Paris, 1952, p. 101.
[14] Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, *Discours sur le projet de loi relatif à la répression des délits de presse*, 22 January 1822, cited in Bagge, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
[15] Bagge, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
[16] Henri Louvancour, *De Henri de Saint-Simon à Charles Fourier*, Paris, 1913, p. 21.
[17] D. G. Charlton, *Secular Religions in France* 1815–1870, London, 1963, p. 99.
[18] Cousin's debt to German idealism is easily documented historically, see e.g., d'Hondt, 'Hegel et les socialistes', *op. cit.*; his undeniable superficiality, his position as "official philosopher" after 1830, and later on his partiality for Schellingianism made him a superb target for the criticism and the mockery of the Young Hegelians and their friends. Gans, *Rückblicke auf Personen und Zustände*, p. 2, restricted himself to remarking that "even then (i.e., 1820–25) Cousin did not appear to me to be the *gesinnungvollste* of men". Heine was far less merciful. In '*The Romantic School*' he wrote *Works* p. 100: "... the greatness of M. Cousin comes more boldly to light when we see that he has learned German philosophy without understanding the language in which it is taught.... How vastly does such a genius overtop us common mortals who only master with the greatest trouble this philosophy though we have been familiar with German from our infancy". In a similar, though even more unkind vein, he added: "... the story of the imprisonment of M. Cousin (in Prussia – AL) is by no means of a purely allegorical origin ... but that he there studied Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in his leisure hours is doubtful for three reasons: first, this book is written in German; second, to read it one must understand German; third, M. Cousin does not understand German at all".
[19] Charlton, *op. cit.*, p. 98, writes that in 1838 Cousin's course drew as many as 2000 listeners.
[20] In the opening chapter of the *Confession d'un enfant du siècle*, Musset draws an unforgettable portrait of his generation. He diagnoses the sickness of his contemporaries as a frustration caused by being born for greatness and condemned to banality: "Worried youth found itself in a world of ruins. All these children were drops of a burning blood which has inundated the earth; they were born in war, for war ... The children looked around at all this (i.e., the present state – AL) thinking all the time that the ghost of Caesar would disembark at Cannes and blow on the larvae but the silence continued unceasingly and all one saw floating in the sky was the pale colour of the fleur-de-lys". Musset was born in 1810 and wrote the *Confession* in 1834–35. Writing almost a generation earlier in the *Mémoires d'Outre Tombe*, Chateaubriand expressed a similar frustration and astutely connected it to a social problem: "A society in which an individual may possess incomes of two millions while others are reduced to living in hovels on heaps of decayed matter alive with worms ... can such a society remain stationary on such foundations in the midst of the advance of ideas? ... What the new society will be I know not; I no more understand it than the ancients could understand the slaveless society born of Christianity". Cited in Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 3. For

Sainte-Beuve's characterization of the epoch as one of social frustration, see his *Portraits contemporains*, vol. I, Paris, 1834, p. 244.

[21] Cited in Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[22] Frederic Ozanam to Hippolyte Fortoul, 15 January 1831: "It is your soul which suffers, your thought which is sick, your heart which is disturbed in the expectation of things which are coming. Suspended between a past which is tottering and a future which has not yet arrived ... you attempt to penetrate its mysteries, your spirit rushes in a thousand directions, gnaws and is devoured. The result is an inexplicable, invincible sickness". Cited in Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[23] Louvancour writes, p. 400, of the need to believe and love: "The emptiness left by the immense destruction of Christianity is everywhere; it is in all our hearts; it is obscurely felt by the masses as it is more clearly felt by higher minds ... as long as this emptiness has not been filled I predict that society will not be calmed".

[24] For a discussion of nineteenth-century thought whose principal thesis seems to be that the end of the Enlightenment bequeathed only an unhappy consciousness to its heirs see J. N. Shklar, *After Utopia*, Princeton, 1957.

[25] See M. Viatte, *Victor Hugo et les illuminés de son temps*, Montreal, 1942.

[26] To cite a few examples: in 1840, one Gluton declared himself the Christ of the Second Coming; at the same time, one Ganneau appealed to the "army of the disinherited" and "the apostles of hunger" to realize a vague "Napoleonic idea" which rested on the concept of Waterloo as Calvary. Vintras, author of the *Oeuvre de la Misericorde Divine*, saw the age of the Holy Spirit coming after a great purge. The first age, the Father's had been that of fear; the second age, the Son's, was that of mercy, which would give way to the age of love, and he, Vintras, was its paraclete as Montanus had been the paraclete of the second age. For some time, Vintras seemed unable to decide whether salvation was to be sought through a resurrected Napoleon or through Naundorff, the alleged son of Louis XVI.

[27] Lubac *op. cit.*, citing *Révolution Sociale*, IV, pp. 237–238, gives a vivid, perhaps ironical, picture: "The year 1825 was the famous year of the missions ... At that time Rousseau and Voltaire were dammed: young people carried scapularies, the girls were decked out in the colours of the Virgin. The testament of Louis XVI was hung up in houses. It was a universal adoration of the Good Lord, of priests, of the king, of princes. The liberals were wrong ..." Although the particular phenomenon recorded here was short-lasting it was typical of the period.

[28] Joseph de Maistre, *Considérations sur la France*, (1796), chapter V, cited in Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

[29] See Bagge, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

[30] Swart, *op. cit.*, p. 52 explains the theocrats' refusal to despair of the future in terms of their national Messianism. "Vive la France, même républicaine!" de Maistre might have said.

[31] Cited by K. Mannheim, 'Conservative Thought', *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[32] De Maistre would even have agreed substantively: "Through its monstrous alliance with the wrong principle during the last century the French nobility lost everything; it is now up to it to repair everything", J. de Maistre. *Du Pape*, cited in Bagge, *op. cit.*, Robespierre cited in Charlton, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[33] For a comparison of French and German conservatism see Rohden, *op. cit.*, and

Mannheim, 'Conservative Thought' *op. cit.* It should be noticed that social legislation in France was initially entirely in the hands of elements which can be only termed conservative. The first bill on child labour was initiated by the "société industrielle de Mulhouse"; it was the Chamber of Peers which raised the project to the level of a legislative act. Although the Mulhouse Society was a Protestant body, such leaders of Social Catholicism as Montalembert and Villeneuve-Bargemont were active in the adoption of the project. The latter was the first to present the problem of the worker as such in the Chamber of Deputies, carefully distinguishing the solution to "generalized misery" which he proposed from the "English solutions". The former defended social legislation as "an opportunity for the Chamber of Peers to exercise its lofty social role, its *conservative* mission" (emphasis mine – AL). See Duroselle, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

[34] Duroselle's superb monograph on this subject, already cited, remains the most complete study of this phenomenon.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 63 and *passim.*

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 142. For study of this interesting thinker see l'Abbé P. Fleury, *Hippolyte de La Morvonnais; étude sur le romantisme en Bretagne*, Paris, 1911.

[39] For a biographic treatment of Buchez see Armand Cuvillier, *P. J. B. Buchez et les origines du socialisme chrétien*, Paris, 1948.

[40] Buchez, 'De l'Egalité' in *l'Européen*, 3 March 1832, cited by Duroselle, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 81 and 83ff.

[42] Cuvillier, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[43] For biographic treatment of Hughes–Félicité–Robert de la Mennais or Lamennais as he later called himself see Bagge, *op. cit.*, pp. 213ff.

[44] Ironically, Lamennais began his career as a fierce ultra-montanist condemning even the liberalism of the Charter and villifying the religious indifference of the age. His conversion to social radicalism came by steps; the final break with Catholic orthodoxy can be put at 1832 when the papal encyclical *Mirari Vos* condemned *L'Avenir*, the newspaper of Lamennais and many other Social Catholics .

[45] For Sismondi's role see Duroselle, *op. cit.*, pp. 7–12. See also: C. Gide and C. Rist, *A History of Economic Doctrines*, 2nd Eng. ed., London, 1948, 1st ed., 1909, pp. 185ff.

[46] There is a vast literature on both the Fourierists and the Saint-Simonians. The latter attempted a most concise summary of their doctrine in a brochure prepared by Bazard and Enfantin for the benefit of the National Assembly, entitled *La Religion Saint-Simonienne*, Paris, 1831. It is to this brochure that I refer in the above paragraph. An excellent history of the Saint-Simonian movement is Sébastien Charléty's, *Histoire du St. Simonisme*, Paris, 1896.

The unsystematic nature of Saint-Simon's doctrine made it essential to elaborate and develop the teachings of the master. Fourier's system, on the other hand, was so complete in itself that it allowed very little room for development. In this sense, it can be said that Fourierism has less of a history than Saint-Simonianism. For a good study of Fourier, see E. Poisson, *Fourier*, Paris, 1932.

[47] Cited in Charléty, *op cit.*, p. 42. For a view of the Saint-Simonians which treats them, following Hayek, as the forerunners to totalitarianism, see George G. Iggers, *The Cult of Authority*, The Hague, 1958.

[48] *La Religion Saint-Simonienne*, p. 31.

[49] See Poisson, *op. cit.*, *passim*, and Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–38.

[50] According to Charlèty, the only expression of a Saint-Simonian metaphysics is the 'Lettre d'Enfantin à Duveyrier', cited p. 142: "God is all that there is . . . souls are finite manifestations of the infinite, all eternal like God . . . love is the guarantee of a future life". As befits a religion of humanity, the theological element is lacking in the Saint-Simonian creed. In the *Exposition de la Doctrine*, cited in Louvancour, p. 84, the Saint-Simonians declared: "If we understand by theocracy, a state in which political and religious law are identical, where the leaders of society speak in God's name, then assuredly we do not hesitate to say that mankind is moving towards a new theocracy". Fourier's attitude to religion was more complex. The Saint-Simonians accused him of not having any sort of moral doctrine and of being simply a technician fiddling with society. Even though Fourier spoke of himself as the vice-Messiah it is certainly true that he had no use for moral chatter and reproached Christianity bitterly for stifling men's passions. Historically, however, the Fourierists were on better terms with Christian reformers and indeed many Fourierists converted to Catholicism. See Louvancour, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[51] Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, p. 26 and *passim*, emphasizes the antipathy of the utopian socialists to Jacobin democrats. The frontiers between conservatives and socialists remained fluid for some time; for instance, not until 1848 did a natural association between communism and atheism develop.

[52] Louvancour, *op. cit.*, is a most thorough treatment of the movement from Saint-Simonianism to Fourierism.

[53] Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 37 citing Jules Lechevalier.

[54] Fourier, *Unité Universelle*, II, p. 115, cited in Louvancour, p. 39.

[55] Gans, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[56] Arnold Ruge, *Zwei Jahre in Paris*, Leipzig, 1846, p. 60.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] The notion of a "Holy Intellectual Alliance" found numerous proponents: Hess, Ruge, Bakunin, Marx to name a few. In fact, the *Deutsche Französische Jahrbücher* were founded on the premise of such an alliance and their failure is testimony to the overall fate of this bold and original conception. Quite striking, however, is the fact that the notion was not an exclusive possession of radical elements but was equally shared by a small group of conservative aristocrats. See Barchou de Penhoen, *Histoire de la philosophie allemande*, Paris, 1836, for the latter variant. See also P. Haubtmann, *Marx et Proudhon*, Paris, 1947; C. Bouglé, *Chez les prophètes socialistes*, Paris, 1918; d'Hondt, *op. cit.*

[61] Ruge, *op. cit.*, p. 416.

[62] *Diary II*, p. 10, July, 1838.

[63] *Ibid.*, August, 1838.

[64] *Ibid.*

[65] *Ibid.*

[66] Cieszkowski did, however, meet a sizable group of English vacationers: *Farbes*, professor of physics at Edinburgh; *Baring*, son of Lord Ashburton; *Johnson*, astronomer; *Switwich*, anglican pastor at Oxford. There is no evidence that these were anything more than casual acquaintances. *Diary II*, p. 10, August, 1838.

[67] Among other readings of the same period: Anciaux, *Exposé des opérations financières*

du roi Guillaume; Richard, *Guide des voyageurs en France: Revue des Deux Mondes*, six issues; E. de Girardin, *vues nouvelles sur l'application de l'armée aux travaux publics:* Laity, *Le Prince Napoléon à Strasbourg*. Evidently, this is what Cieszkowski considered light reading contrast to the more serious philosophical readings of his student days!

[68] Cited in Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[69] For a brief biography and summary of Wołowski's economic position, L. Guzicki and S. Zuraniecka, *Historia polskiej myśli społecznoekonomicznej*, Warsaw, 1969; for further bibliographical references see Jules Rambaud 'Louis Wołowski' in L. Say and J. Chailley, *Nouveau dictionnaire d'économie politique*, vol. II, Paris, 1892, pp. 1192–1194.

[70] Cieszkowski's name appears occasionally in Proudhon's *Carnets*, M. Haubtmann, ed., vols. I, II, III, Paris, 1961–68.

[71] I shall have occasion to return to Wroński in part III. The best, and one of the only, short summaries of Wroński's philosophy with a selection of his works is Philippe d'Arcy, *Wroński: une philosophie de la création*, Paris, 1970.

[72] Fernand Baldensperger, 'Hoëné-Wroński a Francja intelektualna', *Przegląd Współczesny*, XXV, 1928, cites this judgement from Parisian police files of 26 March 1826.

[73] According to. Baldensperger, *op. cit.*, Wroński appears as Grodninski in Balzac's *Martyrs ignorés*, as well as in his *Recherche de l'Absolu*.

[74] Wroński appears to have been a particularly luckless inventor. Much of his energy was consumed in fruitless lawsuits and accusations of plagiarism against men more powerful than himself. Thus, his work of 1819 on mobile rails appears to have been an independent foreshadowing of the railway but attracted no attention. See further on Wroński: W. M. Kozłowski, *Les idées françaises dans la philosophie nationale et la poésie patriotique de la Pologne*, fasc. ler *Hoëné-Wroński*, Paris, 1930.

[75] Cieszkowski records having offered the *Historiosophie* to the *Académie* in November 1838 and of having it reviewed later that month by H. de Passy, a prominent academician and minister under the July monarchy as well as an outspoken liberal. Cieszkowski commented: "in general a quite flattering judgement, though rather false". In February, 1839, at a similar session of the *Académie* Passy is reported to have reviewed Cieszkowski's economic work. I have been unable to find any confirmation of this because of the unavailability of documents.

[76] Custine was close to the Polish émigré community in Paris at the time and it is probable that his impressions of Russia were strongly influenced by this notoriously hostile group. See George F. Kennan, *The Marquis de Custine and his Russia in* 1839, Princeton, 1971, pp. 23–29 and *passim*.

[77] Ruge, *op. cit.*, p. 107 wrote: "French manners predominate in the salon of the *Démocratie Pacifique* (the successor to the *Phalange* – AL) which are so much superior to those of the Germans... People move about freely, read, if they wish, play chess, stand about, discuss, listen, politicize or take counsel... all this has certain preconditions unknown to us Germans; the opposition is public. Here free men come together". During his first winter in Paris, Cieszkowski also visited Fourier's grave, then less than two years old.

[78] See Marguerite Thibert, *Le rôle social de l'art d'après les saint-simoniens*, Paris, n.d. See also Charléty, *op. cit.*

[79] Letter to Michelet, letter nr 3, in Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 367, the project found expression in 'O romansie nowoczesnym', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, VI, part 1, 1846, pp. 135–166.

[80] Viatte, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

[81] *Diary II*, p. 12, 23. October, 1838 records the prophecies of Mlle Lenormand: "a splendid future . . . most important period will be from ages of twenty-eight to thirty-three (i.e., 1842–47 – AL) but it is the present time which is decisive; from April of next year important progress. A long life . . . numerous trips even beyond Europe, Italy and England several times – danger on the sea – authorship, not to work excessively – soon public opinion will learn about me, all eyes of society would be drawn to me – one natural child and several in wedlock – a good husband and father – twice already in love – now two women very interested in me – ability to feel and to awaken laws of love. A mild temperament but constant and capable of realizing important aims – not to accept duels, planned marriage in the family – foresight in my character – two romances one with a free woman, the other not – when I return to Paris it will be to play a *rôle éclatant* – in a word, a very fine and important life, full of happenings. I have lived through a great deal already and from my fifteenth year life began to be important . . ."

[82] Cieszkowski went to Rome first in the spring of 1839 from Paris and then seems to have returned to Rome in December 1839. The account published as 'Kilka wrażen z Rzymu', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, II part I 1842, pp. 642–657 is dated from the latter trip but portrays a first encounter with the "Eternal City". The overwhelming general impression conveyed is one of tension between the capital of the pagan and the Christian world, between the grandeur of the past and the shabbiness of the present.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 655.

[84] Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego.*

CHAPTER VI

[1] Jean Hyppolite, *Études sur Marx et Hegel*, Paris, 1955, and Shlomo Avineri, *Hegel's Theory of the Modern State*, Cambridge, 1972, among others, have argued that Hegel was far more imbued with liberal economics than he was willing to admit; the term "dismal science" appears to have been coined by Carlyle. See Gide et Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 542.

[2] *Diary II*, p. 17.

[3] *Diary I*, p. 3, probably 3 January 1835.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] Cieszkowski mentions Quesnay both in his *Ionian Philosophy* and in his *Diary II*, where he lists among his readings Parnell, *De la réforme financière*, Januszewski, *Statut Koronny* (a discussion of the treasury), and Jarith, *Finanzwissenschaft*, vol. I, to name but those which appear alongside some of the early notes for *Du Crédit et de la Circulation.*

[7] For a biography of Frederyk Skarbek (1792–1866) see Waclaw Szubert, *Studia o Frederyku Skarbku jako Ekonomiście*, Prace z historji myśli społecznej, III, Lodz, 1954. For a discussion of the national economists, see Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, pp. 273–298.

[8] Skarbek, *Théorie des richesses sociales*, vol. II, Paris, 1829, p. 291, quoted in Szubert, *op. cit*, p. 106.

[9] Skarbek, *op. cit.*, II, p. 223: "The mode of production is never decided on the basis of the advantages which may come out of it for national wealth but rather according to the advantages which the capitalists can withdraw from the productive consumption of

their capital. The interests of the capitalists are always contrary to those of the workers since they tend merely to raise the level of profits by means of lowering salaries . . . This means that the consumption of capital in the manufacturing industry only puts a lesser quantity of industry into activity than if it were determined uniquely by the well-being of the country".

[10] In the preface to the *Théorie des richesses sociales*, Skarbek writes: "The true wealth of a nation consists not in the mass of values which it possesses but in the material well-being of a majority of the inhabitants of the country . . . It is this well-being and the means of assuring it which should occupy, above all, the science of social economy and its practical application".

[11] See B. Suchodolski, *Rola Warszawskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk w rozwoju kultury umysłowej w Polsce*, Warsaw, 1951.

[12] Szubert, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[13] For a brief summary of Sismondi's contribution to economic doctrine see Gide and Rist, *op. cit.*, chapter entitled 'Sismondi and the origins of the critical school', pp. 184–211, as well as Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, *passim*. See also Henryk Grossman, *Simonde de Sismondi et ses théories économiques*, Warsaw, 1924.

[14] Gide, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

[15] Sismondi, *Nouveaux principes de l'économie politique*, quoted in Gide, *op. cit.*, p. 195: "Earnings of an entrepreneur sometimes represent nothing but the spoliation of the workmen . . . Such an industry is a social evil".

[16] Villeneuve–Bargemont's *Économie politique chrétienne* appears on Cieszkowski's reading lists for 1837–1838, *Diary II*, p. 1 and p. 5.

[17] I am quoting from the third edition of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, Paris, 1884, for the sake of convenience. Wherever the quotation differs from the 1st edition (Paris, 1839) or the 2nd edition (Paris, 1847) I have indicated the difference."

[18] The first edition reads; "credit is the means which gives values which do not have the faculty of circulating by themselves the ability to circulate.

[19] See the article on 'Interest' by D. Patinkin, in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. VII, p. 470, for an exposition of classical Catholic doctrine. For an account of the transformation in this conception between 1822–36, see John T. Noonan, Jr., *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1957, pp. 377ff.

[20] H. Svoboda, *Grund und Boden als Währungunterlage*, Nurnberg, 1928, goes to the extent of stating that Law's notes were backed entirely by land. This is, of course, untrue since Law's bubble was caused precisely by the fact that he sought to base his notes on values less tangible than land. For a more considered evaluation of Law, see G. R. Bark, *Boden als Geld*, Berlin, 1930. See the short article 'John Law' by Earl J. Hamilton in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. IX, p. 78.

[21] John Law, *Money and Trade*, Glasgow, 1750, cited in Bark, *op. cit.*, p. 25: "Good laws may bring the money to the full circulation it is capable of and force it to those employments that are most profitable to the country; but no laws can make it go further, nor can more people be set to work without more money to circulate so as to pay the wages of a greater number. They may be brought to work on credit and that is not practical unless the credit have a circulation so as to supply the workmen with necessities; if that be supposed then that credit is money and will have the same effects on home and foreign trade, an addition to the money adds to the value of the country".

In short, Law seems to be saying that a multiplication of credit is a multiplication of real economic capital.

[22] See J. B. Vergeot, *Le Crédit comme stimulant et régulateur de l'industrie*, Paris, 1918, as well as Bark, *op. cit.*, pp. 14ff, for a complete history of this idea.

[23] Benjamin Franklin, 'Political Economy'. *Writings*, Boston, 1882, p. 270, cited in Bark, *op. cit.*, p. 38: "Gold as precious metal and gold as means of circulation are two different things, both can rise or fall independently of each other. In this way, we must consider a paper money based on land as both land and money".

[24] For example, the experiments of the German Reichsbank in 1813–14 and the Danish experience of 1808–09. Closer to our period, one can think of the German *Rentenmark* of 1922–23.

[25] As late as 1854, Wołowski could dismiss land-money as a serious economic concept by comparing it to the *assignat*. See his article 'Crédit foncier' in C. Coquelin et U. Guillaumin, eds., *Dictionnaire de l'économie politique*, Paris, 1854, vol. I, p. 493. While rejecting anything which smacked of land-money Wołowski was an enthusiastic supporter of land-credit. When the *Société de crédit foncier* was founded in 1852 Wołowski was director of the Paris branch. See G. de Nouvion, *Charles Coquelin, Sa vie et ses travaux*, Paris, 1908.

[26] It is interesting to remark that the notions of *crédit foncier* were as enthusiastically received in liberal circles as they were among the socialists. For a short sketch of the history of land banks before their creation in France, see Wołowski, 'L'organisation du crédit foncier', *Journal des Economistes*, XXI, 1848. See also G. Boccardo, *Trattato teorico-practico di economia politica*. Turin, 1853, p. 188. Finally, *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* itself had frequent reference to the operation of land banks, especially in Poland, Prussia and Posen.

[27] Nouvion, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[28] Vergeot, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

[29] For other, non-socialist reform schemes see Coquelin et Guillaumin, *op. cit.*, as well as H. D. Macleod, *Dictionary of Political Economy*, London 1863, F. Vidal, *L'organisation du Crédit*, Paris, 1851. In 1848 the journal *Le Crédit* was founded. Its nature is testimony to the hopes put into credit reform and the very tame nature of the majority of credit schemes. The editors of *Le Crédit* called themselves "conservative" since they sought to conserve the republic in the face of reaction; nevertheless, their republicanism was of a very middle-of-the-road sort.

[30] V. F. Wagner, *Geschichte der Kredittheorien*, Vienna, 1937, p. 57 quotes Berkeley in the *Querist*, 1751, "Whether all circulation be not alike a circulation of credit, whatsoever medium be employed and whether gold be any more than credit for so much power".

[31] See Wagner, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[32] M. Aucuy, *Systèmes socialistes d'échange*, Paris, 1907.

[33] If Saint-Simon saw the bank as the key institution of the future, his disciples were more skeptical about its liberating potential even though they still accorded it enormous respect. Thus, in *Doctrine de Saint-Simon: exposition première année* 1829 they defined the bank as "a social institution invested with all the functions so badly fulfilled today. It presides over material exploitation thus viewing things in a comprehensive perspective".

[34] Gide, *op. cit.*, p. 252.

[35] A Saint-Simonian complained in 1848: "The bourgeoisie consider credit something socialist and republican; the workers consider it too bourgeois, too piddling, too *eau de rose*". Arlès to Enfantin, in Charléty, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

[36] K. Kolischer, *Zarys Systemu Polityki Bankowej*, Lowow, 1904, points to one, probably unacknowledged, application of Cieszkowski's scheme: the Austrian interest-bearing state notes based on the salt revenues of Gmunden, Aussee and some other salt mines.

[37] Under the Second Empire, Chevalier was to play a major role in the promotion of free trade, culminating in the Cobden–Chevalier treaty of 1854. For an account of Chevalier's defection from the Saint-Simonians, see Charléty, *op. cit.*

[38] *Journal des Débats*, 22nd August 1840.

[39] E. B. 'Des Banques administratives', *La Phalange*, IV, 1846, p. 476. The editor of the journal was Victor Considerant.

[40] See Duroselle, *op. cit.*, pp. 90ff, on the rapprochement between Fourierists and Catholics in the mid-1840's.

[41] For Proudhon's contacts with the German Parisian community, see P. Haubtmann, *Marx et Proudhon; leurs rapports personnels*, Paris, 1947. Proudhon himself wrote in November 1845 with either irony or awe: "I know more than twenty Germans, all doctors in philosophy", letter to Michaud, *Correspondance*, vol. VI. p. 353, cited in Lubac, *op. cit.*, p. 139. In preparing his *Contradictions économiques*, Proudhon wrote: "It will be a criticism of political economy from the point of view of the social antinomies. At the end, I hope to teach the French public what the dialectic is . . . I have never read Hegel but I am certain that it is his logic which I shall use in my next work", letter to Bergmann, 19 January 1845, *Correspondance de Proudhon*, Paris, 1875, pp. 175–76. Later Marx was to claim: "During long, often overnight debates I infected him with Hegelianism, to his great misfortune, for not knowing German he could not study it properly". 'Über P. J. Proudhon', *Der Social Demokrat*, nr. 16, 17 and 18. 1, 3 & 5 February 1865, in *Marx–Engels Werke*, vol. XVI, p. 27, Haubtmann proves, however, that Proudhon was never particularly impressed by Marx and hence it is likely that he picked up his Hegelian lore elsewhere.

[42] Proudhon, *Carnets*, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 247.

[43] Proudhon P. J. *Système des contradictions économiques ou philosophie de la misère*, vol. II, in *Oeuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1923, pp. 110–111.

[44] See Proudhon's *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, Paris, 1848. Wagner, *op. cit.*, discusses Proudhon's notion there "to give credit under the monarchical regime of gold is to lend" and compares it to Proudhon's statement in *Contradictions économiques* "to credit under the republican regime of the well-organized market is to exchange".

[45] Proudhon, *Contradictions économiques*, p. 113.

[46] *The Poverty of Philosophy*, trans. H. Quelch, Chicago, 1910, chap. II, part 7; 'Über P.J. Proudhon', *op. cit.*, repeats the same critique.

[47] Haubtmann, *op. cit.*, p. 76ff.

[48] See, for example, C. Knies' great work, *Geld und Kredit*, Berlin, 1876.

[49] E. Baumstark, 'Du Crédit et de la Circulation', *Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, June 1842, nr 119, p. 944.

[50] K. Libelt, 'Du Crédit et de la Circulation', *Pisma krytyczne*, vol. V, Posen, 1851, pp. 17ff.

[51] H. D. Macleod, *Dictionary of Political Economy*, vol. I, London 1863, pp. 431–432.

Reference is to G. Boccardo, *Dizionario della economica politica e del commercio*, vol. I, Turin, 1857, pp. 518–519, who wrote of Cieszkowski: "endowed with a notable tendency to abstraction, in his economic works he brought both the qualities and defects inherent to this characteristic. Without being a socialist he is not simply an economist in the orthodox sense of the word; fa parte a se, Dante would say".

[52] W. Śliwowska's *Sprawa Pietraszewców*, Warsaw, 1964, recounts that a certain Jastrzębski gave lectures to the circle on political economy. He shared many of Cieszkowski's views but argued that credit could not possibly solve the major problem of pauperism. During the trial of the Petrashevskij circle it was brought out that Cieszkowski's book had been studied.

[53] In a letter to his editor, Wurtz, dated 19 October 1839 (Biblioteka Polska, Paris, unpub.) Cieszkowski requested that his post be sent to Milan general delivery and expressed his worry that *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* was not selling well. He urged Wurtz to put ads into the *Journal des Débats* and wondered why Wurtz had not advertised in the *Revue Brittanique*, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, *Revue administrative*.

CHAPTER VII

[1] For the details of Cieszkowski's travels see above all his *Diary II*. See also the following correspondence of Zygmunt Krasiński: *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*; *Listy do Konstanego Gaszyńskiego*, Z. Sudolski, ed., Warsaw, 1971; *Listy do Jerzego Lubomirskiego*, Sudolski, ed., Warsaw, 1965. *Listy do Delfiny*, J. Kallenbach, ed., Poznan, 1935.

[2] Quoted by August Cieszkowski, Jr., in his introduction to *Ojcze Nasz*, vol. I, Posen, 1905.

[3] The confusion regarding the principles of land credit is perhaps reflected in the fact that Cieszkowski's article appeared under different titles. In the *Journal des Économistes*, XVII, May 1847, pp. 263ff, it was entitled *Du Crédit foncier* as it was in the third edition of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation*, Paris, 1884, where it appeared as an appendix. In the Bibliothèque Nationale, however, the same article appears as a separate pamphlet under the title *Du crédit immobilier* with pages headed "du crédit agricole", and "mobilier et immobilier". It is the pamphlet edition which I quote below.

[4] 'Chronique', *Journal des Économistes*, XVII, 16 March 1847. It is clear from the contemporary account quoted here that the *Congrès central d'agriculture* was not a body convened by the government as Marcel Planiol writes in 'Crédit foncier', *Grande Encyclopédie Larousse*, vol. XIII, n.d., p. 303.

[5] Cieszkowski made this point in the article under discussion, p. 6. See also André Liesse, *Evolution of Credit and Banks in France*, Washington, 1909, p. 54.

[6] Betrand Gille, *La Banque et le crédit en France de* 1815–1848, Paris, 1959, p. 130

[7] Henry Sagnier, *Le crédit agricole en France*, Paris, 1911, p. 2.

[8] Wołowski's ideas were first expressed in a paper presented to the *Académie des sciences morales*, which was published in the *Revue de Jurisprudence et de Législation*. See Planiol, *op. cit.*, as well as Wołowski's later articles on the same subject in Coquelin and Guillaumin, eds., *op. cit.*, pp. 497–508 and 'L'organisation du crédit foncier', in *Journal des Économistes*, XXI, 1848.

[9] Quoted in Coquelin and Guillaumin, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

[10] The origin of land credit in Central Europe was unambiguously aristocratic. See Joseph Virion, *Le crédit agricole en Pologne*, Paris, 1925, pp. 38–50.

[11] 'Chronique', *Journal des Économistes*, *op. cit.*

[12] *Journal des Économistes*, XVII, 1847, p. 263.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] The revolutionary legislation dated from the 9 Messidor and the 11 Brumaire of the year VII. For a detailed description of the changes wrought, see Besson, 'Hypothèque', in *Grande Encyclopédie*, vol. XX, p. 492, who points out that registration of mortgages had been in decline in France, in spite of occasional attempts at reform since the XII century.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Virion, *op. cit.*, p. 47. The Posen institution was dissolved in 1847.

[17] *Du crédit immobilier*, pp. 9–10: "In addition to the current interest on the mortgage-notes paid by the owner of the mortgaged property and received by the holder of the note,... the intermediary agency which operates the transfer of interest receives in addition a supplementary payment from the property owner fixed at 1%, 1.5% or 2% of the mortgaged capital and intended to obtain the complete extinction of the mortgage in a period of time varying from 28 to 42 years. Once the period has elapsed, the owner is completely free and can withdraw from the association".

[16] A letter already mentioned addressed to August Cieszkowski's father informing him that he has been elected to the presidency of the society of land credit of Warsaw is signed on behalf of the society in A. Cieszkowski's hand, with the signature 'Cieszkowski'. Letter dated 19th June 1832, document nr. 8, file nr. 6380, titled 'Cieszkowski family', in *Archiwum Państowe w Poznaniu.* Poznan.

[19] Cieszkowski argued primarily that the Polish and German experience is sufficient guarantee of the general feasibility of the project. *Du Crédit immobilier*, p. 13. He also shows, basing himself partially on H. Passy, that contrary to general opinion, it is not property which is highly fragmented in France but the soil, i.e., the same landowners possess scattered strips of land. Thus, conditions of land-holding in France are not as different as might appear. Moreover, Cieszkowski suggests, small landowners might obtain collective mortgages as Bavarian farmers were doing. In general, however, Cieszkowski's attempt to extend land credit's applicability to the peasantry is unconvincing. He says nothing about agricultural credit which would have been more relevant to their needs.

[20] Jules Duval was the author of 'l'accord de l'Evangile et de la théorie de Fourier' and 'Jésus Christ et Fourier' in *Démocratie Pacifique*, 1846. In 1862, he participated with Wołowski in organizing a congrès *de bienfaisance* in London. During the Vatican council he argued for the primacy of the pope over councils which he saw as simply aristocratic assemblies. See Duroselle, *op. cit.*, pp. 375, 670.

[21] Coquelin and Guillaumin, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 497–508.

[22] The paper in question was given by Dr. Alexis Schmidt at a meeting of the *Philosophische Gesellschaft* on February 16, 1848, and discussed on March 1. It was reported in *Der Gedanke*, vol. I, p. 175 and published in *Noacks Jahrbücher*, 1848, pp. 534–542. Cieszkowski's letter was apparently not intended for publication. This may explain its intimate and self-justifying tone. It first appeared in Kühne, *op. cit.*, pp. 237–245.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 243. It is interesting to compare Cieszkowski on free trade with a brief comment of Marx also on differential tariffs: "... It is precisely in England that the evil consequences of a system (i.e., of differential tariffs – AL) appear which is no longer the system of our time, which ... is based on division and not unity, which imparts to each separate sphere a separate protection because the general protection, a rational state or a system is lacking in each individual state. Trade and manufacture should be protected but that is precisely the disputed point, whether protective duties really protect". 'Über Schutzzolle' *MEGA*, I, 1, drawn from *Rheinische Zeitung*, 22 November 1842, where this appeared as an editorial footnote.

[24] Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 242. The reference is to Louis Blanc's *Organisation du travail*, Paris, 1839, which enjoyed huge popularity. See Lichtheim, *passim*.

[25] August Cieszkowski, 'Organizacja handlu drzewem i przemysłu leśnego' *Biblioteka Warszawska*, II, part 1, 1843, pp. 112–143.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 129. Henceforth (*H.D*).

[27] Cieszkowski shows himself remarkably aware of the workings of the world wood market. Thus, he considers the implications of a re-orientation of British wood import patterns on the cost of immigrating to America for Irish immigrants. Under the present system they were being given cheap passage to Canada on ships which would transport wood back to Britain. Similarly, he discusses the economics of French forestry and the property laws affecting it.

[28] The odd spelling is Cieszkowski's.

[29] N. Wróblewski, 'Przegląd pierwszego półrocza *Biblioteki Warszawskiej* z roku 1843', *Przegląd Naukowy*, II, 1843, nr. 28, p. 7. It is interesting that this organ of the radical camp should have adopted a so thoroughly liberal position.

[30] August Cieszkowski, 'Uwagi nad obecnym stanem finansów angielskich', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, II, 1842, pp. 377–418. Henceforth (*F.A.*).

[31] Throughout, Cieszkowski supports his description and analysis by reference to statistical figures and English economic writings. The income tax had been tried in the Napoleonic wars as a desperate financial measure. To Cieszkowski's expressed shock, all records of the tax administration had been destroyed as a result of a vote of parliament.

[32] In discussing the failure of Peel's proposals to include changes in the tariff of sugar and wine, Cieszkowski points to the political intricacies underlying the decisions. The ostensible reason for maintaining the sugar tariff was the unfair competition of sugar from slave-owning colonies now that England had freed its slaves. As Cieszkowski puts it: "Looking down the parliamentary stage and behind the scene – as one must often do in representative governments – we find completely different reasons". (*F.A.*, p. 406). The previous government had been toppled on a sugar vote and owing its accession to power, albeit accidentally, to sugar interests. Peel had contracted certain obligations; moreover, the trade pact with Brazil was to be renewed that year and so Peel was trying to tempt concessions out of the Brazilians by offering to reduce the sugar tariff. The maintenance of the tax on wine was a similar ploy vis-à-vis France.

[33] For a very interesting analysis of the transformation of the *Pöbel*, see Conze's article in *Vierteljahresschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, already cited.

[34] I have relied here on Theodore S. Hamerow, *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany* 1815–1871, Princeton, 1966; 1st ed., 1958 whose analysis essentially confirms Conze's. Although Hamerow speaks only of Germany, inasmuch as the two Cieszkowski articles to be discussed in the following sections were

intended for a German–Polish audience, Hamerow's book is valuable and relevant here.

[35] A. E. Cherbuliez, 'Pauperisme', in Coquelin & Guillaumin, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 1854.

[36] Bechard, *De l'état du pauperisme en France et des moyens d'y remédier*, Paris, 1853. Cited in Hans Stein, 'Pauperismus und Assoziation', *International Review for Social History*, I, 1936, pp. 12–13.

[37] Stein, Hamerow, Conze, *op. cit.*; also the bibliographical article by P. Mombert, 'Aus der Literatur über die soziale Frage und über die Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland in der erste Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts" *Archiv für die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung*, IX, 1921, pp. 168–235.

[38] *Diary, II*, p. 1, 6–14, 14 September 1837, lists *Économie politique chrétienne* as one of the books in category III, i.e., looked at but not read thoroughly. Consistently with Cieszkowski's increasing absorption in social and economic matters, the book appears again, however, in *Diary II*, p. 5, under the readings for 10–24 January 1838. Following the second entry is a set of notes on agriculture undoubtedly inspired by his reading of Villeneuve-Bargemont.

[39] Alban de Villeneuve-Bargemont. *Économie politique chrétienne*, vol. I, p. 280 and vol. III, pp. 3–4, Paris, 1834. See the rather simplistic study by M. Ring, *Villeneuve-Bargemont, precursor of modern Social Catholicism*, Milwaukee, 1935. Gide *op. cit.*, mentions Villeneuve-Bargemont as one of the few disciples of Sismondi. Otherwise, history has accepted Marx's harsh judgement in *Poverty of Philosophy*.

[40] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 101: "Let us recognize the fact. All the efforts of philosophy, all the results of science, all the inquiries undertaken with a pure and true heart, have never been able to and will never be able to show the impossibility of assigning to poverty, as to all other ills which afflict humanity, any other cause than that irrevocable and supreme decree which brought man down from the almost divine status which he originally possessed, condemned him to labour, to unhappiness, to sickness and to death . . ."

[41] See Swart, *op. cit.*, p. 66; Villeneuve-Bargemont shared this distaste for England with a good many contemporary socialists. As a former Napoleonic prefect and as a good Catholic he had additional reasons for this antipathy.

[42] Villeneuve-Bargemont, *op. cit.*, vol. III, book III. See also Duroselle, *op. cit.*

[43] *Diary, II*, p. 6, readings for 1–23 January 1838, lists Blanqui's *Cours d'économie industrielle*, from which Cieszkowski drew figures on the budget devoted to pauperism in France.

[44] Further on the same page Cieszkowski noted: "Common tables and social tables set up by Minos in Crete . . . At the cradle of society, communism existed but there was no cultivation. Virgil says: 'Ante Jovem nulli subigebant arva coloni etc. *Georgics I*'." In contrast to this, Cieszkowski also noted on the same page: "Competition must be eliminated by competition". All this would seem to suggest that Cieszkowski had no fixed opinions as yet and was considering various alternatives to present economic organization . . .

[45] *Diary I*, p. 110, 14 November 1838. This curious passage deserves to be quoted more extensively: "An example of homeopathic medicine in social weaknesses may be the creation of the lombards. The church forbade the lending of money for interest most severely. The result was that only the Jews gained and the whole of society suffered from their usury. Instead of solving the problem the prohibitive law had only made it worse. Concessions had to be made and abnormal loans had to be evened out by normal

ones – and the Church itself saw itself obliged to support the lombards, called for their lofty purpose, *monts de piéte* . . . In the present illness the institution of marriage will also be unable to do without a homeopathic medicine . . ."

[46] For a general treatment of Owen, see Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, and for an economic treatment, Gide, *op. cit.* For more specialized treatment of Owen and education, see *Utopianism and Education: Robert Owen and the Owenites*, John Harrison, ed. & Intro., New York, 1968, as well as the volume *Robert Owen: Prophet of the Poor*, S. Pollard and J. Salt, eds., London 1971, where the article by R. G. Garnett, 'Robert Owen and the Community Experiments' is particularly interesting.

[47] Duroselle, *op. cit.* There seems to be some historiographical question as to whether German Catholics were as active socially as the French with Conze arguing that they were: Conze, 'Das Spannungsfeld von Staat und Gesellschaft im Vormärz', in Conze, ed., *Staat und Gesellschaft im deutschen Vormärz*, Stuttgart, 1962. See Stein, *op. cit.*, for contemporary views.

[48] Fourier had nothing but disdain for moralizing, attributing to his own system supra-moral or scientific qualities. He wrote to Enfantin that "reform must begin with the physical and not with the moral" and declared his own method superior to the Saint-Simonians' because "without conniving around ministers or priests, without seizing the finances of France, without the persecution of employers, without irritating the court or the guard". Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 101. The Saint-Simonians responded by belittling the Fourierists as small-scale industrial rather than moral thinkers. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[49] This is the interpretation most effectively argued by Conze in his *Staat und Gesellschaft* . . . , pp. 260 and 360. "The magic word 'association' was the expression of the yearning for a new organization of a society caught in dissolution. It was used for the solution of the 'social question' in a corporative-conservative, liberal-social and socialist-revolutionary sense . . . It was an age of new combinations and associations as traditional groups fell apart. There was no area of life where the new spirit of association did not penetrate . . . hiding behind all the new unions were the more or less strong remainders of the older guilds and corporations . . . the early organizations of the workers' movement all were linked to old guild ties".

[50] Stein, *op. cit.*, pp. 12ff.

[51] Fourier MSS, cited in Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

[52] Duroselle, *op. cit.*, pp. 122ff.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 676. Among the members of Le Play's founding committee were Wołowski, Aug. Cochin, M. Chevalier, Armand de Melun as well as E. Pereire and James de Rothschild.

[54] See Hamerow, *op. cit.*, *passim*. Huber was the editor of *Janus* and the founder of the conservative party in Germany.

[55] L. Buhl, *Andeutungen über die Noth der arbeitenden Klassen und über die Aufgabe der Vereine zum Wohl derselben*, Berlin, 1845, p. 26. The cabinet order cited had been preceded by another one dated 13 November 1843 calling for the creation of unions to diminish or eliminate the ever more deeply penetrating physical, social and ethical corruption (*Verderben*) of the lower popular classes stemming from pauperism or from moral coarseness. Cited in Conze, *Vierteljahresschrift* . . . , p. 356.

[56] Buhl, *op. cit.* Apparently provincial, county and local *Vereine* followed quickly. Often, these became a battleground where liberals and other progressives sought to

introduce their own programmes. In Bielefeld, the spinners and handworkers came to the *Verein* meetings and threatened to set off a popular movement. This was quickly repressed as might be expected. Conze, *Ibid.*

[57] Buhl, *op. cit.* It is interesting to observe that in Villeneuve-Bargemont's tables Prussia still had one of the lowest pauper counts in Europe. Whereas the relation of paupers to population in England was 1:6, in France 1:20, in Germany it was 1:20 and in Prussia 1:30. Lower ratios were to be found only in European Turkey 1:40 and European Russia and Poland 1:100.

[58] August Cieszkowski, 'O wystawie berlinskiej', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, IV, 1844, pp. 704–709. In his article 'Neue Einblicke . . .', *op. cit.*, Kühne suggests that Cieszkowski was active in the *Verein* as well as in the *Pestalozzi Stiftung* (see following section). He also reproduces a letter from Agathon Benary to Cieszkowski dated 24 June 1844, where the former announces that he has been taken into the directorate of the *Verein* and asks Cieszkowski about his suggestions and advice "concerning the principles and point of view from which to operate". 'Neue Einblicke . . .', *op. cit.*

[59] Notes his *Diary, II*, p. 34: "Government should begin as the association of all associations of the country – a general association completing details – the work of the individual associations will remain precisely there where the individual (? . .) is needed".

[60] August Cieszkowski, 'O ochronach wiejskich', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, II, pt. 1, 1842, pp. 367–411; 2nd Polish ed. as separate brochure, Lwow, 1845; 3rd Polish ed., Poznan, 1849; translated into German as *Antrag zu Gunsten der Kleinkinderbewahranstalten als Grundlage der Volkserziehung. Beitrag zur Bestimmung und Feststellung der Aufgabe des Staates in Beziehung auf Volkswohlfarth im Kultur*, Berlin bei W. Moeser, 1855–56. The subtitle here leads one to think that this might be a revised edition. I abbreviate references to the 1st Polish edition as (*V.S.*).

[61] Gide, Lichtheim, *op. cit.*

[62] See Huber's *Selbsthilfe der arbeitenden Klassen*, 1848. A recent study and bibliography is Helmut Faust, *Victor Aimé Huber: ein Bahnbrecher der Genossenschaftsidee*, Hamburg, 1952.

[63] E. Hasselmann, 'The Impact of Owen's Ideas on German Social and Co-operative thought during the Nineteenth Century', in Pollard, ed., *op. cit.* Although this article contributes much to an understanding of Owen in Germany, it is mistaken in considering the *Communist Manifesto* as the first German critique of Owen. Marx and Engels had undertaken this task earlier in *The Holy Family*, *The Poverty of Philosophy*, and *The Condition of the Working Class in England.*

[64] H. Desroche, 'Images and Echoes of Owenism in 19th Century France', in Pollard, ed., *op. cit.* For Cabet, see Lichtheim, *op. cit.*

[65] Cieszkowski had previously mentioned the charitable institutions of Rome including the *Pestalozzi Stiftung* in 'Kilka wrażen z Rzymu', *op. cit.* Here, he remarks that travel accounts discuss such socially important institutions all too rarely.

[66] For a representative sampling, see Pestalozzi's *Educational Writings*, J. A. Green, ed., New York, 1912.

[67] The status of the Polish peasant differed considerably depending on the legal régime of the partitioning power. Cieszkowski does not specify which part of the country he is referring to, in all probability it is German Poland, where serfdom no longer existed. See S. Kiniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, Chicago, 1969.

[68] Cieszkowski adds in a footnote: "The combination of common blessings and the advantages of both a private and a public education which constitute one of the main principles of Pestalozzi's method and one of its advantages was applied by him artificially to the possessing classes. Here it is the natural consequence of the institution of infant schools of the whole mass of the population" (*V.S.*, p. 382).

[69] *Towarzystwo Warszawskie Dobroczynności.* This would lead one to suppose that Cieszkowski is thinking of Russian Poland.

[70] N. Wróblewski, *Przegląd Naukowy*, I, nr 3, 1843, p. 195.

[71] *Philosophy of Right*, p. 40 (paragraph 41).

[72] *Early Writings*, Bottomore, ed., p. 153.

[73] 'O wystawie berlinskiej', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, IV, 1844, pp. 704–709, abbreviated here and cited above (*W.B.*).

[74] The full title of this article: *Zur Verbesserung der Lage der Arbeiter auf dem Lande.* Ein Vortrag gehalten in der zweiten General-Versammlung des landwirtschaftlichen Provinzial-Vereins für die Mark Brandenburg und die Niederlausitz am 17 Mai 1845. Cited here as (*V.L.A.*). It was published as a brochure by E. H. Schröder, Berlin, 1846, and translated into French in the *Journal des Économistes*, XV, October 1845. It was translated into Italian in 1891; see A. Poplawski, 'Z życia i zapomnianych dzieł Cieszkowskiego', *Sfinks*, nr 1, 1916, p. 11.

[75] Cieszkowski quotes the *Zeitschrift des landwirtschaftlichen Zentral-Vereins zu Frankfurt a.d. Oder.* Several of the articles here seem to have formed the basis for the Brandenburg-Niederlausitz *Verein's* discussions: I, nr 2, 'Über die Mittel zur Hebung der Diensttreue und der Moralität des Gesindes', I, pp. 228–236. I, pp. 337–345: 'Vorschläge wodurch sich der sittliche Zustand der geringern Klasse von Landbewohnern dauernd heben lässt'; I, pt. III, pp. 205–215: 'Über die Wichtigkeit der Kleinkinderbewahranstalten auf dem platten Lande', II, pt. II, pp. 90–120: 'Einfluss der Agricultur fortschritte auf die Sittlichkeit der Landgemeinden'. III, pt. II, 'Vorschläge zur moralischen Verbesserung der Tagelohner und des Gesindes auf dem Lande', pp. 169–174. I am citing the titles of these articles to show the sort of subjects which were treated in these *Landwirtschaftliche Vereine* in the absence of any further information about them.

[76] Adam Müller is discussed in Mannheim, 'Conservative Thought', *passim.*

[77] Karol Libelt, 'O ulepszeniu stosunków roboczej klasy ludu po włościach wedle pomysłu Augusta Cieszkowskiego', *Pisma krytyczne*; vol. V, pp. 43–57. Libelt's review of *Du Crédit et de la Circulation* may be recalled.

[78] Mannheim, 'Conservative Thought', pp. 145ff asks the question: "What became of vital relations characteristic of traditional society and their corresponding modes of thought which were suppressed by the rise of a consistent capitalist rationalization?" He concludes that they were redirected towards anti-bourgeois thought in both its conservative and its proletarian variation.

[79] Marx, *Communist Manifesto*, p. 47.

[80] *Cuvillier, op. cit.*, p. 40.

[81] Lamennais, *Le Livre du Peuple*, quoted in H. J. Hunt, *Le socialisme et le romantisme en France*, Oxford, 1933, p. 85.

[82] Leroux, *Démocratie Pacifique*, 15 August 1846, quoted in Hunt, *op. cit.*, appendix.

[83] See Conze, 'Das Spannungsfeld von Staat und Gesellschaft im Vormärz', *op. cit.*

[84] See Louvancour, *op. cit., passim.*

CHAPTER VIII

[1] The Cieszkowski Archive in Poznan contains the nomination papers.

[2] *Diary I*, p. 106.

[3] *Diary II*, p. 5.

[4] *Diary II*, p. 25.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Diary II*, p. 28.

[7] See *Diary II*, p. 29: "universal chaplaincy as there was in the first Christian communes and as Tertullian demands ... for those who think that this would be too taxing, would require too much work and knowledge, I answer *homo es et nihil humanum a te alienum* ..." For universal salvation, *Diary I*, p. 91: "It is said: many are called but few are chosen who only wish to submit themselves to the choice. As it is said in the future: 'who wishes may come; who *wants* may take the water of life free ...' Apoc. XXII. 14."

[8] *Diaries II*, p. 28; "*nobilitas sola est atque ... virtus.*" Beside this quotation Cieszkowski has written: Plato – *De Legibus* and Juvenal .... The text is most difficult to read at this point; it appears in *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, p. 92.

[9] *Diary II*, p. 33.

[10] *Diary II*, p. 29.

[11] A. C., Review of *Pamiętniki domowe zebrane i wydane przez Michała Grabowskiego* in *Biblioteka Warszawska* V, 4, 1845, p. 179. Since the reviewer signs only his initials, there is no proof that this is in fact an article of Cieszkowski. There seem to be, however, sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence to substantiate this hypothesis.

[12] Lefèbvre, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

[13] *Le Globe*, 11 October 1831, quoted in Charléty, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

[14] *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, Paris, Amyot, 1844, abbreviated here as (*P.A.M.*).

[15] This argument seems to rest on the assumption of universal male suffrage in the United States elections for the House of Representatives. Any derogation from the principle could only be a limitation. In France, where a property requirement limited the number of electors to the Chamber of Deputies, Cieszkowski assumed that any change could only be an extension because of the political impossibility of denying the vote to anyone who had already acquired it.

[16] Cieszkowski remarks that in France under the Restoration when the peerage was still hereditary a "*fournée*" of a hundred peers was a common occurrence. In England during the reign of Queen Anne the creation of twelve peers was considered a *coup d'état.*

[17] Mannheim, 'Conservative Thought', *op. cit.*, p. 132.

[18] Rohden, 'Französischer und Deutscher Konservatismum', *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[19] See, for example, R. W. Lougee, *Paul de Lagarde: A Study of Radical Conservatism in Germany*, Cambridge, Mass., 1962.

[20] Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[21] Harold Peeley, 'The Political Thought of Coleridge' in E. Blunden and E. L. Griggs eds, *Coleridge*, London, 1934, p. 165. Beeley relates this point of view to Disraeli as well, explaining the conservative statesman's reluctance to support compulsory inspection of mines even as he was favouring the ten-hour factory act in 1850.

[22] Lefèbvre, *op. cit.*, p. 92. Cieszkowski refers to Mme de Staël in his *Dairy I*, p. 40.
[23] Tyczyński, *Rozbiory i Krytyki*, Petersburg, 1854, p. 82.
[24] Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, vol. I, Bruxelles, 1840, p. 11.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[26] Tocqueville, *op. cit.*, p. 24.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 64.
[29] Cieszkowski cites Tocqueville at length in three places: p. 70, where he refers to Tocqueville's parliamentary statements about "the passion of place", p. 95, where he cites *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, vol. II, ch. 5, concerning the natural defects of a democracy in the conduct of external affairs and the security offered by an aristocratic body, as in England; p. 144, where Cieszkowski calls on Tocqueville to support his arguments concerning the degeneration of democracy: "Ask, for instance, M. de Tocqueville what he thinks of the future of exclusive democracies. Notice the discouragement and fatalism with which he reads their horoscope as soon as he arrives at their weak points and consider yourselves, after having drawn precious lessons from his book, as having been duly warned".
[30] For a discussion of the difference between the two types of anti-bourgeois sentiment, see Rohden, *op. cit.*
[31] The sect was ridden by crises as early as 1831. The first step towards its decline was probably the schism between Bazard and Enfantin, which first seemed to infuse the Saint-Simonians with a new spiritual energy but which ultimately led to their disintegration. The second step was the trial of the Menilmontant Saint-Simonians on morals charges. The final blow was the defection of one of the most ardent and brilliant Saint-Simonians, Michel Chevalier, who parted ways with Enfantin primarily over a question of money. Chevalier's repudiation dates from an article in the *Débats* of January 1838 – nearly a year before Cieszkowski's arrival in Paris. See Charléty, *op. cit.*
[32] In *Unité universelle*, Fourier refers to liberals as "those stringers of In his word who make much noise about liberal constitutions whose nominal springs are liberty, equality and fraternity and whose true springs are constraint, policement and the gallows". Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
[33] Eichthal to John Stuart Mill, 30 April 1830, cited in Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 195. It should be stressed that Saint-Simon came to recognize the role of sentiment only in his later writings. The early works, e.g., *Lettres d'un habitant de Genève*, show an unmitigated scientism and rationalism.
[34] These terms appear throughout Cieszkowski's writings and could, of course, be of a different, even Hegelian, origin. For Saint-Simon see, i.a., *De la réorganisation de la société européenne*, in *Oeuvres*, *op. cit.*, vol. I; also Butler, *op. cit.*, p. 5. also *Introduction aux travaux scientifiques du XIX siècle* in *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, where Saint-Simon periodizes universal history and makes clear his debt to Condorcet.
[35] See Saint-Simon, *Catéchisme des industriels*, vols. IV & V in *Oeuvres*, *op. cit.*; see also Charléty, *op. cit.*, chap. I; Cieszkowski, *De la Pairie et de l'Aristocratie moderne*, pp. 73ff.
[36] Cited in Louvancour, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
[37] In Saint-Simon, *Oeuvres*, vol. I.
[38] *Ibid.*, vol. V, p. 209.

[39] *Ibid.*, vol. II.
[40] *Ibid.*, vol. IV, p. 68.
[41] Saint-Simon, *Catéchisme des industriels. Oeuvres.* vol. IV. p. 80.
[42] *Oeuvres, op. cit.*, I, pp. 201–202.
[43] Many of Saint-Simon's writing appear in the form of petitions and addresses to various potentates. Clearly, this conditions their character; thus, *De la réorganisation de la société européenne* is directed to "the parliaments of France and England", so the greatest possible adherence to established forms is only prudent.
[44] See the valuable note by Knox to paragraph 144 of the *Philosophy of Right* in the English edition of this work, *op. cit.*, p. 347.
[45] *Ibid.*, Preface, p. 8.
[46] *Ibid.*, paragraph 305 p. 199, Clearly, this is not wholly in accordance with the passage cited immediately above from the Preface. Hegel's vacillation regarding natural capacity to rule can perhaps be resolved by stating that for Hegel natural capacities only had rights insofar as they were cultivated.
[47] Krasiński, *Listy do Cieszkowskiego*, vol. I, letter of 19th April 1844, p. 140.
[48] Kühne, *Neue Einblicke, op. cit.*, letter of 24 June 1844.
[49] I. R. (?), *La Phalange*, IV, 1846, pp. 174–178; reviewed with Louis Couture's *Du système parlémentaire en France et d'une réforme capitale.*
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[52] *Noacks Jahrbücher für Spekulative Philosophie*, I, p. 180.
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

CHAPTER IX

[1] The most recent and complete account of the history and politics of the emigration is S. Kalembka, *Wielka Emigracja*, Warsaw, 1971.
[2] Quoted from *L'Avenir* 2.I.1831 in Maria Straszewska, *Zycie literackie wielkiej emigracji we Francji* 1831–40, Warsaw 1970. See also R. Przelaskowski, '*L'Avenir* et la question polonaise' in *Études sur les mouvements libéraux et nationaux de* 1830, Comité français des sciences historiques, ed., Paris, 1932.
[3] On Lelewel see Stefan Kiniewicz, *Samotnik Brukselski*, Warsaw 1960.
[4] Marian Kukiel, *Dzieje Polski Porozbiorowej* 1795–1921, London, 1962, p. 261.
[5] Jan Koźmian, quoted by Straszewska, *op. cit.*, p. 172.
[6] J. Ujejski, 'Allgemeiner Überblick der religiös-sozialen Strömungen unter der polnischen Emigranten nach dem Jahr 1831' *Bulletin de l'Académie des Sciences de Cracovie*, 1915, pp. 11–28.
[7] J. L. Talmon, *Political Messianism: the Romantic Phase*, New York, 1960, p. 15.
[8] *Dzieje polskiego mesjanizmu do powstania listopadowego włącznie*, Lwow, 1931.
[9] A. Walicki, *Filozofia a Mesjanizm*, pp. 9–22; also his 'Milenaryzm i mesjanizm religijny a romantyczny mesjanizm polski', *Pamiętnik Literacki*, LXII, 4, 1971, pp. 23–40.
[10] Walicki, *Filozofia i Mesjanizm*, p. 10.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 11–12 referring to G. Shepperson, 'The Comparative Study of Millenarian

Movements' in Sylvia L. Thrupp, ed., *Millenial Dreams in Action. Essays in Comparative Study*, The Hague, 1962.

[12] M. Zdziechowski, *Mesjaniści i słowianofile; szkice z psychologji narodów słowiańskich*, Krakow, 1888, p. V & p. 189.

[13] S. Cywiński, *Romantyzm a Mesjanizm*, Vilno, 1914, p. 36.

[14] *Ibid.* Nevertheless, Cywiński names the three leading romantic poets – Mickiewicz, Słowacki, Norwid – as the principal Messianists. As elements of Polish Messianism he mentions five points: the notion that only life and creativity are criteria of truth; that one must relate to the world not merely through the knowledge of truth but through surrender to it; that Catholicism is a necessary component (although he acknowledges that Mickiewicz wanted to found a new Church); that the world must be spiritualized; that nations must develop a sense of solidarity.

[15] For instance, W. Lutosławski, a latter-day Polish Messianist and philosopher, who defines Messianism in conventionally vague terms as "a movement religious, philosophical, social and political whose goal is to transfer entirely the life of both individuals and society and to inaugurate a new era in the history of humanity". Curiously, Lutosławski sees Polish Messianism as derived partly from Christian ascetism and partly from Hindu Yogi. *Volonté et Liberté*, Paris, 1912; and 'Le messianisme polonais', *IV congresso internationale di filosofia*, Bologna, April 1911.

[16] Walicki, *Filozofia a Mesjanizm*, p. 6.

[17] See Ujejski, '*Dzieje polskiego mesjanizmu*', who finds properly Messianic traces in Bengiel, Lessing and even Kant, not to speak of the barely shrouded presence of Swedenborg. See also J. D'Hondt, *Hegel Secret*, Paris, 1968.

[18] Ujejski's book, cited above, ends with the period at which Polish Messianism is often seen as commencing.

[19] Walicki's polemical purpose is to stress the French sources of Cieszkowski's thought as he has done in his article, 'Francuskie inspiracje . . .', *op. cit.*; as I have suggested before, the point seems to be a valuable rectification of the exclusively Hegelian Cieszkowski previously presented but to the extent to which it is more than a rectification it is a distortion.

[20] This is Ujejski's point in 'Allgemeiner Überblick . . .', *op. cit.* He stresses that the belief in an imminent change in men's fates had preceded the November Insurrection in the thought of the Romantics. He admits, however, a qualitative change after 1831 and the consequent French influence.

[21] Przelaskowski, *op. cit.*, p. 208, citing *L'Avenir*, 9 June 1831.

[22] Zdziechowski, *op. cit.*, p. 35, citing Mickiewicz' letter to Lelewel of December 1832 from Dresden.

[23] Adam Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego*, Stanisław Pigoń, ed., London, 1940 (?), p. 93; also Handelsman, *Études*, p. 96.

[24] *Diary II*, 14, January 1839, indicates "musical evening at Prince Cz (artoryski ? A.L.).

[25] Straszewska, *op. cit.*, pp. 214ff.

[26] Kiniewicz, *Samotnik Brukselski*, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[27] See D'Arcy's work on Wroński, *op. cit.* An exposition by a contemporary Wrońskiite is Jerzy Braun, *Aperçu de la philosophie de Wroński*, trans. Adam de Lada, pub. by Les Amis de Wroński, Ireland n.d. An excellent recent study in Polish is Adam Sikora's *Posłannicy Słowa*, Warsaw, 1967.

[28] Sikora, *op. cit.*, p. 36, suggests the comparison with Saint-Simon. For the latter see in addition to works previously cited, Frank E. Manuel, *The Prophets of Paris*, Cambridge, Mass., 1962.

[29] This was the *Philosophie critique découverte par Kant*, published in 1803. See Sikora, *op. cit.*, p. 15; D'Arcy gives a slightly different title: *Philosophie critique fondée sur le premier principe du savoir humain.* D'Arcy discusses the place of Kant in Hoëné–Wroński's doctrines quite thoroughly; *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 57ff.

[30] Braun, *op. cit.*, pp. 171–172.

[31] Hoëné–Wroński, *Développement progressif et but final de l'humanité*, Paris, 1861, quoted in d'Arcy, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

[32] This is brought out well by d'Arcy, pp. 32ff., where he cites Schelling extensively. If it appears strange to refer to Hoëné–Wroński as rationalist it must be remembered that he insisted on the fact that the discovery of the law of creation was an act of reason and that humanity was evolving towards a rational acceptance of principles which it had formerly accepted on faith alone. D'Arcy cites Schelling, *Ideas for a philosophy of nature.*

[33] Bronisław Trentowski, *Panteon Wiedzy Ludzkiej*, vol. II, Poznan 1874, pp. 142ff.

[34] Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 190; see also Kozłowski, *op. cit.* Comparisons with Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena* come to mind.

[35] Sikora, *op. cit.*, p. 94, places the beginning of Hoëné–Wroński's national Messianism in *Epitre écrite en janvier* 1827 *et destinée au Souverain Pontife Léon XII.*

[36] Braun, *op. cit.*, p. 190; the transition according to Braun appears in *Epitre au prince Czartoryski sur les destinées de la Pologne et des nations slaves* (1848). Another pamphlet of that year, however, omits all specific reference to either Poles or Russians and speaks only of Slavs in general thus suggesting that Hoëné–Wroński maintained some hopes for the Russians also. See *Odezwa do narodów słowiańskich względem przeznaczeń świata*, Paris, 1848.

[37] B. Gawecki, *Wroński i o Wrońskim*, Warsaw, 1958, p. 31, refers to an undated letter from Cieszkowski to Hoëné–Wroński, apparently in the National Library, Warsaw. The same source shows that Hoëné–Wroński's theories were known to Carové in his *Messianismus, die neue Templar . . . op. cit.*, In Poland, Karol Libelt was among the first to draw attention to Wroński in 1838 in the *Tygodnik Literacki.* For Cieszkowski's meeting with Wroński see *Diary II*, p. 11, 17th October 1838 and *Diary II*, p. 14. January 1839.

[38] *Drogi Ducha, Ojcze Nasz* vol. I, pp. III–XXXIX.

[39] Sikora, *op. cit.*, part III.

[40] For example, J. Kallenbach, *Towianizm na fle historycznym*, Cracow, 1926, or Boleslaw Gawecki, *Polscy myśliciele romantyczni*, Warszawa, 1972, esp. chap. V.

[41] For biographical information on Mickiewicz see his son's account in, Władyslaw Mickiewicz, *Pamiętniki*, 2 vols., Warsaw, 1926; as well as St. Pigoń, *Adam Mickiewicz: Wspomnienia i Myśli*, Warsaw, 1958.

[42] Pigoń, introduction to *Ksiegi, . . .*, p. 24. The first creation of this new period in Mickiewicz' work was part III of the long poem-drama *Dziady.*

[43] Mickiewicz, *Księgi . . .*, p. 51.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[45] Czesław Miłosz, *The History of Polish Literature*, London, 1969, p. 226.

[46] A. Mickiewicz, *Cours de littérature slave*, vol. II, Paris 1860, lesson XLVIII, 14 December 1841, pp. 308.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[48] Z. Krasiński, *Listy do Delfiny Potockiej*, vol. I, Poznan, 1930, p. 491, quoted in Sikora, *op. cit.*, p. 138; and Kallenbach, *op. cit.*

[49] See Sikora, *op. cit.*, p. 135, and Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, pp. 46ff.

[50] Apparently, Christ was the first great man and Towiański is the second, thus leaving unclear the role of Napoleon who elsewhere is referred to in Messianic terms. It may be noticed that if 1900 years separate the first and the second great man, then prehistory has a long course yet to run. The division is borrowed from the Apocalypse. See Sikora, *op. cit.*, pp. 221ff.

[51] Krasiński drew attention to this in his *Listy do Delfiny*, vol. I, p. 274, cited in Sikora, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

[52] See Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, and also Kamil Kantak, *Mickiewicz i Towiańskiego Sprawa Boża*, London, 1957, p. 20.

[53] See A. Walicki, 'Dwa Mesjanizmy . . .', *op. cit.*, pp. 57–59.

[54] See *Cours de littérature slave*, *op. cit.*, lecture XVII, 2 May 1843, vol. IV, pp. 318–337.

[55] *Ibid.*, lecture XXII, 6 June 1843, pp. 427–448.

[56] Władyslaw Mickiewicz, *Pamiętniki*, vol. I, p. 68.

[57] Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. I, dated 21 February 1847, p. 242. Krasiński adds: "he has judged us as God would have if God were heartless . . ."

[58] Pigoń, *op. cit.*, p. 220. This is recounted by Seweryn Goszczyński following a conversation between Mickiewicz and Cieszkowski dated 20 December 1843; Pigoń also quotes Krasiński telling Cieszkowski that Mickiewicz had promised to read the *Our Father* if Cieszkowski would say an *Our Father* with faith.

[59] M. Zdziechowski, 'Krasiński i Schelling', in *Wizja Krasińskiego*, Cracow, 1912, pp. 43ff, speaks of a similarity rather than a debt. Maria Janion appears to be closer to the truth in describing Krasiński as a "pseudo-Hegelian", i.e., as belonging to the religious right-wing of Hegelianism much susceptible to Schelling's influence. See her 'Krasiński – filozofujący poeta romantyczny'. *Filozofia Polska*, vol. II, ed. B. Baczko, Warsaw, 1967.

[60] Janion, *Ibid.*, pp. 327ff.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 322; also M. Janion, 'Romantyczna Wizja Rewolucji', *Problemy polskiego romantyzmu*, Wroclaw, 1971.

[62] See Miłosz, *op. cit.*, pp. 245–246.

[63] *The Dawn* (*Przedświt*) is especially important in this regard. See Juljusz Kleiner's introduction to the fourth edition, Edinburgh, 1942, as well as Bolesław Gawecki, 'Cieszkowski i Krasiński', *Polscy myśliciele romantyczni*, pp. 69–88.

[64] Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 131; the term "infernal gangs" is taken directly from Hoëné-Wroński.

[65] Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. II, dated 4 July 1848, p. 34 from Babylon (i.e., Paris – *sic*).

[66] Letter to Delfina Potocka, dated 31 March 1848, cited in Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

[67] Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. II, 21 May 1848, p. 26.

[68] *Ibid.*, vol. I, dated 8 April 1841, p. 3. This is interesting for the suggestion that Krasiński moderated Cieszkowski's ascetic zeal.

[69] *Ibid.*, vol. II, dated 3 June 1848, p. 8.

[70] Krasiński wrote Delfina Potocka regarding his conversation with Mickiewicz about George Sand: "She has negated everything; she is only critique and destruction. But the divine spark of harmonizing life which puts something in the place of ruins is not there! She is a great spirit said he (i.e., Mickiewicz) – Oh yes, I answered – everywhere she speaks of the ideal of love and yet she is an awful debauchee; everywhere she says that we have to join with the workers – said he (Mickiewicz – AL) but why did she not have her daughter marry a worker?" Cited in Kallenbach, p. 105, dated 20 February 1848. Regarding Proudhon, Krasiński wrote to Cieszkowski, *Listy* . . . , vol. I, p. 194, 8 June 1846: "I have read Proudhon's critique of communism – excellent but what he writes about God is disgusting – as if written in a brothel – without his pants on".

[71] Pigoń, *op. cit.*, p. 156, cites Krasiński: "He (Mickiewicz – AL) said many beautiful things, exactly the same mystically as August said logically and historically, not an iota of difference. He spoke beautifully of Christ, I will not say it was true but it was beautiful". Krasiński's letter to Delfina Potocka, 27 February 1848, cited in Kallenbach, p. 112: "in Mickiewicz there are many things of August but in a fevered state of feeling; there is neither calm judgment nor proof of thought. How is it that these two people understood each other so little? It is only form which separates them. Here there is feeling; there, intelligence!"

[72] Charles Stoeffels was the author of *Resurrection* (Paris, 1840?) whose last chapter was entitled 'May your kingdom come'. Krasiński spoke of the work with the utmost enthusiasm and told Cieszkowski in his letter of 26 March 1843 that Stoeffels' ideas matched Cieszkowski's completely. Krasiński, *Listy* . . . , vol. I, pp. 69–73.

[73] Krasiński, *Listy do Delfiny*, pp. 684 and 689, 12 and 18 January 1843.

[74] *Ibid.*, letter 17 October 1843; also his letter to Delfina Potocka cited in Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 31, and dated 5 January 1842.

[75] Krasiński, *Listy* . . . , vol. I, p. 124: "You are a man not of humanity but of coterie and system – not logos acts in your ears but instinct, custom, the din of Berlin is so strong that you cannot hear the voice of humanity", dated 31 March 1844. Some three years later he writes: "How you are sometimes mistaken in regard to human character . . . and do you know why? Because you never look at the whole of man, only at his relation to his theory!" *Ibid.*, p. 280. Krasiński, like so many other reactionary observers of 1848, blamed Hegel among others for the conflagration of that year. He wrote to Delfina Potocka on 28 May 1848: ". . . such a deep and terrible movement which is false but tries to pretend it is true, began with the Hegelians, began with the Mazzinists, began with the Towiańskiists, in each of them in a different form and in each similarly because against Christ . . . all eliminate Christ: Hegelians as philosophers, Mazzinists as politicians, Towiańskiists as mystics . . . Quoted in Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

[76] Krasiński, *Listy*, vol. II, 13 June 1849, p. 175, Krasiński writes somewhat patronizingly: "You do not know people, my dear August, you know nothing and cannot guess and sometimes you are simplex simplicitas, with the angels and incompatible with Towiańskis, reds and company".

[77] Krasiński to Cieszkowski *Listy* . . . , *op. cit.*, vol. I, dated 30 April 1843, p. 75. In a letter of 18 October 1843 Krasiński wrote to Delfina Potocka: "The whole day is spent reading August. The work about which I told you so many strange passages in Rome is becoming broader. It alone will be the bright fulfillment of the dark forefeeling of Towiański. The hidden seed of years has given fruit".

[78] Jan Koźmian writing to S. Egbert Koźmian from Paris, dated 27 February 1842 quoted in Krasiński, *Listy do Konstantego Gaszyńskiego*, ed., Sudolski, p. 253. Sudolski also cites an interesting letter on the same subject from Cezary Plater (Jan Koźmian's informer) to Prince Czartoryski dated 17 March 1852 from Munich: "I am still not without a certain well-founded fear concerning the direction of Zygmunt's (Krasiński's – AL) thought which together with the strivings of Jan (Zamoyski – AL) Cieszkowski, Trentowski and still some others, among whom I would count the teaching of Alexander Wielopolski, and today perhaps even Mickiewicz, represents to my mind a great danger ... if I were to limit this to its principal aspect, this would be in my opinion the movement towards ... a considerable weakening in obedience and submission to the Church". *Ibid.*, p. 252.

[79] Krasiński to Delfina Potocka, 16 August 1842, cited in Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 36: "... Thank you for the course (presumably, Mickiewicz's Slavonic lectures – AL) and for the Towiański stuff. Whoever has read Fourier will recognize extraordinary similarities between his method and this *suite*, this fire, this tone. Whoever has heard August and Konstanty (Danilewicz – AL) and understood their exposition of the will of God and man based on Christ's words: 'Thy will be done on earth as in heaven' – the basis of this whole new doctrine – the conciliation of the will of God and man will not seem new".

[80] For Danilewicz's views and their obvious dependence on Cieszkowski, see the former's article 'Historyczna Zasada', *Biblioteka Warszawska*, III, 1844, pp. 481–493.

[81] Krasiński to Delfina Potocka, 18 May 1848, in Kallenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[82] Krasiński to Delfina Potocka, 17 March 1848, cited in *Ibid.*, p. 117.

CHAPTER X

[1] B. Baczko, 'Lewica i Prawica heglowska w Polsce', *op. cit.*, p. 113, citing I. Kraszewski.

[2] See again, Isaiah Berlin, 'A marvellous decade', *op. cit.*, *passim*.

[3] It is indicative of the prevailing situation that Krasiński would have felt obliged to burn part II of *Gott und Palingenesie*, a work of no obvious political or other significance, in fear of a police raid in Warsaw. See above, chapter III.

[4] See Baczko, 'Lewica i Prawica ...', *op. cit.*, and Kroński, 'Reakcja mesjanistyczna ...', *op. cit.*; apparently, Ziemiecka, whose journal was the *Pielgrzym*, was less obscurantistically hostile to Hegel than Rzewuski in *Tygodnik Peterburski*. The former admitted at least to having been impressed by Hegel in her youth. For a view which minimizes the opposition between Hegelians and anti-Hegelians even more explicitly than does Kroński, see Anna Sladkowska, 'Stosunek polskiej filozofii połowy XIX-go wieku do klasycznej filozofii niemieckiej', *Myśl Filozoficzna*, 1954, IV, pp. 105–121.

[5] This point is well brought out particularly in the case of Rzewuski in J. Łytkowski's *Józef de Maistre a Henryk Rzewuski*, Cracow, 1925.

[6] Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, paragraph 549, p. 279. Cieszkowski was well aware of this passage since the paragraph is the inspiration of this article on the modern novel already referred to.

[7] Baczko, *op. cit.*, p. 212, cites Mickiewicz: "teachings of Voltaire and Hegel are like poison" (apparently from *Księgi Narodu*...).

[8] When Cieszkowski returned to Poland a certain Antoni Czajkowski, for example, reproached him for writing in German and French. These were perhaps the further phases of the old debate on the problem "Is our language philosophical?" Concerning Czajkowski see Chmielowski, 'August Cieszkowski' in *Ateneum*, II, 1894, p. 135. On the other hand, A. Kurc greeted Cieszkowski enthusiastically and prophesized a brilliant future for him. *Ibid.*

[9] A contemporary observer assigns a key role to Cieszkowski in the most glorious period of the *Biblioteka Warszawska*. H. Lewestam, *Obraz najnowszego ruchu literackiego w Polsce*, Warsaw, 1859. On the other hand, a more recent study maintains that Cieszkowski did not really take a great part in the *Biblioteka*, at least in the sense that he did not contribute any important articles. Antonina Kloskowska 'Socjologiczne i filozoficzne koncepcje *Biblioteki Warszawskiej* w pierwszym dziesięcioleciu pisma 1841–1850', *Przegląd Nauk Historycznych i Społecznych*, VII, 1956, pp. 160–174.

[10] See Kloskowska, *op. cit.*

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[12] Kloskowska acknowledges that the *Biblioteka Warszawska* was an influence in pre-positivism but denies it any real influence because of its religiosity and timidity. This seems to me to be a rather abrupt and unfair judgement.

[13] See Bohdan Zakrzewski, *Tygodnik Literacki* 1838–1845, p. 77, Warsaw, 1964, as well as Maria Straszewska, *Czasopisma literackie w Królestwie Polskim w latach* 1832–1848, Wrocław, 1959, p. 191.

[14] Apparently, even in the "philosophical" 1840's Cieszkowski had difficulties in publishing such purely philosophical works as his *Ionian Philosophy* in the pages of the *Biblioteka Warszawska*. This example was brought up by Dembowski to illustrate his general complaint about the "unphilosophical nature of the Polish reading public". *Pisma*, vol. I, p. 295. It is confirmed by the fact that Cieszkowski's treatise on Ionian philosophy was not continued after two installments.

[15] Zółtowski, in *Sto lat myśli polskiej: wiek XIX*, explains that Cieszkowski Jr. was unwilling to assume responsibility for so large an estate, probably because of his frequent absences. Zóltowski incorrectly indicates the date of purchase as 1842. The Posen archives, Cieszkowski file, document nr 13, contain a deed which refers to a "Spezial Concession für den Grafen August von Cieszkowski aus Stawiska bei Warschau zum Besitze der im flatonischen Kreise Reg. Be. (Regierungsbezirk?) Marienwerder belegenen freien Allodial Rittergutter, Dobrin u Kappe", dated 5 May 1841.

[16] Cieszkowski appears to have moved to the property several years before buying it for already in 1842 correspondence is addressed Wierzenica, while the deed for the purchase of Wierzenica as well as several other properties (Kobylnica, Pawłowek, Żabikowo) is dated 1847. It is probable that legal restrictions prevented Cieszkowski from buying land while he was a foreigner.

[17] Cieszkowski's father seems to have accurately foreseen the course of developments in Russian Poland. In 1854, all landed property owners who were also Prussian subjects were given three months to naturalize themselves Russian or sell their property. It is not clear whether Cieszkowski managed to circumvent this regulation; if so, he lost whatever property remained under Russian jurisdiction, in the insurrection of 1863. According to

Krasiński, it was Cieszkowski's properties outside Posen which assured his income. See his letters to Cieszkowski of 5 July 1854 and 11 May 1851 in *Listy*, vol. II, pp. 349 and 252. According to a letter also from Krasiński to Gaszyński, dated 9 July 1846, *Listy do Gaszyńskiego, . . .*, nr. 148, Cieszkowski's purchase of Champètrier was also a sort of insurance and exit visa: "August is buying some property in the Basses Alpes . . . don't tell anybody about this purchase . . . Perhaps I too shall choose this road to reach the Rhine".

[18] It is difficult to find accurate information on this incident. Several biographical sketches speak of it (e.g., Zółtowski, *Philosophie der Tat*, p. 4), but all seem to rely on Krasiński's oblique references to the event in his correspondence with Cieszkowski and Potocka, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. II, letter of 9 May 1851, p. 262.

[19] Tytus Działyński cited in Witold Jakóbczyk, ed., *Wybitni Wielkopolanie XIX wieku*, Posen, 1959, in article on Działyński by S. Bodniak, p. 100.

[20] Barbara Skarga, 'Praca organiczna . . . , *op. cit.*, p. 175. This is by far the best theoretical treatment of the problem of organicism as an ideology.

[21] Marcel Handelsman, *Les idées françaises, . . .*, p. 139, writes: "the religiosity of Posen even had something very realistic and, even though it supplied the foundation for all philosophic and political conceptions; it was mixed with very practical elements".

[22] N. Żmichowska, *Listy*, vol. I, Wrocław, 1957, pp. 163–164, cited in Bogdan Zakrzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

[23] See Kiniewicz, *The Emancipation of the Polish Peasantry*, for agrarian reform in Prussian Poland, pp. 58–72. The *Lassbauern* are defined as peasants with a "weak right to the soil", *ibid.*, pp. 60–62.

[24] Apparently, the Prussian government hoped to use the rich peasants as a bulwark against the Polish landlords. Hence, the constant emphasis that emancipation came from the king while the continued woes of the peasantry were due to the landlords. See Kiniewicz, *ibid.*; also Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolanie, . . .*, introduction, as well as Peter Brock, 'Socialism and Nationalism in Poland, 1840–1846', *Canadian Slavonic Papers* IV, 1959, pp. 121–125.

[25] For Russian Poland see, for instance, R. F. Leslie, *Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland*, London, 1963, esp. chap. II.

[26] See W. Jakóbczyk, *Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski w XIX wjeku: Dzieje Pracy organicznej*, I, 1815–1850, Posen 1951.

[27] Szmańda, *Polska myśl polityczna w zaborze pruskim* (n.p., n.d.), p. 55. The controversy over mixed marriages in Posen is very similar to the Frankfurt controversy which attracted so much attention from the Hegelians.

[28] Jakóbczyk, ed., *Wybitni Wielkopolanie, . . .*, pp. 8–9.

[29] Szmańda, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 92; also Jakóbczyk, ed., *Wybitni Wielkopolanie, . . ., passim;* for censorship especially, see M. Laubert, 'Presse und Zensur in neupressicher Zeit 1815–1847', *Studien zur Geschichte der Provinz Posen*, Posen, 1908, pp. 200ff.

[31] Laubert, *op. cit.*, p. 261, dates the abolition of the *Kartellkonvention* from 1843; Jakóbczyk speaks of 1842, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

[32] Laubert, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

[33] Handelsman, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[34] Szmańda, *op. cit.*, p. 60, speaks of the *Towarzystwo Kredytowe Ziemskie* in very

favourable terms as an institution preventing German encroachment on Polish lands; Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, . . . , p. 9, dismisses it as an instrument, along with titles and decorations, used to win over the Polish nobility.

[35] Andrzej Wojtkowski, 'Stulecie Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciól Nauk', *Roczniki Historyczne, IX*, 1957, pp. 310ff.

[36] Chief among these is the *Towarzystwo ku Wspieraniu Ubogich i Biednych w Poznaniu*, organized by Marcinkowski in 1845 with the help of the city's intelligentsia and bourgeoisie of all three nationalities (German, Jewish, Polish). In addition to arranging a rational distribution of alms it sought to study the causes of poverty. Jakóbczyk's article, 'Jan Karol Marcinkowski' in his *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, . . . , p. 123.

[37] *Towarzystwo Naukowej Pomocy dla Młodzieży Wielkiego Księstwa* founded in 1841 and continuing in existence until 1939. See Jakóbczyk, *ibid.*

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[39] Jakóbczyk, *Studia nad Dziejami Wielkopolski.*

[40] Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, p. 10.

[41] The survivor was *Przegląd Poznański*, a conservative journal of Catholic ultramontanist tendencies edited by individuals often close to Czartoryski personally, e.g., Jan Kozmiań and Cezary Plater. See Wojtkowski, 'Stulecie . . .', *op. cit.*, p. 312. Even Jakóbczyk who is most critical of the ideologies and policies of the "coterie" which directed the *Przegląd* admits the high quality of this monthly journal which, significantly, only began publication in 1845, i.e., as the liberal phase was ending. *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, p. 11.

[42] *Ibid.* Also Laubert, *op. cit.*, pp. 227 and 252, and Zakrzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[43] Zakrzewski, *op. cit., passim.*

[44] In opposition to Zakrzewski, I would suggest that the evolution of the *Tygodnik* away from extreme revolutionary positions was implicit in its position from the very beginning. The journal was consistently anti-Mickiewicz during the Towiański years. See also Brock, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[45] For biographical sketches of Marcinkowski and Libelt see the articles by Jakóbczyk and Maciejewski in *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, . . .

[46] Jakóbczyk, *Ibid.*, p. 11 and *Studia*, . . . ; Laubert, p. 260.

[47] "O skojarzeniu dążen i prac umyslowych w W. Księstwie Poznańskim", *Rok*, I, 1843, pp. 132–143; referred to henceforth in text as *Rok Art.*

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 142: "Doubtlessly, within the great family of civilized nations we are a young tribe; let us not be ashamed of our youth, for it is full of strength".

[49] See Zakrzewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 43ff.

[50] *Ibid.*; E. Dembowski was soon to break with the *Tygodnik Literacki* for the opposite reason.

[51] Zakrzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 47. The work in question was Engels', *Über die Lage der Arbeiter in England*, which was extravagantly praised in *Rok*, III and IV, 1846.

[52] This hypothesis should be taken as rather tentative. Undoubtedly, Cieszkowski's interest in a scientific society as described in his article was also sincere. In fact, he was to realize this plan some fifteen years later. Moreover, *Rok's* inclusion of Cieszkowski's article may have been nothing but an example of its broadmindedness for Cieszkowski was not connected with the Democratic Society. For the *Tygodnik Literacki's* critique of *Rok's* notion of critique, see Zarkrzewski, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

[53] See Brock, *op. cit.*, as well as his *Polish Revolutionary Populism*, Toronto, 1977.

[54] See Kukiel, *op. cit.*, chapter XVI, and Kiniewicz, *Historia Polski, . . .*, chapter XII.

[55] For Mickiewicz, see Sikora, *op. cit.*, and Maria Janion, 'Romantyczna Wizja Rewolucji', in *Problemy Polskiego Romantyzmu*, Wroclaw, 1971. For Krasiński see Janion, *op. cit.*, as well as Krasiński's *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. I, p. 180, letter of 17 March 1846. From a later letter, 15 May 1846, one would understand that Wierzenica itself witnessed a brief skirmish. See also the letters for September 1846.

[56] Cieszkowski's letter of convocation dated March 1845, addressed to him at Wierzenica and signed by Beurmann, the President of the Province, is preserved in the Posen archives, *op. cit.* The letter is in both German and Polish and indicates that Cieszkowski was to substitute for Tytus Działyński, a prominent senior member of the Posen aristocracy.

[57] Cited by Kühne *op. cit.*, p. 203, from one of Michelet's talks at the *Philosophische Gesellschaft*, reprinted in *Noacks Jahrbücher*, and quoted earlier.

[58] These were the burning issues raised in Michelet's letters; see Kühne, *op. cit.* In fact, Michelet appears more excited than Cieszkowski at his former student's new position and drowns him in advice and admonition.

[59] For Cieszkowski's intercession, see Krasiński's letter of 17 March 1846, *op. cit.* In another letter, 21 February 1847, p. 241, Krasiński indicates his disdain for the newly-introduced *Vereinigter Landtag*: ". . . he (i.e., the king) has given himself not a constitution but a revolution . . . 617 wounded, offended, enraged men in the constitutional system will be like adolescents in the age of first passion, ready to destroy the world to show that they are men".

[60] For the events of 1848 see L. Namier, *Revolution of the Intellectuals*, London, 1944.

[61] Krasiński, *Listy*, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 270, dated 23 May 1847.

[62] The authority on this event seems to be Marian Tyrowicz, *Polski Kongres Polityczny we Wrocławiu* 1848 *r.*, Cracow; 1946.

[63] The most cutting criticisms of this sort come from a part-time émigré, Bronisław Trentowski; he writes, for instance: "The Polish spirit has enough mature depth; abroad, however, it becomes stupid; in Paris, intolerably shallow; in Berlin, comically and strangely deep". *Listy*, Cracow 1937, nr 83, 1846.

[64] It is the accommodating character of the Posen organicists and their basic indifference to the ideological distinctions of the emigration which seems to have bothered the émigrés most. In one exasperated comment, the Poles of Posen were dismissed by an émigré as "a Polono–Germano–aristo–democratic land of lords, philosophers and priests", Berwinski cited in Handelsman, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[65] Namier, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[66] *Marx–Engels Werke*, vol. V, p. 333 citing the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, nr 81, 20 August 1848.

[67] Marx, too, linked the Polish problem closely with the question of Russian–German relations. Thus, in the passage quoted above he wrote: "As long as we help to oppress the Poles and as long as we bind a part of Poland to Germany, so long are we bound to Russia and Russian policy and unable to break fundamentally with patriarchal feudal absolutism at home", *Ibid.*

[68] Krasiński expressed his horror for both "a red republic" and "Moscow", insisting that if these were the only choices he saw no value to life. *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. II, p. 43, 30 July 1848.

[69] See Namier, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–31 and 59ff which is, in this respect, as in so many

others, the most concise account of the situation. Also W. Bleck, 'Die Posener Frage auf den Nationalversammlung im Jahr 1848 und 1849', *Zeitschrift der historischen Gesellschaft für die Provinz Posen*, XXIX, 1914, pp. 1–82.

[70] Namier, *op. cit.*, p. 71. The provincial estates, an obvious anachronism, met for the last time on April 6th. The defeated German minority in Posen refused to abide by the decision of the majority and sought to send its own representatives to the all-German parliament, thus putting a definitive end to cooperation between the two Posen national groups.

[71] See Wojtkowski's article in Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolanie,...*, p. 175.

[72] Tyrowicz, *op. cit.*

[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 66ff.

[74] Wojtkowski, *op. cit.*, in Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolany*.

[75] Wladyslaw Wisłocki, *Jerzy Lubomirski* 1817–1872, Lwow, 1928, pp. 44–46.

[76] The text of Cieszkowski's appeal is reprinted in Wisłocki, *op. cit.* pp. 46–52.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[79] *Ibid.*; Cieszkowski adds as a factor in international oppression "artificial endowment of rights" as well as "egoistic usurpation".

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 50; in a departure from the prevailing tone of the appeal Cieszkowski calls here upon the self-interest of nations.

[82] The language is so untypical of Cieszkowski, the metaphors so hackneyed that one wonders whether the author was not simply trying to summarize the dominant ideas of his contemporaries rather than this own.

[84] *Słowa Wieszcze Polaka wyrzeczone roku MDCCCXLVI*, Praga, 1848. The year 1846 suggests that this was the year when the particular part was written. It appears in the first volume of *Ojcze Nasz* published in February 1848. In the edition of 1922 the *Słowa Wieszcze Polaska* appears as pp. 142–170 of vol. I. I shall discuss this section with the rest of the *Ojcze Nasz* in the following chapter.

[85] The moderate, even rationalist, quality of Cieszkowski's slavophilia is evident from his earliest writings. His *Diaries I*, p. 9, for example, contain the following passages:

> Slavdom is the representative of the historical future in the Christian world – not the absolute element of the future world because this will be made up of the whole of humanity but its foreshadowing – so important a tribe has not yet had a history befitting its importance so it must have it in the future ... *Poland* – corresponds to antiquity. The spirit of classicism – objectivity
>
> *Czechs* – corresponding to the *Christ.* World, dominated by Germanism, the element of Protestantism but unstifled. Subjectivity
>
> *Russia* – corresponds properly speaking to the future. Synthesis of the preceding moments. For this reason has so far been so unhistorical, and now rises so grandly.

[86] For the Prague Congress, see B. Hepner, *Bakounine et le panslavisme révolutionnaire*, Paris, 1950, pp. 265ff.

[87] Krasiński observing the concurrent political activity and armed strife wrote to Cieszkowski: *Listy*, ... vol. II, p. 31, 23 June 1848: "... all the chattering up to now, the demonstrations, the phrases, speeches, proclamations of the Chamber and Czech

congresses, non-Czech or Slav or whatever you want to call them, are only an introduction, a spoken prologue before the curtain rises, before the drama begins – i.e., universal war – civil war and international war . . ."

[88] Bleck, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–43; the *Vorparlament* was dissolved on April 3rd; the *Polendebatte* at Frankfurt took place on 24th July.

[89] Ruge, who writes of having travelled with Cieszkowski in 1848, has this to say of the Slavs in *Briefwechsel und Tagebuchblätter*, vol. II, Berlin, 1886, p. 50: "the problem of the emancipation of the Slavs is approximately the same as that of the emancipation of the Jews; in order to be emancipated they must rise to the spirit of the times and give up all particularism. For small and dispersed barbarous nations the maintenance of a particular nationality is only a misfortune or a plague". In all fairness to Ruge, it should be pointed out that this passage dates from a later period and that he admits that "in 1848 one was not wrong in seeing in the agitation of the Slavs a symptom of their recovery". Still, it is an open question whether Ruge's assertion that the Slavs have no talent for freedom was antecedent to his experience of 1848.

[90] Bleck, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[91] *Ibid.*, p. 54; the motion to defeat the Frankfurt resolution on the Polish question was passed by only one vote.

[92] The electoral law of April 8th 1848 imposed a property qualification and a two-tiered system of election. The result favoured a strong bourgeois representation. Grot, 'Koło Polskie w Berlinie w dobie wiosny ludów', *Przegląd Zachodni*, VIII, nr 9, 1952, pp. 126–172.

[93] Wojtkowski in Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, . . . , p. 263.

[94] *Ibid.*; apparently when Cieszkowski rose to speak the parliamentary restaurant would lose a good part of its clientele. There is a poignant footnote to this part of Cieszkowski's life in an article by Engels in the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, nr 39, 9 July 1848, *Marx–Engels Werke*, vol. V, p. 188. Engels reports a very poor speech by a hesitant and confused German deputy from Posen who was being heckled and interrupted, until Cieszkowski shouted "Don't interrupt, let him end!"

[95] Jakóbczyk, *Studia nad dziejami Wielkopolski*, p. 105. It is probable that Cieszkowski and Bakunin knew each other previously. They both frequented the Herwegh house in Paris about 1840; see E. Krakowski, *La société parisienne cosmopolite au XIX siècle et Cyprian Norwid*, Paris, 1939.

[96] Jakóbczyk, 'Cieszkowski i Liga Polska', *Przegląd Historyczny*, XXXVIII, 1948, p. 149, the speech was made on 28 October 1848.

[97] Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. II, p. 42, dated 30 July 1848.

[98] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 30, dated 30 May 1848.

[99] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 25, dated 23 April 1848. Krasiński had written: "The kingdom of heaven may be reached either by sanctifying spirits longing for it or by first falling into hell and then getting out of there by the need felt of love". Clearly, Krasiński preferred the first but, as he saw it, Cieszkowski had chosen the second.

[100] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 34; later Krasiński wrote, p. 93, dated 10 December 1848: "You should know the people of today! know that they are corrupt to the very marrow; know that they have rotted by avarice of gold and corporeal well-being and atheism" . . . "you look upon people with the glasses of illusion".

[101] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 34; later in an undated letter Krasiński implored: "O my August! I

beseech you preserve yourself, save yourself for after the chaos, if you can, for all that you do now is nothing! Do you not know that the laws of the Revolution are always the same as those of illness?"

[102] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 67, dated 12 November 1848; after this outburst Krasiński was willing to recognize that Cieszkowski had qualified his abolition of nobility distinguishing between Polish and German nobles and maintaining high the banner of true nobility. See letter of 20 November, pp. 76–77.

[103] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 64, dated 7 December 1848; elsewhere, less rudely but more ambiguously, Krasiński compares Cieszkowski and his kind to Hamlet, *Ibid.*, p. 70. His injunctions to leave the Left are repeated hysterically in almost every letter.

[104] The National Assembly elected in April–May 1848 had been turbulent from the very beginning. It rejected the royal constitutional project, refused to assemble in Brandenburg according to the king's request, denied taxes and issued protests. On December 1st the opposition left the chamber thus making a quorum impossible and on the 5th it was dissolved by the king.

[105] For a description of the history and especially the methods of Cobden's Anti-Corn Law League see the classic work by A. Prentice, *The Anti-Corn Law League*, London, 1853, a more recent work, N. McCord, *The Anti-Corn Law League*, London, 1958, as well as C. R. Fay, *The Corn Law and Social England*, Cambridge, 1932, chap. VI, pp. 86–108.

[106] McCord, *op. cit.*, draws attention to the struggle between extremists and moderates within the League; nevertheless, it is still correct to speak of it as a unified and cohesive body.

[107] Jakóbczyk, 'Cieszkowski i Liga Polska', *op. cit.*, p. 152; this was paragraph 1 of the statutes of the League.

[108] D. G. Barnes, *A History of the English Corn Laws*, New York, 1930, p. 259.

[109] Jakóbczyk, *Studia,...*, p. 108; for Daniel O'Connell there does not seem to be any adequate monographic treatment but see D. R. Gwynn, *Daniel O'Connell: the Irish Liberator*, London, 1947.

[110] Cieszkowski's 'Appeal to the representatives of free peoples' in Wisłocki, *op. cit.*, p. 52, says of Ireland: "Look... how the great English nation which has enjoyed the jewel of internal freedom for centuries and in the division of labour among humanity plays first fiddle in many respects, denies justice to this day to a fraternal people; this clear sighted nation is so blind in this case that not only does it tyrannize Ireland but through this weakens itself".

[111] "O skojarzeniu dążeń i prac umysłowych", *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[112] Wisłocki, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–52. The Polish Central Committee does not seem to have had any sort of practical existence.

[113] Jakóbczyk, 'Cieszkowski i Liga Polska', *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 146, citing the *Gazeta Polska*, nr 109, 2 August 1848. It is curious that this conservative newspaper should have used the term "national workshop" so evocative of the French revolutionary experiment of the same year (*ateliers nationaux*). The newspaper seems to have had in mind the idea that Posen would become a laboratory and production plant of both material and moral support to struggling Slav nations. The Cracow *Czas*, 3 November 1848, saw the advantage of the League as a means of combating the Germanization of commerce and industry by taking these activities out of the hands of the Jews and the Germans.

[115] *Ibid.*, p. 146, quoting *Czas*, nr 12, 1848.
[116] The preamble provided for the possible inclusion of Poles in Austria as had originally been intended by Cieszkowski at Breslau but the League never developed beyond Posen. For text of the Statute see Jakóbczyk, *ibid.*
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 146. On 31 August 1848 two prominent Posen conservatives, Potworowski and Lipski, had visited the Prussian minister of the Interior not to obtain permission – which was not needed under the new regulations – but to offer assurances. This, perhaps more than anything else, emphasizes the contrast between the League and the prevalent conspiratorial and revolutionary Polish organizations.
[118] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[119] *Ibid.*; here, the statute mentions the Anti-Corn Law League specifically and formally adopts it as the model for the Polish League. The reference to the hope "that the road so little tried will prove to be the surest" is an open critique of revolutionism.
[120] *Ibid.*; Krasiński who followed the events closely from abroad expressed his approval of Cieszkowski's position even though he was skeptical of the idea of the League in general. See *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, vol. II, p. 122, 22 January 1849.
[121] Krasiński, *Listy*, vol. II, p. 135, 26 February 1849: "My dear August! I warn you that people are saying throughout the Duchy: 'a certain faction, at the head of which is Libelt, wants to push you ahead and use your Lamartine-like popularity to destroy Potworowski, and once this has been achieved, destroy you and take over everything in the League'". Krasiński was, of course, inordinately suspicious and detested Libelt thoroughly but his account does not seem exaggerated.
[122] The notion of supra-partisanship advanced by Cieszkowski and supported by the right-wing had been contested by the Left; even though the latter were defeated they appear to have been right in claiming that a non-factional political organization with no party preferences was a contradiction in terms.
[123] Jakóbczyk, 'Cieszkowski i Liga Polska', *op. cit.*
[124] *Ibid.*, *passim*; Jakóbczyk describes in detail the frustrations of directing so many local chapters each of which was calling for particular attention. Cieszkowski assumed the task of conciliating the parts with the whole even though, strictly speaking, this did not lie within his responsibilities. Krasiński, as always, was issuing warnings which turned out to be well-founded. In principle, he approved of the League, but he added: "... in the present circumstances there is nothing else. I repeat, however, beware the changing waves of the Demos. Today they applaud you and embrace you with tears in their eyes; tomorrow they will stamp their feet and whistle and seethe – and call you a traitor..." *Listy*, vol. II, p. 119, 22 January 1849. Already before the January assembly Krasiński had predicted that nothing would come of the League unless Cieszkowski took it firmly in hand for the Poles "were not as organized a nation as the English", *ibid.*, p. 96, 25 December 1848.
[125] Apparently, Cieszkowski's father was threatened in Russian Poland by his son's activities. See Krasiński, *ibid.*, who predicted that the Russians would send a mass of agents to infiltrate the League.
[126] Jakóbczyk, *op. cit.* The Polish Library in Paris has preserved a letter of Cieszkowski to an English sympathiser of the League, Lord Dudley Stuart, dated 6 May 1850, informing him of the dissolution of the League and thanking him for his cooperation. The new law on associations was passed just before the planned second general assembly of the League was to meet. From the beginning, functionaries had not been allowed to

join the League thus hitting the rural intelligentsia, for the most part school teachers. At its height the League had 246 local chapters and 20,000–30,000 dues-paying members.

[127] Compare with the activity and aims of the Anti-Corn Law League: "To overturn every monopoly with the power only of opinion, tracts, articles, lectures, local anti-Corn Law groups . . . economic missionaries". Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

[128] After Cieszkowski's third election to Berlin in the summer of 1849 Krasiński wrote him: "So you are a deputy once again . . . the *Allgemeine* now writes that you will outdo the Left in this right chamber . . ." *Listy*, . . . , vol. II, pp. 187, 194. In the same elections, Michelet had joined the *Freisinnigen* in refusing to participate. Cieszkowski wrote back to his friend: "Even if I were a German I would have, but as a Pole I had to. Would you have wanted us to leave the field open to Prussian bureaucrats and *Hertzbrüder* and *Polenfresser* of all sorts who would have had themselves elected all over by a few votes and would have arrogated to themselves the title of legitimate deputies of the Grand Duchy of Posen, and then would have disposed of our country as they wished?" Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 402, letter nr 23, dated 29 July 1849.

[129] For the history of the Polish faction in Berlin see Z. Grot, 'Koło polskie w Berlinie w dobie Wiosny Ludów', *op. cit.* Above all, see the *Protokoły Posiedzeń koła polskiego w Berlinie*, vol. I, 1849–51, Poznan, 1956.

[130] Grot, *Protokoły*, p. 17.

[131] Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke', *op. cit.*, p. 24, cites a letter from F. Lassalle asking Cieszkowski for the support of the Polish faction in a given matter and referring to the personal friendship and philosophical collegiality which linked him to Cieszkowski.

[132] Grot, generally hostile to Cieszkowski whom he describes as "a theoretician of the landed class and defender of the Prussian road to capitalism" (*sic*), grudgingly recognizes Cieszkowski's political adroitness; see *Protokoły*, . . . , pp. 16ff; for a more favourable opinion see Wojtkowski, *op. cit.*, in Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolanie.*

[133] Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke', *op. cit.*, p. 24.

[134] Zółtowski, in *Polski Slownik Biograficzny*, Vol. IV, "Cieszkowski rose to the head of the Polish faction; apparently he did not miss a single sitting and took part in several committees. He spoke in political, school, language, church, tax and finance matters . . ."

[135] Krasiński, *Listy*, vol. II, p. 259, dated 1 April 1851.

[136] Zółtowski Grot, *op. cit.*, see also *Jeneral Zamoyski*, vol. VI, Posen, 1930, p. 243. In a letter of 30 November 1850 Cieszkowski explains that it is impossible to demand that Polish troops not be sent against their compatriots in the event of war: ". . . your idea may give us the opportunity for a parliamentary manifestation but it can have no practical consequences since the Chamber will not agree to it and even if it did (which is inconceivable) no commander could agree to having the allocation of his regiments controlled by the Chamber. The only way we could do this is through interpellation to the minister of war whether he does not consider it right and, so to speak, binding by virtue of the law of nations, to recommend to the attention of commanding officers the avoidance if possible of armies of one nation meeting".

[137] *Zusammenstellung von staats – und völkerrechtlichen Urkunden welche das Verhältnis des Grossherzogtums Posen zur preussischen Krone betreffen.* This text was not available to me but it is discussed by Wojtkowski, in Jakóbczyk, *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, . . . pp. 265–266.

[138] Cieszkowski's translation seems to me to be also questionable. The closest term would perhaps be "political autonomy".

[139] *Zwei Anträge des Abgeordneten Grafen Aug. Cieszkowski die Posener Universitäts und Unterrichtsfrage betreffen.* The second is dated 12 March 1853; both are extracts from the parliamentary debates.

[140] Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke', *op. cit.*, pp. 3–5, reproduces an interesting exchange of letters between L. V. Henning, a former philosophical colleague, and Cieszkowski. Henning asks for Cieszkowski's help in having his son nominated to a post in Posen and Cieszkowski replies that he cannot in conscience recommend someone who does not know Polish. Grot, *Rok* 1863 *w Zaborze Pruskim*, Posen, 1963, p. 181, describes Cieszkowski's efforts on behalf of Poles imprisoned for having assisted the insurrection in Russian Poland in 1863. In this book, incidentally, Grot is much more favourable to Cieszkowski than elsewhere, comparing him advantageously to Libelt; p. 60: "Cieszkowski enjoyed no less respect than Libelt . . . he stood above Libelt in temperament and political *savoir-faire*, including his knowledge of the political *coulisses* . . ."

[141] Zółtowski, in *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, and *Sto Lat Myśli Polskiej.*

[142] Krasiński, *Listy do Gaszyńskiego*, vol. I, p. 470, dated 19 April 1847, describes Cieszkowski's strict exercises and concludes: ". . . (I remember) his body green from the cold; strong will is necessary for this and he has it, but for long and important matters; for every day, he lacks it. In addition add gentleness, goodness and an infinite elevation of feelings".

[143] 'August Cieszkowski i Akta Polskie w Wenecji', *Kronika Miasta Poznań*, X, nr 4, 1932, pp. 389–401. These were published in 1890 as *Fontes Rerum Polonicorum* . . .

[144] Zółtowski, in *Sto Lat Myśli Polskiej*, and see also Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, Michelet to Cieszkowski, letter nr 36, dated 14 December 1869, pp. 415–416: ". . . I am of the opinion that all good Catholics should wish that the Jesuits not succeed in persuading the pope to erect his notion of infallibility into a dogma nor the articles of the Syllabus. This would be breaking with modern civilization and I am afraid that half the Catholic world could not accept this rupture".

[145] Zółtowski *op. cit.*; Lowith's comments on Rosenkrantz could perhaps be equally well applied to Cieszkowski: ". . . with indefatigable effort he preserved the readiness to accept all true scientific progress which he ascribed to Hegel's mode of thought. Even technology and the first world exposition which Burckhardt found so appalling were included by Rosenkrantz in the progress of mankind – as he now translated spirit conscious of freedom. Far removed from pessimistic perspectives he saw in the universal spread of international commerce, the book trade and press the elevation of mankind to the level of universality . . . the levelling of all particularities", *op. cit.*, p. 58.

[146] Zółtowski in *Sto Lat*, . . . pp. 421–437, *passim.*

[147] The lower figure is cited in S. Wierzyński's article in *Biblioteki Wielkopolskie i Pomorskie*, Szulc-Gorska, ed., Poznan, 1929; the higher figure as well as a fuller description of the library is contained in Kühne, 'Das Bibliothek des Grafen August Cieszkowski', *op. cit.*; Wierzyński also mentions Cieszkowski's correspondence with Lamartine.

[148] Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke', *op. cit.*, as well as his *Graf August Cieszkowski* for biographical details on Brade and Lehmann as well as extracts from their letters.

[149] Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke', *op. cit.*, letter of 21 January 1866.
[150] Wojtkowski, 'Stulecie Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk', *op. cit.*, provides a summary of the Society's activities through its history.
[151] Wojtkowski in *Wybitni Wielkopolanie*, pp. 271–272.
[152] F. Chłapowski, 'O stosunku Augusta Cieszkowskiego do nauk przyrodniczych', in *Roczniki Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk*, XXI, 1895, pp. 335–355.
[153] *Ibid.*, p. 348.
[154] Jakóbczyk, 'Cieszkowski i Liga Polska', *op. cit.*, p. 150.
[155] H. Barycz, 'Stosunki Augusta Cieszkowskiego z uniwersytetem Jagiellońskim', *Sprawozdania polskiej akademji umiejętności*, XLIII, 1938, pp. 287–288.
[156] Wojtkowski, 'Stulecie', *op. cit.*
[157] N. Urbanowski, 'Wspomnienie o wyższej szkole rolniczej imienia Haliny w Zabikowie', *Roczniki Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk*, XX, 1894, pp. 270ff.
[158] Undated letter from V. Eulenberg to Cieszkowski, in Poznan archives, file nr 6380, part 8.
[159] Zółtowski in *Sto Lat Myśli Polskiej*, . . . , p. 433, and Zaleski, *op. cit.*, p. 365.
[160] Published and commented in J. Znamirowska, 'O nieznanych wierszach', *op. cit.*
[161] See the description in M. Walewska, *Polacy w Paryżu, Florencji i Dreznie*, Warsaw, 1930, p. 123.
[162] Dębicki, L., *Portrety i Sylwetki z XIX-go wieku*, series 2, vol. I, Cracow, 1906, p. 159.

CHAPTER XI

[1] This statement of the author, obviously unverifiable, is relayed by his son in the preface to *Ojcze Nasz*, vol. I, 1st ed. As I have suggested in the introduction, August Cieszkowski, Jr. is a most unreliable source in his zeal to prove the orthodoxy of his father's doctrines and to emphasize the mysticism in his methods.
[2] This is the position taken most consistently by Cieszkowski's biographers. e.g., Zółtowski, *op. cit.*, etc.
[3] See A. Cieszkowski, Jr., preface to *Ojcze Nasz*, vol. III, 1st ed., p. 1: quoting Cieszkowski Sr. on his deathbed: "The times have not yet come. I did not want a stone of construction to become a stone of offense. This is why the *Our Father* has not been published. – But perhaps *now* these times are approaching. From the *Syllabus* to *Rerum Novarum* we have covered quite some distance. Publish the *Invocation* (i.e., volume II, 1st ed. – AL) – Do not read the *Prayers*, until you have published the former (i.e., Invocation – AL). You will then decide yourself whether they are to be published already". In fact, the *Ojcze Nasz* was published twice: edited by A. Cieszkowski Jr., in four volumes between 1899 and 1906; vol. I reprinted the Paris edition of 1848 (Introduction) prefaced by the article 'O Drogach Ducha' (On the Ways of the Spirit), vol. II (the Invocation), vol. III (Hallowed be Thy Name), vol. IV (Thy Kingdom Come); edited by A. Zółtowski, 1922–23, in three volumes, containing all the first edition as well as the third through seventh prayers ('Thy Will be Done' through 'Deliver us from Evil' and the 'Amen'). I quote here from vol. I and III of the 2nd edition and II of the 1st edition.
[4] Trentowski, B., *Panteon Wiedzy Ludzkiej*, Posen, 1874, p. 222. Even though Trentowski gives these reasons he too seems skeptical whether these are the real

reasons: "Why did not August publish the rest of his work? Remember the shallow opinion after publication (of the first volume in 1848 – AL) that this was a brilliant heresy . . . So the results they (i.e., lords and priests – AL) draw is that August, frightened by the judgement of the *vox populi* and not wanting to break completely either with the church or the salons did not publish the rest of his work. This is a very unworthy opinion! August is not in the least a person who would pay much attention to such petty and miserable views. He is an elevated spirit and hence prepared to expose himself to everything in order to serve mankind and the nation honestly. He knows that the truth leads to the cross but redeems the world".

[5] Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, p. 55, who cites this interpretation is similarly skeptical. Cieszkowski Junior also claimed that the sudden revelation took place at a Mass of thanksgiving for the recently completed *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, thus placing the writing of that work some five to six years earlier than all textual and secondary materials (Cieszkowski's letters to Michelet, *Diaries*, etc.). Above all, common sense revolts against the theory that the *Prolegomena* was written before Cieszkowski was eighteen years old and that the *Our Father* was the work of a virtual adolescent, not to speak of the difficulty of explaining any sort of evolution in Cieszkowski's views, after the age of twenty-one or so and until his death at eighty.

[6] The passages of the *Diaries* which have found their way *verbatim* into the *Our Father*, not to speak of those which constitute the raw material for numerous arguments in the work, are too frequent to be cited here. The most direct allusion to the project of the *Our Father* is to be found in *Diaries*, p. 15. Here, Cieszkowski speaks of prophecy as extending beyond the Christian era and talks of the Biblical manna as a prototype of "our daily bread".

[7] Kühne, 'Neue Einblicke . . .', *op. cit.*, cites a letter from Cieszkowski to F. Benary dated 1876 which asks for clarification of certain Hebrew terms referring to God and corresponds exactly to a discussion in volume III of the *Our Father*, 1st ed., p. 25.

[8] Wojtkowski, in Jakóbczyk, *Wielkopolanie XIX-go wieku*, maintains that a note on alcoholism in volume II of the *Our Father* dates from the very end of Cieszkowski's life.

[9] The Amen, *Ojcze Nasz*, vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 283–286, is the only part of the *Our Father* which is dated in the manuscript. Only if one assumes, however, that the work as a whole was written virtually in one sitting can one take the date 1836 on the conclusion of the work to indicate the date of its termination as a whole.

[10] This is the claim made in an editorial note (page unnumbered) to volume II of the first edition where the probable date of composition of the first volume is inferred to be the 1840's while the second volume is said to date from 1837 or 1838. There is no basis for this hypothesis other than August Cieszkowski Junior's affirmations. As he himself admits, however, his father had never spoken a word to him of the *Our Father* until the eve of his death. See Kühne, *Graf August Cieszkowski*, p. 254.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

[12] Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego, . . .*, vol. I, p. 231, dated 7 February 1847.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 253, dated 17 March 1847.

[14] As Kühne points out, *op. cit.*, p. 267, this division occurs in the *Philosophy of History*, edited by Lasson but not in that of E. Gans. Cieszkowski, of course, was familiar with the latter.

[15] See Castella, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[16] See Charleton, *op. cit.*, p. 84, for a discussion of Leroux. For an excellent article on Fourier as Messianist as well as on the general *problématique* of French socialism *qua* Messianism, see Henri Desroche, 'Messianismes et Utopies', *Archives de Sociologie des Réligions*, VIII, July–December 1959, pp. 31–46. Also Louvancour, *op. cit.*, *passim.*

[17] For Cabet, see Lichtheim, Charlton, *op. cit.* For królikowski, see Jan Turowski, *Utopia społeczna Ludwika Królikowskiego*, Warsaw, 1958, as well as Trentowski, *Panteon Wiedzy Ludzkiej*, pp. 180–200.

[18] See E. Gilson, *Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu*, Paris, 1952.

[19] See M. Reeves, *The influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages*, London, 1969. For Joachim's influence on the philosophy of history as a whole see Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History*, Chicago, 1949, esp. pp. 145–159 and 208–213.

[20] Gotthold E. Lessing, *The Education of the Human Race* trans. by F. W. Robertson, London, 1927, p. 3.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[22] A work which puts Schelling in proper perspective is X. Tilliette, *Schelling*, II vols., Paris, 1970. For Hegel, see J. D'Hondt, *Hegel secret.* For the mystical undercurrent in German Idealism, see Benz, *op. cit.*

[23] *Oeuvres*, *op. cit.*, vol. III.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 117.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[27] Kühne, *op. cit.*, p. 261, again quoting Cieszkowski Junior, maintains that the 'Ways of the Spirit' were written before volume I and were originally intended as the introduction to the whole work. However, a note in the text itself indicates that Cieszkowski was working on the 'Ways of the Spirit' about 1863, *Ojcze Nasz*, vol. I, 2nd ed., p. XXIII.

[28] Walicki, 'Dwa mesjanizmy: Adam Mickiewica i August Cieszkowski', in *Filozofia a Mesjanizm*, p. 86.

[29] The phrase "a new explosion of Christianity" is among Cieszkowski's favourites. He repeats it several times throughout the *Our Father*, for the first time in volume I, p. 26. The expression might be attributable to de Maistre.

[30] Fourier, *Théorie des quatre mouvements.* Cieszkowski does not mention Fourier here but specifically refers to Fontenelle and to Kant's *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte des Himmels.*

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SOVIETICA

Publications and Monographs of the Institute of East-European Studies
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1. BOCHEŃSKI, J. M. and BLAKELEY, TH. J. (eds.): *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie.* I: *Die 'Voprosy filosofii' 1947–1956.* 1959, VIII + 75 pp.
2. BOCHEŃSKI, J. M. and BLAKELEY, TH. J. (eds.): *Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie.* II: *Bücher 1947–1956; Bücher und Aufsätze 1957–1958; Namenverzeichnis 1947–1958.* 1959, VIII + 109 pp.
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